commit e42e29cc44 upstream.
This reverts commit cca974daeb.
The added sanity check is incorrect. BUDMIN is not the wrong value and
is too small.
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3eb3cd5992 ]
Commit 04d82a6d08 ("binfmt_flat: allow not offsetting data start")
introduced a RISC-V specific variant of the FLAT format which does
not allocate any space for the (obsolete) array of shared library
pointers. However, it did not disable the code which initializes the
array, resulting in the corruption of sizeof(long) bytes before the DATA
segment, generally the end of the TEXT segment.
Introduce MAX_SHARED_LIBS_UPDATE which depends on the state of
CONFIG_BINFMT_FLAT_NO_DATA_START_OFFSET to guard the initialization of
the shared library pointer region so that it will only be initialized
if space is reserved for it.
Fixes: 04d82a6d08 ("binfmt_flat: allow not offsetting data start")
Co-developed-by: Stefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan O'Rear <sorear@fastmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240807195119.it.782-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d57431c6f5 ]
In order not to call copy_to_user (from fiemap_fill_next_extent)
we allocate memory in the kernel, fill it and copy it to user memory
after up_read(run_lock).
Reported-by: syzbot+36bb70085ef6edc2ebb9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 7063b80268 ]
When searching for the next smaller log2 block, BLKSTOL2() returned 0,
causing shift exponent -1 to be negative.
This patch fixes the issue by exiting the loop directly when negative
shift is found.
Reported-by: syzbot+61be3359d2ee3467e7e4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=61be3359d2ee3467e7e4
Signed-off-by: Pei Li <peili.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ce6dede912 ]
[syzbot reported]
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 PID: 5061 Comm: syz-executor404 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
RIP: 0010:dtInsertEntry+0xd0c/0x1780 fs/jfs/jfs_dtree.c:3713
...
[Analyze]
In dtInsertEntry(), when the pointer h has the same value as p, after writing
name in UniStrncpy_to_le(), p->header.flag will be cleared. This will cause the
previously true judgment "p->header.flag & BT-LEAF" to change to no after writing
the name operation, this leads to entering an incorrect branch and accessing the
uninitialized object ih when judging this condition for the second time.
[Fix]
After got the page, check freelist first, if freelist == 0 then exit dtInsert()
and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: syzbot+bba84aef3a26fb93deb9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit fc01008c92 ]
syzbot reports a f2fs bug as below:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inline.c:258!
CPU: 1 PID: 34 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-syzkaller-00012-g9e4bc4bcae01 #0
RIP: 0010:f2fs_write_inline_data+0x781/0x790 fs/f2fs/inline.c:258
Call Trace:
f2fs_write_single_data_page+0xb65/0x1d60 fs/f2fs/data.c:2834
f2fs_write_cache_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3133 [inline]
__f2fs_write_data_pages fs/f2fs/data.c:3288 [inline]
f2fs_write_data_pages+0x1efe/0x3a90 fs/f2fs/data.c:3315
do_writepages+0x35b/0x870 mm/page-writeback.c:2612
__writeback_single_inode+0x165/0x10b0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1650
writeback_sb_inodes+0x905/0x1260 fs/fs-writeback.c:1941
wb_writeback+0x457/0xce0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2117
wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2264 [inline]
wb_workfn+0x410/0x1090 fs/fs-writeback.c:2304
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa12/0x17c0 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
kthread+0x2f2/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
The root cause is: inline_data inode can be fuzzed, so that there may
be valid blkaddr in its direct node, once f2fs triggers background GC
to migrate the block, it will hit f2fs_bug_on() during dirty page
writeback.
Let's add sanity check on F2FS_INLINE_DATA flag in inode during GC,
so that, it can forbid migrating inline_data inode's data block for
fixing.
Reported-by: syzbot+848062ba19c8782ca5c8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-f2fs-devel/000000000000d103ce06174d7ec3@google.com
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4d5cdd757d ]
There's nothing page-specific happening in ext4_da_do_write_end();
it's merely used for its refcount & lock, both of which are folio
properties. Saves four calls to compound_head().
