linux/sound/core/control.c

2454 lines
65 KiB

ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
*: convert stream-like files from nonseekable_open -> stream_open Using scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci added in 10dce8af3422 ("fs: stream_open - opener for stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without deadlock"), search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations which assume @offset access. I've verified each generated change manually - that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations. The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert, but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g. drivers/input/mousedev.c) Among cases converted 14 were potentially vulnerable to read vs write deadlock (see details in 10dce8af3422): drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:988:1-17: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:401:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write(); change nonseekable_open -> stream_open to fix. and the rest were just safe to convert to stream_open because their read and write do not use ppos at all and corresponding file_operations do not have methods that assume @offset file access(*): arch/powerpc/platforms/52xx/mpc52xx_gpt.c:631:8-24: WARNING: mpc52xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_ibox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_mbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:591:8-24: WARNING: spufs_wbox_stat_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/um/drivers/harddog_kern.c:88:8-24: WARNING: harddog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c:430:33-49: WARNING: microcode_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ds1620.c:215:8-24: WARNING: ds1620_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/dtlk.c:301:1-17: WARNING: dtlk_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/ipmi/ipmi_watchdog.c:840:9-25: WARNING: ipmi_wdog_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/pcmcia/scr24x_cs.c:95:8-24: WARNING: scr24x_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/char/tb0219.c:246:9-25: WARNING: tb0219_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/firewire/nosy.c:306:8-24: WARNING: nosy_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/fschmd.c:840:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/hwmon/w83793.c:1344:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1747:8-24: WARNING: ucma_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/ucm.c:1178:8-24: WARNING: ucm_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_main.c:1086:8-24: WARNING: uverbs_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/input/joydev.c:282:1-17: WARNING: joydev_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c:393:1-17: WARNING: switchtec_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/platform/chrome/cros_ec_debugfs.c:135:8-24: WARNING: cros_ec_console_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-ds1374.c:470:9-25: WARNING: ds1374_wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/rtc/rtc-m41t80.c:805:9-25: WARNING: wdt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/tape_char.c:293:2-18: WARNING: tape_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/char/zcore.c:194:8-24: WARNING: zcore_reipl_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_api.c:528:8-24: WARNING: zcrypt_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/spi/spidev.c:594:1-17: WARNING: spidev_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/staging/pi433/pi433_if.c:974:1-17: WARNING: pi433_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/acquirewdt.c:203:8-24: WARNING: acq_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/advantechwdt.c:202:8-24: WARNING: advwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim1535_wdt.c:252:8-24: WARNING: ali_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/alim7101_wdt.c:217:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ar7_wdt.c:166:8-24: WARNING: ar7_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/at91rm9200_wdt.c:113:8-24: WARNING: at91wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ath79_wdt.c:135:8-24: WARNING: ath79_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/bcm63xx_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: bcm63xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpu5wdt.c:143:8-24: WARNING: cpu5wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/cpwd.c:397:8-24: WARNING: cpwd_fops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/eurotechwdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: eurwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/f71808e_wdt.c:528:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/gef_wdt.c:232:8-24: WARNING: gef_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/geodewdt.c:95:8-24: WARNING: geodewdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ib700wdt.c:241:8-24: WARNING: ibwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ibmasr.c:326:8-24: WARNING: asr_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/indydog.c:80:8-24: WARNING: indydog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/intel_scu_watchdog.c:307:8-24: WARNING: intel_scu_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/iop_wdt.c:104:8-24: WARNING: iop_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/it8712f_wdt.c:330:8-24: WARNING: it8712f_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ixp4xx_wdt.c:68:8-24: WARNING: ixp4xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/ks8695_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: ks8695wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/m54xx_wdt.c:88:8-24: WARNING: m54xx_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/machzwd.c:336:8-24: