commit 3af870aedb upstream.
Commit f2060bdc21 ("nfs/localio: add refcounting for each iocb IO
associated with NFS pgio header") inadvertantly reintroduced the same
potential for __put_cred() triggering BUG_ON(cred == current->cred) that
commit 992203a1fb ("nfs/localio: restore creds before releasing pageio
data") fixed.
Fix this by saving and restoring the cred around each {read,write}_iter
call within the respective for loop of nfs_local_call_{read,write} using
scoped_with_creds().
NOTE: this fix started by first reverting the following commits:
94afb627df ("nfs: use credential guards in nfs_local_call_read()")
bff3c841f7 ("nfs: use credential guards in nfs_local_call_write()")
1d18101a64 ("Merge tag 'kernel-6.19-rc1.cred' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs")
followed by narrowly fixing the cred lifetime issue by using
scoped_with_creds(). In doing so, this commit's changes appear more
extensive than they really are (as evidenced by comparing to v6.18's
fs/nfs/localio.c).
Reported-by: Zorro Lang <zlang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-next/20251205111942.4150b06f@canb.auug.org.au/
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4012d78562 upstream.
erofs readahead could fail with ENOMEM under the memory pressure because
it tries to alloc_page with GFP_NOWAIT | GFP_NORETRY, while GFP_KERNEL
for a regular read. And if readahead fails (with non-uptodate folios),
the original request will then fall back to synchronous read, and
`.read_folio()` should return appropriate errnos.
However, in scenarios where readahead and read operations compete,
read operation could return an unintended EIO because of an incorrect
error propagation.
To resolve this, this patch modifies the behavior so that, when the
PCL is for read(which means pcl.besteffort is true), it attempts actual
decompression instead of propagating the privios error except initial EIO.
- Page size: 4K
- The original size of FileA: 16K
- Compress-ratio per PCL: 50% (Uncompressed 8K -> Compressed 4K)
[page0, page1] [page2, page3]
[PCL0]---------[PCL1]
- functions declaration:
. pread(fd, buf, count, offset)
. readahead(fd, offset, count)
- Thread A tries to read the last 4K
- Thread B tries to do readahead 8K from 4K
- RA, besteffort == false
- R, besteffort == true
<process A> <process B>
pread(FileA, buf, 4K, 12K)
do readahead(page3) // failed with ENOMEM
wait_lock(page3)
if (!uptodate(page3))
goto do_read
readahead(FileA, 4K, 8K)
// Here create PCL-chain like below:
// [null, page1] [page2, null]
// [PCL0:RA]-----[PCL1:RA]
...
do read(page3) // found [PCL1:RA] and add page3 into it,
// and then, change PCL1 from RA to R
...
// Now, PCL-chain is as below:
// [null, page1] [page2, page3]
// [PCL0:RA]-----[PCL1:R]
// try to decompress PCL-chain...
z_erofs_decompress_queue
err = 0;
// failed with ENOMEM, so page 1
// only for RA will not be uptodated.
// it's okay.
err = decompress([PCL0:RA], err)
// However, ENOMEM propagated to next
// PCL, even though PCL is not only
// for RA but also for R. As a result,
// it just failed with ENOMEM without
// trying any decompression, so page2
// and page3 will not be uptodated.
** BUG HERE ** --> err = decompress([PCL1:R], err)
return err as ENOMEM
...
wait_lock(page3)
if (!uptodate(page3))
return EIO <-- Return an unexpected EIO!
...
Fixes: 2349d2fa02 ("erofs: sunset unneeded NOFAILs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jaewook Kim <jw5454.kim@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Sungjong Seo <sj1557.seo@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Junbeom Yeom <junbeom.yeom@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1f941b2c23 upstream.
In error path, call drop_client() to drop the reference
obtained by get_nfsdfs_clp().
Fixes: 78599c42ae ("nfsd4: add file to display list of client's opens")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8f9e967830 upstream.
When finalizing timestamps that have never been updated and preparing to
release the delegation lease, the notify_change() call can trigger a
delegation break, and fail to update the timestamps. When this happens,
there will be messages like this in dmesg:
[ 2709.375785] Unable to update timestamps on inode 00:39:263: -11
Since this code is going to release the lease just after updating the
timestamps, breaking the delegation is undesirable. Fix this by setting
ATTR_DELEG in ia_valid, in order to avoid the delegation break.
Fixes: e5e9b24ab8 ("nfsd: freeze c/mtime updates with outstanding WRITE_ATTRS delegation")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8072e34e13 upstream.
nfsd4_add_rdaccess_to_wrdeleg() unconditionally overwrites
fp->fi_fds[O_RDONLY] with a newly acquired nfsd_file. However, if
the client already has a SHARE_ACCESS_READ open from a previous OPEN
operation, this action overwrites the existing pointer without
releasing its reference, orphaning the previous reference.
Additionally, the function originally stored the same nfsd_file
pointer in both fp->fi_fds[O_RDONLY] and fp->fi_rdeleg_file with
only a single reference. When put_deleg_file() runs, it clears
fi_rdeleg_file and calls nfs4_file_put_access() to release the file.
However, nfs4_file_put_access() only releases fi_fds[O_RDONLY] when
the fi_access[O_RDONLY] counter drops to zero. If another READ open
exists on the file, the counter remains elevated and the nfsd_file
reference from the delegation is never released. This potentially
causes open conflicts on that file.
