[ Upstream commit 5b1e94fa43 ]
This code was mistakenly using the exec bit from the PMD in all
cases, even when the PMD isn't a huge PMD.
If it's not a huge PMD, test the exec bit in the individual ptes down
in tlb_batch_pmd_scan().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 49b6c01f4c ]
One more place where we must not be able
to be preempted or to be interrupted in RT.
Always actually disable interrupts during
synchronization cycle.
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <tkhai@yandex.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit aa3449ee9c ]
Only the second argument, 'op', is signed.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d9124268d8 ]
batadv_frag_insert_packet was unable to handle out-of-order packets because it
dropped them directly. This is caused by the way the fragmentation lists is
checked for the correct place to insert a fragmentation entry.
The fragmentation code keeps the fragments in lists. The fragmentation entries
are kept in descending order of sequence number. The list is traversed and each
entry is compared with the new fragment. If the current entry has a smaller
sequence number than the new fragment then the new one has to be inserted
before the current entry. This ensures that the list is still in descending
order.
An out-of-order packet with a smaller sequence number than all entries in the
list still has to be added to the end of the list. The used hlist has no
information about the last entry in the list inside hlist_head and thus the
last entry has to be calculated differently. Currently the code assumes that
the iterator variable of hlist_for_each_entry can be used for this purpose
after the hlist_for_each_entry finished. This is obviously wrong because the
iterator variable is always NULL when the list was completely traversed.
Instead the information about the last entry has to be stored in a different
variable.
This problem was introduced in 610bfc6bc9
("batman-adv: Receive fragmented packets and merge").
Signed-off-by: Sven Eckelmann <sven@narfation.org>
Signed-off-by: Marek Lindner <mareklindner@neomailbox.ch>
Signed-off-by: Antonio Quartulli <antonio@meshcoding.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 06ebb06d49 ]
Check for cases when the caller requests 0 bytes instead of running off
and dereferencing potentially invalid iovecs.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit fcdfe3a7fa ]
When performing segmentation, the mac_len value is copied right
out of the original skb. However, this value is not always set correctly
(like when the packet is VLAN-tagged) and we'll end up copying a bad
value.
One way to demonstrate this is to configure a VM which tags
packets internally and turn off VLAN acceleration on the forwarding
bridge port. The packets show up corrupt like this:
16:18:24.985548 52:54:00🆎be:25 > 52:54:00:26:ce:a3, ethertype 802.1Q
(0x8100), length 1518: vlan 100, p 0, ethertype 0x05e0,
0x0000: 8cdb 1c7c 8cdb 0064 4006 b59d 0a00 6402 ...|...d@.....d.
0x0010: 0a00 6401 9e0d b441 0a5e 64ec 0330 14fa ..d....A.^d..0..
0x0020: 29e3 01c9 f871 0000 0101 080a 000a e833)....q.........3
0x0030: 000f 8c75 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 ...unetperf.netp
0x0040: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
0x0050: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
0x0060: 6572 6600 6e65 7470 6572 6600 6e65 7470 erf.netperf.netp
...
This also leads to awful throughput as GSO packets are dropped and
cause retransmissions.
The solution is to set the mac_len using the values already available
in then new skb. We've already adjusted all of the header offset, so we
might as well correctly figure out the mac_len using skb_reset_mac_len().
After this change, packets are segmented correctly and performance
is restored.
CC: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 081e83a78d ]
Macvlan devices do not initialize vlan_features. As a result,
any vlan devices configured on top of macvlans perform very poorly.
Initialize vlan_features based on the vlan features of the lower-level
device.
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1be9a950c6 ]
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7 ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05c ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit c36c9d50cc ]
The recent commit "e29aa33 bna: Enable Multi Buffer RX" is causing
a performance regression. It does not properly update 'cmpl' pointer
at the end of the loop in NAPI handler bnad_cq_process(). The result is
only one packet / per NAPI-schedule is processed.
Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 1f74e613de ]
In vegas we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.
Then, we need to do do_div to allow this to be used on 32-bit arches.
