bpf_gen__map_update_elem() emits code that, when the host-supplied
loader ctx provides a non-NULL map_desc[idx].initial_value, overwrites
the blob value with bytes read from the host (bpf_copy_from_user /
bpf_probe_read_kernel) before the BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM that populates
the program's .data/.rodata/.bss maps.
This override runs after emit_signature_match() has validated map->sha[],
and initial_value is part of neither the signed loader instructions nor
the hashed data blob. For a signed loader this lets an untrusted host
substitute global-variable contents into a program whose code carries
a valid signature, thus weakening what the signature attests to.
The blob already contains the signer-provided value (added via add_data()
and covered by the embedded, signed hash), so simply skip emitting the
override for signed loaders (gen_hash). Runtime initialization stays
available for the unsigned light-skeleton path as before. The jump
offsets within the override block are internal to it, so guarding the
whole block leaves them unchanged.
Fixes: ea923080c1 ("libbpf: Embed and verify the metadata hash in the loader")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260601150248.394863-5-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
61e0841523