Add a MAINTAINERS entry for the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: removed changelog, updated description per email thread]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add IPE's admin and developer documentation to the kernel tree.
Co-developed-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add various happy/unhappy unit tests for both IPE's policy parser.
Besides, a test suite for IPE functionality is available at
https://github.com/microsoft/ipe/tree/test-suite
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Enables an IPE policy to be enforced from kernel start, enabling access
control based on trust from kernel startup. This is accomplished by
transforming an IPE policy indicated by CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY into a
c-string literal that is parsed at kernel startup as an unsigned policy.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Enable IPE policy authors to indicate trust for a singular fsverity
file, identified by the digest information, through "fsverity_digest"
and all files using valid fsverity builtin signatures via
"fsverity_signature".
This enables file-level integrity claims to be expressed in IPE,
allowing individual files to be authorized, giving some flexibility
for policy authors. Such file-level claims are important to be expressed
for enforcing the integrity of packages, as well as address some of the
scalability issues in a sole dm-verity based solution (# of loop back
devices, etc).
This solution cannot be done in userspace as the minimum threat that
IPE should mitigate is an attacker downloads malicious payload with
all required dependencies. These dependencies can lack the userspace
check, bypassing the protection entirely. A similar attack succeeds if
the userspace component is replaced with a version that does not
perform the check. As a result, this can only be done in the common
entry point - the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
could be established to only permit the execution of all files with
verified built-in fsverity signatures.
The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
stack interactions.
The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
documentation in fsverity.rst.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to
save the existence of verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's
security blob, and LSMs can make access decisions based on this data.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for a singular dm-verity
volume, identified by roothash, through "dmverity_roothash" and all
signed and validated dm-verity volumes, through "dmverity_signature".
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: fixed some line length issues in the comments]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
dm-verity provides a strong guarantee of a block device's integrity. As
a generic way to check the integrity of a block device, it provides
those integrity guarantees to its higher layers, including the filesystem
level.
However, critical security metadata like the dm-verity roothash and its
signing information are not easily accessible to the LSMs.
To address this limitation, this patch introduces a mechanism to store
and manage these essential security details within a newly added LSM blob
in the block_device structure.
This addition allows LSMs to make access control decisions on the integrity
data stored within the block_device, enabling more flexible security
policies. For instance, LSMs can now revoke access to dm-verity devices
based on their roothashes, ensuring that only authorized and verified
content is accessible. Additionally, LSMs can enforce policies to only
allow files from dm-verity devices that have a valid digital signature to
execute, effectively blocking any unsigned files from execution, thus
enhancing security against unauthorized modifications.
The patch includes new hook calls, `security_bdev_setintegrity()`, in
dm-verity to expose the dm-verity roothash and the roothash signature to
LSMs via preresume() callback. By using the preresume() callback, it
ensures that the security metadata is consistently in sync with the
metadata of the dm-verity target in the current active mapping table.
The hook calls are depended on CONFIG_SECURITY.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
[PM: moved sig_size field as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new LSM blob to the block_device structure,
enabling the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related
to block devices. Currently, for a device mapper's mapped device containing
a dm-verity target, critical security information such as the roothash and
its signing state are not readily accessible. Specifically, while the
dm-verity volume creation process passes the dm-verity roothash and its
signature from userspace to the kernel, the roothash is stored privately
within the dm-verity target, and its signature is discarded
post-verification. This makes it extremely hard for the security subsystem
to utilize these data.
With the addition of the LSM blob to the block_device structure, the
security subsystem can now retain and manage important security metadata
such as the roothash and the signing state of a dm-verity by storing them
inside the blob. Access decisions can then be based on these stored data.
The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in
other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock.
The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the
struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the
security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct
block_device is deallocated or freed.
This patch also introduces a new hook security_bdev_setintegrity() to save
block device's integrity data to the new LSM blob. For example, for
dm-verity, it can use this hook to expose its roothash and signing state
to LSMs, then LSMs can save these data into the LSM blob.
Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in
dm-verity, if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a
different dm-verity target with a new roothash and signing information,
the previously stored data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is
crucial to re-invoke the hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up
to date. This necessity arises from the design of device-mapper, where a
device-mapper device is first created, and then targets are subsequently
loaded into it. These targets can be modified multiple times during the
device's lifetime. Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the
creation of the block device, its actual contents are not initialized at
this stage and can change substantially over time. This includes
alterations from data that the LSM 'trusts' to those it does not, making
it essential to handle these changes correctly. Failure to address this
dynamic aspect could potentially allow for bypassing LSM checks.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy
authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it affecting their
programs. When the mode is changed, a 1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS will
be reported.
This patch adds the following audit records:
audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=4294967295
ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=1 old_enforcing=0 auid=4294967295
ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
The audit record only emit when the value from the user input is
different from the current enforce value.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails,
allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified
of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE
itself.
This patch introduces 3 new audit events.
AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420) indicates the result of an IPE policy evaluation
of a resource.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421) indicates the current active IPE policy
has been changed to another loaded policy.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) indicates a new IPE policy has been loaded
into the kernel.
This patch also adds support for success auditing, allowing users to
identify why an allow decision was made for a resource. However, it is
recommended to use this option with caution, as it is quite noisy.
Here are some examples of the new audit record types:
AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420):
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=297 comm="sh" path="/root/vol/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
ino=3897 rule="op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW"
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=299 comm="sh" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=300 path="/tmp/tmpdp2h1lub/deny/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
ino=131 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
The above three records were generated when the active IPE policy only
allows binaries from the initramfs to run. The three identical `hello`
binary were placed at different locations, only the first hello from
the rootfs(initramfs) was allowed.
Field ipe_op followed by the IPE operation name associated with the log.
Field ipe_hook followed by the name of the LSM hook that triggered the IPE
event.
Field enforcing followed by the enforcement state of IPE. (it will be
introduced in the next commit)
Field pid followed by the pid of the process that triggered the IPE
event.
Field comm followed by the command line program name of the process that
triggered the IPE event.
Field path followed by the file's path name.
Field dev followed by the device name as found in /dev where the file is
from.
Note that for device mappers it will use the name `dm-X` instead of
the name in /dev/mapper.
For a file in a temp file system, which is not from a device, it will use
`tmpfs` for the field.
The implementation of this part is following another existing use case
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE in security/lsm_audit.c
Field ino followed by the file's inode number.
Field rule followed by the IPE rule made the access decision. The whole
rule must be audited because the decision is based on the combination of
all property conditions in the rule.
Along with the syscall audit event, user can know why a blocked
happened. For example:
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=2138 comm="bash" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
audit[1956]: SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=59
success=no exit=-13 a0=556790138df0 a1=556790135390 a2=5567901338b0
a3=ab2a41a67f4f1f4e items=1 ppid=147 pid=1956 auid=4294967295 uid=0
gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0
ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)
The above two records showed bash used execve to run "hello" and got
blocked by IPE. Note that the IPE records are always prior to a SYSCALL
record.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421):
audit: AUDIT1421
old_active_pol_name="Allow_All" old_active_pol_version=0.0.0
old_policy_digest=sha256:E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649
new_active_pol_name="boot_verified" new_active_pol_version=0.0.0
new_policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1
The above record showed the current IPE active policy switch from
`Allow_All` to `boot_verified` along with the version and the hash
digest of the two policies. Note IPE can only have one policy active
at a time, all access decision evaluation is based on the current active
policy.
The normal procedure to deploy a policy is loading the policy to deploy
into the kernel first, then switch the active policy to it.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422):
audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="boot_verified" policy_version=0.0.0
policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F2676
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1
The above record showed a new policy has been loaded into the kernel
with the policy name, policy version and policy hash.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As is typical with LSMs, IPE uses securityfs as its interface with
userspace. for a complete list of the interfaces and the respective
inputs/outputs, please see the documentation under
admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intended deletion
did not happen.
This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.
Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IPE is designed to provide system level trust guarantees, this usually
implies that trust starts from bootup with a hardware root of trust,
which validates the bootloader. After this, the bootloader verifies
the kernel and the initramfs.