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231214053035.1018876-1-willy@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: 83f4414b8f ("ext4: sanity check for NULL pointer after ext4_force_shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 0a46ef2347 ]
ext4_xattr_set_entry() creates new EA inodes while holding buffer lock
on the external xattr block. This is problematic as it nests all the
allocation locking (which acquires locks on other buffers) under the
buffer lock. This can even deadlock when the filesystem is corrupted and
e.g. quota file is setup to contain xattr block as data block. Move the
allocation of EA inode out of ext4_xattr_set_entry() into the callers.
Reported-by: syzbot+a43d4f48b8397d0e41a9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240321162657.27420-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 8208c41c43 ]
When allocating EA inode, quota accounting is done just before
ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create(). Logically these two operations belong
together so just fold quota accounting into
ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create(). We also make
ext4_xattr_inode_lookup_create() return the looked up / created inode to
convert the function to a more standard calling convention.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240209112107.10585-1-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Stable-dep-of: 0a46ef2347 ("ext4: do not create EA inode under buffer lock")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 68d6f4f3fb ]
Prepare for the coming implementation by GCC and Clang of the __counted_by
attribute. Flexible array members annotated with __counted_by can have
their accesses bounds-checked at run-time via CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS (for
array indexing) and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (for strcpy/memcpy-family
functions).
While there, use struct_size() helper, instead of the open-coded
version.
[brauner@kernel.org: contains a fix by Edward for an OOB access]
Reported-by: syzbot+4139435cb1b34cf759c2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_A7845DD769577306D813742365E976E3A205@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZgImCXTdGDTeBvSS@neat
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit a898cb621a ]
Syzbot has found that when it creates corrupted quota files where the
quota tree contains a loop, we will deadlock when tryling to insert a
dquot. Add loop detection into functions traversing the quota tree.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 496530c7c1 ]
Syzbot reported a KMSAN warning,
erofs: (device loop0): z_erofs_lz4_decompress_mem: failed to decompress -12 in[46, 4050] out[917]
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in hex_dump_to_buffer+0xae9/0x10f0 lib/hexdump.c:194
..
print_hex_dump+0x13d/0x3e0 lib/hexdump.c:276
z_erofs_lz4_decompress_mem fs/erofs/decompressor.c:252 [inline]
z_erofs_lz4_decompress+0x257e/0x2a70 fs/erofs/decompressor.c:311
z_erofs_decompress_pcluster fs/erofs/zdata.c:1290 [inline]
z_erofs_decompress_queue+0x338c/0x6460 fs/erofs/zdata.c:1372
z_erofs_runqueue+0x36cd/0x3830
z_erofs_read_folio+0x435/0x810 fs/erofs/zdata.c:1843
The root cause is that the printed decompressed buffer may be filled
incompletely due to decompression failure. Since they were once only
used for debugging, get rid of them now.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+6c746eea496f34b3161d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/000000000000321c24060d7cfa1c@google.com
Reviewed-by: Yue Hu <huyue2@coolpad.com>
Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang <hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231227151903.2900413-1-hsiangkao@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit dd8f87f21d ]
The cpu_key was not initialized in reiserfs_delete_solid_item(), which triggered
this issue.
Reported-and-tested-by: <syzbot+b3b14fb9f8a14c5d0267@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Edward Adam Davis <eadavis@qq.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/tencent_9EA7E746DE92DBC66049A62EDF6ED64CA706@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cca974daeb ]
Currently while joining the leaf in a buddy system there is shift out
of bound error in calculation of BUDSIZE. Added the required check
to the BUDSIZE and fixed the documentation as well.
Reported-by: syzbot+411debe54d318eaed386@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=411debe54d318eaed386
Signed-off-by: Manas Ghandat <ghandatmanas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 6306ff39a7 ]
When sbi->flag is JFS_NOINTEGRITY in lmLogOpen(), log->bdev_handle can't
be inited, so it value will be NULL.
