This supports releasing PEs dynamically. A reference count is
introduced to PE representing number of PCI devices associated
with the PE. The reference count is increased when PCI device
joins the PE and decreased when PCI device leaves the PE in
pnv_pci_release_device(). When the count becomes zero, the PE
and its consumed resources are released. Note that the count
is accessed concurrently. So a counter with "int" type is enough
here.
In order to release the sources consumed by the PE, couple of
helper functions are introduced as below:
* pnv_pci_ioda1_unset_window() - Unset IODA1 DMA32 window
* pnv_pci_ioda1_release_dma_pe() - Release IODA1 DMA32 segments
* pnv_pci_ioda2_release_dma_pe() - Release IODA2 DMA resource
* pnv_ioda_release_pe_seg() - Unmap IO/M32/M64 segments
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
pnv_ioda_deconfigure_pe() is visible only when CONFIG_PCI_IOV is
enabled. The function will be used to tear down PE's associated
mapping in PCI hotplug path that doesn't depend on CONFIG_PCI_IOV.
This makes pnv_ioda_deconfigure_pe() visible and not depend on
CONFIG_PCI_IOV.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
The PCI slots are associated with root port or downstream ports
of the PCIe switch connected to root port. When adapter is hot
added to the PCI slot, it usually requests more IO or memory
resource from the directly connected parent bridge (port) and
update the bridge's windows accordingly. The resource windows
of upstream bridges can't be updated automatically. It possibly
leads to unbalanced resource across the bridges: The window of
downstream bridge is overruning that of upstream bridge. The
IO or MMIO path won't work.
This resolves the above issue by extending bridge windows of
root port and upstream port of the PCIe switch connected to
the root port to PHB's windows.
The windows of root port and bridge behind that are extended to
the PHB's windows to accomodate the PCI hotplug happening in
future. The PHB's 64KB 32-bits MSI region is included in bridge's
M32 windows (in hardware) though it's excluded in the corresponding
resource, as the bridge's M32 windows have 1MB as their minimal
alignment. We observed EEH error during system boot when the MSI
region is included in bridge's M32 window.
This excludes top 1MB (including 64KB 32-bits MSI region) region
from bridge's M32 windows when extending them.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
There is no parent bridge for root bus, meaning pcibios_setup_bridge()
isn't invoked for root bus. The PE for root bus is the ancestor of
other PEs in PELTV. It means we need PE for root bus populated before
all others.
This populates the PE for root bus in pcibios_setup_bridge() path
if it's not populated yet. The PE number next to the reserved one
is used as the PE# to avoid holes in continuous M64 space.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Currently, the PEs and their associated resources are assigned in
ppc_md.pcibios_fixup() except those used by SRIOV VFs. The function
is called for once after PCI probing and resources assignment is
completed. So it's obviously not hotplug friendly.
This creates PEs dynamically in pcibios_setup_bridge() that is
called for the event during system bootup and PCI hotplug: updating
PCI bridge's windows after resource assignment/reassignment are done.
In partial hotplug case, not all PCI devices included to one particular
PE are unplugged and plugged again, we just need unbinding/binding the
hot added PCI devices with the corresponding PE without creating new
one. The change is applied to IODA1 and IODA2 PHBs only. The behaviour
on NPU PHBs aren't changed. There are no PCI bridges on NPU PHBs,
meaning pcibios_setup_bridge() won't be invoked there. We have to use
old path (pnv_pci_ioda_fixup()) to setup PEs on NPU PHBs.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
PE number for one particular PE can be allocated dynamically or
reserved according to the consumed M64 (64-bits prefetchable)
segments of the PE. The M64 segment can't be remapped to arbitrary
PE, meaning the PE number is determined according to the index
of the consumed M64 segment. As below figure shows, M64 resource
grows from low to high end, meaning the PE (number) reserved
according to M64 segment grows from low to high end as well,
so does the dynamically allocated PE number. It will lead to
conflict: PE number (M64 segment) reserved by dynamic allocation
is required by hot added PCI adapter at later point. It fails
the PCI hotplug because of the PE number can't be reserved
based on the index of the consumed M64 segment.