As there's no currently supported integrity method for initramfs, and
it's typically already verified by the bootloader. This patch introduces
a new IPE property `boot_verified` which allows author of IPE policy to
indicate trust for files from initramfs.
The implementation of this feature utilizes the newly added
`initramfs_populated` hook. This hook marks the superblock of the rootfs
after the initramfs has been unpacked into it.
Before mounting the real rootfs on top of the initramfs, initramfs
script will recursively remove all files and directories on the
initramfs. This is typically implemented by using switch_root(8)
(https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/switch_root.8.html).
Therefore the initramfs will be empty and not accessible after the real
rootfs takes over. It is advised to switch to a different policy
that doesn't rely on the `boot_verified` property after this point.
This ensures that the trust policies remain relevant and effective
throughout the system's operation.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of
kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It
accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for
bprm_check_security, file_mprotect, mmap_file, kernel_load_data,
and kernel_read_data.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Introduce a core evaluation function in IPE that will be triggered by
various security hooks (e.g., mmap, bprm_check, kexec). This function
systematically assesses actions against the defined IPE policy, by
iterating over rules specific to the action being taken. This critical
addition enables IPE to enforce its security policies effectively,
ensuring that actions intercepted by these hooks are scrutinized for policy
compliance before they are allowed to proceed.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IPE's interpretation of the what the user trusts is accomplished through
its policy. IPE's design is to not provide support for a single trust
provider, but to support multiple providers to enable the end-user to
choose the best one to seek their needs.
This requires the policy to be rather flexible and modular so that
integrity providers, like fs-verity, dm-verity, or some other system,
can plug into the policy with minimal code changes.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: added NULL check in parse_rule() as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
With the increase in the size of the recoverable page fault
queue, we want to ensure the initial messages from GuC in
the G2H buffer have space while we transfer those out to the
actual pf_queue. Bump the G2H queue size to account for this
increase in the pf_queue size.
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stuart Summers <stuart.summers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/4c2b6974801bcffd8a010d838c8733fa4092573d.1723862633.git.stuart.summers@intel.com
Currently the page fault queue size is hard coded. However
the hardware supports faulting for each EU and each CS.
For some applications running on hardware with a large
number of EUs and CSs, this can result in an overflow of
the page fault queue.
Add a small calculation to determine the page fault queue
size based on the number of EUs and CSs in the platform as
detmined by fuses.
Signed-off-by: Stuart Summers <stuart.summers@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/24d582a3b48c97793b8b6a402f34b4b469471636.1723862633.git.stuart.summers@intel.com
- Check dport for RCH topology before accessing pci_host_bridge
= Skip unnecessary dport setup for cxl-test to fix KASAN warning
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=X26j
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Merge tag 'cxl-fixes-6.11-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl
Pull cxl fixes from Dave Jiang:
"Check for RCH dport before accessing pci_host_bridge and a fix to
address a KASAN warning for the cxl regression test suite cxl-test"
* tag 'cxl-fixes-6.11-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl:
cxl/test: Skip cxl_setup_parent_dport() for emulated dports
cxl/pci: Get AER capability address from RCRB only for RCH dport
Add node for board info registers, which allows getting SoC family and
board revision.
For example, with MESON_GX_SOCINFO config enabled we can get the
following information for board with Amlogic A4 SoC:
soc soc0: Amlogic A4 (A113L2) Revision 40:b (1:1) Detected.
Signed-off-by: Xianwei Zhao <xianwei.zhao@amlogic.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719-soc_info-v3-6-020a3b687c0c@amlogic.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Add node for board info registers, which allows getting SoC family and
board revision.
For example, with MESON_GX_SOCINFO config enabled we can get the
following information for board with Amlogic T7 SoC:
soc soc0: Amlogic T7 (A311D2) Revision 36:c (1:1) Detected.
Signed-off-by: Xianwei Zhao <xianwei.zhao@amlogic.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719-soc_info-v3-5-020a3b687c0c@amlogic.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Add node for board info registers, which allows getting SoC family and
board revision.
