linux/security
Kees Cook d3b428f036 fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping
commit a068acf2ee upstream.

Many file systems that implement the show_options hook fail to correctly
escape their output which could lead to unescaped characters (e.g.  new
lines) leaking into /proc/mounts and /proc/[pid]/mountinfo files.  This
could lead to confusion, spoofed entries (resulting in things like
systemd issuing false d-bus "mount" notifications), and who knows what
else.  This looks like it would only be the root user stepping on
themselves, but it's possible weird things could happen in containers or
in other situations with delegated mount privileges.

Here's an example using overlay with setuid fusermount trusting the
contents of /proc/mounts (via the /etc/mtab symlink).  Imagine the use
of "sudo" is something more sneaky:

  $ BASE="ovl"
  $ MNT="$BASE/mnt"
  $ LOW="$BASE/lower"
  $ UP="$BASE/upper"
  $ WORK="$BASE/work/ 0 0
  none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000"
  $ mkdir -p "$LOW" "$UP" "$WORK"
  $ sudo mount -t overlay -o "lowerdir=$LOW,upperdir=$UP,workdir=$WORK" none /mnt
  $ cat /proc/mounts
  none /root/ovl/mnt overlay rw,relatime,lowerdir=ovl/lower,upperdir=ovl/upper,workdir=ovl/work/ 0 0
  none /proc fuse.pwn user_id=1000 0 0
  $ fusermount -u /proc
  $ cat /proc/mounts
  cat: /proc/mounts: No such file or directory

This fixes the problem by adding new seq_show_option and
seq_show_option_n helpers, and updating the vulnerable show_option
handlers to use them as needed.  Some, like SELinux, need to be open
coded due to unusual existing escape mechanisms.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add lost chunk, per Kees]
[keescook@chromium.org: seq_show_option should be using const parameters]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: J. R. Okajima <hooanon05g@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
History 2015-09-21 10:05:45 -07:00
..
apparmor VFS: security/: d_inode() annotations 2015-04-15 15:06:57 -04:00
integrity ima: update builtin policies 2015-08-03 09:29:12 -07:00
keys KEYS: ensure we free the assoc array edit if edit is valid 2015-08-03 09:29:11 -07:00
selinux fs: create and use seq_show_option for escaping 2015-09-21 10:05:45 -07:00
smack sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point 2015-07-21 10:10:01 -07:00
tomoyo Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2015-04-26 17:22:07 -07:00
yama security/yama: Remove unnecessary selects from Kconfig. 2015-02-27 16:53:10 -08:00
capability.c Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next 2015-04-15 09:00:47 -07:00
commoncap.c VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations 2015-04-15 15:06:56 -04:00
device_cgroup.c cgroup: rename cgroup_subsys->base_cftypes to ->legacy_cftypes 2014-07-15 11:05:09 -04:00
inode.c sysfs: Create mountpoints with sysfs_create_mount_point 2015-07-21 10:10:01 -07:00
Kconfig kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities 2015-04-15 16:35:22 -07:00
lsm_audit.c Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2015-04-26 17:22:07 -07:00
Makefile security: cleanup Makefiles to use standard syntax for specifying sub-directories 2014-02-17 11:08:04 +11:00
min_addr.c mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write 2010-04-23 08:56:31 +10:00
security.c VFS: security/: d_backing_inode() annotations 2015-04-15 15:06:56 -04:00