commit 8678591b47 upstream.
Commit 3e86e4d74c ("kbuild: keep .modinfo section in
vmlinux.unstripped") added .modinfo to ELF_DETAILS while removing it
from COMMON_DISCARDS, as it was needed in vmlinux.unstripped and
ELF_DETAILS was present in all architecture specific vmlinux linker
scripts. While this shuffle is fine for vmlinux, ELF_DETAILS and
COMMON_DISCARDS may be used by other linker scripts, such as the s390
and x86 compressed boot images, which may not expect to have a .modinfo
section. In certain circumstances, this could result in a bootloader
failing to load the compressed kernel [1].
Commit ddc6cbef3e ("s390/boot/vmlinux.lds.S: Ensure bzImage ends with
SecureBoot trailer") recently addressed this for the s390 bzImage but
the same bug remains for arm, parisc, and x86. The presence of .modinfo
in the x86 bzImage was the root cause of the issue worked around with
commit d50f210913 ("kbuild: align modinfo section for Secureboot
Authenticode EDK2 compat"). misc.c in arch/x86/boot/compressed includes
lib/decompress_unzstd.c, which in turn includes lib/xxhash.c and its
MODULE_LICENSE / MODULE_DESCRIPTION macros due to the STATIC definition.
Split .modinfo out from ELF_DETAILS into its own macro and handle it in
all vmlinux linker scripts. Discard .modinfo in the places where it was
previously being discarded from being in COMMON_DISCARDS, as it has
never been necessary in those uses.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3e86e4d74c ("kbuild: keep .modinfo section in vmlinux.unstripped")
Reported-by: Ed W <lists@wildgooses.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/587f25e0-a80e-46a5-9f01-87cb40cfa377@wildgooses.com/ [1]
Tested-by: Ed W <lists@wildgooses.com> # x86_64
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260225-separate-modinfo-from-elf-details-v1-1-387ced6baf4b@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4ca191cec1 upstream.
As part of the work to remove the dependency on calling into the decompressor
code (startup_64()) for a UEFI boot, a call to rmpadjust() was removed from
sev_enable() in favor of checking the value of the snp_vmpl variable.
When booting through a non-UEFI path and calling startup_64(), the call to
sev_enable() is performed before the BSS section is zeroed. With the removal
of the rmpadjust() call and the corresponding check of the return code, the
snp_vmpl variable is checked.
Since the kernel is running at VMPL0, the snp_vmpl variable will not have been
set and should be the default value of 0. However, since the call occurs
before the BSS is zeroed, the snp_vmpl variable may not actually be zero,
which will cause the guest boot to fail.
Since the decompressor relocates itself, the BSS would need to be cleared both
before and after the relocation, but this would, in effect, cause all of the
changes to BSS variables before relocation to be lost after relocation.
Instead, move the snp_vmpl variable into the .data section so that it is
initialized and the value made safe during relocation. As a pre-caution
against future changes, move other SEV-related decompressor variables into the
.data section, too.
Fixes: 68a501d7fd ("x86/boot: Drop redundant RMPADJUST in SEV SVSM presence check")
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com>
Tested-by: Kevin Hui <kevinhui@meta.com>
Tested-by: Changyuan Lyu <changyuanl@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/5648b7de5b0a5d0dfef3785f9582b718678c6448.1770217260.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9073428bb2 upstream.
The SEV-SNP IBPB-on-Entry feature does not require a guest-side
implementation. It was added in Zen5 h/w, after the first SNP Zen
implementation, and thus was not accounted for when the initial set of SNP
features were added to the kernel.
In its abundant precaution, commit
8c29f01654 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
included SEV_STATUS' IBPB-on-Entry bit as a reserved bit, thereby masking
guests from using the feature.
Allow guests to make use of IBPB-on-Entry when supported by the hypervisor, as
the bit is now architecturally defined and safe to expose.
Fixes: 8c29f01654 ("x86/sev: Add SEV-SNP guest feature negotiation support")
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260203222405.4065706-2-kim.phillips@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3d1973a0c7 upstream.
CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE can be a relative path. When compiling using a different
output directory (O=) the build currently fails because it can't find the
filename set in CONFIG_EFI_SBAT_FILE:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S: Assembler messages:
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sbat.S:6: Error: file not found: kernel.sbat
Add $(srctree) as include dir for sbat.o.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
Fixes: 61b57d3539 ("x86/efi: Implement support for embedding SBAT data for x86")
Signed-off-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/f4eda155b0cef91d4d316b4e92f5771cb0aa7187.1772047658.git.jstancek@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6a8a48644c upstream.
IMC on SPR and EMR does not support sub-channels. In contrast, CPUs
that use gnr_uncores[] (e.g. Granite Rapids and Sierra Forest)
implement two command schedulers (SCH0/SCH1) per memory channel,
providing logically independent command and data paths.
Do not reuse the spr_uncore_imc[] configuration for these CPUs.
Instead, introduce a dedicated gnr_uncore_imc[] with per-scheduler
events, so userspace can monitor SCH0 and SCH1 independently.
On these CPUs, replace cas_count_{read,write} with
cas_count_{read,write}_sch{0,1}. This may break existing userspace
that relies on cas_count_{read,write}, prompting it to switch to the
per-scheduler events, as the legacy event reports only partial
traffic (SCH0).