For example, with MESON_GX_SOCINFO config enabled we can get the
following information for board with Amlogic C3 SoC:
soc soc0: Amlogic C3 (C308L) Revision 3d:a (1:1) Detected
Signed-off-by: Xianwei Zhao <xianwei.zhao@amlogic.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719-soc_info-v3-4-020a3b687c0c@amlogic.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Add node for board info registers, which allows getting SoC family and
board revision.
For example, with MESON_GX_SOCINFO config enabled we can get the
following information for board with Amlogic S4 SoC:
soc soc0: Amlogic S4 (S805X2) Revision 37:a (2:1) Detecte
Signed-off-by: Xianwei Zhao <xianwei.zhao@amlogic.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719-soc_info-v3-3-020a3b687c0c@amlogic.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Enable more device nodes for AQ222 base S4, including
SD, regulator and ethnernet node.
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Xianwei Zhao <xianwei.zhao@amlogic.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240709-s4_node-v2-1-b9a218603c31@amlogic.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Remove the global PCI/MSI irqdomain implementation and provide the
required MSI parent functionality by filling in msi_parent_ops, so the
PCI/MSI code can detect the new parent and setup per-device MSI domains.
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Tianyang Zhang <zhangtianyang@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240815112608.26925-2-zhangtianyang@loongson.cn
When soft interrupt actions are called, they are passed a pointer to the
struct softirq action which contains the action's function pointer.
This pointer isn't useful, as the action callback already knows what
function it is. And since each callback handles a specific soft interrupt,
the callback also knows which soft interrupt number is running.
No soft interrupt action callback actually uses this parameter, so remove
it from the function pointer signature. This clarifies that soft interrupt
actions are global routines and makes it slightly cheaper to call them.
Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander Mateos <csander@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240815171549.3260003-1-csander@purestorage.com
The unification of irq_domain_create_legacy() missed the fact that
interrupts must be associated even when the Linux interrupt number provided
in the first_irq argument is 0.
This breaks all call sites of irq_domain_create_legacy() which supply 0 as
the first_irq argument.
Enforce the association for legacy domains in __irq_domain_instantiate() to
cure this.
[ tglx: Massaged it slightly. ]
Fixes: 70114e7f75 ("irqdomain: Simplify simple and legacy domain creation")
Reported-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Signed-off-by Matti Vaittinen <mazziesaccount@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/c3379142-10bc-4f14-b8ac-a46927aeac38@gmail.com
gicv2m_of_init() fails to perform an of_node_put() when
of_address_to_resource() fails, leading to a refcount leak.
Address this by moving the error handling path outside of the loop and
making it common to all failure modes.
Fixes: 4266ab1a8f ("irqchip/gic-v2m: Refactor to prepare for ACPI support")
Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240820092843.1219933-1-make24@iscas.ac.cn
The recently established lock ordering mandates that the per-VM
vmapp_lock is acquired before taking the per-VPE lock.
As it turns out, its_vpe_set_affinity() takes the VPE lock, and
then calls into its_send_vmovp(), which itself takes the vmapp
lock. Obviously, this is a lock order violation.
As its_send_vmovp() is only called from its_vpe_set_affinity(),
hoist the vmapp locking from the former into the latter, restoring
the expected order.
Fixes: f0eb154c39 ("irqchip/gic-v4: Substitute vmovp_lock for a per-VM lock")
Reported-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240818171625.3030584-1-maz@kernel.org
The latest Linux RISC-V no longer boots on the Allwinner D1 platform
because the sun4i_timer driver fails to get an interrupt from PLIC due to
the recent conversion of the PLIC to a platform driver. Converting the
sun4i timer to a platform driver does not work either because the D1 does
not have a SBI timer available so early boot hangs. See the 'Closes:'
link for deeper analysis.
The real fix requires enabling the SBI time extension in the platform
firmware (OpenSBI) and convert sun4i_timer into platform driver.
Unfortunately, the real fix involves changing multiple places and can't be
achieved in a short duration and aside of that requires users to update
firmware.
As a work-around, retrofit PLIC probing such that the PLIC is probed early
only for the Allwinner D1 platform and probed as a regular platform driver
for rest of the RISC-V platforms. In the process, partially revert some of
the previous changes because the PLIC device pointer is not available in
all probing paths.
