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treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500 Based on 2 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation # extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2019-06-04 10:11:33 +02:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: add Intel Mobile Communications copyright Our legal structure changed at some point (see wikipedia), but we forgot to immediately switch over to the new copyright notice. For files that we have modified in the time since the change, add the proper copyright notice now. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2014-09-03 15:24:57 +03:00
mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything When a key is reinstalled we can reset the replay counters etc. which can lead to nonce reuse and/or replay detection being impossible, breaking security properties, as described in the "KRACK attacks". In particular, CVE-2017-13080 applies to GTK rekeying that happened in firmware while the host is in D3, with the second part of the attack being done after the host wakes up. In this case, the wpa_supplicant mitigation isn't sufficient since wpa_supplicant doesn't know the GTK material. In case this happens, simply silently accept the new key coming from userspace but don't take any action on it since it's the same key; this keeps the PN replay counters intact. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-09-05 14:54:54 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove ieee80211_remove_key It is no longer used, remove it. Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250721091956.e964ceacd85c.Idecab8ef161fa58e000b3969bc936399284b79f0@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-07-21 09:20:03 +03:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: Do not include crypto/algapi.h The header file crypto/algapi.h is for internal use only. Use the header file crypto/utils.h instead. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/E1qYlA0-006vFr-Ts@formenos.hmeau.com Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-23 18:32:25 +08:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
[MAC80211]: fix race conditions with keys During receive processing, we select the key long before using it and because there's no locking it is possible that we kfree() the key after having selected it but before using it for crypto operations. Obviously, this is bad. Secondly, during transmit processing, there are two possible races: We have a similar race between select_key() and using it for encryption, but we also have a race here between select_key() and hardware encryption (both when a key is removed.) This patch solves these issues by using RCU: when a key is to be freed, we first remove the pointer from the appropriate places (sdata->keys, sdata->default_key, sta->key) using rcu_assign_pointer() and then synchronize_rcu(). Then, we can safely kfree() the key and remove it from the hardware. There's a window here where the hardware may still be using it for decryption, but we can't work around that without having two hardware callbacks, one to disable the key for RX and one to disable it for TX; but the worst thing that will happen is that we receive a packet decrypted that we don't find a key for any more and then drop it. When we add a key, we first need to upload it to the hardware and then, using rcu_assign_pointer() again, link it into our structures. In the code using keys (TX/RX paths) we use rcu_dereference() to get the key and enclose the whole tx/rx section in a rcu_read_lock() ... rcu_read_unlock() block. Because we've uploaded the key to hardware before linking it into internal structures, we can guarantee that it is valid once get to into tx(). One possible race condition remains, however: when we have hardware acceleration enabled and the driver shuts down the queues, we end up queueing the frame. If now somebody removes the key, the key will be removed from hwaccel and then then driver will be asked to encrypt the frame with a key index that has been removed. Hence, drivers will need to be aware that the hw_key_index they are passed might not be under all circumstances. Most drivers will, however, simply ignore that condition and encrypt the frame with the selected key anyway, this only results in a frame being encrypted with a wrong key or dropped (rightfully) because the key was not valid. There isn't much we can do about it unless we want to walk the pending frame queue every time a key is removed and remove all frames that used it. This race condition, however, will most likely be solved once we add multiqueue support to mac80211 because then frames will be queued further up the stack instead of after being processed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-09-14 11:10:24 -04:00
mac80211: split ieee80211_key_alloc/free In order to RCU-ify sta_info, we need to be able to allocate a key without linking it to an sdata/sta structure (because allocation cannot be done in an rcu critical section). This patch splits up ieee80211_key_alloc() and updates all users appropriately. While at it, this patch fixes a number of race conditions such as finally making key replacement atomic, unfortunately at the expense of more complex code. Note that this patch documents /existing/ bugs with sta info and key interaction, there is currently a race condition when a sta info is freed without holding the RTNL. This will finally be fixed by a followup patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-02-25 16:27:45 +01:00
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 17:04:11 +09:00
net: Add export.h for EXPORT_SYMBOL/THIS_MODULE to non-modules These files are non modular, but need to export symbols using the macros now living in export.h -- call out the include so that things won't break when we remove the implicit presence of module.h from everywhere. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
2011-07-15 11:47:34 -04:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
move asm/unaligned.h to linux/unaligned.h asm/unaligned.h is always an include of asm-generic/unaligned.h; might as well move that thing to linux/unaligned.h and include that - there's nothing arch-specific in that header. auto-generated by the following: for i in `git grep -l -w asm/unaligned.h`; do sed -i -e "s/asm\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i done for i in `git grep -l -w asm-generic/unaligned.h`; do sed -i -e "s/asm-generic\/unaligned.h/linux\/unaligned.h/" $i done git mv include/asm-generic/unaligned.h include/linux/unaligned.h git mv tools/include/asm-generic/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h sed -i -e "/unaligned.h/d" include/asm-generic/Kbuild sed -i -e "s/__ASM_GENERIC/__LINUX/" include/linux/unaligned.h tools/include/linux/unaligned.h
2024-10-01 15:35:57 -04:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
mac80211: add driver ops wrappers In order to later add tracing or verifications to the driver calls mac80211 makes, this patch adds static inline wrappers for all operations. All calls are now written as drv_<op>(local, ...); instead of local->ops-><op>(&local->hw, ...); Where necessary, the wrappers also do existence checking and return default values as appropriate. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-04-23 18:52:52 +02:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:09 +02:00
mac80111: Add GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure GCMP and GCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [remove a spurious newline] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:06 +02:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: add documentation book Quite a while ago I started this book. The required kernel-doc patches have since gone into the tree so it is now possible to build the book in mainline. The actual documentation is still rather incomplete and not all things are linked into the book, but this enables us to edit the documentation collaboratively, hopefully driver authors can add documentation based on their experience with mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-02-26 14:34:06 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: fix some key comments and code The key documentation is slightly out of date, fix that. Also, the list entry in the key struct is no longer used that way, so list_del_init() isn't necessary any more there. Finally, ieee80211_key_link() is no longer invoked under RCU read lock, but rather with an appropriate station lock held. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-01-03 19:51:09 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: fix some key comments and code The key documentation is slightly out of date, fix that. Also, the list entry in the key struct is no longer used that way, so list_del_init() isn't necessary any more there. Finally, ieee80211_key_link() is no longer invoked under RCU read lock, but rather with an appropriate station lock held. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-01-03 19:51:09 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: fix locking in update_vlan_tailroom_need_count() Unfortunately, Michal's change to fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom caused a locking issue that was reported by lockdep, but only in a few cases - the issue was a classic ABBA deadlock caused by taking the mtx after the key_mtx, where normally they're taken the other way around. As the key mutex protects the field in question (I'm adding a few annotations to make that clear) only the iteration needs to be protected, but we can also iterate the interface list with just RCU protection while holding the key mutex. Fixes: f9dca80b98ca ("mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-17 13:54:54 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: fix locking in update_vlan_tailroom_need_count() Unfortunately, Michal's change to fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom caused a locking issue that was reported by lockdep, but only in a few cases - the issue was a classic ABBA deadlock caused by taking the mtx after the key_mtx, where normally they're taken the other way around. As the key mutex protects the field in question (I'm adding a few annotations to make that clear) only the iteration needs to be protected, but we can also iterate the interface list with just RCU protection while holding the key mutex. Fixes: f9dca80b98ca ("mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-17 13:54:54 +02:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: fix locking in update_vlan_tailroom_need_count() Unfortunately, Michal's change to fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom caused a locking issue that was reported by lockdep, but only in a few cases - the issue was a classic ABBA deadlock caused by taking the mtx after the key_mtx, where normally they're taken the other way around. As the key mutex protects the field in question (I'm adding a few annotations to make that clear) only the iteration needs to be protected, but we can also iterate the interface list with just RCU protection while holding the key mutex. Fixes: f9dca80b98ca ("mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-17 13:54:54 +02:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices with race fix Based on inputs from Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> from http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/68193 and http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/71702 In xmit path, devices that do full hardware crypto (including MMIC and ICV) need no tailroom. For such devices, tailroom reservation can be skipped if all the keys are programmed into the hardware (i.e software crypto is not used for any of the keys) and none of the keys wants software to generate Michael MIC and IV. v2: Added check for IV along with MMIC. Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Tested-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> Cc: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> v3: Fixing races to avoid WARNING: at net/mac80211/wpa.c:397 ccmp_encrypt_skb+0xc4/0x1f0 Reported-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> Tested-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> v4: Added links with message ID Signed-off-by: Yogesh Ashok Powar <yogeshp@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-06-28 18:41:37 +05:30
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: fix locking in update_vlan_tailroom_need_count() Unfortunately, Michal's change to fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom caused a locking issue that was reported by lockdep, but only in a few cases - the issue was a classic ABBA deadlock caused by taking the mtx after the key_mtx, where normally they're taken the other way around. As the key mutex protects the field in question (I'm adding a few annotations to make that clear) only the iteration needs to be protected, but we can also iterate the interface list with just RCU protection while holding the key mutex. Fixes: f9dca80b98ca ("mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-17 13:54:54 +02:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices with race fix Based on inputs from Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> from http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/68193 and http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/71702 In xmit path, devices that do full hardware crypto (including MMIC and ICV) need no tailroom. For such devices, tailroom reservation can be skipped if all the keys are programmed into the hardware (i.e software crypto is not used for any of the keys) and none of the keys wants software to generate Michael MIC and IV. v2: Added check for IV along with MMIC. Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Tested-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> Cc: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> v3: Fixing races to avoid WARNING: at net/mac80211/wpa.c:397 ccmp_encrypt_skb+0xc4/0x1f0 Reported-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> Tested-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> v4: Added links with message ID Signed-off-by: Yogesh Ashok Powar <yogeshp@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-06-28 18:41:37 +05:30
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: fix locking in update_vlan_tailroom_need_count() Unfortunately, Michal's change to fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom caused a locking issue that was reported by lockdep, but only in a few cases - the issue was a classic ABBA deadlock caused by taking the mtx after the key_mtx, where normally they're taken the other way around. As the key mutex protects the field in question (I'm adding a few annotations to make that clear) only the iteration needs to be protected, but we can also iterate the interface list with just RCU protection while holding the key mutex. Fixes: f9dca80b98ca ("mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-06-17 13:54:54 +02:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: allow vendor specific cipher suites Allow drivers to specify their own set of cipher suites to advertise vendor-specific ciphers. The driver is then required to implement hardware crypto offload for it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Juuso Oikarinen <juuso.oikarinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-27 14:26:52 +03:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices In the current implementation, mac80211 advertises the support of AP_VLANs based on the driver's support for AP mode; it also blocks encrypted AP_VLAN operation on devices advertising SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL. The implementation seems weird in it's current form and could be often confusing, this is because there can be drivers advertising both SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL and AP mode support (ex: ath10k) in which case AP_VLAN will still be supported but only in open BSS and not in secured BSS. When SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL is enabled, it makes more sense if the decision to support AP_VLANs is left to the driver. Mac80211 can then allow AP_VLAN operations depending on the driver support. Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-03-28 18:34:19 +05:30
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
mac80211: allow drivers to control software crypto Some drivers unfortunately cannot support software crypto, but mac80211 currently assumes that they do. This has the issue that if the hardware enabling fails for some reason, the software fallback is used, which won't work. This clearly isn't desirable, the error should be reported and the key setting refused. Support this in mac80211 by allowing drivers to set a new HW flag IEEE80211_HW_SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL, in which case mac80211 will only allow software fallback if the set_key() method returns 1. The driver will also need to advertise supported cipher suites so that mac80211 doesn't advertise any (future) software ciphers that the driver can't actually do. While at it, to make it easier to support this, refactor the ieee80211_init_cipher_suites() code. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-22 18:44:19 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: don't remove tainted keys after not programming When a key is tainted during resume, it is no longer programmed into the device; however, it's uploaded flag may (will) be set. Clear the flag when not programming it because it's tainted to avoid attempting to remove it again later. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2014-10-13 13:43:29 +02:00
mac80211: Optimize tailroom_needed update checks Optimize/cleanup the delay tailroom checks and adds one missing tailroom update. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-16 21:44:43 +01:00
mac80211: don't remove tainted keys after not programming When a key is tainted during resume, it is no longer programmed into the device; however, it's uploaded flag may (will) be set. Clear the flag when not programming it because it's tainted to avoid attempting to remove it again later. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2014-10-13 13:43:29 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80211: don't remove tainted keys after not programming When a key is tainted during resume, it is no longer programmed into the device; however, it's uploaded flag may (will) be set. Clear the flag when not programming it because it's tainted to avoid attempting to remove it again later. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2014-10-13 13:43:29 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs This adds API to allow adding per-station GTKs, updates mac80211 to support it, and also allows drivers to remove a key from hwaccel again when this may be necessary due to multiple GTKs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-10-05 19:39:30 +02:00
mac80211: allow vendor specific cipher suites Allow drivers to specify their own set of cipher suites to advertise vendor-specific ciphers. The driver is then required to implement hardware crypto offload for it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Juuso Oikarinen <juuso.oikarinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-27 14:26:52 +03:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
mac80211: clean up set_key callback The set_key callback now seems rather odd, passing a MAC address instead of a station struct, and a local address instead of a vif struct. Change that. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> [ath5k] Acked-by: Ivo van Doorn <ivdoorn@gmail.com> [rt2x00] Acked-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@web.de> [p54] Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kalle.valo@nokia.com> [iwl3945] Tested-by: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org> [iwl3945] Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-12-29 12:55:09 +01:00
cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs This adds API to allow adding per-station GTKs, updates mac80211 to support it, and also allows drivers to remove a key from hwaccel again when this may be necessary due to multiple GTKs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-10-05 19:39:30 +02:00
mac80211: convert HW flags to unsigned long bitmap As we're running out of hardware capability flags pretty quickly, convert them to use the regular test_bit() style unsigned long bitmaps. This introduces a number of helper functions/macros to set and to test the bits, along with new debugfs code. The occurrences of an explicit __clear_bit() are intentional, the drivers were never supposed to change their supported bits on the fly. We should investigate changing this to be a per-frame flag. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-06-02 21:39:54 +02:00
cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs This adds API to allow adding per-station GTKs, updates mac80211 to support it, and also allows drivers to remove a key from hwaccel again when this may be necessary due to multiple GTKs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-10-05 19:39:30 +02:00
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