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Doug Leith <doug.leith@nuim.ie>
Fixes: 8d3a564da3 (tcp: tcp_vegas cong avoid fix)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 45a07695bc ]
In veno we do a multiplication of the cwnd and the rtt. This
may overflow and thus their result is stored in a u64. However, we first
need to cast the cwnd so that actually 64-bit arithmetic is done.
A first attempt at fixing 76f1017757 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion
control) was made by 159131149c (tcp: Overflow bug in Vegas), but it
failed to add the required cast in tcp_veno_cong_avoid().
Fixes: 76f1017757 ([TCP]: TCP Veno congestion control)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 95cb574598 ]
Ipv4 tunnels created with "local any remote $ip" didn't work properly since
7d442fab0 (ipv4: Cache dst in tunnels). 99% of packets sent via those tunnels
had src addr = 0.0.0.0. That was because only dst_entry was cached, although
fl4.saddr has to be cached too. Every time ip_tunnel_xmit used cached dst_entry
(tunnel_rtable_get returned non-NULL), fl4.saddr was initialized with
tnl_params->saddr (= 0 in our case), and wasn't changed until iptunnel_xmit().
This patch adds saddr to ip_tunnel->dst_cache, fixing this issue.
Reported-by: Sergey Popov <pinkbyte@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Popov <ixaphire@qrator.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit d92f5dec63 ]
Commit 87aa9f9c61 ("net: phy: consolidate PHY reset in phy_init_hw()")
moved the call to phy_scan_fixups() in phy_init_hw() after a software
reset is performed.
By the time phy_init_hw() is called in phy_device_register(), no driver
has been bound to this PHY yet, so all the checks in phy_init_hw()
against the PHY driver and the PHY driver's config_init function will
return 0. We will therefore never call phy_scan_fixups() as we should.
Fix this by calling phy_scan_fixups() and check for its return value to
restore the intended functionality.
This broke PHY drivers which do register an early PHY fixup callback to
intercept the PHY probing and do things like changing the 32-bits unique
PHY identifier when a pseudo-PHY address has been used, as well as
board-specific PHY fixups that need to be applied during driver probe
time.
Reported-by: Hauke Merthens <hauke-m@hauke-m.de>
Reported-by: Jonas Gorski <jogo@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 40eea803c6 ]
Sasha's report:
> While fuzzing with trinity inside a KVM tools guest running the latest -next
> kernel with the KASAN patchset, I've stumbled on the following spew:
>
> [ 4448.949424] ==================================================================
> [ 4448.951737] AddressSanitizer: user-memory-access on address 0
> [ 4448.952988] Read of size 2 by thread T19638:
> [ 4448.954510] CPU: 28 PID: 19638 Comm: trinity-c76 Not tainted 3.16.0-rc4-next-20140711-sasha-00046-g07d3099-dirty #813
> [ 4448.956823] ffff88046d86ca40 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37e78 ffff880082f37a40
> [ 4448.958233] ffffffffb6e47068 ffff880082f37a68 ffff880082f37a58 ffffffffb242708d
> [ 4448.959552] 0000000000000000 ffff880082f37a88 ffffffffb24255b1 0000000000000000
> [ 4448.961266] Call Trace:
> [ 4448.963158] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
> [ 4448.964244] kasan_report_user_access (mm/kasan/report.c:184)
> [ 4448.965507] __asan_load2 (mm/kasan/kasan.c:352)
> [ 4448.966482] ? netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
> [ 4448.967541] netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2339)
> [ 4448.968537] ? get_parent_ip (kernel/sched/core.c:2555)
> [ 4448.970103] sock_sendmsg (net/socket.c:654)
> [ 4448.971584] ? might_fault (mm/memory.c:3741)
> [ 4448.972526] ? might_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/current.h:14 mm/memory.c:3740)
> [ 4448.973596] ? verify_iovec (net/core/iovec.c:64)
> [ 4448.974522] ___sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2096)
> [ 4448.975797] ? put_lock_stats.isra.13 (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:98 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:254)
> [ 4448.977030] ? lock_release_holdtime (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:273)
> [ 4448.978197] ? lock_release_non_nested (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3434 (discriminator 1))
> [ 4448.979346] ? check_chain_key (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2188)
> [ 4448.980535] __sys_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2181)
> [ 4448.981592] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
> [ 4448.982773] ? trace_hardirqs_on (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2607)
> [ 4448.984458] ? syscall_trace_enter (arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c:1500 (discriminator 2))
> [ 4448.985621] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller (kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2600)
> [ 4448.986754] SyS_sendmmsg (net/socket.c:2201)
> [ 4448.987708] tracesys (arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S:542)
> [ 4448.988929] ==================================================================
This reports means that we've come to netlink_sendmsg() with msg->msg_name == NULL and msg->msg_namelen > 0.