WARNING: zf_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mixcomwd.c:153:8-24: WARNING: mixcomwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mtx-1_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: mtx1_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/mv64x60_wdt.c:136:8-24: WARNING: mv64x60_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nuc900_wdt.c:134:8-24: WARNING: nuc900wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/nv_tco.c:164:8-24: WARNING: nv_tco_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pc87413_wdt.c:289:8-24: WARNING: pc87413_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:698:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd.c:737:8-24: WARNING: pcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:581:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_pci.c:623:8-24: WARNING: pcipcwd_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:488:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pcwd_usb.c:527:8-24: WARNING: usb_pcwd_temperature_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pika_wdt.c:121:8-24: WARNING: pikawdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/pnx833x_wdt.c:119:8-24: WARNING: pnx833x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rc32434_wdt.c:153:8-24: WARNING: rc32434_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/rdc321x_wdt.c:145:8-24: WARNING: rdc321x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/riowd.c:79:1-17: WARNING: riowd_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sa1100_wdt.c:62:8-24: WARNING: sa1100dog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc60xxwdt.c:211:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc7240_wdt.c:139:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc8360.c:274:8-24: WARNING: sbc8360_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_epx_c3.c:81:8-24: WARNING: epx_c3_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sbc_fitpc2_wdt.c:78:8-24: WARNING: fitpc2_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sb_wdog.c:108:1-17: WARNING: sbwdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc1200wdt.c:181:8-24: WARNING: sc1200wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sc520_wdt.c:261:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/sch311x_wdt.c:319:8-24: WARNING: sch311x_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/scx200_wdt.c:105:8-24: WARNING: scx200_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/smsc37b787_wdt.c:369:8-24: WARNING: wb_smsc_wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83877f_wdt.c:227:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/w83977f_wdt.c:301:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wafer5823wdt.c:200:8-24: WARNING: wafwdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/watchdog_dev.c:828:8-24: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:379:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdrtas.c:445:8-24: WARNING: wdrtas_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt285.c:104:1-17: WARNING: watchdog_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt977.c:276:8-24: WARNING: wdt977_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:424:8-24: WARNING: wdt_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt.c:484:8-24: WARNING: wdt_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:464:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_fops: .write() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. drivers/watchdog/wdt_pci.c:527:8-24: WARNING: wdtpci_temp_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. net/batman-adv/log.c:105:1-17: WARNING: batadv_log_fops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/control.c:57:7-23: WARNING: snd_ctl_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/rawmidi.c:385:7-23: WARNING: snd_rawmidi_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:310:7-23: WARNING: snd_seq_f_ops: .read() and .write() have stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. sound/core/timer.c:1428:7-23: WARNING: snd_timer_f_ops: .read() has stream semantic; safe to change nonseekable_open -> stream_open. One can also recheck/review the patch via generating it with explanation comments included via $ make coccicheck MODE=patch COCCI=scripts/coccinelle/api/stream_open.cocci SPFLAGS="-D explain" (*) This second group also contains cases with read/write deadlocks that stream_open.cocci don't yet detect, but which are still valid to convert to stream_open since ppos is not used. For example drivers/pci/switch/switchtec.c calls wait_for_completion_interruptible() in its .read, but stream_open.cocci currently detects only "wait_event*" as blocking. Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr> Cc: Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org> Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com> Cc: Anatolij Gustschin <agust@denx.de> Cc: Jeff Dike <jdike@addtoit.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Anton Ivanov <anton.ivanov@cambridgegreys.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: "James R. Van Zandt" <jrv@vanzandt.mv.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Acked-by: Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> [scr24x_cs] Cc: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de> Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@googlemail.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.com> Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> [watchdog/* hwmon/*] Cc: Rudolf Marek <r.marek@assembler.cz> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de> Cc: Jacek Anaszewski <jacek.anaszewski@gmail.com> Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Cc: Kurt Schwemmer <kurt.schwemmer@microsemi.com> Acked-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> [drivers/pci/switch/switchtec] Cc: Benson Leung <bleung@chromium.org> Acked-by: Enric Balletbo i Serra <enric.balletbo@collabora.com> [platform/chrome] Cc: Alessandro Zummo <a.zummo@towertech.it> Acked-by: Alexandre Belloni <alexandre.belloni@bootlin.com> [rtc/*] Cc: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Cc: Wim Van Sebroeck <wim@linux-watchdog.org> Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Cc: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com Cc: Wan ZongShun <mcuos.com@gmail.com> Cc: Zwane Mwaikambo <zwanem@gmail.com> Cc: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch> Cc: Simon Wunderlich <sw@simonwunderlich.de> Cc: Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