+---+---+---+---+---+--------------------------------+-----+
| 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | ....... | 255 |
+---+---+---+---+---+--------------------------------+-----+
PE number for dynamic allocation ----------------->
PE number reserved for M64 segment ----------------->
To resolve above conflicts, this forces the PE number to be
allocated dynamically in reverse order. With this patch applied,
the PE numbers are reserved in ascending order, but allocated
dynamically in reverse order.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Each PHB maintains an array helping to translate 2-bytes Request
ID (RID) to PE# with the assumption that PE# takes one byte, meaning
that we can't have more than 256 PEs. However, pci_dn->pe_number
already had 4-bytes for the PE#.
This extends the PE# capacity for every PHB. After that, the PE number
is represented by 4-bytes value. Then we can reuse IODA_INVALID_PE to
check the PE# in phb->pe_rmap[] is valid or not.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
pnv_pci_ioda_setup_opal_tce_kill() called by pnv_ioda_setup_dma()
to remap the TCE kill regiter. What's done in pnv_ioda_setup_dma()
will be covered in pcibios_setup_bridge() which is invoked on each
PCI bridge. It means we will possibly remap the TCE kill register
for multiple times and it's unnecessary.
This moves pnv_pci_ioda_setup_opal_tce_kill() to where the PHB is
initialized (pnv_pci_init_ioda_phb()) to avoid above issue.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
The macro defined in arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/pci.c isn't
used by anyone. Just remove it.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <andrew.donnellan@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
This overrides pcibios_setup_bridge() that is called to update PCI
bridge windows when PCI resource assignment is completed, to assign
PE and setup various (resource) mapping for the PE in subsequent
patches.
Signed-off-by: Gavin Shan <gwshan@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Export cpu_to_core_id(). This will be used by the lpfc driver.
This enables topology_core_id() from <linux/topology.h> (defined
to cpu_to_core_id() in arch/powerpc/include/asm/topology.h) to be
used by (non-builtin) modules.
That is arch-neutral, already used by eg, drivers/base/topology.c,
but it is builtin (obj-y in Makefile) thus didn't need the export.
Since the module uses topology_core_id() and this is defined to
cpu_to_core_id(), it needs the export, otherwise:
ERROR: "cpu_to_core_id" [drivers/scsi/lpfc/lpfc.ko] undefined!
Tested on next-20160601.
Signed-off-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mauricfo@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
This enables new registers, LMRR and LMSER, that can trigger an EBB in
userspace code when a monitored load (via the new ldmx instruction)
loads memory from a monitored space. This facility is controlled by a
new FSCR bit, LM.
This patch disables the FSCR LM control bit on task init and enables
that bit when a load monitor facility unavailable exception is taken
for using it. On context switch, this bit is then used to determine
whether the two relevant registers are saved and restored. This is
done lazily for performance reasons.
Signed-off-by: Jack Miller <jack@codezen.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
This fixes a few issues with FSCR init and switching.
In commit 152d523e63 ("powerpc: Create context switch helpers
save_sprs() and restore_sprs()") we moved the setting of the FSCR
register from inside an CPU_FTR_ARCH_207S section to inside just a
CPU_FTR_ARCH_DSCR section. Hence we are setting FSCR on POWER6/7 where
the FSCR doesn't exist. This is harmless but we shouldn't do it.
Also, we can simplify the FSCR context switch. We don't need to go
through the calculation involving dscr_inherit. We can just restore
what we saved last time.
We also set an initial value in INIT_THREAD, so that pid 1 which is
cloned from that gets a sane value.
Based on patch by Jack Miller.
Signed-off-by: Michael Neuling <mikey@neuling.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Current comment in the early_setup_secondary() for paca->soft_enabled
update is misleading. Comment should say to Mark interrupts "disabled"
instead of "enabled". Fix the typo.