After this report there was no usual "Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference"
and this gave me a clue that address 0 is mapped and contains valid socket address structure in it.
This bug was introduced in f3d3342602
(net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic).
Commit message states that:
"Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address."
But in fact this affects sendto when address 0 is mapped and contains
socket address structure in it. In such case copy-in address will succeed,
verify_iovec() function will successfully exit with msg->msg_namelen > 0
and msg->msg_name == NULL.
This patch fixes it by setting msg_namelen to 0 if msg_name == NULL.
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 04ca6973f7 ]
In "Counting Packets Sent Between Arbitrary Internet Hosts", Jeffrey and
Jedidiah describe ways exploiting linux IP identifier generation to
infer whether two machines are exchanging packets.
With commit 73f156a6e8 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count"), we
changed IP id generation, but this does not really prevent this
side-channel technique.
This patch adds a random amount of perturbation so that IP identifiers
for a given destination [1] are no longer monotonically increasing after
an idle period.
Note that prandom_u32_max(1) returns 0, so if generator is used at most
once per jiffy, this patch inserts no hole in the ID suite and do not
increase collision probability.
This is jiffies based, so in the worst case (HZ=1000), the id can
rollover after ~65 seconds of idle time, which should be fine.
We also change the hash used in __ip_select_ident() to not only hash
on daddr, but also saddr and protocol, so that ICMP probes can not be
used to infer information for other protocols.
For IPv6, adds saddr into the hash as well, but not nexthdr.
If I ping the patched target, we can see ID are now hard to predict.
21:57:11.008086 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 1, length 64
21:57:11.010752 IP (... id 2081 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 1, length 64
21:57:12.013133 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 2, length 64
21:57:12.015737 IP (... id 3039 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 2, length 64
21:57:13.016580 IP (...)
A > target: ICMP echo request, seq 3, length 64
21:57:13.019251 IP (... id 3437 ...)
target > A: ICMP echo reply, seq 3, length 64
[1] TCP sessions uses a per flow ID generator not changed by this patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jeffrey Knockel <jeffk@cs.unm.edu>
Reported-by: Jedidiah R. Crandall <crandall@cs.unm.edu>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 73f156a6e8 ]
Ideally, we would need to generate IP ID using a per destination IP
generator.
linux kernels used inet_peer cache for this purpose, but this had a huge
cost on servers disabling MTU discovery.
1) each inet_peer struct consumes 192 bytes
2) inetpeer cache uses a binary tree of inet_peer structs,
with a nominal size of ~66000 elements under load.
3) lookups in this tree are hitting a lot of cache lines, as tree depth
is about 20.
4) If server deals with many tcp flows, we have a high probability of
not finding the inet_peer, allocating a fresh one, inserting it in
the tree with same initial ip_id_count, (cf secure_ip_id())
5) We garbage collect inet_peer aggressively.
IP ID generation do not have to be 'perfect'
Goal is trying to avoid duplicates in a short period of time,
so that reassembly units have a chance to complete reassembly of
fragments belonging to one message before receiving other fragments
with a recycled ID.
We simply use an array of generators, and a Jenkin hash using the dst IP
as a key.
ipv6_select_ident() is put back into net/ipv6/ip6_output.c where it
belongs (it is only used from this file)
secure_ip_id() and secure_ipv6_id() no longer are needed.