mac80211: Disable hw crypto for GTKs on AP VLAN interfaces When using AP VLAN interfaces, each VLAN interface should be in its own broadcast domain. Hostapd achieves this by assigning different GTKs to different AP VLAN interfaces. However, mac80211 drivers are not aware of AP VLAN interfaces and as such mac80211 sends the GTK to the driver in the context of the base AP mode interface. This causes problems when multiple AP VLAN interfaces are used since the driver will use the same key slot for the different GTKs (there's no way for the driver to distinguish the different GTKs from different AP VLAN interfaces). Thus, only the clients associated to one AP VLAN interface (the one that was created last) can actually use broadcast traffic. Fix this by not programming any GTKs for AP VLAN interfaces into the hw but fall back to using software crypto. The GTK for the underlying AP interface is still sent to the driver. That means, broadcast traffic to stations associated to an AP VLAN interface is encrypted in software whereas broadcast traffic to stations associated to the non-VLAN AP interface is encrypted in hardware. Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Helmut Schaa <helmut.schaa@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-11-19 08:11:01 +01:00
mac80211: Honor SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL for unicast keys in AP VLAN mode Restore SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL operation on AP_VLAN interfaces for unicast keys, the original override was intended to be done for group keys as those are treated specially by mac80211 and would always have been rejected. Now the situation is that AP_VLAN support must be enabled by the driver if it can support it (meaning it can support software crypto GTK TX). Thus, also simplify the code - if we get here with AP_VLAN and non- pairwise key, software crypto must be used (driver doesn't know about the interface) and can be used (driver must've advertised AP_VLAN if it also uses SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL). Fixes: db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices") Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-02-09 15:01:38 +01:00
mac80211: Disable hw crypto for GTKs on AP VLAN interfaces When using AP VLAN interfaces, each VLAN interface should be in its own broadcast domain. Hostapd achieves this by assigning different GTKs to different AP VLAN interfaces. However, mac80211 drivers are not aware of AP VLAN interfaces and as such mac80211 sends the GTK to the driver in the context of the base AP mode interface. This causes problems when multiple AP VLAN interfaces are used since the driver will use the same key slot for the different GTKs (there's no way for the driver to distinguish the different GTKs from different AP VLAN interfaces). Thus, only the clients associated to one AP VLAN interface (the one that was created last) can actually use broadcast traffic. Fix this by not programming any GTKs for AP VLAN interfaces into the hw but fall back to using software crypto. The GTK for the underlying AP interface is still sent to the driver. That means, broadcast traffic to stations associated to an AP VLAN interface is encrypted in software whereas broadcast traffic to stations associated to the non-VLAN AP interface is encrypted in hardware. Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Helmut Schaa <helmut.schaa@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-11-19 08:11:01 +01:00
mac80211: Honor SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL for unicast keys in AP VLAN mode Restore SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL operation on AP_VLAN interfaces for unicast keys, the original override was intended to be done for group keys as those are treated specially by mac80211 and would always have been rejected. Now the situation is that AP_VLAN support must be enabled by the driver if it can support it (meaning it can support software crypto GTK TX). Thus, also simplify the code - if we get here with AP_VLAN and non- pairwise key, software crypto must be used (driver doesn't know about the interface) and can be used (driver must've advertised AP_VLAN if it also uses SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL). Fixes: db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices") Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-02-09 15:01:38 +01:00
mac80211: Disable hw crypto for GTKs on AP VLAN interfaces When using AP VLAN interfaces, each VLAN interface should be in its own broadcast domain. Hostapd achieves this by assigning different GTKs to different AP VLAN interfaces. However, mac80211 drivers are not aware of AP VLAN interfaces and as such mac80211 sends the GTK to the driver in the context of the base AP mode interface. This causes problems when multiple AP VLAN interfaces are used since the driver will use the same key slot for the different GTKs (there's no way for the driver to distinguish the different GTKs from different AP VLAN interfaces). Thus, only the clients associated to one AP VLAN interface (the one that was created last) can actually use broadcast traffic. Fix this by not programming any GTKs for AP VLAN interfaces into the hw but fall back to using software crypto. The GTK for the underlying AP interface is still sent to the driver. That means, broadcast traffic to stations associated to an AP VLAN interface is encrypted in software whereas broadcast traffic to stations associated to the non-VLAN AP interface is encrypted in hardware. Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Helmut Schaa <helmut.schaa@googlemail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-11-19 08:11:01 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
wifi: mac80211: isolate driver from inactive links In order to let the driver select active links and properly make multi-link connections, as a first step isolate the driver from inactive links, and set the active links to be only the association link for client-side interfaces. For AP side nothing changes since APs always have to have all their links active. To simplify things, update the for_each_sta_active_link() API to include the appropriate vif pointer. This also implies not allocating a chanctx for an inactive link, which requires a few more changes. Since we now no longer try to program multiple links to the driver, remove the check in the MLME code. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-09-02 16:12:42 +02:00
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs This adds API to allow adding per-station GTKs, updates mac80211 to support it, and also allows drivers to remove a key from hwaccel again when this may be necessary due to multiple GTKs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-10-05 19:39:30 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices with race fix Based on inputs from Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> from http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/68193 and http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/71702 In xmit path, devices that do full hardware crypto (including MMIC and ICV) need no tailroom. For such devices, tailroom reservation can be skipped if all the keys are programmed into the hardware (i.e software crypto is not used for any of the keys) and none of the keys wants software to generate Michael MIC and IV. v2: Added check for IV along with MMIC. Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Tested-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> Cc: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> v3: Fixing races to avoid WARNING: at net/mac80211/wpa.c:397 ccmp_encrypt_skb+0xc4/0x1f0 Reported-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> Tested-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> v4: Added links with message ID Signed-off-by: Yogesh Ashok Powar <yogeshp@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-06-28 18:41:37 +05:30
mac80211: Optimize tailroom_needed update checks Optimize/cleanup the delay tailroom checks and adds one missing tailroom update. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-16 21:44:43 +01:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices with race fix Based on inputs from Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> from http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/68193 and http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/71702 In xmit path, devices that do full hardware crypto (including MMIC and ICV) need no tailroom. For such devices, tailroom reservation can be skipped if all the keys are programmed into the hardware (i.e software crypto is not used for any of the keys) and none of the keys wants software to generate Michael MIC and IV. v2: Added check for IV along with MMIC. Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Tested-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> Cc: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> v3: Fixing races to avoid WARNING: at net/mac80211/wpa.c:397 ccmp_encrypt_skb+0xc4/0x1f0 Reported-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> Tested-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> v4: Added links with message ID Signed-off-by: Yogesh Ashok Powar <yogeshp@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-06-28 18:41:37 +05:30
mac80211: support adding IV-room in the skb for CCMP keys Some cards can generate CCMP IVs in HW, but require the space for the IV to be pre-allocated in the frame at the correct offset. Add a key flag that allows us to achieve this. Signed-off-by: Arik Nemtsov <arik@wizery.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-10-23 08:21:41 +02:00
mac80211: Add MIC space only for TX key option Add a key flag to indicates that the device only needs MIC space and not a real MIC. In such cases, keep the MIC zeroed for ease of debug. Signed-off-by: David Spinadel <david.spinadel@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-12-01 13:50:52 +02:00
cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs This adds API to allow adding per-station GTKs, updates mac80211 to support it, and also allows drivers to remove a key from hwaccel again when this may be necessary due to multiple GTKs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-10-05 19:39:30 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: allow drivers to control software crypto Some drivers unfortunately cannot support software crypto, but mac80211 currently assumes that they do. This has the issue that if the hardware enabling fails for some reason, the software fallback is used, which won't work. This clearly isn't desirable, the error should be reported and the key setting refused. Support this in mac80211 by allowing drivers to set a new HW flag IEEE80211_HW_SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL, in which case mac80211 will only allow software fallback if the set_key() method returns 1. The driver will also need to advertise supported cipher suites so that mac80211 doesn't advertise any (future) software ciphers that the driver can't actually do. While at it, to make it easier to support this, refactor the ieee80211_init_cipher_suites() code. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-22 18:44:19 +01:00
mac80211: clean up debugging There are a few things that make the logging and debugging in mac80211 less useful than it should be right now: * a lot of messages should be pr_info, not pr_debug * wholesale use of pr_debug makes it require *both* Kconfig and dynamic configuration * there are still a lot of ifdefs * the style is very inconsistent, sometimes the sdata->name is printed in front Clean up everything, introducing new macros and separating out the station MLME debugging into a new Kconfig symbol. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-06-22 11:29:50 +02:00
net/mac80211: Use wiphy_<level> Standardize logging messages from printk(KERN_<level> "%s: " fmt , wiphy_name(foo), args); to wiphy_<level>(foo, fmt, args); Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-20 16:25:38 -07:00
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
mac80211: allow vendor specific cipher suites Allow drivers to specify their own set of cipher suites to advertise vendor-specific ciphers. The driver is then required to implement hardware crypto offload for it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Juuso Oikarinen <juuso.oikarinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-27 14:26:52 +03:00
cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs This adds API to allow adding per-station GTKs, updates mac80211 to support it, and also allows drivers to remove a key from hwaccel again when this may be necessary due to multiple GTKs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-10-05 19:39:30 +02:00
mac80111: Add CCMP-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure CCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [squash ccmp256 -> mic_len argument change] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:07 +02:00
mac80211: fix 11w when using encapsulation offloading The 802.11 encapsulation returned early when setting up the keys in case offloading was enabled. This causes ieee802.11w to not work anymore. Fix this by moving the check for offloading into the switch/case construct and allowing CCMP/GCMP keys. With this patch applied ieee80211w works again when enabling offloading. Fixes: 50ff477a8639 ("mac80211: add 802.11 encapsulation offloading support") Reported-by: Maharaja Kennadyrajan <mkenna@qti.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: John Crispin <john@phrozen.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200203122812.18993-1-john@phrozen.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-03 13:28:12 +01:00
cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs This adds API to allow adding per-station GTKs, updates mac80211 to support it, and also allows drivers to remove a key from hwaccel again when this may be necessary due to multiple GTKs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-10-05 19:39:30 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-CMAC-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-CMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:08 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:09 +02:00
mac80211: allow drivers to control software crypto Some drivers unfortunately cannot support software crypto, but mac80211 currently assumes that they do. This has the issue that if the hardware enabling fails for some reason, the software fallback is used, which won't work. This clearly isn't desirable, the error should be reported and the key setting refused. Support this in mac80211 by allowing drivers to set a new HW flag IEEE80211_HW_SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL, in which case mac80211 will only allow software fallback if the set_key() method returns 1. The driver will also need to advertise supported cipher suites so that mac80211 doesn't advertise any (future) software ciphers that the driver can't actually do. While at it, to make it easier to support this, refactor the ieee80211_init_cipher_suites() code. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-22 18:44:19 +01:00
mac80211: Honor SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL for unicast keys in AP VLAN mode Restore SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL operation on AP_VLAN interfaces for unicast keys, the original override was intended to be done for group keys as those are treated specially by mac80211 and would always have been rejected. Now the situation is that AP_VLAN support must be enabled by the driver if it can support it (meaning it can support software crypto GTK TX). Thus, also simplify the code - if we get here with AP_VLAN and non- pairwise key, software crypto must be used (driver doesn't know about the interface) and can be used (driver must've advertised AP_VLAN if it also uses SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL). Fixes: db3bdcb9c3ff ("mac80211: allow AP_VLAN operation on crypto controlled devices") Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [rewrite commit message] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-02-09 15:01:38 +01:00
mac80211: allow drivers to control software crypto Some drivers unfortunately cannot support software crypto, but mac80211 currently assumes that they do. This has the issue that if the hardware enabling fails for some reason, the software fallback is used, which won't work. This clearly isn't desirable, the error should be reported and the key setting refused. Support this in mac80211 by allowing drivers to set a new HW flag IEEE80211_HW_SW_CRYPTO_CONTROL, in which case mac80211 will only allow software fallback if the set_key() method returns 1. The driver will also need to advertise supported cipher suites so that mac80211 doesn't advertise any (future) software ciphers that the driver can't actually do. While at it, to make it easier to support this, refactor the ieee80211_init_cipher_suites() code. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-22 18:44:19 +01:00
cfg80211/mac80211: allow per-station GTKs This adds API to allow adding per-station GTKs, updates mac80211 to support it, and also allows drivers to remove a key from hwaccel again when this may be necessary due to multiple GTKs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-10-05 19:39:30 +02:00
mac80211: allow vendor specific cipher suites Allow drivers to specify their own set of cipher suites to advertise vendor-specific ciphers. The driver is then required to implement hardware crypto offload for it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Juuso Oikarinen <juuso.oikarinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-27 14:26:52 +03:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: clean up set_key callback The set_key callback now seems rather odd, passing a MAC address instead of a station struct, and a local address instead of a vif struct. Change that. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> [ath5k] Acked-by: Ivo van Doorn <ivdoorn@gmail.com> [rt2x00] Acked-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@web.de> [p54] Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kalle.valo@nokia.com> [iwl3945] Tested-by: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org> [iwl3945] Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-12-29 12:55:09 +01:00
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: split ieee80211_key_alloc/free In order to RCU-ify sta_info, we need to be able to allocate a key without linking it to an sdata/sta structure (because allocation cannot be done in an rcu critical section). This patch splits up ieee80211_key_alloc() and updates all users appropriately. While at it, this patch fixes a number of race conditions such as finally making key replacement atomic, unfortunately at the expense of more complex code. Note that this patch documents /existing/ bugs with sta info and key interaction, there is currently a race condition when a sta info is freed without holding the RTNL. This will finally be fixed by a followup patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-02-25 16:27:45 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: simplify key locking Since I recently made station management able to sleep, I can now rework key management as well; since it will no longer need a spinlock and can also use a mutex instead, a bunch of code to allow drivers' set_key to sleep while key management is protected by a spinlock can now be removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-06-01 10:19:19 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
mac80211: clean up set_key callback The set_key callback now seems rather odd, passing a MAC address instead of a station struct, and a local address instead of a vif struct. Change that. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Bob Copeland <me@bobcopeland.com> [ath5k] Acked-by: Ivo van Doorn <ivdoorn@gmail.com> [rt2x00] Acked-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@web.de> [p54] Tested-by: Kalle Valo <kalle.valo@nokia.com> [iwl3945] Tested-by: Samuel Ortiz <samuel@sortiz.org> [iwl3945] Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-12-29 12:55:09 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: isolate driver from inactive links In order to let the driver select active links and properly make multi-link connections, as a first step isolate the driver from inactive links, and set the active links to be only the association link for client-side interfaces. For AP side nothing changes since APs always have to have all their links active. To simplify things, update the for_each_sta_active_link() API to include the appropriate vif pointer. This also implies not allocating a chanctx for an inactive link, which requires a few more changes. Since we now no longer try to program multiple links to the driver, remove the check in the MLME code. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-09-02 16:12:42 +02:00
mac80211: Optimize tailroom_needed update checks Optimize/cleanup the delay tailroom checks and adds one missing tailroom update. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-16 21:44:43 +01:00
mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices with race fix Based on inputs from Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> from http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/68193 and http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/71702 In xmit path, devices that do full hardware crypto (including MMIC and ICV) need no tailroom. For such devices, tailroom reservation can be skipped if all the keys are programmed into the hardware (i.e software crypto is not used for any of the keys) and none of the keys wants software to generate Michael MIC and IV. v2: Added check for IV along with MMIC. Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Tested-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> Cc: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> v3: Fixing races to avoid WARNING: at net/mac80211/wpa.c:397 ccmp_encrypt_skb+0xc4/0x1f0 Reported-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> Tested-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> v4: Added links with message ID Signed-off-by: Yogesh Ashok Powar <yogeshp@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-06-28 18:41:37 +05:30
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: trace interface name It's not all that useful to have the vif/sdata pointer, we'd rather refer to the interfaces by their name. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-11-25 20:30:31 +01:00