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Fixes the following testsuite failure:
$ sudo ./perf test -v kallsyms
1: vmlinux symtab matches kallsyms :
--- start ---
test child forked, pid 12489
Using /proc/kcore for kernel object code
Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
Using /boot/vmlinux for symbols
0xc00000000003d300: diff name v: .kretprobe_trampoline_holder k: kretprobe_trampoline
Maps only in vmlinux:
c00000000086ca38-c000000000879b6c 87ca38 [kernel].text.unlikely
c000000000879b6c-c000000000bf0000 889b6c [kernel].meminit.text
c000000000bf0000-c000000000c53264 c00000 [kernel].init.text
c000000000c53264-d000000004250000 c63264 [kernel].exit.text
d000000004250000-d000000004450000 0 [libcrc32c]
d000000004450000-d000000004620000 0 [xfs]
d000000004620000-d000000004680000 0 [autofs4]
d000000004680000-d0000000046e0000 0 [x_tables]
d0000000046e0000-d000000004780000 0 [ip_tables]
d000000004780000-d0000000047e0000 0 [rng_core]
d0000000047e0000-ffffffffffffffff 0 [pseries_rng]
Maps in vmlinux with a different name in kallsyms:
Maps only in kallsyms:
d000000000000000-f000000000000000 1000000000010000 [kernel.kallsyms]
f000000000000000-ffffffffffffffff 3000000000010000 [kernel.kallsyms]
test child finished with -1
---- end ----
vmlinux symtab matches kallsyms: FAILED!
The problem is that the kretprobe_trampoline symbol looks like this:
$ eu-readelf -s /boot/vmlinux G kretprobe_trampoline
2431: c000000001302368 24 NOTYPE LOCAL DEFAULT 37 kretprobe_trampoline_holder
2432: c00000000003d300 8 FUNC LOCAL DEFAULT 1 .kretprobe_trampoline_holder
97543: c00000000003d300 0 NOTYPE GLOBAL DEFAULT 1 kretprobe_trampoline
Its type is NOTYPE, and its size is 0, and this is a problem because
symbol-elf.c:dso__load_sym skips function symbols that are not STT_FUNC
or STT_GNU_IFUNC (this is determined by elf_sym__is_function). Even
if the type is changed to STT_FUNC, when dso__load_sym calls
symbols__fixup_duplicate, the kretprobe_trampoline symbol is dropped in
favour of .kretprobe_trampoline_holder because the latter has non-zero
size (as determined by choose_best_symbol).
With this patch, all vmlinux symbols match /proc/kallsyms and the
testcase passes.
Commit c1c355ce14 ("x86/kprobes: Get rid of
kretprobe_trampoline_holder()") gets rid of kretprobe_trampoline_holder
altogether on x86. This commit does the same on powerpc. This change
introduces no regressions on the perf and ftracetest testsuite results.
Reviewed-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Few fixes to remove build warnings with W=1
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Merge tag 'vexpress-fixes-4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sudeep.holla/linux into next/cleanup
ARMv7 VExpress fixes for v4.8
Few fixes to remove build warnings with W=1
* tag 'vexpress-fixes-4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sudeep.holla/linux:
power: vexpress: make dev_attr_active static
ARM: vexpress/spc: fix missing include of spc.h
ARM: versatile: fix missing <plat/platsmp.h> include
ARM: vexpress/hotplug: fix missing core.h include
ARM: vexpress/spc: remove unused variable perf_stat_reg
Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Unit addresses should not have a leading '0x'. Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Duc Dang <dhdang@apm.com>
The convention in these files is to use lowercase for "0x" prefixes and for
the hex constants themselves, but a few changes didn't follow that
convention, which makes the file annoying to read.
Use lowercase consistently for the hex constants. No functional change
intended.
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Duc Dang <dhdang@apm.com>
Child devices in a VMD domain that want to use MSI are slowing down MSI-X
using devices sharing the same vectors. Move all MSI usage to a single VMD
vector, and MSI-X devices can share the rest.
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Otherwise APIC code assumes VMD's IRQ domain can be managed by the APIC,
resulting in an invalid cast of irq_data during irq_force_complete_move().
Signed-off-by: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Enabling interrupts may result in an interrupt raised and serviced while
VMD holds a lock, resulting in contention with the spin lock held while
enabling interrupts.
The solution is to disable preemption and save/restore the state during
interrupt enable and disable.