Rename ip_select_ident_more() to ip_select_ident_segs() to avoid
unnecessary decrement/increment of the number of segments.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit a0e5ef53aa ]
The SPI check introduced in ea9884b3ac
was intended for IPComp SAs but actually prevented AH SAs from getting
installed (depending on the SPI).
Fixes: ea9884b3ac ("xfrm: check user specified spi for IPComp")
Cc: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 8762e50928 upstream.
init_espfix_ap() is currently off by one level when informing hypervisor
that allocated pages will be used for ministacks' page tables.
The most immediate effect of this on a PV guest is that if
'stack_page = __get_free_page()' returns a non-zeroed-out page the hypervisor
will refuse to use it for a page table (which it shouldn't be anyway). This will
result in warnings by both Xen and Linux.
More importantly, a subsequent write to that page (again, by a PV guest) is
likely to result in fatal page fault.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1404926298-5565-1-git-send-email-boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c75b53af2f upstream.
I use btree from 3.14-rc2 in my own module. When the btree module is
removed, a warning arises:
kmem_cache_destroy btree_node: Slab cache still has objects
CPU: 13 PID: 9150 Comm: rmmod Tainted: GF O 3.14.0-rc2 #1
Hardware name: Inspur NF5270M3/NF5270M3, BIOS CHEETAH_2.1.3 09/10/2013
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x49/0x5d
kmem_cache_destroy+0xcf/0xe0
btree_module_exit+0x10/0x12 [btree]
SyS_delete_module+0x198/0x1f0
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
The cause is that it doesn't release the last btree node, when height = 1
and fill = 1.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded test of NULL]
Signed-off-by: Minfei Huang <huangminfei@ucloud.cn>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3cf521f7dc upstream.
The l2tp [get|set]sockopt() code has fallen back to the UDP functions
for socket option levels != SOL_PPPOL2TP since day one, but that has
never actually worked, since the l2tp socket isn't an inet socket.
As David Miller points out:
"If we wanted this to work, it'd have to look up the tunnel and then
use tunnel->sk, but I wonder how useful that would be"
Since this can never have worked so nobody could possibly have depended
on that functionality, just remove the broken code and return -EINVAL.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Acked-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Phil Turnbull <phil.turnbull@oracle.com>
Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 17290231df upstream.
There are two FIXMEs in the double exception handler 'for the extremely
unlikely case'. This case gets hit by gcc during kernel build once in
a few hours, resulting in an unrecoverable exception condition.
Provide missing fixup routine to handle this case. Double exception
literals now need 8 more bytes, add them to the linker script.
Also replace bbsi instructions with bbsi.l as we're branching depending
on 8th and 7th LSB-based bits of exception address.
This may be tested by adding the explicit DTLB invalidation to window
overflow handlers, like the following:
# --- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/vectors.S
# +++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/vectors.S
# @@ -592,6 +592,14 @@ ENDPROC(_WindowUnderflow4)
# ENTRY_ALIGN64(_WindowOverflow8)
#
# s32e a0, a9, -16
# + bbsi.l a9, 31, 1f
# + rsr a0, ccount
# + bbsi.l a0, 4, 1f
# + pdtlb a0, a9
# + idtlb a0
# + movi a0, 9
# + idtlb a0
# +1:
# l32e a0, a1, -12
# s32e a2, a9, -8
# s32e a1, a9, -12
Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ea9f9274bf upstream.
Remove xen_enable_nmi() to fix a 64-bit guest crash when registering
the NMI callback on Xen 3.1 and earlier.
It's not needed since the NMI callback is set by a set_trap_table
hypercall (in xen_load_idt() or xen_write_idt_entry()).
It's also broken since it only set the current VCPU's callback.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reported-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Steven Noonan <steven@uplinklabs.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 92c14bd947 upstream.
This is only relevant to implementations with multiple clusters, where clusters
have separate clock lines but all CPUs within a cluster share it.
Consider a dual cluster platform with 2 cores per cluster. During suspend we
start hot unplugging CPUs in order 1 to 3. When CPU2 is removed, policy->kobj
would be moved to CPU3 and when CPU3 goes down we wouldn't free policy or its
kobj as we want to retain permissions/values/etc.