Fixes: 632c4bf6d0 ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Support Granite Rapids")
Fixes: cb4a6ccf35 ("perf/x86/intel/uncore: Support Sierra Forest and Grand Ridge")
Reported-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Zide Chen <zide.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260210005225.20311-1-zide.chen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a4b0bf6a40 upstream.
efi_free_boot_services() frees memory occupied by EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_CODE
and EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA using memblock_free_late().
There are two issue with that: memblock_free_late() should be used for
memory allocated with memblock_alloc() while the memory reserved with
memblock_reserve() should be freed with free_reserved_area().
More acutely, with CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y
efi_free_boot_services() is called before deferred initialization of the
memory map is complete.
Benjamin Herrenschmidt reports that this causes a leak of ~140MB of
RAM on EC2 t3a.nano instances which only have 512MB or RAM.
If the freed memory resides in the areas that memory map for them is
still uninitialized, they won't be actually freed because
memblock_free_late() calls memblock_free_pages() and the latter skips
uninitialized pages.
Using free_reserved_area() at this point is also problematic because
__free_page() accesses the buddy of the freed page and that again might
end up in uninitialized part of the memory map.
Delaying the entire efi_free_boot_services() could be problematic
because in addition to freeing boot services memory it updates
efi.memmap without any synchronization and that's undesirable late in
boot when there is concurrency.
More robust approach is to only defer freeing of the EFI boot services
memory.
Split efi_free_boot_services() in two. First efi_unmap_boot_services()
collects ranges that should be freed into an array then
efi_free_boot_services() later frees them after deferred init is complete.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ec2aaef14783869b3be6e3c253b2dcbf67dbc12a.camel@kernel.crashing.org
Fixes: 916f676f8d ("x86, efi: Retain boot service code until after switching to virtual mode")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport (Microsoft) <rppt@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 0e6f596d6a ]
There are declarations of the variable "eentry", "pcpu_handlers[]" and
"exception_handlers[]" in asm/setup.h, the source files already include
this header file directly or indirectly, so no need to declare them in
the source files, just remove the code.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 055c7e7519 ]
After commit 4cd641a79e ("LoongArch: Remove unnecessary checks for ORC
unwinder"), the system can not boot normally under some configs (such as
enable KASAN), there are many error messages "cannot find unwind pc".
The kernel boots normally with the defconfig, so no problem found out at
the first time. Here is one way to reproduce:
cd linux
make mrproper defconfig -j"$(nproc)"
scripts/config -e KASAN
make olddefconfig all -j"$(nproc)"
sudo make modules_install
sudo make install
sudo reboot
The address that can not unwind is not a valid kernel address which is
between "pcpu_handlers[cpu]" and "pcpu_handlers[cpu] + vec_sz" due to
the code of eentry was copied to the new area of pcpu_handlers[cpu] in
setup_tlb_handler(), handle this special case to get the valid address
to unwind normally.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4cd641a79e ]
According to the following function definitions, __kernel_text_address()
already checks __module_text_address(), so it should remove the check of
__module_text_address() in bt_address() at least.
int __kernel_text_address(unsigned long addr)
{
if (kernel_text_address(addr))
return 1;
...
return 0;
}
int kernel_text_address(unsigned long addr)
{
bool no_rcu;
int ret = 1;
...
if (is_module_text_address(addr))
goto out;
...
return ret;
}
bool is_module_text_address(unsigned long addr)
{
guard(rcu)();
return __module_text_address(addr) != NULL;
}
Furthermore, there are two checks of __kernel_text_address(), one is in
bt_address() and the other is after calling bt_address(), it looks like
redundant.
Handle the exception address first and then use __kernel_text_address()
to validate the calculated address for exception or the normal address
in bt_address(), then it can remove the check of __kernel_text_address()
after calling bt_address().
Just remove unnecessary checks, no functional changes intended.
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Stable-dep-of: 055c7e7519 ("LoongArch: Handle percpu handler address for ORC unwinder")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6517dfbcc9 ]
Add two flags for KVM_CAP_X2APIC_API to allow userspace to control support
for Suppress EOI Broadcasts when using a split IRQCHIP (I/O APIC emulated
by userspace), which KVM completely mishandles. When x2APIC support was
first added, KVM incorrectly advertised and "enabled" Suppress EOI
Broadcast, without fully supporting the I/O APIC side of the equation,
i.e. without adding directed EOI to KVM's in-kernel I/O APIC.
That flaw was carried over to split IRQCHIP support, i.e. KVM advertised
support for Suppress EOI Broadcasts irrespective of whether or not the
userspace I/O APIC implementation supported directed EOIs. Even worse,
KVM didn't actually suppress EOI broadcasts, i.e. userspace VMMs without
support for directed EOI came to rely on the "spurious" broadcasts.
KVM "fixed" the in-kernel I/O APIC implementation by completely disabling
support for Suppress EOI Broadcasts in commit 0bcc3fb95b ("KVM: lapic:
stop advertising DIRECTED_EOI when in-kernel IOAPIC is in use"), but
didn't do anything to remedy userspace I/O APIC implementations.