Then, on server shutdown, these leaks cause __nfsd_file_cache_purge()
to encounter files with an elevated reference count that cannot be
cleaned up, ultimately triggering a BUG() in kmem_cache_destroy()
because there are still nfsd_file objects allocated in that cache.
Fixes: e7a8ebc305 ("NFSD: Offer write delegation for OPEN with OPEN4_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a49a2a1baa upstream.
Usage of vfs_test_lock() is somewhat confused. Documentation suggests
it is given a "lock" but this is not the case. It is given a struct
file_lock which contains some details of the sort of lock it should be
looking for.
In particular passing a "file_lock" containing fl_lmops or fl_ops is
meaningless and possibly confusing.
This is particularly problematic in lockd. nlmsvc_testlock() receives
an initialised "file_lock" from xdr-decode, including manager ops and an
owner. It then mistakenly passes this to vfs_test_lock() which might
replace the owner and the ops. This can lead to confusion when freeing
the lock.
The primary role of the 'struct file_lock' passed to vfs_test_lock() is
to report a conflicting lock that was found, so it makes more sense for
nlmsvc_testlock() to pass "conflock", which it uses for returning the
conflicting lock.
With this change, freeing of the lock is not confused and code in
__nlm4svc_proc_test() and __nlmsvc_proc_test() can be simplified.
Documentation for vfs_test_lock() is improved to reflect its real
purpose, and a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added to avoid a similar problem in the
future.
Reported-by: Olga Kornievskaia <okorniev@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251021130506.45065-1-okorniev@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Fixes: 20fa190272 ("nfs: add export operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e3e8e176ca upstream.
Mike noted that when NFSD responds to an NFS_FILE_SYNC WRITE, it
does not also persist file time stamps. To wit, Section 18.32.3
of RFC 8881 mandates:
> The client specifies with the stable parameter the method of how
> the data is to be processed by the server. If stable is
> FILE_SYNC4, the server MUST commit the data written plus all file
> system metadata to stable storage before returning results. This
> corresponds to the NFSv2 protocol semantics. Any other behavior
> constitutes a protocol violation. If stable is DATA_SYNC4, then
> the server MUST commit all of the data to stable storage and
> enough of the metadata to retrieve the data before returning.
Commit 3f3503adb3 ("NFSD: Use vfs_iocb_iter_write()") replaced:
- flags |= RWF_SYNC;
with:
+ kiocb.ki_flags |= IOCB_DSYNC;
which appears to be correct given:
if (flags & RWF_SYNC)
kiocb_flags |= IOCB_DSYNC;
in kiocb_set_rw_flags(). However the author of that commit did not
appreciate that the previous line in kiocb_set_rw_flags() results
in IOCB_SYNC also being set:
kiocb_flags |= (__force int) (flags & RWF_SUPPORTED);
RWF_SUPPORTED contains RWF_SYNC, and RWF_SYNC is the same bit as
IOCB_SYNC. Reviewers at the time did not catch the omission.
Reported-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@kernel.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-nfs/20251018005431.3403-1-cel@kernel.org/T/#t
Fixes: 3f3503adb3 ("NFSD: Use vfs_iocb_iter_write()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 68f6bd128e upstream.
When reading a compressed file, we may read several pages in addition to
the one requested. The current code will overwrite pages in the page
cache with the data from disc which can definitely result in changes
that have been made being lost.
For example if we have four consecutie pages ABCD in the file compressed
into a single extent, on first access, we'll bring in ABCD. Then we
write to page B. Memory pressure results in the eviction of ACD.
When we attempt to write to page C, we will overwrite the data in page
B with the data currently on disk.
I haven't investigated the decompression code to check whether it's
OK to overwrite a clean page or whether it might be possible to see
corrupt data. Out of an abundance of caution, decline to overwrite
uptodate pages, not just dirty pages.
Fixes: 4342306f0f (fs/ntfs3: Add file operations and implementation)
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 0c56693b06 ]
In get_file_all_info(), if vfs_getattr() fails, the function returns
immediately without freeing the allocated filename, leading to a memory
leak.
Fix this by freeing the filename before returning in this error case.
Fixes: 5614c8c487 ("ksmbd: replace generic_fillattr with vfs_getattr")
Signed-off-by: Zilin Guan <zilin@seu.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit bd5603eaae upstream.