2019-03-26 23:51:19 +03:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Track in-flight control read/write/tlv accesses Although the power state check is performed in various places (e.g. at the entrance of quite a few ioctls), there can be still some pending tasks that already went into the ioctl handler or other ops, and those may access the hardware even after the power state check. For example, kcontrol access ioctl paths that call info/get/put callbacks may update the hardware registers. If a system wants to assure the free from such hw access (like the case of PCI rescan feature we're going to implement in future), this situation must be avoided, and we have to sync such in-flight tasks finishing beforehand. For that purpose, this patch introduces a few new things in core code: - A refcount, power_ref, and a wait queue, power_ref_sleep, to the card object - A few new helpers, snd_power_ref(), snd_power_unref(), snd_power_ref_and_wait(), and snd_power_sync_ref() In the code paths that call kctl info/read/write/tlv ops, we check the power state with the newly introduced snd_power_ref_and_wait(). This function also takes the card.power_ref refcount for tracking this in-flight task. Once after the access finishes, snd_power_unref() is called to released the refcount in return. So the driver can sync via snd_power_sync_ref() assuring that all in-flight tasks have been finished. As of this patch, snd_power_sync_ref() is called only at snd_card_disconnect(), but it'll be used in other places in future. Note that atomic_t is used for power_ref intentionally instead of refcount_t. It's because of the design of refcount_t type; refcount_t cannot be zero-based, and it cannot do dec_and_test() call for multiple times, hence it's not suitable for our purpose. Also, this patch changes snd_power_wait() to accept only SNDRV_CTL_POWER_D0, which is the only value that makes sense. In later patch, the snd_power_wait() calls will be cleaned up. Reviewed-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210523090920.15345-3-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-05-23 11:09:16 +02:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Fix racy management of user ctl memory size account We've got a report about the possible race in the user control element counts (card->user_ctl_count), and it was confirmed that the race wasn't serious in the old code up to 5.12. There, the value modification itself was exclusive and protected via a write semaphore, hence it's at most concurrent reads and evaluations before the increment. Since it's only about the soft-limit to avoid the exhausting memory usage, one-off isn't a big problem at all. Meanwhile, the relevant code has been largely modified recently, and now card->user_ctl_count was replaced with card->user_ctl_alloc_size, and a few more places were added to access this field. And, in this new code, it turned out to be more serious: the modifications are scattered in various places, and a few of them are without protection. It implies that it may lead to an inconsistent value by racy accesses. For addressing it, this patch extends the range covered by the card->controls_rwsem write lock at snd_ctl_elem_add() so that the all code paths that modify and refer to card->user_ctl_alloc_size are protected by the rwsem properly. The patch adds also comments in a couple of functions to indicate that they are under the rwsem lock. Fixes: 66c6d1ef86ff ("ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/FEEBF384-44BE-42CF-8FB3-93470933F64F@purdue.edu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210415131856.13113-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-15 15:18:56 +02:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: delegate TLV eventing to each driver In a design of ALSA control core, a set of elements is represented by 'struct snd_kcontrol' to share common attributes. The set of elements shares TLV (Type-Length-Value) data, too. On the other hand, in ALSA control interface/protocol for applications, a TLV operation is committed to an element. Totally, the operation can have sub-effect to the other elements in the set. For example, TLV_WRITE operation is expected to change TLV data, which returns to applications. Applications attempt to change the TLV data per element, but in the above design, they can effect to elements in the same set. As a default, ALSA control core has no implementation except for TLV_READ operation. Thus, the above design looks to have no issue. However, in kernel APIs of ALSA control component, developers can program a handler for any request of the TLV operation. Therefore, for elements in a set which has the handler, applications can commit TLV_WRITE and TLV_COMMAND requests. For the above scenario, ALSA control core assist notification. When the handler returns positive value, the core queueing an event for a requested element. However, this includes design defects that the event is not queued for the other element in a set. Actually, developers can program the handlers to keep per-element TLV data, but it depends on each driver. As of v4.13-rc6, there's no driver in tree to utilize the notification, except for user-defined element set. This commit delegates the notification into each driver to prevent developers from the design defects. Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2017-08-24 10:46:14 +09:00