KVM's bogus handling of Suppress EOI Broadcast is problematic when the
guest relies on interrupts being masked in the I/O APIC until well after
the initial local APIC EOI. E.g. Windows with Credential Guard enabled
handles interrupts in the following order:
1. Interrupt for L2 arrives.
2. L1 APIC EOIs the interrupt.
3. L1 resumes L2 and injects the interrupt.
4. L2 EOIs after servicing.
5. L1 performs the I/O APIC EOI.
Because KVM EOIs the I/O APIC at step #2, the guest can get an interrupt
storm, e.g. if the IRQ line is still asserted and userspace reacts to the
EOI by re-injecting the IRQ, because the guest doesn't de-assert the line
until step #4, and doesn't expect the interrupt to be re-enabled until
step #5.
Unfortunately, simply "fixing" the bug isn't an option, as KVM has no way
of knowing if the userspace I/O APIC supports directed EOIs, i.e.
suppressing EOI broadcasts would result in interrupts being stuck masked
in the userspace I/O APIC due to step #5 being ignored by userspace. And
fully disabling support for Suppress EOI Broadcast is also undesirable, as
picking up the fix would require a guest reboot, *and* more importantly
would change the virtual CPU model exposed to the guest without any buy-in
from userspace.
Add KVM_X2APIC_ENABLE_SUPPRESS_EOI_BROADCAST and
KVM_X2APIC_DISABLE_SUPPRESS_EOI_BROADCAST flags to allow userspace to
explicitly enable or disable support for Suppress EOI Broadcasts. This
gives userspace control over the virtual CPU model exposed to the guest,
as KVM should never have enabled support for Suppress EOI Broadcast without
userspace opt-in. Not setting either flag will result in legacy quirky
behavior for backward compatibility.
Disallow fully enabling SUPPRESS_EOI_BROADCAST when using an in-kernel
I/O APIC, as KVM's history/support is just as tragic. E.g. it's not clear
that commit c806a6ad35 ("KVM: x86: call irq notifiers with directed EOI")
was entirely correct, i.e. it may have simply papered over the lack of
Directed EOI emulation in the I/O APIC.
Note, Suppress EOI Broadcasts is defined only in Intel's SDM, not in AMD's
APM. But the bit is writable on some AMD CPUs, e.g. Turin, and KVM's ABI
is to support Directed EOI (KVM's name) irrespective of guest CPU vendor.
Fixes: 7543a635aa ("KVM: x86: Add KVM exit for IOAPIC EOIs")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/7D497EF1-607D-4D37-98E7-DAF95F099342@nutanix.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Khushit Shah <khushit.shah@nutanix.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260123125657.3384063-1-khushit.shah@nutanix.com
[sean: clean up minor formatting goofs and fix a comment typo]
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit faa6baa364 ]
Replace verbatim license text with a `SPDX-License-Identifier`.
The comment header mis-attributes this license to be "X11", but the
license text does not include the last line "Except as contained in this
notice, the name of the X Consortium shall not be used in advertising or
otherwise to promote the sale, use or other dealings in this Software
without prior written authorization from the X Consortium.". Therefore,
this license is actually equivalent to the SPDX "MIT" license (confirmed
by text diffing).
Cc: Andrej Rosano <andrej@inversepath.com>
Signed-off-by: Bence Csókás <csokas.bence@prolan.hu>
Acked-by: Andrej Rosano <andrej.rosano@reversec.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 43d67ec26b ("PCI: dwc: ep: Fix resizable BAR support for multi-PF configurations")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 46c56b7371 ]
The pcie bus address should be mapped 1:1 to the cpu side MMIO address, so
that there is no same address allocated from normal system memory. Otherwise
it's broken if the same address assigned to the EP for DMA purpose.Fix it to
sync with the vendor BSP.
Fixes: 0acf4fa7f1 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add PCIe3 support for rk3588")
Fixes: 8d81b77f4c ("arm64: dts: rockchip: add rk3588 PCIe2 support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Lin <shawn.lin@rock-chips.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1767600929-195341-2-git-send-email-shawn.lin@rock-chips.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f63ea193a4 ]
The pcie bus address should be mapped 1:1 to the cpu side MMIO address, so
that there is no same address allocated from normal system memory. Otherwise
it's broken if the same address assigned to the EP for DMA purpose.Fix it to
sync with the vendor BSP.
Fixes: 568a67e742 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: Fix rk356x PCIe register and range mappings")
Fixes: 66b51ea7d7 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: Add rk3568 PCIe2x1 controller")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Powers-Holmes <aholmes@omnom.net>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Lin <shawn.lin@rock-chips.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1767600929-195341-1-git-send-email-shawn.lin@rock-chips.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d55c571e43 ]
This script
#!/usr/bin/bash
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
echo 'void main(void) {}' > TEST.c
# -fcf-protection to ensure that the 1st endbr32 insn can't be emulated
gcc -m32 -fcf-protection=branch TEST.c -o test
bpftrace -e 'uprobe:./test:main {}' -c ./test
"hangs", the probed ./test task enters an endless loop.