Therefore, add the "log ->no_integrity=1" judgment in lbmStartIO() to avoid such
problems.
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+23bc20037854bb335d59@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu@windriver.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231009094557.1398920-1-lizhi.xu@windriver.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 898c57f456 ]
Convert jfs to use bdev_open_by_dev() and pass the handle around.
CC: Dave Kleikamp <shaggy@kernel.org>
CC: jfs-discussion@lists.sourceforge.net
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Acked-by: Dave Kleikamp <dave.kleikamp@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230927093442.25915-24-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 6306ff39a7 ("jfs: fix log->bdev_handle null ptr deref in lbmStartIO")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit f4a48bc36c ]
Convert mount code to use bdev_open_by_dev() and propagate the handle
around to bdev_release().
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230927093442.25915-19-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 6306ff39a7 ("jfs: fix log->bdev_handle null ptr deref in lbmStartIO")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 16fb9808ab ]
The final bit of stats that is global is the rpc svc_stat. Move this
into the nfsd_net struct and use that everywhere instead of the global
struct. Remove the unused global struct.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit e41ee44cc6 ]
This is the last global stat, take it out of the nfsd_stats struct and
make it a global part of nfsd, report it the same as always.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 4b14885411 ]
We have a global set of counters that we modify for all of the nfsd
operations, but now that we're exposing these stats across all network
namespaces we need to make the stats also be per-network namespace. We
already have some caching stats that are per-network namespace, so move
these definitions into the same counter and then adjust all the helpers
and users of these stats to provide the appropriate nfsd_net struct so
that the stats are maintained for the per-network namespace objects.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 93483ac5fe ]
We are running nfsd servers inside of containers with their own network
namespace, and we want to monitor these services using the stats found
in /proc. However these are not exposed in the proc inside of the
container, so we have to bind mount the host /proc into our containers
to get at this information.
Separate out the stat counters init and the proc registration, and move
the proc registration into the pernet operations entry and exit points
so that these stats can be exposed inside of network namespaces.
This is an intermediate step, this just exposes the global counters in
the network namespace. Subsequent patches will move these counters into
the per-network namespace container.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d98416cc21 ]
We're going to merge the stats all into per network namespace in
subsequent patches, rename these nn counters to be consistent with the
rest of the stats.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 3f6ef182f1 ]
Now that this isn't used anywhere, remove it.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit f094323867 ]
Since only one service actually reports the rpc stats there's not much
of a reason to have a pointer to it in the svc_program struct. Adjust
the svc_create_pooled function to take the sv_stats as an argument and
pass the struct through there as desired instead of getting it from the
svc_program->pg_stats.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
[ cel: adjusted to apply to v6.6.y ]
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a2214ed588 ]
A lot of places are setting a blank svc_stats in ->pg_stats and never
utilizing these stats. Remove all of these extra structs as we're not
reporting these stats anywhere.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 6939ace1f2 ]
fs/nfsd/export.c: In function 'svc_export_parse':
fs/nfsd/export.c:737:1: warning: the frame size of 1040 bytes is larger than 1024 bytes [-Wframe-larger-than=]
737 | }
On my systems, svc_export_parse() has a stack frame of over 800
bytes, not 1040, but nonetheless, it could do with some reduction.
When a struct svc_export is on the stack, it's a temporary structure
used as an argument, and not visible as an actual exported FS. No
need to reserve space for export_stats in such cases.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202310012359.YEw5IrK6-lkp@intel.com/
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 4b14885411 ("nfsd: make all of the nfsd stats per-network namespace")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 5ec39944f8 ]
In function ‘export_stats_init’,
inlined from ‘svc_export_alloc’ at fs/nfsd/export.c:866:6:
fs/nfsd/export.c:337:16: warning: ‘nfsd_percpu_counters_init’ accessing 40 bytes in a region of size 0 [-Wstringop-overflow=]
337 | return nfsd_percpu_counters_init(&stats->counter, EXP_STATS_COUNTERS_NUM);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
fs/nfsd/export.c:337:16: note: referencing argument 1 of type ‘struct percpu_counter[0]’
fs/nfsd/stats.h: In function ‘svc_export_alloc’:
fs/nfsd/stats.h:40:5: note: in a call to function ‘nfsd_percpu_counters_init’
40 | int nfsd_percpu_counters_init(struct percpu_counter counters[], int num);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Stable-dep-of: 93483ac5fe ("nfsd: expose /proc/net/sunrpc/nfsd in net namespaces")
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f50733b45d upstream.