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: clean up debugging There are a few things that make the logging and debugging in mac80211 less useful than it should be right now: * a lot of messages should be pr_info, not pr_debug * wholesale use of pr_debug makes it require *both* Kconfig and dynamic configuration * there are still a lot of ifdefs * the style is very inconsistent, sometimes the sdata->name is printed in front Clean up everything, introducing new macros and separating out the station MLME debugging into a new Kconfig symbol. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-06-22 11:29:50 +02:00
net/mac80211: Use wiphy_<level> Standardize logging messages from printk(KERN_<level> "%s: " fmt , wiphy_name(foo), args); to wiphy_<level>(foo, fmt, args); Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-20 16:25:38 -07:00
mac80211: dont program keys for stations not uploaded If a station couldn't be uploaded to the driver but is still kept (only in IBSS mode) we still shouldn't try to program the keys for it into hardware; fix this bug by skipping the key upload in this case. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2012-01-20 13:55:19 +01:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore. This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the frames are still on the TXQ. Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption. With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this behaviour on a key being configured. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-03-26 15:09:42 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore. This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the frames are still on the TXQ. Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption. With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this behaviour on a key being configured. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-03-26 15:09:42 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore. This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the frames are still on the TXQ. Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption. With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this behaviour on a key being configured. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-03-26 15:09:42 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for rekeys with Extended Key ID Extended Key ID allows A-MPDU sessions while rekeying as long as each A-MPDU aggregates only MPDUs with one keyid together. Drivers able to segregate MPDUs accordingly can tell mac80211 to not stop A-MPDU sessions when rekeying by setting the new flag IEEE80211_HW_AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190629195015.19680-3-alexander@wetzel-home.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-06-29 21:50:14 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore. This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the frames are still on the TXQ. Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption. With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this behaviour on a key being configured. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-03-26 15:09:42 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for rekeys with Extended Key ID Extended Key ID allows A-MPDU sessions while rekeying as long as each A-MPDU aggregates only MPDUs with one keyid together. Drivers able to segregate MPDUs accordingly can tell mac80211 to not stop A-MPDU sessions when rekeying by setting the new flag IEEE80211_HW_AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190629195015.19680-3-alexander@wetzel-home.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-06-29 21:50:14 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Simplify Extended Key ID API 1) Drop IEEE80211_HW_EXT_KEY_ID_NATIVE and let drivers directly set the NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID flag. 2) Drop IEEE80211_HW_NO_AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT and simply assume all drivers are unable to handle A-MPDU key borders. The new Extended Key ID API now requires all mac80211 drivers to set NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_EXT_KEY_ID when they implement set_key() and can handle Extended Key ID. For drivers not providing set_key() mac80211 itself enables Extended Key ID support, using the internal SW crypto services. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190629195015.19680-2-alexander@wetzel-home.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-06-29 21:50:13 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for rekeys with Extended Key ID Extended Key ID allows A-MPDU sessions while rekeying as long as each A-MPDU aggregates only MPDUs with one keyid together. Drivers able to segregate MPDUs accordingly can tell mac80211 to not stop A-MPDU sessions when rekeying by setting the new flag IEEE80211_HW_AMPDU_KEYBORDER_SUPPORT. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190629195015.19680-3-alexander@wetzel-home.de Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-06-29 21:50:14 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove ampdu_mlme.mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the A-MPDU locking, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:04 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: simplify key locking Since I recently made station management able to sleep, I can now rework key management as well; since it will no longer need a spinlock and can also use a mutex instead, a bunch of code to allow drivers' set_key to sleep while key management is protected by a spinlock can now be removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-06-01 10:19:19 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reorg some iface data structs for MLD Start reorganizing interface related data structures toward MLD. The most complex part here is for the keys, since we have to split the various kinds of GTKs off to the link but still need to use (for WEP) the other keys as a fallback even for multicast frames. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-16 15:00:15 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reorg some iface data structs for MLD Start reorganizing interface related data structures toward MLD. The most complex part here is for the keys, since we have to split the various kinds of GTKs off to the link but still need to use (for WEP) the other keys as a fallback even for multicast frames. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-16 15:00:15 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reorg some iface data structs for MLD Start reorganizing interface related data structures toward MLD. The most complex part here is for the keys, since we have to split the various kinds of GTKs off to the link but still need to use (for WEP) the other keys as a fallback even for multicast frames. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-16 15:00:15 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: add op to configure default key id There are hardwares which support offload of data packets for example when auto ARP is enabled the hw will send the ARP response. In such cases if WEP encryption is configured the hw must know the default WEP key in order to encrypt the packets correctly. When hw_accel is enabled and encryption type is set to WEP, the driver should get the default key index from mac80211. Signed-off-by: Yoni Divinsky <yoni.divinsky@ti.com> [cleanups, fixes, documentation] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-05-30 11:36:39 +03:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
mac80211: add TX fastpath In order to speed up mac80211's TX path, add the "fast-xmit" cache that will cache the data frame 802.11 header and other data to be able to build the frame more quickly. This cache is rebuilt when external triggers imply changes, but a lot of the checks done per packet today are simplified away to the check for the cache. There's also a more detailed description in the code. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-03-21 15:25:43 +01:00
mac80211: don't call drv_set_default_unicast_key() for VLANs Since drivers know nothing about AP_VLAN interfaces, trying to call drv_set_default_unicast_key() just results in a warning and no call to the driver. Avoid the warning by not calling the driver for this on AP_VLAN interfaces. This means that drivers that somehow need this call for AP mode will fail to work properly in the presence of VLAN interfaces, but the current drivers don't seem to use it, and mac80211 will select and indicate the key - so drivers should be OK now. Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2016-12-13 09:39:18 +01:00
mac80211: add op to configure default key id There are hardwares which support offload of data packets for example when auto ARP is enabled the hw will send the ARP response. In such cases if WEP encryption is configured the hw must know the default WEP key in order to encrypt the packets correctly. When hw_accel is enabled and encryption type is set to WEP, the driver should get the default key index from mac80211. Signed-off-by: Yoni Divinsky <yoni.divinsky@ti.com> [cleanups, fixes, documentation] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-05-30 11:36:39 +03:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: simplify key locking Since I recently made station management able to sleep, I can now rework key management as well; since it will no longer need a spinlock and can also use a mutex instead, a bunch of code to allow drivers' set_key to sleep while key management is protected by a spinlock can now be removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-06-01 10:19:19 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reject WEP or pairwise keys with key ID > 3 We don't really care too much right now since our data structures are set up to not have a problem with this, but clearly it's wrong to accept WEP and pairwise keys with key ID > 3. However, with MLD we need to split into per-link (GTK, IGTK, BIGTK) and per interface/MLD (including WEP) keys so make sure this is not a problem. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-19 17:57:53 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: verify ieee80211_key_replace() arguments There's no code calling ieee80211_key_replace() with both arguments NULL and it wouldn't make sense, but in the interest of maintainability add a warning for it. As a side effect, this also shuts up a smatch warning. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-10-29 10:00:08 +01:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: verify ieee80211_key_replace() arguments There's no code calling ieee80211_key_replace() with both arguments NULL and it wouldn't make sense, but in the interest of maintainability add a warning for it. As a side effect, this also shuts up a smatch warning. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-10-29 10:00:08 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: reject WEP or pairwise keys with key ID > 3 We don't really care too much right now since our data structures are set up to not have a problem with this, but clearly it's wrong to accept WEP and pairwise keys with key ID > 3. However, with MLD we need to split into per-link (GTK, IGTK, BIGTK) and per interface/MLD (including WEP) keys so make sure this is not a problem. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-19 17:57:53 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reject WEP or pairwise keys with key ID > 3 We don't really care too much right now since our data structures are set up to not have a problem with this, but clearly it's wrong to accept WEP and pairwise keys with key ID > 3. However, with MLD we need to split into per-link (GTK, IGTK, BIGTK) and per interface/MLD (including WEP) keys so make sure this is not a problem. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-19 17:57:53 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove sta_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the sta_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reject WEP or pairwise keys with key ID > 3 We don't really care too much right now since our data structures are set up to not have a problem with this, but clearly it's wrong to accept WEP and pairwise keys with key ID > 3. However, with MLD we need to split into per-link (GTK, IGTK, BIGTK) and per interface/MLD (including WEP) keys so make sure this is not a problem. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-19 17:57:53 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support This adds generic cipher scheme support to mac80211, such schemes are fully under control by the driver. On hw registration drivers may specify additional HW ciphers with a scheme how these ciphers have to be handled by mac80211 TX/RR. A cipher scheme specifies a cipher suite value, a size of the security header to be added to or stripped from frames and how the PN is to be verified on RX. Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-24 14:23:27 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: AMPDU handling for Extended Key ID IEEE 802.11 - 2016 forbids mixing MPDUs with different keyIDs in one A-MPDU. Drivers supporting A-MPDUs and Extended Key ID must actively enforce that requirement due to the available two unicast keyIDs. Allow driver to signal mac80211 that they will not check the keyID in MPDUs when aggregating them and that they expect mac80211 to stop Tx aggregation when rekeying a connection using Extended Key ID. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-05-06 21:01:48 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: fix key tailroom accounting leak For keys added by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(), we assume that they're already present in the hardware and set the flag KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. However, setting this flag needs to be paired with decrementing the tailroom needed, which was missed. Fixes: f52a0b408ed1 ("wifi: mac80211: mark keys as uploaded when added by the driver") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251019115358.c88eafb4083e.I69e9d4d78a756a133668c55b5570cf15a4b0e6a4@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-10-19 11:54:27 +03:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: fix key tailroom accounting leak For keys added by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(), we assume that they're already present in the hardware and set the flag KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. However, setting this flag needs to be paired with decrementing the tailroom needed, which was missed. Fixes: f52a0b408ed1 ("wifi: mac80211: mark keys as uploaded when added by the driver") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251019115358.c88eafb4083e.I69e9d4d78a756a133668c55b5570cf15a4b0e6a4@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-10-19 11:54:27 +03:00
wifi: mac80211: mark keys as uploaded when added by the driver When the driver has some form of GTK rekeying offload, e.g. during WoWLAN, mac80211 can assume that keys that the driver adds for that are already present in the hardware acceleration. Mark them accordingly. Signed-off-by: Yedidya Benshimol <yedidya.ben.shimol@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230621144414.bc78c7ff2a3d.I5e313d69e2b6a7a4766ef82d0faa122dd4c1c46d@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-06-21 14:44:36 +03:00
wifi: mac80211: fix key tailroom accounting leak For keys added by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(), we assume that they're already present in the hardware and set the flag KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. However, setting this flag needs to be paired with decrementing the tailroom needed, which was missed. Fixes: f52a0b408ed1 ("wifi: mac80211: mark keys as uploaded when added by the driver") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251019115358.c88eafb4083e.I69e9d4d78a756a133668c55b5570cf15a4b0e6a4@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-10-19 11:54:27 +03:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support This adds generic cipher scheme support to mac80211, such schemes are fully under control by the driver. On hw registration drivers may specify additional HW ciphers with a scheme how these ciphers have to be handled by mac80211 TX/RR. A cipher scheme specifies a cipher suite value, a size of the security header to be added to or stripped from frames and how the PN is to be verified on RX. Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-24 14:23:27 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support This adds generic cipher scheme support to mac80211, such schemes are fully under control by the driver. On hw registration drivers may specify additional HW ciphers with a scheme how these ciphers have to be handled by mac80211 TX/RR. A cipher scheme specifies a cipher suite value, a size of the security header to be added to or stripped from frames and how the PN is to be verified on RX. Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-24 14:23:27 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
mac80211: drop data frames without key on encrypted links If we know that we have an encrypted link (based on having had a key configured for TX in the past) then drop all data frames in the key selection handler if there's no key anymore. This fixes an issue with mac80211 internal TXQs - there we can buffer frames for an encrypted link, but then if the key is no longer there when they're dequeued, the frames are sent without encryption. This happens if a station is disconnected while the frames are still on the TXQ. Detecting that a link should be encrypted based on a first key having been configured for TX is fine as there are no use cases for a connection going from with encryption to no encryption. With extended key IDs, however, there is a case of having a key configured for only decryption, so we can't just trigger this behaviour on a key being configured. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20200326150855.6865c7f28a14.I9fb1d911b064262d33e33dfba730cdeef83926ca@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-03-26 15:09:42 +02:00
mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support This adds generic cipher scheme support to mac80211, such schemes are fully under control by the driver. On hw registration drivers may specify additional HW ciphers with a scheme how these ciphers have to be handled by mac80211 TX/RR. A cipher scheme specifies a cipher suite value, a size of the security header to be added to or stripped from frames and how the PN is to be verified on RX. Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-24 14:23:27 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support This adds generic cipher scheme support to mac80211, such schemes are fully under control by the driver. On hw registration drivers may specify additional HW ciphers with a scheme how these ciphers have to be handled by mac80211 TX/RR. A cipher scheme specifies a cipher suite value, a size of the security header to be added to or stripped from frames and how the PN is to be verified on RX. Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-24 14:23:27 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: sparse RCU annotations This adds sparse RCU annotations to most of mac80211, only the mesh code remains to be done. Due the the previous patches, the annotations are pretty simple. The only thing that this actually changes is removing the RCU usage of key->sta in debugfs since this pointer isn't actually an RCU-managed pointer (it only has a single assignment done before the key even goes live). As that is otherwise harmless, I decided to make it part of this patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-05-13 14:15:49 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: sparse RCU annotations This adds sparse RCU annotations to most of mac80211, only the mesh code remains to be done. Due the the previous patches, the annotations are pretty simple. The only thing that this actually changes is removing the RCU usage of key->sta in debugfs since this pointer isn't actually an RCU-managed pointer (it only has a single assignment done before the key even goes live). As that is otherwise harmless, I decided to make it part of this patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-05-13 14:15:49 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: sparse RCU annotations This adds sparse RCU annotations to most of mac80211, only the mesh code remains to be done. Due the the previous patches, the annotations are pretty simple. The only thing that this actually changes is removing the RCU usage of key->sta in debugfs since this pointer isn't actually an RCU-managed pointer (it only has a single assignment done before the key even goes live). As that is otherwise harmless, I decided to make it part of this patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-05-13 14:15:49 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reorg some iface data structs for MLD Start reorganizing interface related data structures toward MLD. The most complex part here is for the keys, since we have to split the various kinds of GTKs off to the link but still need to use (for WEP) the other keys as a fallback even for multicast frames. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-16 15:00:15 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reorg some iface data structs for MLD Start reorganizing interface related data structures toward MLD. The most complex part here is for the keys, since we have to split the various kinds of GTKs off to the link but still need to use (for WEP) the other keys as a fallback even for multicast frames. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-16 15:00:15 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: fix some key comments and code The key documentation is slightly out of date, fix that. Also, the list entry in the key struct is no longer used that way, so list_del_init() isn't necessary any more there. Finally, ieee80211_key_link() is no longer invoked under RCU read lock, but rather with an appropriate station lock held. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-01-03 19:51:09 +01:00