The problem is that with randomize_va_space == 0
get_unmapped_area(TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE) called by xol_add_vma() can not
just return the "addr == TASK_SIZE - PAGE_SIZE" hint, this addr is used
by the stack vma.
arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown() doesn't take TIF_ADDR32 into account and
in_32bit_syscall() is false, this leads to info.high_limit > TASK_SIZE.
vm_unmapped_area() happily returns the high address > TASK_SIZE and then
get_unmapped_area() returns -ENOMEM after the "if (addr > TASK_SIZE - len)"
check.
handle_swbp() doesn't report this failure (probably it should) and silently
restarts the probed insn. Endless loop.
I think that the right fix should change the x86 get_unmapped_area() paths
to rely on TIF_ADDR32 rather than in_32bit_syscall(). Note also that if
CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI=y, in_x32_syscall() falsely returns true in this case
because ->orig_ax = -1.
But we need a simple fix for -stable, so this patch just sets TS_COMPAT if
the probed task is 32-bit to make in_ia32_syscall() true.
Fixes: 1b028f784e ("x86/mm: Introduce mmap_compat_base() for 32-bit mmap()")
Reported-by: Paulo Andrade <pandrade@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aV5uldEvV7pb4RA8@redhat.com/
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/aWO7Fdxn39piQnxu@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ae25884ad7 ]
When userspace is interrupted at the start of a function, before we
get a chance to complete the frame, unwind will miss one caller.
X86 has a uprobe specific fixup for this, add bits to the generic
unwinder to support this.
Suggested-by: Jens Remus <jremus@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251024145156.GM4068168@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Stable-dep-of: d55c571e43 ("x86/uprobes: Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 49cf34c081 ]
Use ARCH_INIT_USER_FP_FRAME to describe how frame pointers are unwound
on x86, and enable CONFIG_HAVE_UNWIND_USER_FP accordingly so the
unwind_user interfaces can be used.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250827193828.347397433@kernel.org
Stable-dep-of: d55c571e43 ("x86/uprobes: Fix XOL allocation failure for 32-bit tasks")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ead63640d4 ]
Ignore -EBUSY when checking nested events after exiting a blocking state
while L2 is active, as exiting to userspace will generate a spurious
userspace exit, usually with KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN, and likely lead to the VM's
demise. Continuing with the wakeup isn't perfect either, as *something*
has gone sideways if a vCPU is awakened in L2 with an injected event (or
worse, a nested run pending), but continuing on gives the VM a decent
chance of surviving without any major side effects.
As explained in the Fixes commits, it _should_ be impossible for a vCPU to
be put into a blocking state with an already-injected event (exception,
IRQ, or NMI). Unfortunately, userspace can stuff MP_STATE and/or injected
events, and thus put the vCPU into what should be an impossible state.
Don't bother trying to preserve the WARN, e.g. with an anti-syzkaller
Kconfig, as WARNs can (hopefully) be added in paths where _KVM_ would be
violating x86 architecture, e.g. by WARNing if KVM attempts to inject an
exception or interrupt while the vCPU isn't running.
Cc: Alessandro Ratti <alessandro@0x65c.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 26844fee6a ("KVM: x86: never write to memory from kvm_vcpu_check_block()")
Fixes: 45405155d8 ("KVM: x86: WARN if a vCPU gets a valid wakeup that KVM can't yet inject")
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/text?tag=ReproC&x=10d4261a580000
Reported-by: syzbot+1522459a74d26b0ac33a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/671bc7a7.050a0220.455e8.022a.GAE@google.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260109030657.994759-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit adbf61cc47 ]
ACPI v6.3 defined a new "Online Capable" MADT LAPIC flag. This bit is
used in conjunction with the "Enabled" MADT LAPIC flag to determine if
a CPU can be enabled/hotplugged by the OS after boot.
Before the new bit was defined, the "Enabled" bit was explicitly
described like this (ACPI v6.0 wording provided):
"If zero, this processor is unusable, and the operating system
support will not attempt to use it"
This means that CPU hotplug (based on MADT) is not possible. Many BIOS
implementations follow this guidance. They may include LAPIC entries in
MADT for unavailable CPUs, but since these entries are marked with
"Enabled=0" it is expected that the OS will completely ignore these
entries.
However, QEMU will do the same (include entries with "Enabled=0") for
the purpose of allowing CPU hotplug within the guest.
Comment from QEMU function pc_madt_cpu_entry():
/* ACPI spec says that LAPIC entry for non present
* CPU may be omitted from MADT or it must be marked
* as disabled. However omitting non present CPU from
* MADT breaks hotplug on linux. So possible CPUs
* should be put in MADT but kept disabled.
*/
Recent Linux topology changes broke the QEMU use case. A following fix
for the QEMU use case broke bare metal topology enumeration.
Rework the Linux MADT LAPIC flags check to allow the QEMU use case only
for guests and to maintain the ACPI spec behavior for bare metal.
Remove an unnecessary check added to fix a bare metal case introduced by
the QEMU "fix".
[ bp: Change logic as Michal suggested. ]
[ mingo: Removed misapplied -stable tag. ]
Fixes: fed8d8773b ("x86/acpi/boot: Correct acpi_is_processor_usable() check")
Fixes: f0551af021 ("x86/topology: Ignore non-present APIC IDs in a present package")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251024204658.3da9bf3f.michal.pecio@gmail.com
Reported-by: Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yazen Ghannam <yazen.ghannam@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Michal Pecio <michal.pecio@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20251111145357.4031846-1-yazen.ghannam@amd.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ef06fd16d4 ]
struct bpf_plt contains a u64 target field. Currently, the BPF JIT
allocator requests an alignment of 4 bytes (sizeof(u32)) for the JIT
buffer.