Now on resume, we will get CPU2 before CPU3 and will call __cpufreq_add_dev().
We will recover the old policy and update policy->cpu from 3 to 2 from
update_policy_cpu().
But the kobj is still tied to CPU3 and isn't moved to CPU2. We wouldn't create a
link for CPU2, but would try that for CPU3 while bringing it online. Which will
report errors as CPU3 already has kobj assigned to it.
This bug got introduced with commit 42f921a, which overlooked this scenario.
To fix this, lets move kobj to the new policy->cpu while bringing first CPU of a
cluster back. Also do a WARN_ON() if kobject_move failed, as we would reach here
only for the first CPU of a non-boot cluster. And we can't recover from this
situation, if kobject_move() fails.
Fixes: 42f921a6f1 (cpufreq: remove sysfs files for CPUs which failed to come back after resume)
Cc: 3.13+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.13+
Reported-and-tested-by: Bu Yitian <ybu@qti.qualcomm.com>
Reported-by: Saravana Kannan <skannan@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 08b9939997 upstream.
This reverts commit 277d916fc2 as it was
at least breaking iwlwifi by setting the IEEE80211_TX_CTL_NO_PS_BUFFER
flag in all kinds of interface modes, not only for AP mode where it is
appropriate.
To avoid reintroducing the original problem, explicitly check for probe
request frames in the multicast buffering code.
Fixes: 277d916fc2 ("mac80211: move "bufferable MMPDU" check to fix AP mode scan")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e120fb4596 upstream.
After clarification from the hardware team it was found that
this 1.8V PHY supply can't be switched OFF when SoC is Active.
Since the PHY IPs don't contain isolation logic built in the design to
allow the power rail to be switched off, there is a very high risk
of IP reliability and additional leakage paths which can result in
additional power consumption.
The only scenario where this rail can be switched off is part of Power on
reset sequencing, but it needs to be kept always-on during operation.
This patch is required for proper functionality of USB, SATA
and PCIe on DRA7-evm.
CC: Rajendra Nayak <rnayak@ti.com>
CC: Tero Kristo <t-kristo@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Quadros <rogerq@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 23d9cec07c upstream.
The DRA74/72 control module pins have a weak pull up and pull down.
This is configured by bit offset 17. if BIT(17) is 1, a pull up is
selected, else a pull down is selected.
However, this pull resisstor is applied based on BIT(16) -
PULLUDENABLE - if BIT(18) is *0*, then pull as defined in BIT(17) is
applied, else no weak pulls are applied. We defined this in reverse.
Reference: Table 18-5 (Description of the pad configuration register
bits) in Technical Reference Manual Revision (DRA74x revision Q:
SPRUHI2Q Revised June 2014 and DRA72x revision F: SPRUHP2F - Revised
June 2014)
Fixes: 6e58b8f1da ("ARM: dts: DRA7: Add the dts files for dra7 SoC and dra7-evm board")
Signed-off-by: Nishanth Menon <nm@ti.com>
Tested-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7209a75d20 upstream.
This moves the espfix64 logic into native_iret. To make this work,
it gets rid of the native patch for INTERRUPT_RETURN:
INTERRUPT_RETURN on native kernels is now 'jmp native_iret'.
This changes the 16-bit SS behavior on Xen from OOPSing to leaking
some bits of the Xen hypervisor's RSP (I think).
[ hpa: this is a nonzero cost on native, but probably not enough to
measure. Xen needs to fix this in their own code, probably doing
something equivalent to espfix64. ]
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7b8f1d8ef6597cb16ae004a43c56980a7de3cf94.1406129132.git.luto@amacapital.net
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 34273f41d5 upstream.
Embedded systems, which may be very memory-size-sensitive, are
extremely unlikely to ever encounter any 16-bit software, so make it
a CONFIG_EXPERT option to turn off support for any 16-bit software
whatsoever.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 197725de65 upstream.
Make espfix64 a hidden Kconfig option. This fixes the x86-64 UML
build which had broken due to the non-existence of init_espfix_bsp()
in UML: since UML uses its own Kconfig, this option does not appear in
the UML build.