When opening a file for exec via do_filp_open(), permission checking is
done against the file's metadata at that moment, and on success, a file
pointer is passed back. Much later in the execve() code path, the file
metadata (specifically mode, uid, and gid) is used to determine if/how
to set the uid and gid. However, those values may have changed since the
permissions check, meaning the execution may gain unintended privileges.
For example, if a file could change permissions from executable and not
set-id:
---------x 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target
to set-id and non-executable:
---S------ 1 root root 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target
it is possible to gain root privileges when execution should have been
disallowed.
While this race condition is rare in real-world scenarios, it has been
observed (and proven exploitable) when package managers are updating
the setuid bits of installed programs. Such files start with being
world-executable but then are adjusted to be group-exec with a set-uid
bit. For example, "chmod o-x,u+s target" makes "target" executable only
by uid "root" and gid "cdrom", while also becoming setuid-root:
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target
becomes:
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root cdrom 16048 Aug 7 13:16 target
But racing the chmod means users without group "cdrom" membership can
get the permission to execute "target" just before the chmod, and when
the chmod finishes, the exec reaches brpm_fill_uid(), and performs the
setuid to root, violating the expressed authorization of "only cdrom
group members can setuid to root".
Re-check that we still have execute permissions in case the metadata
has changed. It would be better to keep a copy from the perm-check time,
but until we can do that refactoring, the least-bad option is to do a
full inode_permission() call (under inode lock). It is understood that
this is safe against dead-locks, but hardly optimal.
Reported-by: Marco Vanotti <mvanotti@google.com>
Tested-by: Marco Vanotti <mvanotti@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e0391e92f9 upstream.
If we do a direct IO sync write, at btrfs_sync_file(), and we need to skip
inode logging or we get an error starting a transaction or an error when
flushing delalloc, we end up unlocking the inode when we shouldn't under
the 'out_release_extents' label, and then unlock it again at
btrfs_direct_write().
Fix that by checking if we have to skip inode unlocking under that label.
Reported-by: syzbot+7dbbb74af6291b5a5a8b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000dfd631061eaeb4bc@google.com/
Fixes: 939b656bc8 ("btrfs: fix corruption after buffer fault in during direct IO append write")
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 45cf976008 upstream.
Commit a70f9fe52d ("xfs: detect and handle invalid iclog size set by
mkfs") added a fixup for incorrect h_size values used for the initial
umount record in old xfsprogs versions. Later commit 0c771b99d6
("xfs: clean up calculation of LR header blocks") cleaned up the log
reover buffer calculation, but stoped using the fixed up h_size value
to size the log recovery buffer, which can lead to an out of bounds
access when the incorrect h_size does not come from the old mkfs
tool, but a fuzzer.
Fix this by open coding xlog_logrec_hblks and taking the fixed h_size
into account for this calculation.
Fixes: 0c771b99d6 ("xfs: clean up calculation of LR header blocks")
Reported-by: Sam Sun <samsun1006219@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" <djwong@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chandan Babu R <chandanbabu@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Berry <kpberry@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 939b656bc8 upstream.
During an append (O_APPEND write flag) direct IO write if the input buffer
was not previously faulted in, we can corrupt the file in a way that the
final size is unexpected and it includes an unexpected hole.