ALSA: control: Fix racy management of user ctl memory size account We've got a report about the possible race in the user control element counts (card->user_ctl_count), and it was confirmed that the race wasn't serious in the old code up to 5.12. There, the value modification itself was exclusive and protected via a write semaphore, hence it's at most concurrent reads and evaluations before the increment. Since it's only about the soft-limit to avoid the exhausting memory usage, one-off isn't a big problem at all. Meanwhile, the relevant code has been largely modified recently, and now card->user_ctl_count was replaced with card->user_ctl_alloc_size, and a few more places were added to access this field. And, in this new code, it turned out to be more serious: the modifications are scattered in various places, and a few of them are without protection. It implies that it may lead to an inconsistent value by racy accesses. For addressing it, this patch extends the range covered by the card->controls_rwsem write lock at snd_ctl_elem_add() so that the all code paths that modify and refer to card->user_ctl_alloc_size are protected by the rwsem properly. The patch adds also comments in a couple of functions to indicate that they are under the rwsem lock. Fixes: 66c6d1ef86ff ("ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/FEEBF384-44BE-42CF-8FB3-93470933F64F@purdue.edu Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210415131856.13113-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-15 15:18:56 +02:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not expect a control to be removed from under its feed. The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit. Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control has been removed. Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice. Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2014-06-18 13:32:32 +02:00
ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not expect a control to be removed from under its feed. The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit. Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control has been removed. Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice. Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2014-06-18 13:32:32 +02:00
ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not expect a control to be removed from under its feed. The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit. Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control has been removed. Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice. Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2014-06-18 13:32:32 +02:00
ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not expect a control to be removed from under its feed. The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit. Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control has been removed. Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice. Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2014-06-18 13:32:32 +02:00
ALSA: control: Fix replacing user controls There are two issues with the current implementation for replacing user controls. The first is that the code does not check if the control is actually a user control and neither does it check if the control is owned by the process that tries to remove it. That allows userspace applications to remove arbitrary controls, which can cause a user after free if a for example a driver does not expect a control to be removed from under its feed. The second issue is that on one hand when a control is replaced the user_ctl_count limit is not checked and on the other hand the user_ctl_count is increased (even though the number of user controls does not change). This allows userspace, once the user_ctl_count limit as been reached, to repeatedly replace a control until user_ctl_count overflows. Once that happens new controls can be added effectively bypassing the user_ctl_count limit. Both issues can be fixed by instead of open-coding the removal of the control that is to be replaced to use snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl(). This function does proper permission checks as well as decrements user_ctl_count after the control has been removed. Note that by using snd_ctl_remove_user_ctl() the check which returns -EBUSY at beginning of the function if the control already exists is removed. This is not a problem though since the check is quite useless, because the lock that is protecting the control list is released between the check and before adding the new control to the list, which means that it is possible that a different control with the same settings is added to the list after the check. Luckily there is another check that is done while holding the lock in snd_ctl_add(), so we'll rely on that to make sure that the same control is not added twice. Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2014-06-18 13:32:32 +02:00