mac80211: add atomic uploaded keys iterator add ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu() to iterate over uploaded keys in atomic context (when rcu is locked) The station removal code removes the keys only after calling synchronize_net(), so it's not safe to iterate the keys at this point (and postponing the actual key deletion with call_rcu() might result in some badly-ordered ops calls). Add a flag to indicate a station is being removed, and skip the configured keys if it's set. Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-11-17 10:24:37 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support This adds generic cipher scheme support to mac80211, such schemes are fully under control by the driver. On hw registration drivers may specify additional HW ciphers with a scheme how these ciphers have to be handled by mac80211 TX/RR. A cipher scheme specifies a cipher suite value, a size of the security header to be added to or stripped from frames and how the PN is to be verified on RX. Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-24 14:23:27 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove cipher scheme support The only driver using this was iwlwifi, where we just removed the support because it was never really used. Remove the code from mac80211 as well. Change-Id: I1667417a5932315ee9d81f5c233c56a354923f09 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-02-09 13:14:26 +01:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
mac80211: Don't squash error codes in key setup functions ieee80211_add_key() currently returns -ENOMEM in case of any error, including a missing crypto algorithm. Change ieee80211_key_alloc() and ieee80211_aes_{key_setup_encrypt,cmac_key_setup}() to encode errors with ERR_PTR() rather than returning NULL, and change ieee80211_add_key() accordingly. Compile-tested only. Reported-by: Marcin Owsiany <porridge@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-01 17:37:03 +01:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
mac80211: remove BUG_ON usage These BUG_ON statements should never trigger, but in the unlikely event that somebody does manage don't stop everything but simply exit the code path with an error. Leave the one BUG_ON where changing it would result in a NULL pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2014-04-29 17:55:26 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
mac80211: Don't squash error codes in key setup functions ieee80211_add_key() currently returns -ENOMEM in case of any error, including a missing crypto algorithm. Change ieee80211_key_alloc() and ieee80211_aes_{key_setup_encrypt,cmac_key_setup}() to encode errors with ERR_PTR() rather than returning NULL, and change ieee80211_add_key() accordingly. Compile-tested only. Reported-by: Marcin Owsiany <porridge@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-01 17:37:03 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: use cipher suite selectors Currently, mac80211 translates the cfg80211 cipher suite selectors into ALG_* values. That isn't all too useful, and some drivers benefit from the distinction between WEP40 and WEP104 as well. Therefore, convert it all to use the cipher suite selectors. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Acked-by: Gertjan van Wingerde <gwingerde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:38 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: use cipher suite selectors Currently, mac80211 translates the cfg80211 cipher suite selectors into ALG_* values. That isn't all too useful, and some drivers benefit from the distinction between WEP40 and WEP104 as well. Therefore, convert it all to use the cipher suite selectors. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Acked-by: Gertjan van Wingerde <gwingerde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:38 +02:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
mac80211: free up 2 bytes in skb->cb Free up 2 bytes in skb->cb to be used for multi-rate retry later. Move iv_len and icv_len initialization into key alloc. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-10-05 18:02:48 +02:00
mac80211: use cipher suite selectors Currently, mac80211 translates the cfg80211 cipher suite selectors into ALG_* values. That isn't all too useful, and some drivers benefit from the distinction between WEP40 and WEP104 as well. Therefore, convert it all to use the cipher suite selectors. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Acked-by: Gertjan van Wingerde <gwingerde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:38 +02:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
nl80211: Validate NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ length Validate RSC (NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ) length in nl80211/cfg80211 instead of having to do this in all the drivers. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni.malinen@atheros.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-05-15 12:38:32 +03:00
mac80211: introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS and use it Introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS in the generic 802.11 header file and use it in place of STA_TID_NUM and NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES which are both really the number of TIDs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-11-14 23:22:21 +01:00
nl80211: Add RSC configuration for new keys When setting a key with NL80211_CMD_NEW_KEY, we should allow the key sequence number (RSC) to be set in order to allow replay protection to work correctly for group keys. This patch documents this use for nl80211 and adds the couple of missing pieces in nl80211/cfg80211 and mac80211 to support this. In addition, WEXT SIOCSIWENCODEEXT compat processing in cfg80211 is extended to handle the RSC (this was already specified in WEXT, but just not implemented in cfg80211/mac80211). Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni.malinen@atheros.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-05-11 21:57:58 +03:00
mac80211: fix TKIP races, make API easier to use Our current TKIP code races against itself on TX since we can process multiple packets at the same time on different ACs, but they all share the TX context for TKIP. This can lead to bad IVs etc. Also, the crypto offload helper code just obtains the P1K/P2K from the cache, and can update it as well, but there's no guarantee that packets are really processed in order. To fix these issues, first introduce a spinlock that will protect the IV16/IV32 values in the TX context. This first step makes sure that we don't assign the same IV multiple times or get confused in other ways. Secondly, change the way the P1K cache works. I add a field "p1k_iv32" that stores the value of the IV32 when the P1K was last recomputed, and if different from the last time, then a new P1K is recomputed. This can cause the P1K computation to flip back and forth if packets are processed out of order. All this also happens under the new spinlock. Finally, because there are argument differences, split up the ieee80211_get_tkip_key() API into ieee80211_get_tkip_p1k() and ieee80211_get_tkip_p2k() and give them the correct arguments. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 22:28:01 +02:00
mac80211: free up 2 bytes in skb->cb Free up 2 bytes in skb->cb to be used for multi-rate retry later. Move iv_len and icv_len initialization into key alloc. Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-10-05 18:02:48 +02:00
mac80211: use cipher suite selectors Currently, mac80211 translates the cfg80211 cipher suite selectors into ALG_* values. That isn't all too useful, and some drivers benefit from the distinction between WEP40 and WEP104 as well. Therefore, convert it all to use the cipher suite selectors. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Acked-by: Gertjan van Wingerde <gwingerde@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:38 +02:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
nl80211: Validate NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ length Validate RSC (NL80211_ATTR_KEY_SEQ) length in nl80211/cfg80211 instead of having to do this in all the drivers. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni.malinen@atheros.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-05-15 12:38:32 +03:00
mac80211: introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS and use it Introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS in the generic 802.11 header file and use it in place of STA_TID_NUM and NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES which are both really the number of TIDs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-11-14 23:22:21 +01:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
nl80211: Add RSC configuration for new keys When setting a key with NL80211_CMD_NEW_KEY, we should allow the key sequence number (RSC) to be set in order to allow replay protection to work correctly for group keys. This patch documents this use for nl80211 and adds the couple of missing pieces in nl80211/cfg80211 and mac80211 to support this. In addition, WEXT SIOCSIWENCODEEXT compat processing in cfg80211 is extended to handle the RSC (this was already specified in WEXT, but just not implemented in cfg80211/mac80211). Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni.malinen@atheros.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-05-11 21:57:58 +03:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
nl80211: Add RSC configuration for new keys When setting a key with NL80211_CMD_NEW_KEY, we should allow the key sequence number (RSC) to be set in order to allow replay protection to work correctly for group keys. This patch documents this use for nl80211 and adds the couple of missing pieces in nl80211/cfg80211 and mac80211 to support this. In addition, WEXT SIOCSIWENCODEEXT compat processing in cfg80211 is extended to handle the RSC (this was already specified in WEXT, but just not implemented in cfg80211/mac80211). Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni.malinen@atheros.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-05-11 21:57:58 +03:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80111: Add CCMP-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure CCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [squash ccmp256 -> mic_len argument change] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:07 +02:00
mac80211: Don't squash error codes in key setup functions ieee80211_add_key() currently returns -ENOMEM in case of any error, including a missing crypto algorithm. Change ieee80211_key_alloc() and ieee80211_aes_{key_setup_encrypt,cmac_key_setup}() to encode errors with ERR_PTR() rather than returning NULL, and change ieee80211_add_key() accordingly. Compile-tested only. Reported-by: Marcin Owsiany <porridge@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-01 17:37:03 +01:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: fix NULL pointer dereference in ieee80211_key_alloc() The ieee80211_key struct can be kfree()d several times in the function, for example if some of the key setup functions fails beforehand, but there's no check if the struct is still valid before we call memcpy() and INIT_LIST_HEAD() on it. In some cases (like it was in my case), if there's missing aes-generic module it could lead to the following kernel OOPS: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000018c .... PC is at memcpy+0x80/0x29c ... Backtrace: [<bf11c5e4>] (ieee80211_key_alloc+0x0/0x234 [mac80211]) from [<bf1148b4>] (ieee80211_add_key+0x70/0x12c [mac80211]) [<bf114844>] (ieee80211_add_key+0x0/0x12c [mac80211]) from [<bf070cc0>] (__cfg80211_set_encryption+0x2a8/0x464 [cfg80211]) Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-03-27 13:31:26 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: move key tfm setup There's no need to keep separate if statements for setting up the CCMP/AES-CMAC tfm structs; move that into the existing switch statement. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:39 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-CMAC-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-CMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:08 +02:00
mac80211: move key tfm setup There's no need to keep separate if statements for setting up the CCMP/AES-CMAC tfm structs; move that into the existing switch statement. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:39 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-CMAC-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-CMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:08 +02:00
mac80211: move key tfm setup There's no need to keep separate if statements for setting up the CCMP/AES-CMAC tfm structs; move that into the existing switch statement. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:39 +02:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
mac80211: use CMAC_PN_LEN Instead of hardcoding its value (6), use the constant. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-11-14 23:15:11 +01:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-CMAC-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-CMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:08 +02:00
mac80211: Don't squash error codes in key setup functions ieee80211_add_key() currently returns -ENOMEM in case of any error, including a missing crypto algorithm. Change ieee80211_key_alloc() and ieee80211_aes_{key_setup_encrypt,cmac_key_setup}() to encode errors with ERR_PTR() rather than returning NULL, and change ieee80211_add_key() accordingly. Compile-tested only. Reported-by: Marcin Owsiany <porridge@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-01 17:37:03 +01:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80211: fix NULL pointer dereference in ieee80211_key_alloc() The ieee80211_key struct can be kfree()d several times in the function, for example if some of the key setup functions fails beforehand, but there's no check if the struct is still valid before we call memcpy() and INIT_LIST_HEAD() on it. In some cases (like it was in my case), if there's missing aes-generic module it could lead to the following kernel OOPS: Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000018c .... PC is at memcpy+0x80/0x29c ... Backtrace: [<bf11c5e4>] (ieee80211_key_alloc+0x0/0x234 [mac80211]) from [<bf1148b4>] (ieee80211_add_key+0x70/0x12c [mac80211]) [<bf114844>] (ieee80211_add_key+0x0/0x12c [mac80211]) from [<bf070cc0>] (__cfg80211_set_encryption+0x2a8/0x464 [cfg80211]) Signed-off-by: Petr Štetiar <ynezz@true.cz> Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-03-27 13:31:26 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80211: move key tfm setup There's no need to keep separate if statements for setting up the CCMP/AES-CMAC tfm structs; move that into the existing switch statement. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:39 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:09 +02:00
mac80111: Add GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure GCMP and GCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [remove a spurious newline] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:06 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80211: move key tfm setup There's no need to keep separate if statements for setting up the CCMP/AES-CMAC tfm structs; move that into the existing switch statement. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-10 09:46:39 +02:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80211: split ieee80211_key_alloc/free In order to RCU-ify sta_info, we need to be able to allocate a key without linking it to an sdata/sta structure (because allocation cannot be done in an rcu critical section). This patch splits up ieee80211_key_alloc() and updates all users appropriately. While at it, this patch fixes a number of race conditions such as finally making key replacement atomic, unfortunately at the expense of more complex code. Note that this patch documents /existing/ bugs with sta info and key interaction, there is currently a race condition when a sta info is freed without holding the RTNL. This will finally be fixed by a followup patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-02-25 16:27:45 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: clean up key freeing a bit When a key is allocated but not really added, there's no need to go through the entire teardown process. Also, if adding a key fails, ieee80211_key_link() can take care of freeing it instead of the (only) caller. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:53:52 +01:00
mac80111: Add GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure GCMP and GCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [remove a spurious newline] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:06 +02:00
mac80111: Add CCMP-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure CCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [squash ccmp256 -> mic_len argument change] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:07 +02:00
mac80211: clean up key freeing a bit When a key is allocated but not really added, there's no need to go through the entire teardown process. Also, if adding a key fails, ieee80211_key_link() can take care of freeing it instead of the (only) caller. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:53:52 +01:00
mac80111: Add GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure GCMP and GCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [remove a spurious newline] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:06 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-CMAC-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-CMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:08 +02:00
mac80211: clean up key freeing a bit When a key is allocated but not really added, there's no need to go through the entire teardown process. Also, if adding a key fails, ieee80211_key_link() can take care of freeing it instead of the (only) caller. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:53:52 +01:00
mac80111: Add GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure GCMP and GCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [remove a spurious newline] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:06 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:09 +02:00
mac80111: Add GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure GCMP and GCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [remove a spurious newline] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:06 +02:00
mm, treewide: rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() As said by Linus: A symmetric naming is only helpful if it implies symmetries in use. Otherwise it's actively misleading. In "kzalloc()", the z is meaningful and an important part of what the caller wants. In "kzfree()", the z is actively detrimental, because maybe in the future we really _might_ want to use that "memfill(0xdeadbeef)" or something. The "zero" part of the interface isn't even _relevant_. The main reason that kzfree() exists is to clear sensitive information that should not be leaked to other future users of the same memory objects. Rename kzfree() to kfree_sensitive() to follow the example of the recently added kvfree_sensitive() and make the intention of the API more explicit. In addition, memzero_explicit() is used to clear the memory to make sure that it won't get optimized away by the compiler. The renaming is done by using the command sequence: git grep -w --name-only kzfree |\ xargs sed -i 's/kzfree/kfree_sensitive/' followed by some editing of the kfree_sensitive() kerneldoc and adding a kzfree backward compatibility macro in slab.h. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c needs linux/slab.h] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix fs/crypto/inline_crypt.c some more] Suggested-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: "Jason A . Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616154311.12314-3-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2020-08-06 23:18:13 -07:00
mac80211: clean up key freeing a bit When a key is allocated but not really added, there's no need to go through the entire teardown process. Also, if adding a key fails, ieee80211_key_link() can take care of freeing it instead of the (only) caller. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:53:52 +01:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
mac80211: simplify key locking Since I recently made station management able to sleep, I can now rework key management as well; since it will no longer need a spinlock and can also use a mutex instead, a bunch of code to allow drivers' set_key to sleep while key management is protected by a spinlock can now be removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-06-01 10:19:19 +02:00
mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices with race fix Based on inputs from Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> from http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/68193 and http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/71702 In xmit path, devices that do full hardware crypto (including MMIC and ICV) need no tailroom. For such devices, tailroom reservation can be skipped if all the keys are programmed into the hardware (i.e software crypto is not used for any of the keys) and none of the keys wants software to generate Michael MIC and IV. v2: Added check for IV along with MMIC. Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Tested-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> Cc: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> v3: Fixing races to avoid WARNING: at net/mac80211/wpa.c:397 ccmp_encrypt_skb+0xc4/0x1f0 Reported-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> Tested-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> v4: Added links with message ID Signed-off-by: Yogesh Ashok Powar <yogeshp@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-06-28 18:41:37 +05:30
mac80211: defer tailroom counter manipulation when roaming During roaming, the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt counter will often take values 2,1,0,1,2 because first keys are removed and then new keys are added. This is inefficient because during the 0->1 transition, synchronize_net must be called to avoid packet races, although typically no packets would be flowing during that time. To avoid that, defer the decrement (2->1, 1->0) when keys are removed (by half a second). This means the counter will really have the values 2,2,2,3,4 ... 2, thus never reaching 0 and having to do the 0->1 transition. Note that this patch entirely disregards the drivers for which this optimisation was done to start with, for them the key removal itself will be expensive because it has to synchronize_net() after the counter is incremented to remove the key from HW crypto. For them the sequence will look like this: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0 (*) which is clearly a lot more inefficient. This could be addressed separately, during key removal the 0->1->0 sequence isn't necessary. (*) it starts at 0 because HW crypto is on, then goes to 1 when HW crypto is disabled for a key, then back to 0 because the key is deleted; this happens for both keys in the example. When new keys are added, it goes to 1 first because they're added in software; when a key is moved to hardware it goes back to 0 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-02-23 00:59:03 +01:00
mac80211: Fix key freeing to handle unlinked keys Key locking simplification removed key->sdata != NULL verification from ieee80211_key_free(). While that is fine for most use cases, there is one path where this function can be called with an unlinked key (i.e., key->sdata == NULL && key->local == NULL). This results in a NULL pointer dereference with the current implementation. This is known to happen at least with FT protocol when wpa_supplicant tries to configure the key before association. Avoid the issue by passing in the local pointer to ieee80211_key_free(). In addition, do not clear the key from hw_accel or debugfs if it has not yet been added. At least the hw_accel one could trigger another NULL pointer dereference. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-07-26 15:52:03 -07:00
mac80211: defer tailroom counter manipulation when roaming During roaming, the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt counter will often take values 2,1,0,1,2 because first keys are removed and then new keys are added. This is inefficient because during the 0->1 transition, synchronize_net must be called to avoid packet races, although typically no packets would be flowing during that time. To avoid that, defer the decrement (2->1, 1->0) when keys are removed (by half a second). This means the counter will really have the values 2,2,2,3,4 ... 2, thus never reaching 0 and having to do the 0->1 transition. Note that this patch entirely disregards the drivers for which this optimisation was done to start with, for them the key removal itself will be expensive because it has to synchronize_net() after the counter is incremented to remove the key from HW crypto. For them the sequence will look like this: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0 (*) which is clearly a lot more inefficient. This could be addressed separately, during key removal the 0->1->0 sequence isn't necessary. (*) it starts at 0 because HW crypto is on, then goes to 1 when HW crypto is disabled for a key, then back to 0 because the key is deleted; this happens for both keys in the example. When new keys are added, it goes to 1 first because they're added in software; when a key is moved to hardware it goes back to 0 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-02-23 00:59:03 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: move key tailroom work to wiphy work This way we hold the wiphy mutex there, as a step towards removing some of the additional locks we have. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 13:59:47 +02:00
mac80211: defer tailroom counter manipulation when roaming During roaming, the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt counter will often take values 2,1,0,1,2 because first keys are removed and then new keys are added. This is inefficient because during the 0->1 transition, synchronize_net must be called to avoid packet races, although typically no packets would be flowing during that time. To avoid that, defer the decrement (2->1, 1->0) when keys are removed (by half a second). This means the counter will really have the values 2,2,2,3,4 ... 2, thus never reaching 0 and having to do the 0->1 transition. Note that this patch entirely disregards the drivers for which this optimisation was done to start with, for them the key removal itself will be expensive because it has to synchronize_net() after the counter is incremented to remove the key from HW crypto. For them the sequence will look like this: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0 (*) which is clearly a lot more inefficient. This could be addressed separately, during key removal the 0->1->0 sequence isn't necessary. (*) it starts at 0 because HW crypto is on, then goes to 1 when HW crypto is disabled for a key, then back to 0 because the key is deleted; this happens for both keys in the example. When new keys are added, it goes to 1 first because they're added in software; when a key is moved to hardware it goes back to 0 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-02-23 00:59:03 +01:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: defer tailroom counter manipulation when roaming During roaming, the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt counter will often take values 2,1,0,1,2 because first keys are removed and then new keys are added. This is inefficient because during the 0->1 transition, synchronize_net must be called to avoid packet races, although typically no packets would be flowing during that time. To avoid that, defer the decrement (2->1, 1->0) when keys are removed (by half a second). This means the counter will really have the values 2,2,2,3,4 ... 2, thus never reaching 0 and having to do the 0->1 transition. Note that this patch entirely disregards the drivers for which this optimisation was done to start with, for them the key removal itself will be expensive because it has to synchronize_net() after the counter is incremented to remove the key from HW crypto. For them the sequence will look like this: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0 (*) which is clearly a lot more inefficient. This could be addressed separately, during key removal the 0->1->0 sequence isn't necessary. (*) it starts at 0 because HW crypto is on, then goes to 1 when HW crypto is disabled for a key, then back to 0 because the key is deleted; this happens for both keys in the example. When new keys are added, it goes to 1 first because they're added in software; when a key is moved to hardware it goes back to 0 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-02-23 00:59:03 +01:00
mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices with race fix Based on inputs from Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> from http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/68193 and http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/71702 In xmit path, devices that do full hardware crypto (including MMIC and ICV) need no tailroom. For such devices, tailroom reservation can be skipped if all the keys are programmed into the hardware (i.e software crypto is not used for any of the keys) and none of the keys wants software to generate Michael MIC and IV. v2: Added check for IV along with MMIC. Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Tested-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> Cc: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> v3: Fixing races to avoid WARNING: at net/mac80211/wpa.c:397 ccmp_encrypt_skb+0xc4/0x1f0 Reported-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> Tested-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> v4: Added links with message ID Signed-off-by: Yogesh Ashok Powar <yogeshp@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-06-28 18:41:37 +05:30
mac80211: simplify key locking Since I recently made station management able to sleep, I can now rework key management as well; since it will no longer need a spinlock and can also use a mutex instead, a bunch of code to allow drivers' set_key to sleep while key management is protected by a spinlock can now be removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-06-01 10:19:19 +02:00
mac80211: clean up key freeing a bit When a key is allocated but not really added, there's no need to go through the entire teardown process. Also, if adding a key fails, ieee80211_key_link() can take care of freeing it instead of the (only) caller. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:53:52 +01:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
mac80211: add atomic uploaded keys iterator add ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu() to iterate over uploaded keys in atomic context (when rcu is locked) The station removal code removes the keys only after calling synchronize_net(), so it's not safe to iterate the keys at this point (and postponing the actual key deletion with call_rcu() might result in some badly-ordered ops calls). Add a flag to indicate a station is being removed, and skip the configured keys if it's set. Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-11-17 10:24:37 +02:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
mac80211: clean up key freeing a bit When a key is allocated but not really added, there's no need to go through the entire teardown process. Also, if adding a key fails, ieee80211_key_link() can take care of freeing it instead of the (only) caller. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:53:52 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix potential key leak When returning from ieee80211_key_link(), the key needs to have been freed or successfully installed. This was missed in a number of error paths, fix it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-09-19 08:34:16 +02:00
mac80211: clean up key freeing a bit When a key is allocated but not really added, there's no need to go through the entire teardown process. Also, if adding a key fails, ieee80211_key_link() can take care of freeing it instead of the (only) caller. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:53:52 +01:00
mac80211: simplify key locking Since I recently made station management able to sleep, I can now rework key management as well; since it will no longer need a spinlock and can also use a mutex instead, a bunch of code to allow drivers' set_key to sleep while key management is protected by a spinlock can now be removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-06-01 10:19:19 +02:00
mac80211: don't compare TKIP TX MIC key in reinstall prevention For the reinstall prevention, the code I had added compares the whole key. It turns out though that iwlwifi firmware doesn't provide the TKIP TX MIC key as it's not needed in client mode, and thus the comparison will always return false. For client mode, thus always zero out the TX MIC key part before doing the comparison in order to avoid accepting the reinstall of the key with identical encryption and RX MIC key, but not the same TX MIC key (since the supplicant provides the real one.) Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-10-24 21:12:13 +02:00
mac80211: allow vendor specific cipher suites Allow drivers to specify their own set of cipher suites to advertise vendor-specific ciphers. The driver is then required to implement hardware crypto offload for it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Juuso Oikarinen <juuso.oikarinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-27 14:26:52 +03:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: allow vendor specific cipher suites Allow drivers to specify their own set of cipher suites to advertise vendor-specific ciphers. The driver is then required to implement hardware crypto offload for it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Juuso Oikarinen <juuso.oikarinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-27 14:26:52 +03:00
mac80211: split ieee80211_key_alloc/free In order to RCU-ify sta_info, we need to be able to allocate a key without linking it to an sdata/sta structure (because allocation cannot be done in an rcu critical section). This patch splits up ieee80211_key_alloc() and updates all users appropriately. While at it, this patch fixes a number of race conditions such as finally making key replacement atomic, unfortunately at the expense of more complex code. Note that this patch documents /existing/ bugs with sta info and key interaction, there is currently a race condition when a sta info is freed without holding the RTNL. This will finally be fixed by a followup patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-02-25 16:27:45 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key. To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects. This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2021-05-11 20:02:43 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reorg some iface data structs for MLD Start reorganizing interface related data structures toward MLD. The most complex part here is for the keys, since we have to split the various kinds of GTKs off to the link but still need to use (for WEP) the other keys as a fallback even for multicast frames. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-16 15:00:15 +02:00
mac80211: restrict delayed tailroom needed decrement As explained in ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(), during roam, keys of the old AP will be destroyed and new keys will be installed. Deletion of the old key causes crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 1 to 0 and the new key installation causes a transition from 0 to 1. Whenever crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt transitions from 0 to 1, we invoke synchronize_net(); the reason for doing this is to avoid a race in the TX path as explained in increment_tailroom_need_count(). This synchronize_net() operation can be slow and can affect the station roam time. To avoid this, decrementing the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is delayed for a while so that upon installation of new key the transition would be from 1 to 2 instead of 0 to 1 and thereby improving the roam time. This is all correct for a STA iftype, but deferring the tailroom_needed decrement for other iftypes may be unnecessary. For example, let's consider the case of a 4-addr client connecting to an AP for which AP_VLAN interface is also created, let the initial value for tailroom_needed on the AP be 1. * 4-addr client connects to the AP (AP: tailroom_needed = 1) * AP will clear old keys, delay decrement of tailroom_needed count * AP_VLAN is created, it takes the tailroom count from master (AP_VLAN: tailroom_needed = 1, AP: tailroom_needed = 1) * Install new key for the station, assume key is plumbed in the HW, there won't be any change in tailroom_needed count on AP iface * Delayed decrement of tailroom_needed count on AP (AP: tailroom_needed = 0, AP_VLAN: tailroom_needed = 1) Because of the delayed decrement on AP iface, tailroom_needed count goes out of sync between AP(master iface) and AP_VLAN(slave iface) and there would be unnecessary tailroom created for the packets going through AP_VLAN iface. Also, WARN_ONs were observed while trying to bring down the AP_VLAN interface: (warn_slowpath_common) (warn_slowpath_null+0x18/0x20) (warn_slowpath_null) (ieee80211_free_keys+0x114/0x1e4) (ieee80211_free_keys) (ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor+0x51c/0x850) (ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor) (ieee80211_stop+0x30/0x3c) (ieee80211_stop) (__dev_close_many+0x94/0xb8) (__dev_close_many) (dev_close_many+0x5c/0xc8) Restricting delayed decrement to station interface alone fixes the problem and it makes sense to do so because delayed decrement is done to improve roam time which is applicable only for client devices. Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-07-10 16:48:27 +05:30
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: split ieee80211_key_alloc/free In order to RCU-ify sta_info, we need to be able to allocate a key without linking it to an sdata/sta structure (because allocation cannot be done in an rcu critical section). This patch splits up ieee80211_key_alloc() and updates all users appropriately. While at it, this patch fixes a number of race conditions such as finally making key replacement atomic, unfortunately at the expense of more complex code. Note that this patch documents /existing/ bugs with sta info and key interaction, there is currently a race condition when a sta info is freed without holding the RTNL. This will finally be fixed by a followup patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-02-25 16:27:45 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
mac80211: remove unnecessary key condition When we reach this point, the key cannot be NULL. Remove the condition that suggests otherwise. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-6-luca@coelho.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-08-30 14:24:48 +03:00
wifi: mac80211: fix potential key leak When returning from ieee80211_key_link(), the key needs to have been freed or successfully installed. This was missed in a number of error paths, fix it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-09-19 08:34:16 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix potential key leak When returning from ieee80211_key_link(), the key needs to have been freed or successfully installed. This was missed in a number of error paths, fix it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-09-19 08:34:16 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove sta_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the sta_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: fix another key installation error path Due to overlapping changes and merges, another error path ended up broken. Fix this one as well. Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-10-20 09:38:28 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: reorg some iface data structs for MLD Start reorganizing interface related data structures toward MLD. The most complex part here is for the keys, since we have to split the various kinds of GTKs off to the link but still need to use (for WEP) the other keys as a fallback even for multicast frames. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-16 15:00:15 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: reorg some iface data structs for MLD Start reorganizing interface related data structures toward MLD. The most complex part here is for the keys, since we have to split the various kinds of GTKs off to the link but still need to use (for WEP) the other keys as a fallback even for multicast frames. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-05-16 15:00:15 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix potential key leak When returning from ieee80211_key_link(), the key needs to have been freed or successfully installed. This was missed in a number of error paths, fix it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-09-19 08:34:16 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix potential key leak When returning from ieee80211_key_link(), the key needs to have been freed or successfully installed. This was missed in a number of error paths, fix it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-09-19 08:34:16 +02:00
mac80211: IEEE 802.11 Extended Key ID support Add support for Extended Key ID as defined in IEEE 802.11-2016. - Implement the nl80211 API for Extended Key ID - Extend mac80211 API to allow drivers to support Extended Key ID - Enable Extended Key ID by default for drivers only supporting SW crypto (e.g. mac80211_hwsim) - Allow unicast Tx usage to be supressed (IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_NO_AUTO_TX) - Select the decryption key based on the MPDU keyid - Enforce existing assumptions in the code that rekeys don't change the cipher Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [remove module parameter] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-03-19 21:34:08 +01:00
mac80211: split ieee80211_key_alloc/free In order to RCU-ify sta_info, we need to be able to allocate a key without linking it to an sdata/sta structure (because allocation cannot be done in an rcu critical section). This patch splits up ieee80211_key_alloc() and updates all users appropriately. While at it, this patch fixes a number of race conditions such as finally making key replacement atomic, unfortunately at the expense of more complex code. Note that this patch documents /existing/ bugs with sta info and key interaction, there is currently a race condition when a sta info is freed without holding the RTNL. This will finally be fixed by a followup patch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-02-25 16:27:45 +01:00
mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything When a key is reinstalled we can reset the replay counters etc. which can lead to nonce reuse and/or replay detection being impossible, breaking security properties, as described in the "KRACK attacks". In particular, CVE-2017-13080 applies to GTK rekeying that happened in firmware while the host is in D3, with the second part of the attack being done after the host wakes up. In this case, the wpa_supplicant mitigation isn't sufficient since wpa_supplicant doesn't know the GTK material. In case this happens, simply silently accept the new key coming from userspace but don't take any action on it since it's the same key; this keeps the PN replay counters intact. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-09-05 14:54:54 +02:00
mac80211: don't compare TKIP TX MIC key in reinstall prevention For the reinstall prevention, the code I had added compares the whole key. It turns out though that iwlwifi firmware doesn't provide the TKIP TX MIC key as it's not needed in client mode, and thus the comparison will always return false. For client mode, thus always zero out the TX MIC key part before doing the comparison in order to avoid accepting the reinstall of the key with identical encryption and RX MIC key, but not the same TX MIC key (since the supplicant provides the real one.) Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-10-24 21:12:13 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: fix potential key use-after-free When ieee80211_key_link() is called by ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() but returns 0 due to KRACK protection (identical key reinstall), ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() will still return a pointer into the key, in a potential use-after-free. This normally doesn't happen since it's only called by iwlwifi in case of WoWLAN rekey offload which has its own KRACK protection, but still better to fix, do that by returning an error code and converting that to success on the cfg80211 boundary only, leaving the error for bad callers of ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add(). Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Fixes: fdf7cb4185b6 ("mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything") Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-09-19 08:34:15 +02:00
Merge wireless into wireless-next Resolve several conflicts, mostly between changes/fixes in wireless and the locking rework in wireless-next. One of the conflicts actually shows a bug in wireless that we'll want to fix separately. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@kernel.org>
2023-10-05 22:57:34 +02:00
mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything When a key is reinstalled we can reset the replay counters etc. which can lead to nonce reuse and/or replay detection being impossible, breaking security properties, as described in the "KRACK attacks". In particular, CVE-2017-13080 applies to GTK rekeying that happened in firmware while the host is in D3, with the second part of the attack being done after the host wakes up. In this case, the wpa_supplicant mitigation isn't sufficient since wpa_supplicant doesn't know the GTK material. In case this happens, simply silently accept the new key coming from userspace but don't take any action on it since it's the same key; this keeps the PN replay counters intact. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-09-05 14:54:54 +02:00
mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key. To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects. This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2021-05-11 20:02:43 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: add support for SPP A-MSDUs If software crypto is used, simply add support for SPP A-MSDUs (and use it whenever enabled as required by the cfg80211 API). If hardware crypto is used, leave it up to the driver to set the NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_SPP_AMSDU_SUPPORT flag and then check sta->spp_amsdu or the IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_SPP_AMSDU key flag. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Gabay <daniel.gabay@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Gregory Greenman <gregory.greenman@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20240102213313.b8ada4514e2b.I1ac25d5f158165b5a88062a5a5e4c4fbeecf9a5d@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-01-02 21:35:40 +02:00
mac80211: Skip tailroom reservation for full HW-crypto devices with race fix Based on inputs from Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> from http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/68193 and http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.wireless.general/71702 In xmit path, devices that do full hardware crypto (including MMIC and ICV) need no tailroom. For such devices, tailroom reservation can be skipped if all the keys are programmed into the hardware (i.e software crypto is not used for any of the keys) and none of the keys wants software to generate Michael MIC and IV. v2: Added check for IV along with MMIC. Reported-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Tested-by: Fabio Rossi <rossi.f@inwind.it> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> Cc: Mohammed Shafi Shajakhan <mshajakhan@atheros.com> v3: Fixing races to avoid WARNING: at net/mac80211/wpa.c:397 ccmp_encrypt_skb+0xc4/0x1f0 Reported-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> Tested-by: Andreas Hartmann <andihartmann@01019freenet.de> v4: Added links with message ID Signed-off-by: Yogesh Ashok Powar <yogeshp@marvell.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-06-28 18:41:37 +05:30
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
[MAC80211]: fix race conditions with keys During receive processing, we select the key long before using it and because there's no locking it is possible that we kfree() the key after having selected it but before using it for crypto operations. Obviously, this is bad. Secondly, during transmit processing, there are two possible races: We have a similar race between select_key() and using it for encryption, but we also have a race here between select_key() and hardware encryption (both when a key is removed.) This patch solves these issues by using RCU: when a key is to be freed, we first remove the pointer from the appropriate places (sdata->keys, sdata->default_key, sta->key) using rcu_assign_pointer() and then synchronize_rcu(). Then, we can safely kfree() the key and remove it from the hardware. There's a window here where the hardware may still be using it for decryption, but we can't work around that without having two hardware callbacks, one to disable the key for RX and one to disable it for TX; but the worst thing that will happen is that we receive a packet decrypted that we don't find a key for any more and then drop it. When we add a key, we first need to upload it to the hardware and then, using rcu_assign_pointer() again, link it into our structures. In the code using keys (TX/RX paths) we use rcu_dereference() to get the key and enclose the whole tx/rx section in a rcu_read_lock() ... rcu_read_unlock() block. Because we've uploaded the key to hardware before linking it into internal structures, we can guarantee that it is valid once get to into tx(). One possible race condition remains, however: when we have hardware acceleration enabled and the driver shuts down the queues, we end up queueing the frame. If now somebody removes the key, the key will be removed from hwaccel and then then driver will be asked to encrypt the frame with a key index that has been removed. Hence, drivers will need to be aware that the hw_key_index they are passed might not be under all circumstances. Most drivers will, however, simply ignore that condition and encrypt the frame with the selected key anyway, this only results in a frame being encrypted with a wrong key or dropped (rightfully) because the key was not valid. There isn't much we can do about it unless we want to walk the pending frame queue every time a key is removed and remove all frames that used it. This race condition, however, will most likely be solved once we add multiqueue support to mac80211 because then frames will be queued further up the stack instead of after being processed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-09-14 11:10:24 -04:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80211: Fix PTK rekey freezes and clear text leak Rekeying PTK keys without "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" did use a procedure not suitable to replace in-use keys and could caused the following issues: 1) Freeze caused by incoming frames: If the local STA installed the key prior to the remote STA we still had the old key active in the hardware when mac80211 switched over to the new key. Therefore there was a window where the card could hand over frames decoded with the old key to mac80211 and bump the new PN (IV) value to an incorrect high number. When it happened the local replay detection silently started to drop all frames sent with the new key. 2) Freeze caused by outgoing frames: If mac80211 was providing the PN (IV) and handed over a clear text frame for encryption to the hardware prior to a key change the driver/card could have processed the queued frame after switching to the new key. This bumped the PN value on the remote STA to an incorrect high number, tricking the remote STA to discard all frames we sent later. 3) Freeze caused by RX aggregation reorder buffer: An aggregation session started with the old key and ending after the switch to the new key also bumped the PN to an incorrect high number, freezing the connection quite similar to 1). 4) Freeze caused by repeating lost frames in an aggregation session: A driver could repeat a lost frame and encrypt it with the new key while in a TX aggregation session without updating the PN for the new key. This also could freeze connections similar to 2). 5) Clear text leak: Removing encryption offload from the card cleared the encryption offload flag only after the card had deleted the key and we did not stop TX during the rekey. The driver/card could therefore get unencrypted frames from mac80211 while no longer be instructed to encrypt them. To prevent those issues the key install logic has been changed: - Mac80211 divers known to be able to rekey PTK0 keys have to set @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0, - mac80211 stops queuing frames depending on the key during the replace - the key is first replaced in the hardware and after that in mac80211 - and mac80211 stops/blocks new aggregation sessions during the rekey. For drivers not setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 the user space must avoid PTK rekeys if "Extended Key ID for Individually Addressed Frames" is not being used. Rekeys for mac80211 drivers without this flag will generate a warning and use an extra call to ieee80211_flush_queues() to both highlight and try to prevent the issues with not updated drivers. The core of the fix changes the key install procedure from: - atomic switch over to the new key in mac80211 - remove the old key in the hardware (stops encryption offloading, fall back to software encryption with a potential clear text packet leak in between) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 - enable hardware encryption offloading for the new key to: - if it's a PTK mark the old key as tainted to drop TX frames with the outgoing key - replace the key in hardware with the new one - atomic switch over to the new (not marked as tainted) key in mac80211 (which also resumes TX) - delete the inactive old key in mac80211 With the new sequence the hardware will be unable to decrypt frames encrypted with the old key prior to switching to the new key in mac80211 and thus prevent PNs from packets decrypted with the old key to be accounted against the new key. For that to work the drivers have to provide a clear boundary. Mac80211 drivers setting @NL80211_EXT_FEATURE_CAN_REPLACE_PTK0 confirm to provide it and mac80211 will then be able to correctly rekey in-use PTK keys with those drivers. The mac80211 requirements for drivers to set the flag have been added to the "Hardware crypto acceleration" documentation section. It drills down to: The drivers must not hand over frames decrypted with the old key to mac80211 once the call to set_key() with %DISABLE_KEY has been completed. It's allowed to either drop or continue to use the old key for any outgoing frames which are already in the queues, but it must not send out any of them unencrypted or encrypted with the new key. Even with the new boundary in place aggregation sessions with the reorder buffer are problematic: RX aggregation session started prior and completed after the rekey could still dump frames received with the old key at mac80211 after it switched over to the new key. This is side stepped by stopping all (RX and TX) aggregation sessions when replacing a PTK key and hardware key offloading. Stopping TX aggregation sessions avoids the need to get the PNs (IVs) updated in frames prepared for the old key and (re)transmitted after the switch to the new key. As a bonus it improves the compatibility when the remote STA is not handling rekeys as it should. When using software crypto aggregation sessions are not stopped. Mac80211 won't be able to decode the dangerous frames and discard them without special handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Wetzel <alexander@wetzel-home.de> [trim overly long rekey warning] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-08-31 15:00:38 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80211: clean up key freeing a bit When a key is allocated but not really added, there's no need to go through the entire teardown process. Also, if adding a key fails, ieee80211_key_link() can take care of freeing it instead of the (only) caller. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:53:52 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: fix potential key leak When returning from ieee80211_key_link(), the key needs to have been freed or successfully installed. This was missed in a number of error paths, fix it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-09-19 08:34:16 +02:00
mac80211: accept key reinstall without changing anything When a key is reinstalled we can reset the replay counters etc. which can lead to nonce reuse and/or replay detection being impossible, breaking security properties, as described in the "KRACK attacks". In particular, CVE-2017-13080 applies to GTK rekeying that happened in firmware while the host is in D3, with the second part of the attack being done after the host wakes up. In this case, the wpa_supplicant mitigation isn't sufficient since wpa_supplicant doesn't know the GTK material. In case this happens, simply silently accept the new key coming from userspace but don't take any action on it since it's the same key; this keeps the PN replay counters intact. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2017-09-05 14:54:54 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: fix potential key leak When returning from ieee80211_key_link(), the key needs to have been freed or successfully installed. This was missed in a number of error paths, fix it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-09-19 08:34:16 +02:00
mac80211: allow vendor specific cipher suites Allow drivers to specify their own set of cipher suites to advertise vendor-specific ciphers. The driver is then required to implement hardware crypto offload for it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Juuso Oikarinen <juuso.oikarinen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-08-27 14:26:52 +03:00
mac80211: fix key hwaccel race The previous key locking patch left a small race: it would be possible to add a key and take the interface down before the key todo is run so that hwaccel for that key is enabled on an interface that is down. Avoid this by running the todo list when an interface is brought up or down. This patch also fixes a small bug: before this change, a few functions used the key list without the lock that protects it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-09 16:45:37 +02:00
mac80211: remove underscores from some key functions Some key function don't exist without underscores, so remove the underscores from those. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:58:23 +01:00
mac80211: fix key hwaccel race The previous key locking patch left a small race: it would be possible to add a key and take the interface down before the key todo is run so that hwaccel for that key is enabled on an interface that is down. Avoid this by running the todo list when an interface is brought up or down. This patch also fixes a small bug: before this change, a few functions used the key list without the lock that protects it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-09 16:45:37 +02:00
mac80211: make key locking clearer The code in ieee80211_del_key() doesn't acquire the key_mtx properly when it dereferences the keys. It turns out that isn't actually necessary since the key_mtx itself seems to be redundant since all key manipulations are done under the RTNL, but as long as we have the key_mtx we should use it the right way too. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-05-12 14:31:49 +02:00
mac80211: fix key hwaccel race The previous key locking patch left a small race: it would be possible to add a key and take the interface down before the key todo is run so that hwaccel for that key is enabled on an interface that is down. Avoid this by running the todo list when an interface is brought up or down. This patch also fixes a small bug: before this change, a few functions used the key list without the lock that protects it. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-09 16:45:37 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: remove underscores from some key functions Some key function don't exist without underscores, so remove the underscores from those. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 22:58:23 +01:00
[MAC80211]: split out some key functions from ieee80211.c into a new file key.c which doesn't have much code right now but it makes ieee80211.c easier to read. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Jiri Benc <jbenc@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2007-07-27 15:43:23 +02:00
mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value. The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational for the delayed tailroom needed: /* * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than * zero and no 0->1 transition happens. * * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case * within an ESS this usually won't happen. */ The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug: 1. Disconnect from encrypted AP 2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key 3. Schedule work 4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP 5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1 6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec and remove the counters warning as we just reset both. Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-08-30 14:24:49 +03:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: simplify key locking Since I recently made station management able to sleep, I can now rework key management as well; since it will no longer need a spinlock and can also use a mutex instead, a bunch of code to allow drivers' set_key to sleep while key management is protected by a spinlock can now be removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-06-01 10:19:19 +02:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: simplify key locking Since I recently made station management able to sleep, I can now rework key management as well; since it will no longer need a spinlock and can also use a mutex instead, a bunch of code to allow drivers' set_key to sleep while key management is protected by a spinlock can now be removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-06-01 10:19:19 +02:00