Because the base address of the JIT buffer can be 4-byte aligned (e.g.,
ending in 0x4 or 0xc), the relative padding logic in build_plt() fails
to ensure that target lands on an 8-byte boundary.
This leads to two issues:
1. UBSAN reports misaligned-access warnings when dereferencing the
structure.
2. More critically, target is updated concurrently via WRITE_ONCE() in
bpf_arch_text_poke() while the JIT'd code executes ldr. On arm64,
64-bit loads/stores are only guaranteed to be single-copy atomic if
they are 64-bit aligned. A misaligned target risks a torn read,
causing the JIT to jump to a corrupted address.
Fix this by increasing the allocation alignment requirement to 8 bytes
(sizeof(u64)) in bpf_jit_binary_pack_alloc(). This anchors the base of
the JIT buffer to an 8-byte boundary, allowing the relative padding math
in build_plt() to correctly align the target field.
Fixes: b2ad54e153 ("bpf, arm64: Implement bpf_arch_text_poke() for arm64")
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260226075525.233321-1-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8f09803713 ]
The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap()
implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a 'pgprot_t' value
determined from the user mapping of the target 'pfn' being accessed by
the kernel. On arm64, the 'pgprot_t' contains all of the non-address
bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up
returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when
accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:
| Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000
| ...
| Call trace:
| __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8
| generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8
| __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8
| access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30
| environ_read+0x238/0x3e8
| vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0
| ksys_read+0xcc/0x178
| __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68
Extract only the memory type from the user 'pgprot_t' in ioremap_prot()
and assert that we're being passed a user mapping, to protect us against
any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid
falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro
which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().
Cc: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
Cc: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Fixes: 893dea9ccd ("arm64: Add HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT support")
Reported-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f6bf47ab32 ]
Rename our ioremap_prot() implementation to __ioremap_prot() and convert
all arch-internal callers over to the new function.
ioremap_prot() remains as a #define to __ioremap_prot() for
generic_access_phys() and will be subsequently extended to handle user
permissions in 'prot'.
Cc: Zeng Heng <zengheng4@huawei.com>
Cc: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 8f09803713 ("arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dbc0fb3567 ]
Since delayed accounting of system time [1] the virtual timer is
forwarded by do_account_vtime() but also vtime_account_kernel(),
vtime_account_softirq(), and vtime_account_hardirq(). This leads
to double accounting of system, guest, softirq, and hardirq time.
Remove accounting from the vtime_account*() family to restore old behavior.
There is only one user of the vtimer interface, which might explain
why nobody noticed this so far.
Fixes: b7394a5f4c ("sched/cputime, s390: Implement delayed accounting of system time") [1]
Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0d785e2c32 ]
With the conversion to generic entry [1] cpu idle exit cpu time accounting
was converted from assembly to C. This introduced an reversed order of cpu
time accounting.
On cpu idle exit the current accounting happens with the following call
chain:
-> do_io_irq()/do_ext_irq()
-> irq_enter_rcu()
-> account_hardirq_enter()
-> vtime_account_irq()
-> vtime_account_kernel()
vtime_account_kernel() accounts the passed cpu time since last_update_timer
as system time, and updates last_update_timer to the current cpu timer
value.
However the subsequent call of
-> account_idle_time_irq()
will incorrectly subtract passed cpu time from timer_idle_enter to the
updated last_update_timer value from system_timer. Then last_update_timer
is updated to a sys_enter_timer, which means that last_update_timer goes
back in time.
Subsequently account_hardirq_exit() will account too much cpu time as
hardirq time. The sum of all accounted cpu times is still correct, however
some cpu time which was previously accounted as system time is now
accounted as hardirq time, plus there is the oddity that last_update_timer
goes back in time.
Restore previous behavior by extracting cpu time accounting code from
account_idle_time_irq() into a new update_timer_idle() function and call it
before irq_enter_rcu().
Fixes: 56e62a7370 ("s390: convert to generic entry") [1]
Reviewed-by: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 24c8147abb ]
Rustam reported his clang builds did not boot properly; turns out his
.config has: CONFIG_DEBUG_FORCE_FUNCTION_ALIGN_64B=y set.
Fix up the FineIBT code to deal with this unusual alignment.
Fixes: 931ab63664 ("x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT")
Reported-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit aa280a08e7 ]
array_index_nospec() is no use if the result gets spilled to the stack, as
it makes the believed safe-under-speculation value subject to memory
predictions.
For all practical purposes, this means array_index_nospec() must be used in
the expression that accesses the array.
As the code currently stands, it's the wrong side of irqentry_enter(), and
'index' is put into %ebp across the function call.
Remove the index variable and reposition array_index_nospec(), so it's
calculated immediately before the array access.
Fixes: 14619d912b ("x86/fred: FRED entry/exit and dispatch code")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260106131504.679932-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7e7c2cf002 ]
In protected mode, the hypervisor maintains a separate instance of
the `kvm` structure for each VM. For non-protected VMs, this structure is
initialized from the host's `kvm` state.