Fixes: e306a894bd ("irqchip/sifive-plic: Chain to parent IRQ after handlers are ready")
Fixes: 8ec99b0331 ("irqchip/sifive-plic: Convert PLIC driver into a platform driver")
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Anup Patel <apatel@ventanamicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Tested-by: Emil Renner Berthing <emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Holland <samuel.holland@sifive.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240820034850.3189912-1-apatel@ventanamicro.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240814145642.344485-1-emil.renner.berthing@canonical.com/
An endpoint can discover the minimum size, maximum size and alignment
boundary for the Rx/Tx buffers by passing the function ID of the
FFA_RXTX_MAP ABI as input in the FFA_FEATURES interface. The maximum
size is an optional field and a value of 0 means that the partition
manager or the hypervisor does not enforce a maximum size.
Use the discovery mechanism and remove the hardcoded 4kB buffer size.
If the discovery fails, it still defaults to 4kB.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-7-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Successful completion of both direct messaging function can be indicated
through an invocation of FFA_YIELD or GGA_INTERRUPT by the callee.
FFA_INTERRUPT indicates that the direct request was interrupted and must
be resumed through the FFA_RUN interface which is already done in the
driver.
FFA_YIELD indicates that the receiver endpoint has transitioned to the
blocked runtime state and must be resumed through the FFA_RUN interface.
However, the way receiver endpoint gets unblocked is implementation
defined. So, the driver just sleeps for 1 - 2ms and issues FFA_RUN. It
can return to the caller with FFA_YIELD is the receiver endpoint is still
blocked.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-6-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP} supported only x3-x7 to pass implementation
defined values as part of the message. This may not be sufficient sometimes
and also it would be good to use all the registers supported by SMCCC v1.2
(x0-x17) for such register based communication.
Also another limitation with the FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP} is the
ability to target a specific service within the partition based on it's
UUID.
In order to address both of the above limitation, FF-A v1.2 introduced
FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP}2 which has the ability to target the
message to a specific service based on its UUID within a partition as
well as utilise all the available registers(x4-x17 specifically) for
the communication.
This change adds support for FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_REQ2 and
FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP2.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-5-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
FF-A v1.2 introduced FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS which is similar to
FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET except that the former uses the registers to
get the required information instead of the Rx buffer which the latter
uses.
We need to first check if the platform supports this new API using
FFA_FEATURES so that we can fallback to the FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET
(which is mandatory) if FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS is not implemented.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-4-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
We need to use ffa_features() in ffa_partition_probe() to detect if
the newer FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS API is supported in the platform
or not. To avoid unnecessary forward declaration within the file, let
us just move this ffa_features() earlier.
No funtional change.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-3-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Arm Firmware Framework for A-profile(FFA) v1.2 introduces register based
discovery mechanism and direct messaging extensions that enables to target
specific UUID within a partition.
Let us add all the newly supported FF-A function IDs in the spec.
Also update to the error values and associated handling.
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-2-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
These changes fixes a set of below coding style issues:
1. spaces required around that '=' (ctx:VxW)
2. possible unnecessary 'out of memory' message
3. unnecessary for single statement blocks
Message-Id: <20240820-ffa_v1-2-v2-1-18c0c5f3c65e@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Add AMDI0015 to the ACPI APD support list to ensure correct clock settings
for the I3C device on the latest AMD platforms.
Co-developed-by: Sanket Goswami <Sanket.Goswami@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sanket Goswami <Sanket.Goswami@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Shyam Sundar S K <Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240812144018.360847-1-Shyam-sundar.S-k@amd.com
[ rjw: Added missing tag ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
When gfs2_fill_super() fails, destroy_workqueue() is called within
gfs2_gl_hash_clear(), and the subsequent code path calls
destroy_workqueue() on the same work queue again.
This issue can be fixed by setting the work queue pointer to NULL after
the first destroy_workqueue() call and checking for a NULL pointer
before attempting to destroy the work queue again.
Reported-by: syzbot+d34c2a269ed512c531b0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d34c2a269ed512c531b0
Fixes: 30e388d573 ("gfs2: Switch to a per-filesystem glock workqueue")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Julian Sun <sunjunchao2870@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