cfg80211: avoid holding the RTNL when calling the driver Currently, _everything_ in cfg80211 holds the RTNL, and if you have a slow USB device (or a few) you can get some bad lock contention on that. Fix that by re-adding a mutex to each wiphy/rdev as we had at some point, so we have locking for the wireless_dev lists and all the other things in there, and also so that drivers still don't have to worry too much about it (they still won't get parallel calls for a single device). Then, we can restrict the RTNL to a few cases where we add or remove interfaces and really need the added protection. Some of the global list management still also uses the RTNL, since we need to have it anyway for netdev management, but we only hold the RTNL for very short periods of time here. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122161942.81df9f5e047a.I4a8e1a60b18863ea8c5e6d3a0faeafb2d45b2f40@changeid Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> [marvell driver issues] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2021-01-22 16:19:43 +01:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value. The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational for the delayed tailroom needed: /* * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than * zero and no 0->1 transition happens. * * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case * within an ESS this usually won't happen. */ The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug: 1. Disconnect from encrypted AP 2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key 3. Schedule work 4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP 5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1 6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec and remove the counters warning as we just reset both. Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-08-30 14:24:49 +03:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value. The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational for the delayed tailroom needed: /* * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than * zero and no 0->1 transition happens. * * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case * within an ESS this usually won't happen. */ The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug: 1. Disconnect from encrypted AP 2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key 3. Schedule work 4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP 5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1 6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec and remove the counters warning as we just reset both. Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-08-30 14:24:49 +03:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value. The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational for the delayed tailroom needed: /* * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than * zero and no 0->1 transition happens. * * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case * within an ESS this usually won't happen. */ The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug: 1. Disconnect from encrypted AP 2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key 3. Schedule work 4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP 5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1 6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec and remove the counters warning as we just reset both. Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-08-30 14:24:49 +03:00
wifi: mac80211: don't increment crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt twice In reconfig, in case the driver asks to disconnect during the reconfig, all the keys of the interface are marked as tainted. Then ieee80211_reenable_keys will loop over all the interface keys, and for each one it will a) increment crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt b) call ieee80211_key_enable_hw_accel, which in turn will detect that this key is tainted, so it will mark it as "not in hardware", which is paired with crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt incrementation, so we get two incrementations for each tainted key. Then we get a warning in ieee80211_free_keys. To fix it, don't increment the count in ieee80211_reenable_keys for tainted keys Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260118092821.4ca111fddcda.Id6e554f4b1c83760aa02d5a9e4e3080edb197aa2@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2026-01-18 09:28:29 +02:00
mac80211: clear crypto tx tailroom counter upon keys enable In case we got a fw restart while roaming from encrypted AP to non-encrypted one, we might end up with hitting a warning on the pending counter crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec having a non-zero value. The following comment taken from net/mac80211/key.c explains the rational for the delayed tailroom needed: /* * The reason for the delayed tailroom needed decrementing is to * make roaming faster: during roaming, all keys are first deleted * and then new keys are installed. The first new key causes the * crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 0 to 1, which invokes * the cost of synchronize_net() (which can be slow). Avoid this * by deferring the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt decrementing on * key removal for a while, so if we roam the value is larger than * zero and no 0->1 transition happens. * * The cost is that if the AP switching was from an AP with keys * to one without, we still allocate tailroom while it would no * longer be needed. However, in the typical (fast) roaming case * within an ESS this usually won't happen. */ The next flow lead to the warning eventually reported as a bug: 1. Disconnect from encrypted AP 2. Set crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec = 1 for the key 3. Schedule work 4. Reconnect to non-encrypted AP 5. Add a new key, setting the tailroom counter = 1 6. Got FW restart while pending counter is set ---> hit the warning While on it, the ieee80211_reset_crypto_tx_tailroom() func was merged into its single caller ieee80211_reenable_keys (previously called ieee80211_enable_keys). Also, we reset the crypto_tx_tailroom_pending_dec and remove the counters warning as we just reset both. Signed-off-by: Lior Cohen <lior2.cohen@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190830112451.21655-7-luca@coelho.fi Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2019-08-30 14:24:49 +03:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
wifi: mac80211: skip non-uploaded keys in ieee80211_iter_keys Sync iterator conditions with ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu. Fixes: 830af02f24fb ("mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241006153630.87885-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-10-06 17:36:30 +02:00
mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys When in suspend/wowlan, devices might implement crypto offload differently (more features), and might require reprogramming keys for the WoWLAN (as it is the case for Intel devices that use another uCode image). Thus allow the driver to iterate all keys in this context. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-05 16:35:39 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys When in suspend/wowlan, devices might implement crypto offload differently (more features), and might require reprogramming keys for the WoWLAN (as it is the case for Intel devices that use another uCode image). Thus allow the driver to iterate all keys in this context. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-05 16:35:39 +02:00
cfg80211: avoid holding the RTNL when calling the driver Currently, _everything_ in cfg80211 holds the RTNL, and if you have a slow USB device (or a few) you can get some bad lock contention on that. Fix that by re-adding a mutex to each wiphy/rdev as we had at some point, so we have locking for the wireless_dev lists and all the other things in there, and also so that drivers still don't have to worry too much about it (they still won't get parallel calls for a single device). Then, we can restrict the RTNL to a few cases where we add or remove interfaces and really need the added protection. Some of the global list management still also uses the RTNL, since we need to have it anyway for netdev management, but we only hold the RTNL for very short periods of time here. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122161942.81df9f5e047a.I4a8e1a60b18863ea8c5e6d3a0faeafb2d45b2f40@changeid Tested-by: Marek Szyprowski <m.szyprowski@samsung.com> [marvell driver issues] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2021-01-22 16:19:43 +01:00
mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys When in suspend/wowlan, devices might implement crypto offload differently (more features), and might require reprogramming keys for the WoWLAN (as it is the case for Intel devices that use another uCode image). Thus allow the driver to iterate all keys in this context. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-05 16:35:39 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: skip non-uploaded keys in ieee80211_iter_keys Sync iterator conditions with ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu. Fixes: 830af02f24fb ("mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241006153630.87885-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-10-06 17:36:30 +02:00
mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys When in suspend/wowlan, devices might implement crypto offload differently (more features), and might require reprogramming keys for the WoWLAN (as it is the case for Intel devices that use another uCode image). Thus allow the driver to iterate all keys in this context. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-05 16:35:39 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: skip non-uploaded keys in ieee80211_iter_keys Sync iterator conditions with ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu. Fixes: 830af02f24fb ("mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241006153630.87885-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-10-06 17:36:30 +02:00
mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys When in suspend/wowlan, devices might implement crypto offload differently (more features), and might require reprogramming keys for the WoWLAN (as it is the case for Intel devices that use another uCode image). Thus allow the driver to iterate all keys in this context. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-05 16:35:39 +02:00
mac80211: add atomic uploaded keys iterator add ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu() to iterate over uploaded keys in atomic context (when rcu is locked) The station removal code removes the keys only after calling synchronize_net(), so it's not safe to iterate the keys at this point (and postponing the actual key deletion with call_rcu() might result in some badly-ordered ops calls). Add a flag to indicate a station is being removed, and skip the configured keys if it's set. Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-11-17 10:24:37 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: skip non-uploaded keys in ieee80211_iter_keys Sync iterator conditions with ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu. Fixes: 830af02f24fb ("mac80211: allow driver to iterate keys") Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@nbd.name> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241006153630.87885-1-nbd@nbd.name Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-10-06 17:36:30 +02:00
mac80211: add atomic uploaded keys iterator add ieee80211_iter_keys_rcu() to iterate over uploaded keys in atomic context (when rcu is locked) The station removal code removes the keys only after calling synchronize_net(), so it's not safe to iterate the keys at this point (and postponing the actual key deletion with call_rcu() might result in some badly-ordered ops calls). Add a flag to indicate a station is being removed, and skip the configured keys if it's set. Signed-off-by: Eliad Peller <eliadx.peller@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-11-17 10:24:37 +02:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: fix key vs. sta locking problems Up to now, key manipulation is supposed to run under RTNL to avoid concurrent manipulations and also allow the set_key() hardware callback to sleep. This is not feasible because STA structs are rcu-protected and thus a lot of operations there cannot take the RTNL. Also, key references are rcu-protected so we cannot do things atomically. This patch changes key locking completely: * key operations are now atomic * hardware crypto offload is enabled and disabled from a workqueue, due to that key freeing is also delayed * debugfs code is also run from a workqueue * keys reference STAs (and vice versa!) so during STA unlink the STAs key reference is removed but not the keys STA reference, to avoid races key todo work is run before STA destruction. * fewer STA operations now need the RTNL which was required due to key operations This fixes the locking problems lockdep pointed out and also makes things more light-weight because the rtnl isn't required as much. Note that the key todo lock/key mutex are global locks, this is not required, of course, they could be per-hardware instead. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2008-04-08 17:56:52 +02:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: defer tailroom counter manipulation when roaming During roaming, the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt counter will often take values 2,1,0,1,2 because first keys are removed and then new keys are added. This is inefficient because during the 0->1 transition, synchronize_net must be called to avoid packet races, although typically no packets would be flowing during that time. To avoid that, defer the decrement (2->1, 1->0) when keys are removed (by half a second). This means the counter will really have the values 2,2,2,3,4 ... 2, thus never reaching 0 and having to do the 0->1 transition. Note that this patch entirely disregards the drivers for which this optimisation was done to start with, for them the key removal itself will be expensive because it has to synchronize_net() after the counter is incremented to remove the key from HW crypto. For them the sequence will look like this: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0 (*) which is clearly a lot more inefficient. This could be addressed separately, during key removal the 0->1->0 sequence isn't necessary. (*) it starts at 0 because HW crypto is on, then goes to 1 when HW crypto is disabled for a key, then back to 0 because the key is deleted; this happens for both keys in the example. When new keys are added, it goes to 1 first because they're added in software; when a key is moved to hardware it goes back to 0 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-02-23 00:59:03 +01:00
mac80211: 802.11w - Use BIP (AES-128-CMAC) Add mechanism for managing BIP keys (IGTK) and integrate BIP into the TX/RX paths. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi> Acked-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2009-01-08 13:32:02 +02:00
mac80211: Support BIGTK configuration for Beacon protection Extend mac80211 key configuration to support the new BIGTK with key index values 6 and 7. Support for actually protecting Beacon frames (adding the MME in AP mode and checking it in STA mode) is covered in separate commits. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@codeaurora.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222132548.20835-3-jouni@codeaurora.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-02-22 15:25:44 +02:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
mac80211: support separate default keys Add support for split default keys (unicast and multicast) in mac80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2010-12-09 19:49:02 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: move key tailroom work to wiphy work This way we hold the wiphy mutex there, as a step towards removing some of the additional locks we have. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 13:59:47 +02:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: free all AP/VLAN keys at once When the AP interface is stopped, free all AP and VLAN keys at once to only require synchronize_net() once. Since that does synchronize_net(), also move two such calls into the function (using the new force_synchronize parameter) to avoid doing it twice. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:47:09 +01:00
[MAC80211]: rework key handling This moves all the key handling code out from ieee80211_ioctl.c into key.c and also does the following changes including documentation updates in mac80211.h: 1) Turn off hardware acceleration for keys when the interface is down. This is necessary because otherwise monitor interfaces could be decrypting frames for other interfaces that are down at the moment. Also, it should go some way towards better suspend/resume support, in any case the routines used here could be used for that as well. Additionally, this makes the driver interface nicer, keys for a specific local MAC address are only ever present while an interface with that MAC address is enabled. 2) Change driver set_key() callback interface to allow only return values of -ENOSPC, -EOPNOTSUPP and 0, warn on all other return values. This allows debugging the stack when a driver notices it's handed a key while it is down. 3) Invert the flag meaning to KEY_FLAG_UPLOADED_TO_HARDWARE. 4) Remove REMOVE_ALL_KEYS command as it isn't used nor do we want to use it, we'll use DISABLE_KEY for each key. It is hard to use REMOVE_ALL_KEYS because we can handle multiple virtual interfaces with different key configuration, so we'd have to keep track of a lot of state for this and that isn't worth it. 5) Warn when disabling a key fails, it musn't. 6) Remove IEEE80211_HW_NO_TKIP_WMM_HWACCEL in favour of per-key IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_WMM_STA to let driver sort it out itself. 7) Tell driver that a (non-WEP) key is used only for transmission by using an all-zeroes station MAC address when configuring. 8) Change the set_key() callback to have access to the local MAC address the key is being added for. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Acked-by: Michael Wu <flamingice@sourmilk.net> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2007-08-28 17:01:55 -04:00
mac80211: support GTK rekey offload This adds the necessary mac80211 APIs to support GTK rekey offload, mirroring the functionality from cfg80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-05 16:35:41 +02:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
mac80211: move synchronize_net() before sta key removal There's no reason to do this inside the sta key removal since the keys can only be reached through the sta (and not by the driver at all) so once the sta can no longer be reached, the keys are safe. This will allow further optimisation opportunities with multiple stations. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:05:45 +01:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: prepare sta handling for MLO support Currently in mac80211 each STA object is represented using sta_info datastructure with the associated STA specific information and drivers access ieee80211_sta part of it. With MLO (Multi Link Operation) support being added in 802.11be standard, though the association is logically with a single Multi Link capable STA, at the physical level communication can happen via different advertised links (uniquely identified by Channel, operating class, BSSID) and hence the need to handle multiple link STA parameters within a composite sta_info object called the MLD STA. The different link STA part of MLD STA are identified using the link address which can be same or different as the MLD STA address and unique link id based on the link vif. To support extension of such a model, the sta_info datastructure is modified to hold multiple link STA objects with link specific params currently within sta_info moved to this new structure. Similarly this is done for ieee80211_sta as well which will be accessed within mac80211 as well as by drivers, hence trivial driver changes are expected to support this. For current non MLO supported drivers, only one link STA is present and link information is accessed via 'deflink' member. For MLO drivers, we still need to define the APIs etc. to get the correct link ID and access the correct part of the station info. Currently in mac80211, all link STA info are accessed directly via deflink. These will be updated to access via link pointers indexed by link id with MLO support patches, with link id being 0 for non MLO supported cases. Except for couple of macro related changes, below spatch takes care of updating mac80211 and driver code to access to the link STA info via deflink. @ieee80211_sta@ struct ieee80211_sta *s; struct sta_info *si; identifier var = {supp_rates, ht_cap, vht_cap, he_cap, he_6ghz_capa, eht_cap, rx_nss, bandwidth, txpwr}; @@ ( s-> - var + deflink.var | si->sta. - var + deflink.var ) @sta_info@ struct sta_info *si; identifier var = {gtk, pcpu_rx_stats, rx_stats, rx_stats_avg, status_stats, tx_stats, cur_max_bandwidth}; @@ ( si-> - var + deflink.var ) Signed-off-by: Sriram R <quic_srirrama@quicinc.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1649086883-13246-1-git-send-email-quic_srirrama@quicinc.com [remove MLO-drivers notes from commit message, not clear yet; run spatch] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-04-04 21:11:23 +05:30
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: restrict delayed tailroom needed decrement As explained in ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(), during roam, keys of the old AP will be destroyed and new keys will be installed. Deletion of the old key causes crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 1 to 0 and the new key installation causes a transition from 0 to 1. Whenever crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt transitions from 0 to 1, we invoke synchronize_net(); the reason for doing this is to avoid a race in the TX path as explained in increment_tailroom_need_count(). This synchronize_net() operation can be slow and can affect the station roam time. To avoid this, decrementing the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is delayed for a while so that upon installation of new key the transition would be from 1 to 2 instead of 0 to 1 and thereby improving the roam time. This is all correct for a STA iftype, but deferring the tailroom_needed decrement for other iftypes may be unnecessary. For example, let's consider the case of a 4-addr client connecting to an AP for which AP_VLAN interface is also created, let the initial value for tailroom_needed on the AP be 1. * 4-addr client connects to the AP (AP: tailroom_needed = 1) * AP will clear old keys, delay decrement of tailroom_needed count * AP_VLAN is created, it takes the tailroom count from master (AP_VLAN: tailroom_needed = 1, AP: tailroom_needed = 1) * Install new key for the station, assume key is plumbed in the HW, there won't be any change in tailroom_needed count on AP iface * Delayed decrement of tailroom_needed count on AP (AP: tailroom_needed = 0, AP_VLAN: tailroom_needed = 1) Because of the delayed decrement on AP iface, tailroom_needed count goes out of sync between AP(master iface) and AP_VLAN(slave iface) and there would be unnecessary tailroom created for the packets going through AP_VLAN iface. Also, WARN_ONs were observed while trying to bring down the AP_VLAN interface: (warn_slowpath_common) (warn_slowpath_null+0x18/0x20) (warn_slowpath_null) (ieee80211_free_keys+0x114/0x1e4) (ieee80211_free_keys) (ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor+0x51c/0x850) (ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor) (ieee80211_stop+0x30/0x3c) (ieee80211_stop) (__dev_close_many+0x94/0xb8) (__dev_close_many) (dev_close_many+0x5c/0xc8) Restricting delayed decrement to station interface alone fixes the problem and it makes sense to do so because delayed decrement is done to improve roam time which is applicable only for client devices. Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-07-10 16:48:27 +05:30