ALSA: control: Add verification for kctl accesses The current implementation of ALSA control API fully relies on the callbacks of each driver, and there is no verification of the values passed via API. This patch is an attempt to improve the situation slightly by adding the validation code for the values stored via info and get callbacks. The patch adds a new kconfig, CONFIG_SND_CTL_VALIDATION. It depends on CONFIG_SND_DEBUG and off as default since the validation would require a slight overhead including the additional call of info callback at each get callback invocation. When this config is enabled, the values stored by each info callback invocation are verified, namely: - Whether the info type is valid - Whether the number of enum items is non-zero - Whether the given info count is within the allowed boundary Similarly, the values stored at each get callback are verified as well: - Whether the values are within the given range - Whether the values are aligned with the given step - Whether any further changes are seen in the data array over the given info count The last point helps identifying a possibly invalid data type access, typically a case where the info callback declares the type being SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_ENUMERATED while the get/put callbacks store the values in value.integer.value[] array. When a validation fails, the ALSA core logs an error message including the device and the control ID, and the API call also returns an error. So, with the new validation turned on, the driver behavior difference may be visible on user-space, too -- it's intentional, though, so that we can catch an error more clearly. The patch also introduces a new ctl access type, SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_ACCESS_SKIP_CHECK. A driver may pass this flag with other access bits to indicate that the ctl element won't be verified. It's useful when a driver code is specially written to access the data greater than info->count size by some reason. For example, this flag is actually set now in HD-audio HDMI codec driver which needs to clear the data array in the case of the disconnected monitor. Also, the PCM channel-map helper code is slightly modified to avoid the false-positive hit by this validation code, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200104083556.27789-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2020-01-04 09:35:56 +01:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
ALSA: control: Add memory consumption limit to user controls ALSA control interface allows users to add arbitrary control elements (called "user controls" or "user elements"), and its resource usage is limited just by the max number of control sets (currently 32). This limit, however, is quite loose: each allocation of control set may have 1028 elements, and each element may have up to 512 bytes (ILP32) or 1024 bytes (LP64) of value data. Moreover, each control set may contain the enum strings and TLV data, which can be up to 64kB and 128kB, respectively. Totally, the whole memory consumption may go over 38MB -- it's quite large, and we'd rather like to reduce the size. OTOH, there have been other requests even to increase the max number of user elements; e.g. ALSA firewire stack require the more user controls, hence we want to raise the bar, too. For satisfying both requirements, this patch changes the management of user controls: instead of setting the upper limit of the number of user controls, we check the actual memory allocation size and set the upper limit of the total allocation in bytes. As long as the memory consumption stays below the limit, more user controls are allowed than the current limit 32. At the same time, we set the lower limit (8MB) as default than the current theoretical limit, in order to lower the risk of DoS. As a compromise for lowering the default limit, now the actual memory limit is defined as a module option, 'max_user_ctl_alloc_size', so that user can increase/decrease the limit if really needed, too. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/s5htur3zl5e.wl-tiwai@suse.de Co-developed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Tested-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210408103149.40357-1-o-takashi@sakamocchi.jp Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2021-04-08 19:31:49 +09:00
2019-12-23 18:33:47 +09:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00
ALSA: control: Use xarray for faster lookups The control elements are managed in a single linked list and we traverse the whole list for matching each numid or ctl id per every inquiry of a control element. This is OK-ish for a small number of elements but obviously it doesn't scale. Especially the matching with the ctl id takes time because it checks each field of the snd_ctl_id element, e.g. the name string is matched with strcmp(). This patch adds the hash tables with Xarray for improving the lookup speed of a control element. There are two xarray tables added to the card; one for numid and another for ctl id. For the numid, we use the numid as the index, while for the ctl id, we calculate a hash key. The lookup is done via a single xa_load() execution. As long as the given control element is found on the Xarray table, that's fine, we can give back a quick lookup result. The problem is when no entry hits on the table, and for this case, we have a slight optimization. Namely, the driver checks whether we had a collision on Xarray table, and do a fallback search (linear lookup of the full entries) only if a hash key collision happened beforehand. So, in theory, the inquiry for a non-existing element might take still time even with this patch in a worst case, but this must be pretty rare. The feature is enabled via CONFIG_SND_CTL_FAST_LOOKUP, which is turned on as default. For simplicity, the option can be turned off only when CONFIG_EXPERT is set ("You are expert? Then you manage 1000 knobs"). Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211028130027.18764-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220609180504.775-1-tiwai@suse.de Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1653813866.git.quic_rbankapu@quicinc.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220610064537.18660-1-tiwai@suse.de Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
2022-06-10 08:45:37 +02:00