The problem happens like this:
1) We have an empty file, with size 0, for example;
2) We do an O_APPEND direct IO with a length of 4096 bytes and the input
buffer is not currently faulted in;
3) We enter btrfs_direct_write(), lock the inode and call
generic_write_checks(), which calls generic_write_checks_count(), and
that function sets the iocb position to 0 with the following code:
if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_APPEND)
iocb->ki_pos = i_size_read(inode);
4) We call btrfs_dio_write() and enter into iomap, which will end up
calling btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() and that calls
btrfs_get_blocks_direct_write(), where we update the i_size of the
inode to 4096 bytes;
5) After btrfs_dio_iomap_begin() returns, iomap will attempt to access
the page of the write input buffer (at iomap_dio_bio_iter(), with a
call to bio_iov_iter_get_pages()) and fail with -EFAULT, which gets
returned to btrfs at btrfs_direct_write() via btrfs_dio_write();
6) At btrfs_direct_write() we get the -EFAULT error, unlock the inode,
fault in the write buffer and then goto to the label 'relock';
7) We lock again the inode, do all the necessary checks again and call
again generic_write_checks(), which calls generic_write_checks_count()
again, and there we set the iocb's position to 4K, which is the current
i_size of the inode, with the following code pointed above:
if (iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_APPEND)
iocb->ki_pos = i_size_read(inode);
8) Then we go again to btrfs_dio_write() and enter iomap and the write
succeeds, but it wrote to the file range [4K, 8K), leaving a hole in
the [0, 4K) range and an i_size of 8K, which goes against the
expectations of having the data written to the range [0, 4K) and get an
i_size of 4K.
Fix this by not unlocking the inode before faulting in the input buffer,
in case we get -EFAULT or an incomplete write, and not jumping to the
'relock' label after faulting in the buffer - instead jump to a location
immediately before calling iomap, skipping all the write checks and
relocking. This solves this problem and it's fine even in case the input
buffer is memory mapped to the same file range, since only holding the
range locked in the inode's io tree can cause a deadlock, it's safe to
keep the inode lock (VFS lock), as was fixed and described in commit
51bd9563b6 ("btrfs: fix deadlock due to page faults during direct IO
reads and writes").
A sample reproducer provided by a reporter is the following:
$ cat test.c
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <test file>\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
int fd = open(argv[1], O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_DIRECT |
O_APPEND, 0644);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("creating test file");
return 1;
}
char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
ssize_t ret = write(fd, buf, 4096);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("pwritev2");
return 1;
}
struct stat stbuf;
ret = fstat(fd, &stbuf);
if (ret < 0) {
perror("stat");
return 1;
}
printf("size: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)stbuf.st_size);
return stbuf.st_size == 4096 ? 0 : 1;
}
A test case for fstests will be sent soon.
Reported-by: Hanna Czenczek <hreitz@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/0b841d46-12fe-4e64-9abb-871d8d0de271@redhat.com/
Fixes: 8184620ae2 ("btrfs: fix lost file sync on direct IO write with nowait and dsync iocb")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Tested-by: Hanna Czenczek <hreitz@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 12653ec361 upstream.
[BUG]
There is a bug report that using the latest trunk GCC 15, btrfs would cause
unterminated-string-initialization warning:
linux-6.6/fs/btrfs/print-tree.c:29:49: error: initializer-string for array of ‘char’ is too long [-Werror=unterminated-string-initialization]
29 | { BTRFS_BLOCK_GROUP_TREE_OBJECTID, "BLOCK_GROUP_TREE" },
|
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[CAUSE]
To print tree names we have an array of root_name_map structure, which
uses "char name[16];" to store the name string of a tree.
But the following trees have names exactly at 16 chars length:
- "BLOCK_GROUP_TREE"
- "RAID_STRIPE_TREE"
This means we will have no space for the terminating '\0', and can lead
to unexpected access when printing the name.
[FIX]
Instead of "char name[16];" use "const char *" instead.
Since the name strings are all read-only data, and are all NULL
terminated by default, there is not much need to bother the length at
all.
Reported-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
Reported-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Fixes: edde81f1ab ("btrfs: add raid stripe tree pretty printer")
Fixes: 9c54e80ddc ("btrfs: add code to support the block group root")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Suggested-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8e55643247 upstream.