Commit e26ee4efbc ("fuse: allocate ff->release_args only if release is
needed") skips allocating ff->release_args if the server does not
implement open. However in doing so, fuse_prepare_release() now skips
grabbing the reference on the inode, which makes it possible for an
inode to be evicted from the dcache while there are inflight readahead
requests. This causes a deadlock if the server triggers reclaim while
servicing the readahead request and reclaim attempts to evict the inode
of the file being read ahead. Since the folio is locked during
readahead, when reclaim evicts the fuse inode and fuse_evict_inode()
attempts to remove all folios associated with the inode from the page
cache (truncate_inode_pages_range()), reclaim will block forever waiting
for the lock since readahead cannot relinquish the lock because it is
itself blocked in reclaim:
>>> stack_trace(1504735)
folio_wait_bit_common (mm/filemap.c:1308:4)
folio_lock (./include/linux/pagemap.h:1052:3)
truncate_inode_pages_range (mm/truncate.c:336:10)
fuse_evict_inode (fs/fuse/inode.c:161:2)
evict (fs/inode.c:704:3)
dentry_unlink_inode (fs/dcache.c:412:3)
__dentry_kill (fs/dcache.c:615:3)
shrink_kill (fs/dcache.c:1060:12)
shrink_dentry_list (fs/dcache.c:1087:3)
prune_dcache_sb (fs/dcache.c:1168:2)
super_cache_scan (fs/super.c:221:10)
do_shrink_slab (mm/shrinker.c:435:9)
shrink_slab (mm/shrinker.c:626:10)
shrink_node (mm/vmscan.c:5951:2)
shrink_zones (mm/vmscan.c:6195:3)
do_try_to_free_pages (mm/vmscan.c:6257:3)
do_swap_page (mm/memory.c:4136:11)
handle_pte_fault (mm/memory.c:5562:10)
handle_mm_fault (mm/memory.c:5870:9)
do_user_addr_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1338:10)
handle_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1481:3)
exc_page_fault (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539:2)
asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x27
Fix this deadlock by allocating ff->release_args and grabbing the
reference on the inode when preparing the file for release even if the
server does not implement open. The inode reference will be dropped when
the last reference on the fuse file is dropped (see fuse_file_put() ->
fuse_release_end()).
Fixes: e26ee4efbc ("fuse: allocate ff->release_args only if release is needed")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 95c39eef7c upstream.
When a request is terminated before it has been committed, the request
is not removed from the queue's list. This leaves a dangling list entry
that leads to list corruption and use-after-free issues.
Remove the request from the queue's list for terminated non-committed
requests.
Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong <joannelkoong@gmail.com>
Fixes: c090c8abae ("fuse: Add io-uring sqe commit and fetch support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Bernd Schubert <bschubert@ddn.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ebae102897 upstream.
Clang is not happy about set but (in some cases) unused variable:
fs/nfsd/export.c:1027:17: error: variable 'inode' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-variable]
since it's used as a parameter to dprintk() which might be configured
a no-op. To avoid uglifying code with the specific ifdeffery just mark
the variable __maybe_unused.
The commit [1], which introduced this behaviour, is quite old and hence
the Fixes tag points to the first of the Git era.
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/history/history.git/commit/?id=0431923fb7a1 [1]
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ad3cbbb0c1 upstream.
>From RFC 8881:
5.8.1.14. Attribute 75: suppattr_exclcreat
> The bit vector that would set all REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED
> attributes that are supported by the EXCLUSIVE4_1 method of file
> creation via the OPEN operation. The scope of this attribute
> applies to all objects with a matching fsid.
There's nothing in RFC 8881 that states that suppattr_exclcreat is
or is not allowed to contain bits for attributes that are clear in
the reported supported_attrs bitmask. But it doesn't make sense for
an NFS server to indicate that it /doesn't/ implement an attribute,
but then also indicate that clients /are/ allowed to set that
attribute using OPEN(create) with EXCLUSIVE4_1.
The FATTR4_WORD2_TIME_DELEG attributes are also not to be allowed
for OPEN(create) with EXCLUSIVE4_1. It doesn't make sense to set
a delegated timestamp on a new file.
Fixes: 7e13f4f8d2 ("nfsd: handle delegated timestamps in SETATTR")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 913f7cf77b upstream.
An NFSv4 client that sets an ACL with a named principal during file
creation retrieves the ACL afterwards, and finds that it is only a
default ACL (based on the mode bits) and not the ACL that was
requested during file creation. This violates RFC 8881 section
6.4.1.3: "the ACL attribute is set as given".
The issue occurs in nfsd_create_setattr(), which calls
nfsd_attrs_valid() to determine whether to call nfsd_setattr().
However, nfsd_attrs_valid() checks only for iattr changes and
security labels, but not POSIX ACLs. When only an ACL is present,
the function returns false, nfsd_setattr() is skipped, and the
POSIX ACL is never applied to the inode.
Subsequently, when the client retrieves the ACL, the server finds
no POSIX ACL on the inode and returns one generated from the file's
mode bits rather than returning the originally-specified ACL.
Reported-by: Aurélien Couderc <aurelien.couderc2002@gmail.com>
Fixes: c0cbe70742 ("NFSD: add posix ACLs to struct nfsd_attrs")
Cc: Roland Mainz <roland.mainz@nrubsig.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 27d17641ca upstream.
>From RFC 8881:
5.8.1.14. Attribute 75: suppattr_exclcreat
> The bit vector that would set all REQUIRED and RECOMMENDED
> attributes that are supported by the EXCLUSIVE4_1 method of file
> creation via the OPEN operation. The scope of this attribute
> applies to all objects with a matching fsid.
There's nothing in RFC 8881 that states that suppattr_exclcreat is
or is not allowed to contain bits for attributes that are clear in
the reported supported_attrs bitmask. But it doesn't make sense for
an NFS server to indicate that it /doesn't/ implement an attribute,
but then also indicate that clients /are/ allowed to set that
attribute using OPEN(create) with EXCLUSIVE4_1.
Ensure that the SECURITY_LABEL and ACL bits are not set in the
suppattr_exclcreat bitmask when they are also not set in the
supported_attrs bitmask.
