linux/security
Eric Biggers d3dc1ffed4 KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination
commit 4dca6ea1d9 upstream.

When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring.  This should require Write permission to the keyring.  However,
there is actually no permission check.

This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted.  This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring.  keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.

Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method.  Adding negative keys is trivial.  Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier.  It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().

Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.

We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key().  Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.

We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976b5
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring.  (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)

Fixes: 3e30148c3d ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
History 2018-01-01 20:52:12 +00:00
..
apparmor sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags 2017-10-12 15:28:22 +01:00
integrity ima: accept previously set IMA_NEW_FILE 2017-08-26 02:14:23 +01:00
keys KEYS: add missing permission check for request_key() destination 2018-01-01 20:52:12 +00:00
selinux selinux: fix double free in selinux_parse_opts_str() 2017-09-15 18:30:10 +01:00
smack security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks 2018-01-01 20:52:10 +00:00
tomoyo get rid of pointless checks for NULL ->i_op 2014-04-01 23:19:16 -04:00
yama security: let security modules use PTRACE_MODE_* with bitmasks 2018-01-01 20:52:10 +00:00
capability.c Merge tag 'keys-20140314' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs into next 2014-04-14 11:42:49 +10:00
commoncap.c ptrace: use fsuid, fsgid, effective creds for fs access checks 2017-09-15 18:30:17 +01:00
device_cgroup.c device_cgroup: use css_has_online_children() instead of has_children() 2014-05-16 13:22:52 -04:00
inode.c sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point 2015-08-20 18:24:03 +01:00
Kconfig security: select correct default LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR on arm on arm64 2014-02-05 14:59:14 +00:00
lsm_audit.c audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace 2014-03-20 10:11:55 -04:00
Makefile security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directories 2014-02-17 11:08:04 +11:00
min_addr.c mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write 2010-04-23 08:56:31 +10:00
security.c vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs. 2017-04-04 22:21:56 +01:00