To mirror the SRCU lock held in eventfs_iterate() when iterating over
eventfs inodes, use call_srcu() to free them too.
This was accidentally(?) degraded to RCU in commit 43aa6f97c2
("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts").
Cc: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@broadcom.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240723210755.8970-1-minipli@grsecurity.net
Fixes: 43aa6f97c2 ("eventfs: Get rid of dentry pointers without refcounts")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 12c20c65d0 upstream.
Commit 77a06c33a2 ("eventfs: Test for ei->is_freed when accessing
ei->dentry") added another check, testing if the parent was freed after
we released the mutex. If so, the function returns NULL. However, all
callers expect it to either return a valid pointer or an error pointer,
at least since commit 5264a2f4bb ("tracing: Fix a NULL vs IS_ERR() bug
in event_subsystem_dir()"). Returning NULL will therefore fail the error
condition check in the caller.
Fix this by substituting the NULL return value with a fitting error
pointer.
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 77a06c33a2 ("eventfs: Test for ei->is_freed when accessing ei->dentry")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240723122522.2724-1-minipli@grsecurity.net
Reviewed-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1b5487aefb upstream.
Setting encryption as required in security flags was broken.
For example (to require all mounts to be encrypted by setting):
"echo 0x400c5 > /proc/fs/cifs/SecurityFlags"
Would return "Invalid argument" and log "Unsupported security flags"
This patch fixes that (e.g. allowing overriding the default for
SecurityFlags 0x00c5, including 0x40000 to require seal, ie
SMB3.1.1 encryption) so now that works and forces encryption
on subsequent mounts.
Acked-by: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0df2ac59be upstream.
The leading comment above alloc_inode_sb() is pretty explicit about it:
/*
* This must be used for allocating filesystems specific inodes to set
* up the inode reclaim context correctly.
*/
Switch tracefs over to alloc_inode_sb() to make sure inodes are properly
linked.
Cc: Ajay Kaher <ajay.kaher@broadcom.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20240807115143.45927-2-minipli@grsecurity.net
Fixes: ba37ff75e0 ("eventfs: Implement tracefs_inode_cache")
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 36bb22a08a ]
Replace the always-true check tcon->origin_fullpath with
check of server->leaf_fullpath
See https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219083
The check of the new @tcon will always be true during mounting,
since @tcon->origin_fullpath will only be set after the tree is
connected to the latest common resource, as well as checking if
the prefix paths from it are fully accessible.
Fixes: 3ae872de41 ("smb: client: fix shared DFS root mounts with different prefixes")
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Korobeynikov <gkorobeynikov@astralinux.ru>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit cc102aa246 ]
The new_bh is from alloc_buffer_head, we should call free_buffer_head to
free it in error case.
Signed-off-by: Kemeng Shi <shikemeng@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhang Yi <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240514112438.1269037-2-shikemeng@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 320d8dc612 ]
If we failed to link a free space entry because there's already a
conflicting entry for the same offset, we free the free space entry but
we don't free the associated bitmap that we had just allocated before.