Fixes: 8c18f2052e ("nfsd41: SUPPATTR_EXCLCREAT attribute")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 635bc4def0 upstream.
inotify/fanotify do not allow users with no read access to a file to
subscribe to events (e.g. IN_ACCESS/IN_MODIFY), but they do allow the
same user to subscribe for watching events on children when the user
has access to the parent directory (e.g. /dev).
Users with no read access to a file but with read access to its parent
directory can still stat the file and see if it was accessed/modified
via atime/mtime change.
The same is not true for special files (e.g. /dev/null). Users will not
generally observe atime/mtime changes when other users read/write to
special files, only when someone sets atime/mtime via utimensat().
Align fsnotify events with this stat behavior and do not generate
ACCESS/MODIFY events to parent watchers on read/write of special files.
The events are still generated to parent watchers on utimensat(). This
closes some side-channels that could be possibly used for information
exfiltration [1].
[1] https://snee.la/pdf/pubs/file-notification-attacks.pdf
Reported-by: Sudheendra Raghav Neela <sneela@tugraz.at>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 982d2616a2 upstream.
Garbage collection assumes all zones contain the full amount of blocks.
Mkfs already ensures this happens, but make the kernel check it as well
to avoid getting into trouble due to fuzzers or mkfs bugs.
Fixes: 2167eaabe2 ("xfs: define the zoned on-disk format")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 5990fd7569 upstream.
The xchk_setup_xattr_buf function can allocate a new value buffer, which
means that any reference to ab->value before the call could become a
dangling pointer. Fix this by moving an assignment to after the buffer
setup.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.10
Fixes: e47dcf113a ("xfs: repair extended attributes")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit dc68c0f601 upstream.
The grofs code for zoned RT subvolums already tries to check for zone
alignment, but gets it wrong by using the old instead of the new mount
structure.
Fixes: 01b71e64bb ("xfs: support growfs on zoned file systems")
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.15
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f067250520 upstream.
gcc 14.2 warns about:
xfs_attr_item.c: In function ‘xfs_attr_recover_work’:
xfs_attr_item.c:785:9: warning: ‘ip’ may be used uninitialized [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
785 | xfs_trans_ijoin(tp, ip, 0);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
xfs_attr_item.c:740:42: note: ‘ip’ was declared here
740 | struct xfs_inode *ip;
| ^~
I think this is bogus since xfs_attri_recover_work either returns a real
pointer having initialized ip or an ERR_PTR having not touched it, but
the tools are smarter than me so let's just null-init the variable
anyway.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.8
Fixes: e70fb328d5 ("xfs: recreate work items when recovering intent items")
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit fc40459de8 upstream.
xfs_buf_item_get_format() may allocate memory for bip->bli_formats,
free the memory in the error path.
Fixes: c3d5f0c2fb ("xfs: complain if anyone tries to create a too-large buffer log item")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Haoxiang Li <lihaoxiang@isrc.iscas.ac.cn>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cem@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 039bef30e3 upstream.
syzbot reported a kernel BUG in ocfs2_find_victim_chain() because the
`cl_next_free_rec` field of the allocation chain list (next free slot in
the chain list) is 0, triggring the BUG_ON(!cl->cl_next_free_rec)
condition in ocfs2_find_victim_chain() and panicking the kernel.
To fix this, an if condition is introduced in ocfs2_claim_suballoc_bits(),
just before calling ocfs2_find_victim_chain(), the code block in it being
executed when either of the following conditions is true:
1. `cl_next_free_rec` is equal to 0, indicating that there are no free
chains in the allocation chain list
2. `cl_next_free_rec` is greater than `cl_count` (the total number of
chains in the allocation chain list)
Either of them being true is indicative of the fact that there are no
chains left for usage.
This is addressed using ocfs2_error(), which prints
the error log for debugging purposes, rather than panicking the kernel.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20251201130711.143900-1-activprithvi@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Prithvi Tambewagh <activprithvi@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=96d38c6e1655c1420a72
Tested-by: syzbot+96d38c6e1655c1420a72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 01fba45dea upstream.
With below scripts, it will trigger panic in f2fs:
mkfs.f2fs -f /dev/vdd
mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs
touch /mnt/f2fs/foo
sync
echo 111 >> /mnt/f2fs/foo
f2fs_io fsync /mnt/f2fs/foo
f2fs_io shutdown 2 /mnt/f2fs
umount /mnt/f2fs
mount -o ro,norecovery /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs
or
mount -o ro,disable_roll_forward /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs
F2FS-fs (vdd): f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, check_only: 0
F2FS-fs (vdd): Mounted with checkpoint version = 7f5c361f
F2FS-fs (vdd): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 0
F2FS-fs (vdd): f2fs_recover_fsync_data: recovery fsync data, check_only: 1
Filesystem f2fs get_tree() didn't set fc->root, returned 1
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/super.c:1761!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 722 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.18.0-rc2+ #721 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:vfs_get_tree.cold+0x18/0x1a
Call Trace:
<TASK>
fc_mount+0x13/0xa0
path_mount+0x34e/0xc50
__x64_sys_mount+0x121/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x84/0x800
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7fa6cc126cfe
The root cause is we missed to handle error number returned from
f2fs_recover_fsync_data() when mounting image w/ ro,norecovery or
ro,disable_roll_forward mount option, result in returning a positive
error number to vfs_get_tree(), fix it.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 6781eabba1 ("f2fs: give -EINVAL for norecovery and rw mount")
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 37345eae9d upstream.
w/ LFS mode, in get_left_section_blocks(), we should not account the
blocks which were used before and now are invalided, otherwise those
blocks will be counted as freed one in has_curseg_enough_space(), result
in missing to trigger GC in time.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 249ad438e1 ("f2fs: add a method for calculating the remaining blocks in the current segment in LFS mode.")