This also makes it possible to make support for 16-bit segments a
configuration option, for the people who want to minimize the size of
the kernel.
Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit e1fe9ed8d2 upstream.
Sparse warns that the percpu variables aren't declared before they are
defined. Rather than hacking around it, move espfix definitions into
a proper header file.
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3891a04aaf upstream.
The IRET instruction, when returning to a 16-bit segment, only
restores the bottom 16 bits of the user space stack pointer. This
causes some 16-bit software to break, but it also leaks kernel state
to user space. We have a software workaround for that ("espfix") for
the 32-bit kernel, but it relies on a nonzero stack segment base which
is not available in 64-bit mode.
In checkin:
b3b42ac2cb x86-64, modify_ldt: Ban 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels
we "solved" this by forbidding 16-bit segments on 64-bit kernels, with
the logic that 16-bit support is crippled on 64-bit kernels anyway (no
V86 support), but it turns out that people are doing stuff like
running old Win16 binaries under Wine and expect it to work.
This works around this by creating percpu "ministacks", each of which
is mapped 2^16 times 64K apart. When we detect that the return SS is
on the LDT, we copy the IRET frame to the ministack and use the
relevant alias to return to userspace. The ministacks are mapped
readonly, so if IRET faults we promote #GP to #DF which is an IST
vector and thus has its own stack; we then do the fixup in the #DF
handler.
(Making #GP an IST exception would make the msr_safe functions unsafe
in NMI/MC context, and quite possibly have other effects.)
Special thanks to:
- Andy Lutomirski, for the suggestion of using very small stack slots
and copy (as opposed to map) the IRET frame there, and for the
suggestion to mark them readonly and let the fault promote to #DF.
- Konrad Wilk for paravirt fixup and testing.
- Borislav Petkov for testing help and useful comments.
Reported-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1398816946-3351-1-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andrew Lutomriski <amluto@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dirk Hohndel <dirk@hohndel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>
Cc: comex <comexk@gmail.com>
Cc: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # consider after upstream merge
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 7ed6fb9b5a upstream.
This reverts commit fa81511bb0 in
preparation of merging in the proper fix (espfix64).
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f723aa1817 upstream.
During suspend we call sched_clock_poll() to update the epoch and
accumulated time and reprogram the sched_clock_timer to fire
before the next wrap-around time. Unfortunately,
sched_clock_poll() doesn't restart the timer, instead it relies
on the hrtimer layer to do that and during suspend we aren't
calling that function from the hrtimer layer. Instead, we're
reprogramming the expires time while the hrtimer is enqueued,
which can cause the hrtimer tree to be corrupted. Furthermore, we
restart the timer during suspend but we update the epoch during
resume which seems counter-intuitive.
Let's fix this by saving the accumulated state and canceling the
timer during suspend. On resume we can update the epoch and
restart the timer similar to what we would do if we were starting
the clock for the first time.
Fixes: a08ca5d108 "sched_clock: Use an hrtimer instead of timer"
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1406174630-23458-1-git-send-email-john.stultz@linaro.org
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit aac74dc495 upstream.
After learning we'll need some sort of deferred printk functionality in
the timekeeping core, Peter suggested we rename the printk_sched function
so it can be reused by needed subsystems.
This only changes the function name. No logic changes.
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Bohac <jbohac@suse.cz>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 44fa816bb7 upstream.
nr_dirty is updated without locking, causing it to drift so that it is
non-zero (either a small positive integer, or a very large one when an
underflow occurs) even when there are no actual dirty blocks. This was
due to a race between the workqueue and map function accessing nr_dirty
in parallel without proper protection.
People were seeing under runs due to a race on increment/decrement of
nr_dirty, see: https://lkml.org/lkml/2014/6/3/648
Fix this by using an atomic_t for nr_dirty.
Reported-by: roma1390@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Anssi Hannula <anssi.hannula@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Joe Thornber <ejt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d8c712ea47 upstream.
1d3d4437ea ("vmscan: per-node deferred work") added a flags field to
struct shrinker assuming that all shrinkers were zero filled. The dm
bufio shrinker is not zero filled, which leaves arbitrary kmalloc() data
in flags. So far the only defined flags bit is SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE.