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support This adds generic cipher scheme support to mac80211, such schemes are fully under control by the driver. On hw registration drivers may specify additional HW ciphers with a scheme how these ciphers have to be handled by mac80211 TX/RR. A cipher scheme specifies a cipher suite value, a size of the security header to be added to or stripped from frames and how the PN is to be verified on RX. Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-24 14:23:27 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: remove key_mtx We now hold the wiphy mutex everywhere that we use or needed the key_mtx, so we don't need this mutex any more. Remove it. Most of this change was done automatically with spatch. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 14:00:02 +02:00
mac80211: add generic cipher scheme support This adds generic cipher scheme support to mac80211, such schemes are fully under control by the driver. On hw registration drivers may specify additional HW ciphers with a scheme how these ciphers have to be handled by mac80211 TX/RR. A cipher scheme specifies a cipher suite value, a size of the security header to be added to or stripped from frames and how the PN is to be verified on RX. Signed-off-by: Max Stepanov <Max.Stepanov@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-24 14:23:27 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: properly implement MLO key handling Implement key installation and lookup (on TX and RX) for MLO, so we can use multiple GTKs/IGTKs/BIGTKs. Co-authored-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ilan Peer <ilan.peer@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-08-17 11:17:01 +02:00
mac80211: restrict delayed tailroom needed decrement As explained in ieee80211_delayed_tailroom_dec(), during roam, keys of the old AP will be destroyed and new keys will be installed. Deletion of the old key causes crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt to go from 1 to 0 and the new key installation causes a transition from 0 to 1. Whenever crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt transitions from 0 to 1, we invoke synchronize_net(); the reason for doing this is to avoid a race in the TX path as explained in increment_tailroom_need_count(). This synchronize_net() operation can be slow and can affect the station roam time. To avoid this, decrementing the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt is delayed for a while so that upon installation of new key the transition would be from 1 to 2 instead of 0 to 1 and thereby improving the roam time. This is all correct for a STA iftype, but deferring the tailroom_needed decrement for other iftypes may be unnecessary. For example, let's consider the case of a 4-addr client connecting to an AP for which AP_VLAN interface is also created, let the initial value for tailroom_needed on the AP be 1. * 4-addr client connects to the AP (AP: tailroom_needed = 1) * AP will clear old keys, delay decrement of tailroom_needed count * AP_VLAN is created, it takes the tailroom count from master (AP_VLAN: tailroom_needed = 1, AP: tailroom_needed = 1) * Install new key for the station, assume key is plumbed in the HW, there won't be any change in tailroom_needed count on AP iface * Delayed decrement of tailroom_needed count on AP (AP: tailroom_needed = 0, AP_VLAN: tailroom_needed = 1) Because of the delayed decrement on AP iface, tailroom_needed count goes out of sync between AP(master iface) and AP_VLAN(slave iface) and there would be unnecessary tailroom created for the packets going through AP_VLAN iface. Also, WARN_ONs were observed while trying to bring down the AP_VLAN interface: (warn_slowpath_common) (warn_slowpath_null+0x18/0x20) (warn_slowpath_null) (ieee80211_free_keys+0x114/0x1e4) (ieee80211_free_keys) (ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor+0x51c/0x850) (ieee80211_del_virtual_monitor) (ieee80211_stop+0x30/0x3c) (ieee80211_stop) (__dev_close_many+0x94/0xb8) (__dev_close_many) (dev_close_many+0x5c/0xc8) Restricting delayed decrement to station interface alone fixes the problem and it makes sense to do so because delayed decrement is done to improve roam time which is applicable only for client devices. Signed-off-by: Manikanta Pubbisetty <mpubbise@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2018-07-10 16:48:27 +05:30
mac80211: move synchronize_net() before sta key removal There's no reason to do this inside the sta key removal since the keys can only be reached through the sta (and not by the driver at all) so once the sta can no longer be reached, the keys are safe. This will allow further optimisation opportunities with multiple stations. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-12-04 23:05:45 +01:00
mac80211: batch key free synchronize_net() Instead of calling synchronize_net() for every key on an interface or when a station is removed, do it only once for all keys in both of these cases. As a side-effect, removing station keys now always calls synchronize_net() even if there are no keys, which fixes an issue with station removal happening in the driver while the station could still be used for TX. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-03-06 23:09:11 +01:00
wifi: mac80211: move key tailroom work to wiphy work This way we hold the wiphy mutex there, as a step towards removing some of the additional locks we have. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2023-08-28 13:59:47 +02:00
mac80211: defer tailroom counter manipulation when roaming During roaming, the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt counter will often take values 2,1,0,1,2 because first keys are removed and then new keys are added. This is inefficient because during the 0->1 transition, synchronize_net must be called to avoid packet races, although typically no packets would be flowing during that time. To avoid that, defer the decrement (2->1, 1->0) when keys are removed (by half a second). This means the counter will really have the values 2,2,2,3,4 ... 2, thus never reaching 0 and having to do the 0->1 transition. Note that this patch entirely disregards the drivers for which this optimisation was done to start with, for them the key removal itself will be expensive because it has to synchronize_net() after the counter is incremented to remove the key from HW crypto. For them the sequence will look like this: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0 (*) which is clearly a lot more inefficient. This could be addressed separately, during key removal the 0->1->0 sequence isn't necessary. (*) it starts at 0 because HW crypto is on, then goes to 1 when HW crypto is disabled for a key, then back to 0 because the key is deleted; this happens for both keys in the example. When new keys are added, it goes to 1 first because they're added in software; when a key is moved to hardware it goes back to 0 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-02-23 00:59:03 +01:00
mac80211: fix AP_VLAN crypto tailroom calculation Some splats I was seeing: (a) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wep.c:102 ieee80211_wep_add_iv (b) WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:73 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add (c) WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at /devel/src/linux/net/mac80211/wpa.c:433 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt I've seen (a) and (b) with ath9k hw crypto and (c) with ath9k sw crypto. All of them were related to insufficient skb tailroom and I was able to trigger these with ping6 program. AP_VLANs may inherit crypto keys from parent AP. This wasn't considered and yielded problems in some setups resulting in inability to transmit data because mac80211 wouldn't resize skbs when necessary and subsequently drop some packets due to insufficient tailroom. For efficiency purposes don't inspect both AP_VLAN and AP sdata looking for tailroom counter. Instead update AP_VLAN tailroom counters whenever their master AP tailroom counter changes. Signed-off-by: Michal Kazior <michal.kazior@tieto.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-05-13 09:16:48 +00:00
mac80211: defer tailroom counter manipulation when roaming During roaming, the crypto_tx_tailroom_needed_cnt counter will often take values 2,1,0,1,2 because first keys are removed and then new keys are added. This is inefficient because during the 0->1 transition, synchronize_net must be called to avoid packet races, although typically no packets would be flowing during that time. To avoid that, defer the decrement (2->1, 1->0) when keys are removed (by half a second). This means the counter will really have the values 2,2,2,3,4 ... 2, thus never reaching 0 and having to do the 0->1 transition. Note that this patch entirely disregards the drivers for which this optimisation was done to start with, for them the key removal itself will be expensive because it has to synchronize_net() after the counter is incremented to remove the key from HW crypto. For them the sequence will look like this: 0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0 (*) which is clearly a lot more inefficient. This could be addressed separately, during key removal the 0->1->0 sequence isn't necessary. (*) it starts at 0 because HW crypto is on, then goes to 1 when HW crypto is disabled for a key, then back to 0 because the key is deleted; this happens for both keys in the example. When new keys are added, it goes to 1 first because they're added in software; when a key is moved to hardware it goes back to 0 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-02-23 00:59:03 +01:00
mac80211: support GTK rekey offload This adds the necessary mac80211 APIs to support GTK rekey offload, mirroring the functionality from cfg80211. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-05 16:35:41 +02:00
mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it about all those counters, we need to be able to get them from mac80211, this adds the required API. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 18:58:00 +02:00
mac80211: introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS and use it Introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS in the generic 802.11 header file and use it in place of STA_TID_NUM and NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES which are both really the number of TIDs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-11-14 23:22:21 +01:00
mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it about all those counters, we need to be able to get them from mac80211, this adds the required API. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 18:58:00 +02:00
mac80111: Add CCMP-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure CCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [squash ccmp256 -> mic_len argument change] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:07 +02:00
mac80211: introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS and use it Introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS in the generic 802.11 header file and use it in place of STA_TID_NUM and NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES which are both really the number of TIDs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-11-14 23:22:21 +01:00
mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it about all those counters, we need to be able to get them from mac80211, this adds the required API. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 18:58:00 +02:00
mac80211: introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS and use it Introduce IEEE80211_NUM_TIDS in the generic 802.11 header file and use it in place of STA_TID_NUM and NUM_RX_DATA_QUEUES which are both really the number of TIDs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2012-11-14 23:22:21 +01:00
mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it about all those counters, we need to be able to get them from mac80211, this adds the required API. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 18:58:00 +02:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it about all those counters, we need to be able to get them from mac80211, this adds the required API. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 18:58:00 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-CMAC-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-CMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:08 +02:00
mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it about all those counters, we need to be able to get them from mac80211, this adds the required API. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 18:58:00 +02:00
wireless: move crypto constants to ieee80211.h mac80211 and the Intel drivers all define crypto constants, move them to ieee80211.h instead. Reviewed-by: Emmanuel Grumbach <emmanuel.grumbach@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-05-08 13:09:08 +02:00
mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it about all those counters, we need to be able to get them from mac80211, this adds the required API. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 18:58:00 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:09 +02:00
mac80111: Add GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure GCMP and GCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [remove a spurious newline] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:06 +02:00
mac80211: allow drivers to access key sequence counter In order to implement GTK rekeying, the device needs to be able to encrypt frames with the right PN/IV and check the PN/IV in RX frames. To be able to tell it about all those counters, we need to be able to get them from mac80211, this adds the required API. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
2011-07-07 18:58:00 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80111: Add CCMP-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure CCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [squash ccmp256 -> mic_len argument change] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:07 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-CMAC-256 cipher This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-CMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:08 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80111: Add BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure BIP-GMAC-128 and BIP-GMAC-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:09 +02:00
mac80111: Add GCMP and GCMP-256 ciphers This allows mac80211 to configure GCMP and GCMP-256 to the driver and also use software-implementation within mac80211 when the driver does not support this with hardware accelaration. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com> [remove a spurious newline] Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2015-01-24 19:52:06 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: don't require cipher and keylen in gtk rekey ieee80211_add_gtk_rekey receives a keyconf as an argument, and the cipher and keylen are taken from there to the new allocated key. But in rekey, both the cipher and the keylen should be the same as of the old key, so let ieee80211_add_gtk_rekey find those, so drivers won't have to fill it in. Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250721214922.3c5c023bfae9.Ie6594ae2b4b6d5b3d536e642b349046ebfce7a5d@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-07-21 21:50:49 +03:00
wifi: mac80211: add link id to ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() In MLO, we need the link id in the GTK key to be given by the driver after rekeying in wowlan, so add that. Signed-off-by: Shaul Triebitz <shaul.triebitz@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Miriam Rachel Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20240228094500.ce1bfc83a680.I43a6f8ab2804ee07116a37d5b9ec601b843464b1@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-02-28 09:44:56 +01:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: don't require cipher and keylen in gtk rekey ieee80211_add_gtk_rekey receives a keyconf as an argument, and the cipher and keylen are taken from there to the new allocated key. But in rekey, both the cipher and the keylen should be the same as of the old key, so let ieee80211_add_gtk_rekey find those, so drivers won't have to fill it in. Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250721214922.3c5c023bfae9.Ie6594ae2b4b6d5b3d536e642b349046ebfce7a5d@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-07-21 21:50:49 +03:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: add link id to ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() In MLO, we need the link id in the GTK key to be given by the driver after rekeying in wowlan, so add that. Signed-off-by: Shaul Triebitz <shaul.triebitz@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Miriam Rachel Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20240228094500.ce1bfc83a680.I43a6f8ab2804ee07116a37d5b9ec601b843464b1@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-02-28 09:44:56 +01:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: don't require cipher and keylen in gtk rekey ieee80211_add_gtk_rekey receives a keyconf as an argument, and the cipher and keylen are taken from there to the new allocated key. But in rekey, both the cipher and the keylen should be the same as of the old key, so let ieee80211_add_gtk_rekey find those, so drivers won't have to fill it in. Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250721214922.3c5c023bfae9.Ie6594ae2b4b6d5b3d536e642b349046ebfce7a5d@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-07-21 21:50:49 +03:00
wifi: mac80211: remove cipher scheme support The only driver using this was iwlwifi, where we just removed the support because it was never really used. Remove the code from mac80211 as well. Change-Id: I1667417a5932315ee9d81f5c233c56a354923f09 Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-02-09 13:14:26 +01:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80211: use ERR_CAST() No need for ERR_PTR(PTR_ERR()) since there's ERR_CAST, use it. Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-28 19:03:36 +02:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: set key link ID to the deflink one When in non-MLO mode, the key ID was set to -1 even for keys that are not pairwise. Change the link ID to be the link ID of the deflink in this case so that drivers do not need to special cases for this. Signed-off-by: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Miri Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250102161730.0c066f084677.I4a5c288465e75119edb6a0df90dddf6f30d14a02@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2025-01-02 16:20:05 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: add link id to ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add() In MLO, we need the link id in the GTK key to be given by the driver after rekeying in wowlan, so add that. Signed-off-by: Shaul Triebitz <shaul.triebitz@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Miriam Rachel Korenblit <miriam.rachel.korenblit@intel.com> Link: https://msgid.link/20240228094500.ce1bfc83a680.I43a6f8ab2804ee07116a37d5b9ec601b843464b1@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2024-02-28 09:44:56 +01:00
mac80211: add APIs to allow keeping connections after WoWLAN In order to be able to (securely) keep connections alive after the system was suspended for WoWLAN, we need some additional APIs. We already have API (ieee80211_gtk_rekey_notify) to tell wpa_supplicant about the new replay counter if GTK rekeying was done by the device while the host was asleep, but that's not sufficient. If GTK rekeying wasn't done, we need to tell the host about sequence counters for the GTK (and PTK regardless of rekeying) that was used while asleep, add ieee80211_set_key_rx_seq() for that. If GTK rekeying was done, then we need to be able to disable the old keys (with ieee80211_remove_key()) and allocate the new GTK key(s) in mac80211 (with ieee80211_gtk_rekey_add()). If protocol offload (e.g. ARP) is implemented, then also the TX sequence counter for the PTK must be updated, using the new ieee80211_set_key_tx_seq() function. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2013-08-07 20:11:55 +02:00
mac80211: support MIC error/replay detected counters driver update Support the driver incrementing MIC error and replay detected counters when having detected a bad frame, if it drops it directly instead of relying on mac80211 to do the checks. These are then exposed to userspace, though currently only in some cases and in debugfs. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/iwlwifi.20201129172929.fb59be9c6de8.Ife2260887366f585afadd78c983ebea93d2bb54b@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2020-11-29 17:30:45 +02:00
wifi: mac80211: implement link switching Implement an API function and debugfs file to switch active links. Also provide an async version of the API so drivers can call it in arbitrary contexts, e.g. while in the authorized callback. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
2022-09-02 16:12:56 +02:00