Currently, `pkvm_init_features_from_host()` copies the
`KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED` flag from the host without the
underlying `id_regs` data being initialized. This results in the
hypervisor seeing the flag as set while the ID registers remain zeroed.
Consequently, `kvm_has_feat()` checks at EL2 fail (return 0) for
non-protected VMs. This breaks logic that relies on feature detection,
such as `ctxt_has_tcrx()` for TCR2_EL1 support. As a result, certain
system registers (e.g., TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1, POR_EL1) are not
saved/restored during the world switch, which could lead to state
corruption.
Fix this by explicitly copying the ID registers from the host `kvm` to
the hypervisor `kvm` for non-protected VMs during initialization, since
we trust the host with its non-protected guests' features. Also ensure
`KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED` is cleared initially in
`pkvm_init_features_from_host` so that `vm_copy_id_regs` can properly
initialize them and set the flag once done.
Fixes: 41d6028e28 ("KVM: arm64: Convert the SVE guest vcpu flag to a vm flag")
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260213143815.1732675-4-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f66857bafd ]
When CONFIG_ARM64_POE is disabled, KVM does not save/restore POR_EL1.
However, ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1 sanitisation currently exposes the feature to
guests whenever the hardware supports it, ignoring the host kernel
configuration.
If a guest detects this feature and attempts to use it, the host will
fail to context-switch POR_EL1, potentially leading to state corruption.
Fix this by masking ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1.S1POE in the sanitised system
registers, preventing KVM from advertising the feature when the host
does not support it (i.e. system_supports_poe() is false).
Fixes: 70ed723829 ("KVM: arm64: Sanitise ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1")
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260213143815.1732675-2-tabba@google.com
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e5cb94ba5f ]
Ben reports that when running with CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT, using
__arch_counter_get_cntvct_stable() results in well deserves warnings,
as we access a per-CPU variable without preemption disabled.
Fix the issue by disabling preemption on reading the counter. We can
probably do a lot better by not disabling preemption on systems that
do not require horrible workarounds to return a valid counter value,
but this plugs the issue for the time being.
Fixes: 29cc0f3aa7 ("arm64: Force the use of CNTVCT_EL0 in __delay()")
Reported-by: Ben Horgan <ben.horgan@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aZw3EGs4rbQvbAzV@e134344.arm.com
Tested-by: Ben Horgan <ben.horgan@arm.com>
Tested-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 29cc0f3aa7 ]
Quentin forwards a report from Hyesoo Yu, describing an interesting
problem with the use of WFxT in __delay() when a vcpu is loaded and
that KVM is *not* in VHE mode (either nVHE or hVHE).
In this case, CNTVOFF_EL2 is set to a non-zero value to reflect the
state of the guest virtual counter. At the same time, __delay() is
using get_cycles() to read the counter value, which is indirected to
reading CNTPCT_EL0.
The core of the issue is that WFxT is using the *virtual* counter,
while the kernel is using the physical counter, and that the offset
introduces a really bad discrepancy between the two.
Fix this by forcing the use of CNTVCT_EL0, making __delay() consistent
irrespective of the value of CNTVOFF_EL2.
Reported-by: Hyesoo Yu <hyesoo.yu@samsung.com>
Reported-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>
Fixes: 7d26b0516a ("arm64: Use WFxT for __delay() when possible")
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ktosachvft2cgqd5qkukn275ugmhy6xrhxur4zqpdxlfr3qh5h@o3zrfnsq63od
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e00ac9e5af ]
Dave reports that kexec may fail when the first kernel boots via the EFI
stub but without EFI runtime services, as in that case, the RSDP address
field in struct bootparams is never assigned. Kexec copies this value
into the version of struct bootparams that it provides to the incoming
kernel, which may have no other means to locate the ACPI root pointer.
So take the value from the EFI config tables if no root pointer has been
set in the first kernel's struct bootparams.
Fixes: a1b87d54f4 ("x86/efistub: Avoid legacy decompressor when doing EFI boot")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.1
Reported-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-efi/aZQg_tRQmdKNadCg@darkstar.users.ipa.redhat.com/
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7cb37af61f ]
According to Documentation/dev-tools/kasan.rst, software KASAN modes use
compiler instrumentation to insert validity checks. Such instrumentation
might be incompatible with some parts of the kernel, and therefore needs
to be disabled, just use the attribute __no_sanitize_address to disable
instrumentation for the low level function setup_ptwalker().
Otherwise bringing up the secondary CPUs failed when CONFIG_KASAN is set
(especially when PTW is enabled), here are the call chains:
smpboot_entry()
start_secondary()
cpu_probe()
per_cpu_trap_init()
tlb_init()
setup_tlb_handler()
setup_ptwalker()
The reason is the PGD registers are configured in setup_ptwalker(), but
KASAN instrumentation may cause TLB exceptions before that.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 77403a06d8 ]
Currently, use %p to prevent leaking information about the kernel memory
layout when printing the PC address, but the kernel log messages are not
useful to debug problem if bt_address() returns 0. Given that the type of
"pc" variable is unsigned long, it should use %px to print the unmodified
unwinding address.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2172d6ebac ]
Currently we use bottom-up allocation after sparse_init(), the reason is
sparse_init() need a lot of memory, and bottom-up allocation may exhaust
precious low memory (below 4GB). On the other hand, SWIOTLB and CMA need
low memories for DMA32, so swiotlb_init() and dma_contiguous_reserve()
need bottom-up allocation.