But there are proposed patches which add other bits to shrinker.flags
(e.g. memcg awareness).
Rather than simply initializing the shrinker, this patch uses kzalloc()
when allocating the dm_bufio_client to ensure that the embedded shrinker
and any other similar structures are zeroed.
This fixes theoretical over aggressive shrinking of dm bufio objects.
If the uninitialized dm_bufio_client.shrinker.flags contains
SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE then shrink_slab() would call the dm shrinker for
each numa node rather than just once. This has been broken since 3.12.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 61bd55ce16 upstream.
When creating the demux table we need to iterate over the selected scan mask for
the buffer to get the samples which should be copied to destination buffer.
Right now the code uses the mask which contains all active channels, which means
the demux table contains entries which causes it to copy all the samples from
source to destination buffer one by one without doing any demuxing.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 9b2a4d35a6 upstream.
val2 should be zero
This will make no difference for correct inputs but will reject
incorrect ones with a decimal part in the value written to the sysfs
interface.
Signed-off-by: Peter Meerwald <pmeerw@pmeerw.net>
Cc: Oleksandr Kravchenko <o.v.kravchenko@globallogic.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 381676d5e8 upstream.
The userspace interface for acceleration sensors is documented as using
m/s^2 units [Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-iio]
The fullscale raw values for the BMA80 corresponds to -/+ 1, 1.5, 2, etc G
depending on the selected mode.
The scale table was converting to G rather than m/s^2.
Change the scaling table to match the documented interface.
See commit 71702e6e, iio: mma8452: Use correct acceleration units,
for a related fix.
Signed-off-by: Peter Meerwald <pmeerw@pmeerw.net>
Cc: Oleksandr Kravchenko <o.v.kravchenko@globallogic.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b6328a07bd upstream.
The acpi_pnp_match() function is used for finding the ACPI device
object that should be associated with the given PNP device.
Unfortunately, the check used by that function is not strict enough
and may cause success to be returned for a wrong ACPI device object.
To fix that, use the observation that the pointer to the ACPI
device object in question is already stored in the data field
in struct pnp_dev, so acpi_pnp_match() can simply use that
field to do its job.
This problem was uncovered in 3.14 by commit 202317a573 (ACPI / scan:
Add acpi_device objects for all device nodes in the namespace).
Fixes: 202317a573 (ACPI / scan: Add acpi_device objects for all device nodes in the namespace)
Reported-and-tested-by: Vinson Lee <vlee@twopensource.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4aa0abed3a upstream.
byReAssocCount is incremented every second resulting in
disassociated message being send every 10 seconds whether
connection or not.
byReAssocCount should only advance while eCommandState
is in WLAN_ASSOCIATE_WAIT
Change existing scope to if condition.
Signed-off-by: Malcolm Priestley <tvboxspy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b104a35d32 upstream.
The page allocator relies on __GFP_WAIT to determine if ALLOC_CPUSET
should be set in allocflags. ALLOC_CPUSET controls if a page allocation
should be restricted only to the set of allowed cpuset mems.
Transparent hugepages clears __GFP_WAIT when defrag is disabled to prevent
the fault path from using memory compaction or direct reclaim. Thus, it
is unfairly able to allocate outside of its cpuset mems restriction as a
side-effect.
This patch ensures that ALLOC_CPUSET is only cleared when the gfp mask is
truly GFP_ATOMIC by verifying it is also not a thp allocation.
Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Reported-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Tested-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com>
Cc: Bob Liu <lliubbo@gmail.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hedi Berriche <hedi@sgi.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa.bhat@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f6789593d5 upstream.
Under memory pressure, it is possible for dirty_thresh, calculated by
global_dirty_limits() in balance_dirty_pages(), to equal zero. Then, if
strictlimit is true, bdi_dirty_limits() tries to resolve the proportion:
bdi_bg_thresh : bdi_thresh = background_thresh : dirty_thresh
by dividing by zero.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Patlasov <mpatlasov@parallels.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Wu Fengguang <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
