mirror of
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/
synced 2026-10-31 05:15:34 +00:00
04d29e3609
to enable stuffing independently from Retbleed, do some cleanups to simplify and streamline the code - Simplify SRSO and make mitigation types selection more versatile depending on the Retbleed mitigation selection. Simplify code some - Add the second part of the attack vector controls which provide a lot friendlier user interface to the speculation mitigations than selecting each one by one as it is now. Instead, the selection of whole attack vectors which are relevant to the system in use can be done and protection against only those vectors is enabled, thus giving back some performance to the users -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEzv7L6UO9uDPlPSfHEsHwGGHeVUoFAmiHh6cACgkQEsHwGGHe VUqprw//QMpqtWGVbo4bJ176sLtwn8cdKxOJwx9rWyFH/f3Zcn5hK1x+Zifm22hj NNo7YMLTvEg6BicxIDKp89tfXM5cwLS3pcUabWy7IS7Xzs7yLyRajNQ3hOFhQd9g UAUg8xx33xspCatlXzl4HcbOR0xyxb/qR4vd5H89Gir9GIuiO5+uz+3SdqEzzl8w 2UfPDY5B9cXO8VoGsvJMtLTO1ULUHHZPgRdPaH8rSr9QkGlVFefpgUaw6Budic84 kjNpE4tyJEvVLceZr8UtZWmVBwBS4z9oNRdqHbCFnrpPdYXnzYXA6pKMm1vP3zCz atRuWxmn0U6o9wZfxcBF7ZI2o3k049U8zxLWlz9mX4pXbMuqSX6MsR4kw82ta/Hp IzM9LckPO2STYHvJJlcEOivYbKTKttwYZd0rjfaFtJ0z+vVar4EyPyTbfGAdiH50 T2UUmC9SpffVVhnOcaTUGtT/4SFCVA8ZNsoPm27auGVzZRnLOFSV63iv5fl41o3X pELyVfLzR3XtXFNXrzXY09lEKh5HIiy33Qe+syCNEoF56zTN+IREu37M7dKiWBmx xRJE9U9ZgxZjbEuMV0jKEMPOMzMf1ONQw5HSpfIgoT5OLwKXhP5HptHkKS3rwppG 5Glo2kfvxKzFl/THHv7EPoIvVVL/tezcvO3H7z4owRl/jgw0CvA= =zO6b -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 CPU mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov: - Untangle the Retbleed from the ITS mitigation on Intel. Allow for ITS to enable stuffing independently from Retbleed, do some cleanups to simplify and streamline the code - Simplify SRSO and make mitigation types selection more versatile depending on the Retbleed mitigation selection. Simplify code some - Add the second part of the attack vector controls which provide a lot friendlier user interface to the speculation mitigations than selecting each one by one as it is now. Instead, the selection of whole attack vectors which are relevant to the system in use can be done and protection against only those vectors is enabled, thus giving back some performance to the users * tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits) x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TSA x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITS x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1 x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support cpu: Define attack vectors ... |
History
|
|
|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| acpi | ||
| asm-generic | ||
| clocksource | ||
| crypto | ||
| cxl | ||
| drm | ||
| dt-bindings | ||
| hyperv | ||
| keys | ||
| kunit | ||
| kvm | ||
| linux | ||
| math-emu | ||
| media | ||
| memory | ||
| misc | ||
| net | ||
| pcmcia | ||
| ras | ||
| rdma | ||
| rv | ||
| scsi | ||
| soc | ||
| sound | ||
| target | ||
| trace | ||
| uapi | ||
| ufs | ||
| vdso | ||
| video | ||
| xen | ||
| Kbuild | ||