linux/security
Matt Bobrowski a6d634f794 bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized
[ Upstream commit a6f0643e4f ]

When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps
(BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However,
if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted
from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for
the BPF LSM.

Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset
(bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at
its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a
valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes
or more).

When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE
map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode->i_security + 8. This erroneously
aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning
of the inode->i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup
or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued
RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued
callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering
an immediate kernel panic.

Fix this by introducing a global bpf_lsm_initialized boolean flag
marked with __ro_after_init. Set this flag to true inside bpf_lsm_init()
when the LSM framework successfully registers the BPF LSM. Gate map
allocation in inode_storage_map_alloc() on this flag, returning
-EOPNOTSUPP if the BPF LSM is in turn uninitialized.

This fail-fast approach prevents userspace from allocating inode
storage maps when the supporting BPF LSM infrastructure is absent,
avoiding zombie map states.

Fixes: 8ea636848a ("bpf: Implement bpf_local_storage for inodes")
Reported-by: oxsignal <awo@kakao.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>
Reviewed-by: Amery Hung <ameryhung@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260628201103.3624525-1-mattbobrowski@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
History 2026-08-23 14:17:17 +02:00
..
apparmor apparmor: fix label can not be immediately before a declaration 2026-07-24 15:51:39 +02:00
bpf bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized 2026-08-23 14:17:17 +02:00
integrity ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify() 2026-08-19 17:14:15 +02:00
keys keys: make keyring key-chunk byte order agree with keyring_diff_objects() 2026-08-19 17:14:06 +02:00
landlock landlock: Add the errata interface 2025-05-02 07:44:20 +02:00
loadpin LoadPin: Ignore the "contents" argument of the LSM hooks 2022-12-31 13:14:45 +01:00
lockdown Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2020-06-02 17:36:24 -07:00
safesetid safesetid: check size of policy writes 2025-03-13 12:50:17 +01:00
selinux selinux: do not cancel a policy conversion that never started 2026-08-23 14:17:15 +02:00
smack smack: /smack/doi: accept previously used values 2026-03-04 07:19:31 -05:00
tomoyo tomoyo: don't emit warning in tomoyo_write_control() 2025-03-13 12:50:18 +01:00
yama task_work: cleanup notification modes 2020-10-17 15:05:30 -06:00
commoncap.c capabilities: fix potential memleak on error path from vfs_getxattr_alloc() 2022-11-10 18:15:39 +01:00
device_cgroup.c device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure 2023-01-12 11:58:59 +01:00
inode.c securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough... 2025-08-28 16:24:17 +02:00
Kconfig proc: add config & param to block forcing mem writes 2024-10-17 15:11:27 +02:00
Kconfig.hardening security: Restrict CONFIG_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS to gcc or clang > 15.0.6 2022-12-31 13:14:46 +01:00
lsm_audit.c audit: remove unnecessary 'ret' initialization 2021-06-11 13:21:28 -04:00
Makefile security: remove unneeded subdir-$(CONFIG_...) 2021-09-03 08:17:20 +09:00
min_addr.c sysctl: pass kernel pointers to ->proc_handler 2020-04-27 02:07:40 -04:00
security.c xen/privcmd: add boot control for restricted usage in domU 2026-04-18 10:33:22 +02:00