Fixes: bf34c93d26 ("f2fs: check curseg space before foreground GC")
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 68d05693f8 upstream.
mkfs.f2fs -f /dev/vdd
mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs
touch /mnt/f2fs/foo
sync # avoid CP_UMOUNT_FLAG in last f2fs_checkpoint.ckpt_flags
touch /mnt/f2fs/bar
f2fs_io fsync /mnt/f2fs/bar
f2fs_io shutdown 2 /mnt/f2fs
umount /mnt/f2fs
blockdev --setro /dev/vdd
mount /dev/vdd /mnt/f2fs
mount: /mnt/f2fs: WARNING: source write-protected, mounted read-only.
For the case if we create and fsync a new inode before sudden power-cut,
without norecovery or disable_roll_forward mount option, the following
mount will succeed w/o recovering last fsynced inode.
The problem here is that we only check inode_list list after
find_fsync_dnodes() in f2fs_recover_fsync_data() to find out whether
there is recoverable data in the iamge, but there is a missed case, if
last fsynced inode is not existing in last checkpoint, then, we will
fail to get its inode due to nat of inode node is not existing in last
checkpoint, so the inode won't be linked in inode_list.
Let's detect such case in dyrun mode to fix this issue.
After this change, mount will fail as expected below:
mount: /mnt/f2fs: cannot mount /dev/vdd read-only.
dmesg(1) may have more information after failed mount system call.
demsg:
F2FS-fs (vdd): Need to recover fsync data, but write access unavailable, please try mount w/ disable_roll_forward or norecovery
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 6781eabba1 ("f2fs: give -EINVAL for norecovery and rw mount")
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 392711ef18 upstream.
The one_time_gc field in struct victim_sel_policy is conditionally
initialized but unconditionally read, leading to undefined behavior
that triggers UBSAN warnings.
In f2fs_get_victim() at fs/f2fs/gc.c:774, the victim_sel_policy
structure is declared without initialization:
struct victim_sel_policy p;
The field p.one_time_gc is only assigned when the 'one_time' parameter
is true (line 789):
if (one_time) {
p.one_time_gc = one_time;
...
}
However, this field is unconditionally read in subsequent get_gc_cost()
at line 395:
if (p->one_time_gc && (valid_thresh_ratio < 100) && ...)
When one_time is false, p.one_time_gc contains uninitialized stack
memory. Hence p.one_time_gc is an invalid bool value.
UBSAN detects this invalid bool value:
UBSAN: invalid-load in fs/f2fs/gc.c:395:7
load of value 77 is not a valid value for type '_Bool'
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 1297 Comm: f2fs_gc-252:16 Not tainted 6.18.0-rc3
#5 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: OpenStack Foundation OpenStack Nova,
BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x90
dump_stack+0x14/0x20
__ubsan_handle_load_invalid_value+0xb3/0xf0
? dl_server_update+0x2e/0x40
? update_curr+0x147/0x170
f2fs_get_victim.cold+0x66/0x134 [f2fs]
? sched_balance_newidle+0x2ca/0x470
? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x8d/0x2a0
f2fs_gc+0x2ba/0x8e0 [f2fs]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x12/0x40
? __timer_delete_sync+0x80/0xe0
? timer_delete_sync+0x14/0x20
? schedule_timeout+0x82/0x100
gc_thread_func+0x38b/0x860 [f2fs]
? gc_thread_func+0x38b/0x860 [f2fs]
? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x10b/0x220
? __pfx_gc_thread_func+0x10/0x10 [f2fs]
? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x12/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x11a/0x160
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
This issue is reliably reproducible with the following steps on a
100GB SSD /dev/vdb:
mkfs.f2fs -f /dev/vdb
mount /dev/vdb /mnt/f2fs_test
fio --name=gc --directory=/mnt/f2fs_test --rw=randwrite \
--bs=4k --size=8G --numjobs=12 --fsync=4 --runtime=10 \
--time_based
echo 1 > /sys/fs/f2fs/vdb/gc_urgent
The uninitialized value causes incorrect GC victim selection, leading
to unpredictable garbage collection behavior.
Fix by zero-initializing the entire victim_sel_policy structure to
ensure all fields have defined values.
Fixes: e791d00bd0 ("f2fs: add valid block ratio not to do excessive GC for one time GC")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xiaole He <hexiaole1994@126.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1f27ef42bb upstream.