Since swiotlb_init() and dma_contiguous_reserve() are both called in
arch_mem_init(), we no longer need bottom-up allocation after that. So
we set the allocation policy to top-down at the end of arch_mem_init(),
in order to avoid later memory allocations (such as KASAN) exhaust low
memory.
This solve at least two problems:
1. Some buggy BIOSes use 0xfd000000~0xfe000000 for secondary CPUs, but
didn't reserve this range, which causes smpboot failures.
2. Some DMA32 devices, such as Loongson-DRM and OHCI, cannot work with
KASAN enabled.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 94b0c831ed ]
The arch definition of cpumask_of_node() cannot handle NUMA_NO_NODE -
which is a valid index - so add a check for this.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit e93bb4b76c ]
Since commit 6e690d54cf ("serial: 8250: fix return error code in
serial8250_request_std_resource()"), registering an 8250 MMIO port
without mapbase no longer works, as the resource range is derived from
mapbase/mapsize.
Populate mapbase and mapsize accordingly. Also drop ugly membase KSEG1
pointer and set UPF_IOREMAP instead, letting the 8250 core perform the
ioremap.
Fixes: 6e690d54cf ("serial: 8250: fix return error code in serial8250_request_std_resource()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Waldemar Brodkorb <wbx@openadk.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mips/aX-d0ShTplHKZT33@waldemar-brodkorb.de/
Signed-off-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dcf69599c4 ]
If device_register() fails, put_device() is the correct way to
drop the device reference.
Found by code review.
Fixes: 1070c9655b ("[PA-RISC] Fix must_check warnings in drivers.c")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 32ec465103 ]
Loongson2ef reserves io range below 0x4000 (LOONGSON_PCI_IO_START) while
ISA-mode only IDE controller on the south bridge still has a hard
dependency on ISA IO ports.
The reservation was done by lifting loongson_pci_io_resource.start onto
0x4000. Prior to commit ae81aad5c2 ("MIPS: PCI: Use
pci_enable_resources()"), the arch specific pcibios_enable_resources()
did not check if the resources were claimed, which diverges from what
PCI core checks, effectively hiding the fact that IDE IO resources were
not properly within the resource tree. After starting to use
pcibios_enable_resources() from PCI core, enabling IDE controller fails:
pata_cs5536 0000:00:0e.2: BAR 0 [io 0x01f0-0x01f7]: not claimed; can't enable device
pata_cs5536 0000:00:0e.2: probe with driver pata_cs5536 failed with error -22
MIPS PCI code already has support for enforcing lower bounds using
PCIBIOS_MIN_IO in pcibios_align_resource() without altering the IO
window start address itself. Make Loongson2ef PCI code use
PCIBIOS_MIN_IO too.
Fixes: ae81aad5c2 ("MIPS: PCI: Use pci_enable_resources()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Beiyan Yun <root@infi.wang>
Tested-by: Yao Zi <me@ziyao.cc>
Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <rongrong@oss.cipunited.com>
Acked-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6a00c043af ]
We are about to set loongson_pci_io_resource.start to 0 and adopt
PCIBIOS_MIN_IO. As the first step, PCI controller needs to be registered
in early stage to make it the root of other resources (e.g., i8259) and
prevent resource conflicts.
Register it in plat_mem_setup() instead of arch_initcall().
Fixes: ae81aad5c2 ("MIPS: PCI: Use pci_enable_resources()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: Beiyan Yun <root@infi.wang>
Tested-by: Yao Zi <me@ziyao.cc>
Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <rongrong@oss.cipunited.com>
Acked-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit bb0c99e08a ]
The implementation of __READ_ONCE() under CONFIG_LTO=y incorrectly
qualified the fallback "once" access for types larger than 8 bytes,
which are not atomic but should still happen "once" and suppress common
compiler optimizations.
The cast `volatile typeof(__x)` applied the volatile qualifier to the
pointer type itself rather than the pointee. This created a volatile
pointer to a non-volatile type, which violated __READ_ONCE() semantics.
Fix this by casting to `volatile typeof(*__x) *`.
With a defconfig + LTO + debug options build, we see the following
functions to be affected:
xen_manage_runstate_time (884 -> 944 bytes)
xen_steal_clock (248 -> 340 bytes)
^-- use __READ_ONCE() to load vcpu_runstate_info structs
Fixes: e35123d83e ("arm64: lto: Strengthen READ_ONCE() to acquire when CONFIG_LTO=y")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Boqun Feng <boqun@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Tested-by: David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 33c1c6d8a2 ]
As kcalloc() may fail, check its return value to avoid a NULL pointer
dereference when passing it to of_property_read_u32_array().
Fixes: 790a1662d3 ("powerpc/smp: Parse ibm,thread-groups with multiple properties")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li <lgs201920130244@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250923133235.1862108-1-lgs201920130244@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 1f3b950492 ]
If a process wrote to POR_EL0 and then crashed before a context switch
happened, the coredump would contain an incorrect value for POR_EL0.