Fixes lockdep:
======================================================
[ INFO: HARDIRQ-safe -> HARDIRQ-unsafe lock order detected ]
4.6.0-2016-06-16-lockdep+ #47 Tainted: G E
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/0:1/447 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] is trying to acquire:
(list_lock){+.+...}, at: [<ffffffffa04eb8fc>] vmd_irq_enable+0x3c/0x70 [vmd]
and this task is already holding:
(&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff810e1ff6>] __setup_irq+0xa6/0x610
which would create a new lock dependency:
(&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...} -> (list_lock){+.+...}
but this new dependency connects a HARDIRQ-irq-safe lock:
(&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-...}
... which became HARDIRQ-irq-safe at:
[<ffffffff810c9f21>] __lock_acquire+0x981/0xe00
[<ffffffff810cb039>] lock_acquire+0x119/0x220
[<ffffffff8167294d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3d/0x80
[<ffffffff810e36d4>] handle_level_irq+0x24/0x110
[<ffffffff8101f20a>] handle_irq+0x1a/0x30
[<ffffffff81675fc1>] do_IRQ+0x61/0x120
[<ffffffff8167404c>] ret_from_intr+0x0/0x20
[<ffffffff81672e30>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x40/0x60
[<ffffffff810e21ee>] __setup_irq+0x29e/0x610
[<ffffffff810e25a1>] setup_irq+0x41/0x90
[<ffffffff81f5777f>] setup_default_timer_irq+0x1e/0x20
[<ffffffff81f57798>] hpet_time_init+0x17/0x19
[<ffffffff81f5775a>] x86_late_time_init+0xa/0x11
[<ffffffff81f51e9b>] start_kernel+0x382/0x436
[<ffffffff81f51308>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[<ffffffff81f51445>] x86_64_start_kernel+0x13b/0x14a
to a HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe lock:
(list_lock){+.+...}
... which became HARDIRQ-irq-unsafe at:
... [<ffffffff810c9d8e>] __lock_acquire+0x7ee/0xe00
[<ffffffff810cb039>] lock_acquire+0x119/0x220
[<ffffffff8167294d>] _raw_spin_lock+0x3d/0x80
[<ffffffffa04eba42>] vmd_msi_init+0x72/0x150 [vmd]
[<ffffffff810e8597>] msi_domain_alloc+0xb7/0x140
[<ffffffff810e6b10>] irq_domain_alloc_irqs_recursive+0x40/0xa0
[<ffffffff810e6cea>] __irq_domain_alloc_irqs+0x14a/0x330
[<ffffffff810e8a8c>] msi_domain_alloc_irqs+0x8c/0x1d0
[<ffffffff813ca4e3>] pci_msi_setup_msi_irqs+0x43/0x70
[<ffffffff813cada1>] pci_enable_msi_range+0x131/0x280
[<ffffffff813bf5e0>] pcie_port_device_register+0x320/0x4e0
[<ffffffff813bf9a4>] pcie_portdrv_probe+0x34/0x60
[<ffffffff813b0e85>] local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0
[<ffffffff813b226b>] pci_device_probe+0xdb/0x130
[<ffffffff8149e3cc>] driver_probe_device+0x22c/0x440
[<ffffffff8149e774>] __device_attach_driver+0x94/0x110
[<ffffffff8149bfad>] bus_for_each_drv+0x5d/0x90
[<ffffffff8149e030>] __device_attach+0xc0/0x140
[<ffffffff8149e0c0>] device_attach+0x10/0x20
[<ffffffff813a77f7>] pci_bus_add_device+0x47/0x90
[<ffffffff813a7879>] pci_bus_add_devices+0x39/0x70
[<ffffffff813aaba7>] pci_rescan_bus+0x27/0x30
[<ffffffffa04ec1af>] vmd_probe+0x68f/0x76c [vmd]
[<ffffffff813b0e85>] local_pci_probe+0x45/0xa0
[<ffffffff81088064>] work_for_cpu_fn+0x14/0x20
[<ffffffff8108c244>] process_one_work+0x1f4/0x740
[<ffffffff8108c9c6>] worker_thread+0x236/0x4f0
[<ffffffff810935c2>] kthread+0xf2/0x110
[<ffffffff816738f2>] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x50
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(list_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
lock(list_lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&irq_desc_lock_class);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Signed-off-by: Jon Derrick <jonathan.derrick@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Keith Busch <keith.busch@intel.com>
Pull s390 fixes from Martin Schwidefsky:
"Two more bugs fixes for 4.7:
- a KVM regression introduced with the pgtable.c code split
- a perf issue with two hardware PMUs using a shared event context"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux:
s390/cpum_cf: use perf software context for hardware counters
KVM: s390/mm: Fix CMMA reset during reboot
Enable the PL330 DMA and DMATEST on SoCFPGA.