As Hong Yun reported in mailing list:
loop7: detected capacity change from 0 to 131072
------------[ cut here ]------------
kmem_cache of name 'f2fs_xattr_entry-7:7' already exists
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24426 at mm/slab_common.c:110 kmem_cache_sanity_check mm/slab_common.c:109 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 24426 at mm/slab_common.c:110 __kmem_cache_create_args+0xa6/0x320 mm/slab_common.c:307
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 24426 Comm: syz.7.1370 Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4 #1 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:kmem_cache_sanity_check mm/slab_common.c:109 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__kmem_cache_create_args+0xa6/0x320 mm/slab_common.c:307
Call Trace:
__kmem_cache_create include/linux/slab.h:353 [inline]
f2fs_kmem_cache_create fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2943 [inline]
f2fs_init_xattr_caches+0xa5/0xe0 fs/f2fs/xattr.c:843
f2fs_fill_super+0x1645/0x2620 fs/f2fs/super.c:4918
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x1fb/0x260 fs/super.c:1692
vfs_get_tree+0x43/0x140 fs/super.c:1815
do_new_mount+0x201/0x550 fs/namespace.c:3808
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4136 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4347 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x298/0x2f0 fs/namespace.c:4324
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The bug can be reproduced w/ below scripts:
- mount /dev/vdb /mnt1
- mount /dev/vdc /mnt2
- umount /mnt1
- mounnt /dev/vdb /mnt1
The reason is if we created two slab caches, named f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3
and f2fs_xattr_entry-7:7, and they have the same slab size. Actually,
slab system will only create one slab cache core structure which has
slab name of "f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3", and two slab caches share the same
structure and cache address.
So, if we destroy f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3 cache w/ cache address, it will
decrease reference count of slab cache, rather than release slab cache
entirely, since there is one more user has referenced the cache.
Then, if we try to create slab cache w/ name "f2fs_xattr_entry-7:3" again,
slab system will find that there is existed cache which has the same name
and trigger the warning.
Let's changes to use global inline_xattr_slab instead of per-sb slab cache
for fixing.
Fixes: a999150f4f ("f2fs: use kmem_cache pool during inline xattr lookups")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-by: Hong Yun <yhong@link.cuhk.edu.hk>
Tested-by: Hong Yun <yhong@link.cuhk.edu.hk>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d33f89b34a upstream.
F2FS can mount filesystems with corrupted directory depth values that
get runtime-clamped to MAX_DIR_HASH_DEPTH. When RENAME_WHITEOUT
operations are performed on such directories, f2fs_rename performs
directory modifications (updating target entry and deleting source
entry) before attempting to add the whiteout entry via f2fs_add_link.
If f2fs_add_link fails due to the corrupted directory structure, the
function returns an error to VFS, but the partial directory
modifications have already been committed to disk. VFS assumes the
entire rename operation failed and does not update the dentry cache,
leaving stale mappings.
In the error path, VFS does not call d_move() to update the dentry
cache. This results in new_dentry still pointing to the old inode
(new_inode) which has already had its i_nlink decremented to zero.
The stale cache causes subsequent operations to incorrectly reference
the freed inode.
This causes subsequent operations to use cached dentry information that
no longer matches the on-disk state. When a second rename targets the
same entry, VFS attempts to decrement i_nlink on the stale inode, which
may already have i_nlink=0, triggering a WARNING in drop_nlink().
Example sequence:
1. First rename (RENAME_WHITEOUT): file2 → file1
- f2fs updates file1 entry on disk (points to inode 8)
- f2fs deletes file2 entry on disk
- f2fs_add_link(whiteout) fails (corrupted directory)
- Returns error to VFS
- VFS does not call d_move() due to error
- VFS cache still has: file1 → inode 7 (stale!)
- inode 7 has i_nlink=0 (already decremented)
2. Second rename: file3 → file1
- VFS uses stale cache: file1 → inode 7
- Tries to drop_nlink on inode 7 (i_nlink already 0)
- WARNING in drop_nlink()
Fix this by explicitly invalidating old_dentry and new_dentry when
f2fs_add_link fails during whiteout creation. This forces VFS to
refresh from disk on subsequent operations, ensuring cache consistency
even when the rename partially succeeds.
Reproducer:
1. Mount F2FS image with corrupted i_current_depth
2. renameat2(file2, file1, RENAME_WHITEOUT)
3. renameat2(file3, file1, 0)
4. System triggers WARNING in drop_nlink()
Fixes: 7e01e7ad74 ("f2fs: support RENAME_WHITEOUT")
Reported-by: syzbot+632cf32276a9a564188d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=632cf32276a9a564188d
Suggested-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20251022233349.102728-1-kartikey406@gmail.com/ [v1]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit be112e7449 upstream.
In order to let userspace detect such error rather than suffering
silent failure.
Fixes: 4354994f09 ("f2fs: checkpoint disabling")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 297baa4aa2 upstream.
Xfstests generic/335, generic/336 sometimes crash with the following message:
F2FS-fs (dm-0): detect filesystem reference count leak during umount, type: 9, count: 1
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/super.c:1939!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 609351 Comm: umount Tainted: G W 6.17.0-rc5-xfstests-g9dd1835ecda5 #1 PREEMPT(none)
Tainted: [W]=WARN
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:f2fs_put_super+0x3b3/0x3c0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
generic_shutdown_super+0x7e/0x190
kill_block_super+0x1a/0x40
kill_f2fs_super+0x9d/0x190
deactivate_locked_super+0x30/0xb0
cleanup_mnt+0xba/0x150
task_work_run+0x5c/0xa0
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xb7/0xc0
do_syscall_64+0x1ae/0x1c0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
It appears that sometimes it is possible that f2fs_put_super() is called before
all node page reads are completed.