The value read in poe_get() would be a stale value left in thread.por_el0. Fix
this by reading the value from the system register, if the target thread is the
current thread.
This matches what gcs/fpsimd do.
Fixes: 1751981992 ("arm64/ptrace: add support for FEAT_POE")
Reported-by: David Spickett <david.spickett@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>
Cc: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c5489d0433 ]
When the second-stage kernel is booted via kexec with a limiting command
line such as "mem=<size>", the physical range that contains the carried
over IMA measurement list may fall outside the truncated RAM leading to a
kernel panic.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff97793ff47000
RIP: ima_restore_measurement_list+0xdc/0x45a
#PF: error_code(0x0000) – not-present page
Other architectures already validate the range with page_is_ram(), as done
in commit cbf9c4b961 ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer
against memory bounds") do a similar check on x86.
Without carrying the measurement list across kexec, the attestation
would fail.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251231061609.907170-4-harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Harshit Mogalapalli <harshit.m.mogalapalli@oracle.com>
Fixes: b69a2afd5a ("x86/kexec: Carry forward IMA measurement log on kexec")
Reported-by: Paul Webb <paul.x.webb@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Betkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: guoweikang <guoweikang.kernel@gmail.com>
Cc: Henry Willard <henry.willard@oracle.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Cc: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@fb.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: Sourabh Jain <sourabhjain@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleinxer <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yifei Liu <yifei.l.liu@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 79a3286e61 ]
Rockchip RK3576 UFS controller uses a dedicated pin to reset the connected
UFS device, which can operate either in a hardware controlled mode or as a
GPIO pin.
Power-on default is GPIO mode, but the boot ROM reconfigures it to a
hardware controlled mode if it uses UFS to load the next boot stage.
Given that existing bindings (and rk3576.dtsi) expect a GPIO-controlled
device reset, request the required pin config explicitly.
The pin is requested with pull-down enabled, which is in line with the
SoC power-on default and helps ensure that the attached UFS chip stays
in reset until the driver takes over the control of the respective
GPIO line.
This doesn't appear to affect Linux, but it does affect U-boot:
Before:
=> md.l 0x2604b398
2604b398: 00000011 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
< ... snip ... >
=> ufs init
ufshcd-rockchip ufshc@2a2d0000: [RX, TX]: gear=[3, 3], lane[2, 2], pwr[FASTAUTO_MODE, FASTAUTO_MODE], rate = 2
=> md.l 0x2604b398
2604b398: 00000011 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
After:
=> md.l 0x2604b398
2604b398: 00000011 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
< ... snip ...>
=> ufs init
ufshcd-rockchip ufshc@2a2d0000: [RX, TX]: gear=[3, 3], lane[2, 2], pwr[FASTAUTO_MODE, FASTAUTO_MODE], rate = 2
=> md.l 0x2604b398
2604b398: 00000010 00000000 00000000 00000000 ................
(0x2604b398 is the respective pin mux register, with its BIT0 driving the
mode of UFS_RST: unset = GPIO, set = hardware controlled UFS_RST)
This helps ensure that GPIO-driven device reset actually fires when the
system requests it, not when whatever black box magic inside the UFSHC
decides to reset the flash chip.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c75e5e010f ("scsi: arm64: dts: rockchip: Add UFS support for RK3576 SoC")
Reported-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Charkov <alchark@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121-ufs-rst-v3-1-35839bcb4ca7@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 2eb80a2eee ]
We had extended the sysreg masking infrastructure to more general
registers, instead of restricting it to VNCR-backed registers, since
commit a016202009 ("KVM: arm64: Extend masking facility to arbitrary
registers"). Fix kvm_get_sysreg_res0() to reflect this fact.
Note that we're sure that we only deal with FGT registers in
kvm_get_sysreg_res0(), the
if (sr < __VNCR_START__)
is actually a never false, which should probably be removed later.
Fixes: 69c19e047d ("KVM: arm64: Add TCR2_EL2 to the sysreg arrays")
Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu (Huawei) <zenghui.yu@linux.dev>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260121101631.41037-1-zenghui.yu@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 84d875e698 ]
On s390 PCI busses and slots with multiple functions may have holes
because PCI functions are passed-through by the hypervisor on a per
function basis and some functions may be in standby or reserved. This
fact is indicated by returning true from the
hypervisor_isolated_pci_functions() helper and triggers common code to
scan all possible devfn values. Via pci_scan_single_device() this in
turn causes config reads for the device and vendor IDs, even for PCI
functions which are in standby and thereofore disabled.
So far these futile config reads, as well as potentially writes, which
can never succeed were handled by the PCI load/store instructions
themselves. This works as the platform just returns an error for
a disabled and thus not usable function handle. It does cause spamming
of error logs and additional overhead though.
Instead check if the used function handle is enabled in zpci_cfg_load()
and zpci_cfg_write() and if not enable directly return -ENODEV. Also
refactor zpci_cfg_load() and zpci_cfg_store() slightly to accommodate
the new logic while meeting modern kernel style guidelines.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: a50297cf82 ("s390/pci: separate zbus creation from scanning")
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <alifm@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