Fix that by freeing the bitmap before freeing the entry.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 97713b1a2c ]
[BUG]
For subpage + zoned case, the following workload can lead to rsv data
leak at unmount time:
# mkfs.btrfs -f -s 4k $dev
# mount $dev $mnt
# fsstress -w -n 8 -d $mnt -s 1709539240
0/0: fiemap - no filename
0/1: copyrange read - no filename
0/2: write - no filename
0/3: rename - no source filename
0/4: creat f0 x:0 0 0
0/4: creat add id=0,parent=-1
0/5: writev f0[259 1 0 0 0 0] [778052,113,965] 0
0/6: ioctl(FIEMAP) f0[259 1 0 0 224 887097] [1294220,2291618343991484791,0x10000] -1
0/7: dwrite - xfsctl(XFS_IOC_DIOINFO) f0[259 1 0 0 224 887097] return 25, fallback to stat()
0/7: dwrite f0[259 1 0 0 224 887097] [696320,102400] 0
# umount $mnt
The dmesg includes the following rsv leak detection warning (all call
trace skipped):
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 4528 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:8653 btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1e0/0x200 [btrfs]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 4528 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:8654 btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1a8/0x200 [btrfs]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 4528 at fs/btrfs/inode.c:8660 btrfs_destroy_inode+0x1a0/0x200 [btrfs]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BTRFS info (device sda): last unmount of filesystem 1b4abba9-de34-4f07-9e7f-157cf12a18d6
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4528 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4434 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x338/0x500 [btrfs]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BTRFS info (device sda): space_info DATA has 268218368 free, is not full
BTRFS info (device sda): space_info total=268435456, used=204800, pinned=0, reserved=0, may_use=12288, readonly=0 zone_unusable=0
BTRFS info (device sda): global_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sda): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sda): chunk_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sda): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sda): delayed_refs_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 4528 at fs/btrfs/block-group.c:4434 btrfs_free_block_groups+0x338/0x500 [btrfs]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
BTRFS info (device sda): space_info METADATA has 267796480 free, is not full
BTRFS info (device sda): space_info total=268435456, used=131072, pinned=0, reserved=0, may_use=262144, readonly=0 zone_unusable=245760
BTRFS info (device sda): global_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sda): trans_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sda): chunk_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sda): delayed_block_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
BTRFS info (device sda): delayed_refs_rsv: size 0 reserved 0
Above $dev is a tcmu-runner emulated zoned HDD, which has a max zone
append size of 64K, and the system has 64K page size.
[CAUSE]
I have added several trace_printk() to show the events (header skipped):
> btrfs_dirty_pages: r/i=5/259 dirty start=774144 len=114688
> btrfs_dirty_pages: r/i=5/259 dirty part of page=720896 off_in_page=53248 len_in_page=12288
> btrfs_dirty_pages: r/i=5/259 dirty part of page=786432 off_in_page=0 len_in_page=65536
> btrfs_dirty_pages: r/i=5/259 dirty part of page=851968 off_in_page=0 len_in_page=36864
The above lines show our buffered write has dirtied 3 pages of inode
259 of root 5:
704K 768K 832K 896K
I |////I/////////////////I///////////| I
756K 868K
|///| is the dirtied range using subpage bitmaps. and 'I' is the page
boundary.
Meanwhile all three pages (704K, 768K, 832K) have their PageDirty
flag set.
> btrfs_direct_write: r/i=5/259 start dio filepos=696320 len=102400
Then direct IO write starts, since the range [680K, 780K) covers the
beginning part of the above dirty range, we need to writeback the
two pages at 704K and 768K.
> cow_file_range: r/i=5/259 add ordered extent filepos=774144 len=65536
> extent_write_locked_range: r/i=5/259 locked page=720896 start=774144 len=65536
Now the above 2 lines show that we're writing back for dirty range
[756K, 756K + 64K).
We only writeback 64K because the zoned device has max zone append size
as 64K.
> extent_write_locked_range: r/i=5/259 clear dirty for page=786432
!!! The above line shows the root cause. !!!
We're calling clear_page_dirty_for_io() inside extent_write_locked_range(),
for the page 768K.
This is because extent_write_locked_range() can go beyond the current
locked page, here we hit the page at 768K and clear its page dirt.
In fact this would lead to the desync between subpage dirty and page
dirty flags. We have the page dirty flag cleared, but the subpage range
[820K, 832K) is still dirty.
After the writeback of range [756K, 820K), the dirty flags look like
this, as page 768K no longer has dirty flag set.
704K 768K 832K 896K
I I | I/////////////| I
820K 868K
This means we will no longer writeback range [820K, 832K), thus the
reserved data/metadata space would never be properly released.
> extent_write_cache_pages: r/i=5/259 skip non-dirty folio=786432
Now even though we try to start writeback for page 768K, since the
page is not dirty, we completely skip it at extent_write_cache_pages()
time.