Adding a call to f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() for F2FS_RD_NODE fixes the problem.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 20872584b8 ("f2fs: fix to drop all dirty meta/node pages during umount()")
Signed-off-by: Jan Prusakowski <jprusakowski@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6f52063db9 upstream.
The reservation type argument for the pr_preempt call should match the
one used in nfsd4_block_get_device_info_scsi.
Fixes: f99d4fbdae ("nfsd: add SCSI layout support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 40a71b53d5 upstream.
jbd2 journal handling code doesn't want jbd2_might_wait_for_commit()
to be placed between start_this_handle() and stop_this_handle(). So it
marks the region with rwsem_acquire_read() and rwsem_release().
However, the annotation is too strong for that purpose. We don't have
to use more than try lock annotation for that.
rwsem_acquire_read() implies:
1. might be a waiter on contention of the lock.
2. enter to the critical section of the lock.
All we need in here is to act 2, not 1. So trylock version of
annotation is sufficient for that purpose. Now that dept partially
relies on lockdep annotaions, dept interpets rwsem_acquire_read() as a
potential wait and might report a deadlock by the wait.
Replace it with trylock version of annotation.
Signed-off-by: Byungchul Park <byungchul@sk.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Message-ID: <20251024073940.1063-1-byungchul@sk.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7c11c56eb3 upstream.
Kernel commit 0a6ce20c15 ("ext4: verify orphan file size is not too big")
limits the maximum supported orphan file size to 8 << 20.
However, in e2fsprogs, the orphan file size is set to 32–512 filesystem
blocks when creating a filesystem.
With 64k block size, formatting an ext4 fs >32G gives an orphan file bigger
than the kernel allows, so mount prints an error and fails:
EXT4-fs (vdb): orphan file too big: 8650752
EXT4-fs (vdb): mount failed
To prevent this issue and allow previously created 64KB filesystems to
mount, we updates the maximum allowed orphan file size in the kernel to
512 filesystem blocks.
Fixes: 0a6ce20c15 ("ext4: verify orphan file size is not too big")
Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251120134233.2994147-1-libaokun@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3f7a79d05c upstream.
When the MB_CHECK_ASSERT macro is enabled, an assertion failure can
occur in __mb_check_buddy when checking preallocated blocks (pa) in
a block group:
Assertion failure in mb_free_blocks() : "groupnr == e4b->bd_group"
This happens when a pa at the very end of a block group (e.g.,
pa_pstart=32765, pa_len=3 in a group of 32768 blocks) becomes
exhausted - its pa_pstart is advanced by pa_len to 32768, which
lies in the next block group. If this exhausted pa (with pa_len == 0)
is still in the bb_prealloc_list during the buddy check, the assertion
incorrectly flags it as belonging to the wrong group. A possible
sequence is as follows:
ext4_mb_new_blocks
ext4_mb_release_context
pa->pa_pstart += EXT4_C2B(sbi, ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len)
pa->pa_len -= ac->ac_b_ex.fe_len
__mb_check_buddy
for each pa in group
ext4_get_group_no_and_offset
MB_CHECK_ASSERT(groupnr == e4b->bd_group)
To fix this, we modify the check to skip block group validation for
exhausted preallocations (where pa_len == 0). Such entries are in a
transitional state and will be removed from the list soon, so they
should not trigger an assertion. This change prevents the false
positive while maintaining the integrity of the checks for active
allocations.
Fixes: c9de560ded ("ext4: Add multi block allocator for ext4")
Signed-off-by: Yongjian Sun <sunyongjian1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251106060614.631382-2-sunyongjian@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4091c8206c upstream.
i_state_flags used on 32-bit archs, need to clear this flag when
alloc inode.
Find this issue when umount ext4, sometimes track the inode as orphan
accidently, cause ext4 mesg dump.
Fixes: acf943e976 ("ext4: fix checks for orphan inodes")
Signed-off-by: Haibo Chen <haibo.chen@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251104-ext4-v1-1-73691a0800f9@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b97cb7d6a0 upstream.
If ext4_get_inode_loc() fails (e.g. if it returns -EFSCORRUPTED),
iloc.bh will remain set to NULL. Since ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all()
lacks error checking, this will lead to a null pointer dereference
in ext4_raw_inode(), called right after ext4_get_inode_loc().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: c8e008b604 ("ext4: ignore xattrs past end")
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Karina Yankevich <k.yankevich@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Sergey Shtylyov <s.shtylyov@omp.ru>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Message-ID: <20251022093253.3546296-1-k.yankevich@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3db63d2c2d upstream.
params.mount_opts may come as potentially non-NUL-term string. Userspace
is expected to pass a NUL-term string. Add an extra check to ensure this
holds true. Note that further code utilizes strscpy_pad() so this is just
for proper informing the user of incorrect data being provided.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-2-pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ee5a977b4e upstream.
