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Peter Zijlstra 0c92385dc0 x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT-BHI mitigation
While WAIT_FOR_ENDBR is specified to be a full speculation stop; it
has been shown that some implementations are 'leaky' to such an extend
that speculation can escape even the FineIBT preamble.

To deal with this, add additional hardening to the FineIBT preamble.

Notably, using a new LLVM feature:

  e223485c9b

which encodes the number of arguments in the kCFI preamble's register.

Using this register<->arity mapping, have the FineIBT preamble CALL
into a stub clobbering the relevant argument registers in the
speculative case.

Scott sayeth thusly:

Microarchitectural attacks such as Branch History Injection (BHI) and
Intra-mode Branch Target Injection (IMBTI) [1] can cause an indirect
call to mispredict to an adversary-influenced target within the same
hardware domain (e.g., within the kernel). Instructions at the
mispredicted target may execute speculatively and potentially expose
kernel data (e.g., to a user-mode adversary) through a
microarchitectural covert channel such as CPU cache state.

CET-IBT [2] is a coarse-grained control-flow integrity (CFI) ISA
extension that enforces that each indirect call (or indirect jump)
must land on an ENDBR (end branch) instruction, even speculatively*.
FineIBT is a software technique that refines CET-IBT by associating
each function type with a 32-bit hash and enforcing (at the callee)
that the hash of the caller's function pointer type matches the hash
of the callee's function type. However, recent research [3] has
demonstrated that the conditional branch that enforces FineIBT's hash
check can be coerced to mispredict, potentially allowing an adversary
to speculatively bypass the hash check:

__cfi_foo:
  ENDBR64
  SUB R10d, 0x01234567
  JZ foo    # Even if the hash check fails and ZF=0, this branch could still mispredict as taken
  UD2
foo:
  ...

The techniques demonstrated in [3] require the attacker to be able to
control the contents of at least one live register at the mispredicted
target. Therefore, this patch set introduces a sequence of CMOV
instructions at each indirect-callable target that poisons every live
register with data that the attacker cannot control whenever the
FineIBT hash check fails, thus mitigating any potential attack.

The security provided by this scheme has been discussed in detail on
an earlier thread [4].

 [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/software-security-guidance/technical-documentation/branch-history-injection.html
 [2] Intel Software Developer's Manual, Volume 1, Chapter 18
 [3] https://www.vusec.net/projects/native-bhi/
 [4] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240927194925.707462984@infradead.org/
 *There are some caveats for certain processors, see [1] for more info

Suggested-by: Scott Constable <scott.d.constable@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250224124200.820402212@infradead.org
History 2025-02-26 13:49:11 +01:00
arch x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT-BHI mitigation 2025-02-26 13:49:11 +01:00
block block-6.14-20250214 2025-02-14 11:40:59 -08:00
certs sign-file,extract-cert: use pkcs11 provider for OPENSSL MAJOR >= 3 2024-09-20 19:52:48 +03:00
crypto treewide: const qualify ctl_tables where applicable 2025-01-28 13:48:37 +01:00
Documentation Driver core api addition for 6.14-rc3 2025-02-16 12:54:42 -08:00
drivers Driver core api addition for 6.14-rc3 2025-02-16 12:54:42 -08:00
fs SMB3 client multichannel fix 2025-02-14 14:42:52 -08:00
include x86/cfi: Add 'cfi=warn' boot option 2025-02-26 12:10:48 +01:00
init Kbuild updates for v6.14 2025-01-31 12:07:07 -08:00
io_uring io_uring-6.14-20250214 2025-02-14 11:30:53 -08:00
ipc treewide: const qualify ctl_tables where applicable 2025-01-28 13:48:37 +01:00
kernel x86/cfi: Add 'cfi=warn' boot option 2025-02-26 12:10:48 +01:00
lib hardening fixes for v6.14-rc2 2025-02-08 14:12:17 -08:00
LICENSES LICENSES: add 0BSD license text 2024-09-01 20:43:24 -07:00
mm execmem: add API for temporal remapping as RW and restoring ROX afterwards 2025-02-03 11:46:02 +01:00
net Including fixes from netfilter, wireless and bluetooth. 2025-02-13 12:17:04 -08:00
rust Driver core api addition for 6.14-rc3 2025-02-16 12:54:42 -08:00
samples Driver core api addition for 6.14-rc3 2025-02-16 12:54:42 -08:00
scripts modpost: Fix a few typos in a comment 2025-02-16 03:10:58 +09:00
security Redo of pathname patternization and fix spelling errors. 2025-02-11 10:19:36 -08:00
sound sound fixes for 6.14-rc1 2025-01-31 09:17:02 -08:00
tools Linux 6.14-rc3 2025-02-18 11:07:15 +01:00
usr kbuild: Drop support for include/asm-<arch> in headers_check.pl 2024-12-21 11:43:17 +09:00
virt KVM: remove kvm_arch_post_init_vm 2025-02-04 11:27:45 -05:00
.clang-format clang-format: Update with v6.11-rc1's for_each macro list 2024-08-02 13:20:31 +02:00
.clippy.toml rust: give Clippy the minimum supported Rust version 2025-01-10 00:17:25 +01:00
.cocciconfig scripts: add Linux .cocciconfig for coccinelle 2016-07-22 12:13:39 +02:00
.editorconfig .editorconfig: remove trim_trailing_whitespace option 2024-06-13 16:47:52 +02:00
.get_maintainer.ignore MAINTAINERS: Retire Ralf Baechle 2024-11-12 15:48:59 +01:00
.gitattributes .gitattributes: set diff driver for Rust source code files 2023-05-31 17:48:25 +02:00
.gitignore rust: use host dylib naming convention to support macOS 2025-01-10 01:01:24 +01:00
.mailmap wireless fixes for v6.14-rc3 2025-02-10 18:13:07 -08:00
.rustfmt.toml rust: add .rustfmt.toml 2022-09-28 09:02:20 +02:00
COPYING COPYING: state that all contributions really are covered by this file 2020-02-10 13:32:20 -08:00
CREDITS MAINTAINERS: Move Pavel to kernel.org address 2025-02-07 09:12:33 -08:00
Kbuild Kbuild updates for v6.1 2022-10-10 12:00:45 -07:00
Kconfig kbuild: ensure full rebuild when the compiler is updated 2020-05-12 13:28:33 +09:00
MAINTAINERS Driver core api addition for 6.14-rc3 2025-02-16 12:54:42 -08:00
Makefile x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT-BHI mitigation 2025-02-26 13:49:11 +01:00
README README: Fix spelling 2024-03-18 03:36:32 -06:00

Linux kernel
============

There are several guides for kernel developers and users. These guides can
be rendered in a number of formats, like HTML and PDF. Please read
Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst first.

In order to build the documentation, use ``make htmldocs`` or
``make pdfdocs``.  The formatted documentation can also be read online at:

    https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/

There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory,
several of them using the reStructuredText markup notation.

Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the
requirements for building and running the kernel, and information about
the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.