> btrfs_direct_write: r/i=5/259 dio done filepos=696320 len=0
Now the direct IO finished.
> cow_file_range: r/i=5/259 add ordered extent filepos=851968 len=36864
> extent_write_locked_range: r/i=5/259 locked page=851968 start=851968 len=36864
Now we writeback the remaining dirty range, which is [832K, 868K).
Causing the range [820K, 832K) never to be submitted, thus leaking the
reserved space.
This bug only affects subpage and zoned case. For non-subpage and zoned
case, we have exactly one sector for each page, thus no such partial dirty
cases.
For subpage and non-zoned case, we never go into run_delalloc_cow(), and
normally all the dirty subpage ranges would be properly submitted inside
__extent_writepage_io().
[FIX]
Just do not clear the page dirty at all inside extent_write_locked_range().
As __extent_writepage_io() would do a more accurate, subpage compatible
clear for page and subpage dirty flags anyway.
Now the correct trace would look like this:
> btrfs_dirty_pages: r/i=5/259 dirty start=774144 len=114688
> btrfs_dirty_pages: r/i=5/259 dirty part of page=720896 off_in_page=53248 len_in_page=12288
> btrfs_dirty_pages: r/i=5/259 dirty part of page=786432 off_in_page=0 len_in_page=65536
> btrfs_dirty_pages: r/i=5/259 dirty part of page=851968 off_in_page=0 len_in_page=36864
The page dirty part is still the same 3 pages.
> btrfs_direct_write: r/i=5/259 start dio filepos=696320 len=102400
> cow_file_range: r/i=5/259 add ordered extent filepos=774144 len=65536
> extent_write_locked_range: r/i=5/259 locked page=720896 start=774144 len=65536
And the writeback for the first 64K is still correct.
> cow_file_range: r/i=5/259 add ordered extent filepos=839680 len=49152
> extent_write_locked_range: r/i=5/259 locked page=786432 start=839680 len=49152
Now with the fix, we can properly writeback the range [820K, 832K), and
properly release the reserved data/metadata space.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 56e69e5975 ]
An overflow may occur if the function is called with the last
block and an offset greater than zero. It is necessary to add
a check to avoid this.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Svace.
[JK: Make test cover also unalloc table freeing]
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240620072413.7448-1-r.smirnov@omp.ru
Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Roman Smirnov <r.smirnov@omp.ru>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 4b96024ef2 ]
As per MS-FSA 2.1.5.10.14, support for FSCTL_GET_REPARSE_POINT is
optional and if the server doesn't support it,
STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST must be returned for the operation.
If we find files with reparse points and we can't read them due to
lack of client or server support, just ignore it and then treat them
as regular files or junctions.
Fixes: 5f71ebc412 ("smb: client: parse reparse point flag in create response")
Reported-by: Sebastian Steinbeisser <Sebastian.Steinbeisser@lrz.de>
Tested-by: Sebastian Steinbeisser <Sebastian.Steinbeisser@lrz.de>
Acked-by: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 8aa37bde1a upstream.
both callers have verified that fd is not greater than ->max_fds;
however, misprediction might end up with
tofree = fdt->fd[fd];
being speculatively executed. That's wrong for the same reasons
why it's wrong in close_fd()/file_close_fd_locked(); the same
solution applies - array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds) could differ
from fd only in case of speculative execution on mispredicted path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d89c285d28 upstream.
The block group's avail bytes printed when dumping a space info subtract
the delalloc_bytes. However, as shown in btrfs_add_reserved_bytes() and
btrfs_free_reserved_bytes(), it is added or subtracted along with
"reserved" for the delalloc case, which means the "delalloc_bytes" is a
part of the "reserved" bytes. So, excluding it to calculate the avail space
counts delalloc_bytes twice, which can lead to an invalid result.
Fixes: e50b122b83 ("btrfs: print available space for a block group when dumping a space info")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.6+
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Burkov <boris@bur.io>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