strscpy_pad() can't be used to copy a non-NUL-term string into a NUL-term
string of possibly bigger size. Commit 0efc5990bc ("string.h: Introduce
memtostr() and memtostr_pad()") provides additional information in that
regard. So if this happens, the following warning is observed:
strnlen: detected buffer overflow: 65 byte read of buffer size 64
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 28655 at lib/string_helpers.c:1032 __fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 28655 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.12.54-syzkaller-00144-g5f0270f1ba00 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x96/0xc0 lib/string_helpers.c:1032
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__fortify_panic+0x1f/0x30 lib/string_helpers.c:1039
strnlen include/linux/fortify-string.h:235 [inline]
sized_strscpy include/linux/fortify-string.h:309 [inline]
parse_apply_sb_mount_options fs/ext4/super.c:2504 [inline]
__ext4_fill_super fs/ext4/super.c:5261 [inline]
ext4_fill_super+0x3c35/0xad00 fs/ext4/super.c:5706
get_tree_bdev_flags+0x387/0x620 fs/super.c:1636
vfs_get_tree+0x93/0x380 fs/super.c:1814
do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3553 [inline]
path_mount+0x6ae/0x1f70 fs/namespace.c:3880
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3893 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4103 [inline]
__se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4080 [inline]
__x64_sys_mount+0x280/0x300 fs/namespace.c:4080
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x64/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Since userspace is expected to provide s_mount_opts field to be at most 63
characters long with the ending byte being NUL-term, use a 64-byte buffer
which matches the size of s_mount_opts, so that strscpy_pad() does its job
properly. Return with error if the user still managed to provide a
non-NUL-term string here.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Fixes: 8ecb790ea8 ("ext4: avoid potential buffer over-read in parse_apply_sb_mount_options()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251101160430.222297-1-pchelkin@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 222047f68e upstream.
The freeze_all_ptr check in filesystems_freeze_callback() introduced by
commit a3f8f86627 ("power: always freeze efivarfs") is reverse which
quite confusingly causes all file systems to be frozen when
filesystem_freeze_enabled is false.
On my systems it causes the WARN_ON_ONCE() in __set_task_frozen() to
trigger, most likely due to an attempt to freeze a file system that is
not ready for that.
Add a logical negation to the check in question to reverse it as
appropriate.
Fixes: a3f8f86627 ("power: always freeze efivarfs")
Cc: 6.18+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.18+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/12788397.O9o76ZdvQC@rafael.j.wysocki
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 801f614ba2 upstream.
Some NTFS volumes failed to mount because sparse data runs were not
handled correctly during runlist unpacking. The code performed arithmetic
on the special SPARSE_LCN64 marker, leading to invalid LCN values and
mount errors.
Add an explicit check for the case described above, marking the run as
sparse without applying arithmetic.
Fixes: 736fc7bf5f ("fs: ntfs3: Fix integer overflow in run_unpack()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6abfe10789 upstream.
Copying the file system while it is mounted as read-only results in
a mount failure:
[~]# mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sdc
[~]# mount /dev/sdc -o ro /mnt/test
[~]# dd if=/dev/sdc of=/dev/sda bs=1M
[~]# mount /dev/sda /mnt/test1
[ 1094.849826] JBD2: journal checksum error
[ 1094.850927] EXT4-fs (sda): Could not load journal inode
mount: mount /dev/sda on /mnt/test1 failed: Bad message
The process described above is just an abstracted way I came up with to
reproduce the issue. In the actual scenario, the file system was mounted
read-only and then copied while it was still mounted. It was found that
the mount operation failed. The user intended to verify the data or use
it as a backup, and this action was performed during a version upgrade.
Above issue may happen as follows:
ext4_fill_super
set_journal_csum_feature_set(sb)
if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb))
incompat = JBD2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_CSUM_V3;
if (test_opt(sb, JOURNAL_CHECKSUM)
jbd2_journal_set_features(sbi->s_journal, compat, 0, incompat);
lock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer);
sb->s_feature_incompat |= cpu_to_be32(incompat);
//The data in the journal sb was modified, but the checksum was not
updated, so the data remaining in memory has a mismatch between the
data and the checksum.
unlock_buffer(journal->j_sb_buffer);
In this case, the journal sb copied over is in a state where the checksum
and data are inconsistent, so mounting fails.
To solve the above issue, update the checksum in memory after modifying
the journal sb.
Fixes: 4fd5ea43bc ("jbd2: checksum journal superblock")
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251103010123.3753631-1-yebin@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4cfc7d5a4a upstream.
After commit b77b4a4815 ("gfs2: Rework freeze / thaw logic"),
the freeze error handling is broken because gfs2_do_thaw()
overwrites the 'error' variable, causing incorrect processing
of the original freeze error.
Fix this by calling gfs2_do_thaw() when gfs2_lock_fs_check_clean()
fails but ignoring its return value to preserve the original
freeze error for proper reporting.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: b77b4a4815 ("gfs2: Rework freeze / thaw logic")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5+
Signed-off-by: Alexey Velichayshiy <a.velichayshiy@ispras.ru>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0185c2292c upstream.
In our user safe ino resolve ioctl we'll just turn any ret into -EACCES
from inode_permission(). This is redundant, and could potentially be
wrong if we had an ENOMEM in the security layer or some such other
error, so simply return the actual return value.
Note: The patch was taken from v5 of fscrypt patchset
(https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/cover.1706116485.git.josef@toxicpanda.com/)
which was handled over time by various people: Omar Sandoval, Sweet Tea
Dorminy, Josef Bacik.
Fixes: 23d0b79dfa ("btrfs: Add unprivileged version of ino_lookup ioctl")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.4+
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ add note ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