make savedefconfig says CONFIG_FHANDLE is not needed in the defconfig,
remove it.
Signed-off-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@opensource.altera.com>
---
v2: Also enable DMATEST as a kernel module
ARM SCPI Sensors were merged for v4.4 and they are defined in the Juno
dts. Enable it in the defconfig to get them registered automatically in
Juno by default.
Signed-off-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Most of the ARM SoCs have small SRAM memory used for various purposes
that require faster access to data compared to normal DDR.
This patch enables the Generic on-chip SRAM driver on ARM64.
Cc: Kevin Hilman <khilman@kernel.org>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
I misread the inline asm. It uses a rare construct to provide an input
to a previously declared output to do the atomic_read().
Reported-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Andreas Schwab <schwab@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-m68k@lists.linux-m68k.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Nested virtualization will have to enable own gmaps. Current code
would enable the wrong gmap whenever scheduled out and back in,
therefore resulting in the wrong gmap being enabled.
This patch reenables the last enabled gmap, therefore avoiding having to
touch vcpu->arch.gmap when enabling a different gmap.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
The default kvm gmap notifier doesn't have to handle shadow gmaps.
So let's just directly exit in case we get notified about one.
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Let's not fault in everything in read-write but limit it to read-only
where possible.
When restricting access rights, we already have the required protection
level in our hands. When reading from guest 2 storage (gmap_read_table),
it is obviously PROT_READ. When shadowing a pte, the required protection
level is given via the guest 2 provided pte.
Based on an initial patch by Martin Schwidefsky.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
It will be very helpful to have a mechanism to check without any locks
if a given gmap shadow is still valid and matches the given properties.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
For nested virtualization, we want to know if we are handling a protection
exception, because these can directly be forwarded to the guest without
additional checks.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We have no known user of real-space designation and only support it to
be architecture compliant.
Gmap shadows with real-space designation are never unshadowed
automatically, as there is nothing to protect for the top level table.
So let's simply limit the number of such shadows to one by removing
existing ones on creation of another one.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
We can easily support real-space designation just like EDAT1 and EDAT2.
So guest2 can provide for guest3 an asce with the real-space control being
set.
We simply have to allocate the biggest page table possible and fake all
levels.
There is no protection to consider. If we exceed guest memory, vsie code
will inject an addressing exception (via program intercept). In the future,
we could limit the fake table level to the gmap page table.
As the top level page table can never go away, such gmap shadows will never
get unshadowed, we'll have to come up with another way to limit the number
of kept gmap shadows.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Just like we already do with ste protection, let's take rte protection
into account. This way, the host pte doesn't have to be mapped writable.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
If the guest is enabled for EDAT2, we can easily create shadows for
guest2 -> guest3 provided tables that make use of EDAT2.
If guest2 references a 2GB page, this memory looks consecutive for guest2,
but it does not have to be so for us. Therefore we have to create fake
segment and page tables.
This works just like EDAT1 support, so page tables are removed when the
parent table (r3t table entry) is changed.
We don't hve to care about:
- ACCF-Validity Control in RTTE
- Access-Control Bits in RTTE
- Fetch-Protection Bit in RTTE
- Common-Region Bit in RTTE
Just like for EDAT1, all bits might be dropped and there is no guaranteed
that they are active.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
If the guest is enabled for EDAT1, we can easily create shadows for
guest2 -> guest3 provided tables that make use of EDAT1.
If guest2 references a 1MB page, this memory looks consecutive for guest2,
but it might not be so for us. Therefore we have to create fake page tables.
We can easily add that to our existing infrastructure. The invalidation
mechanism will make sure that fake page tables are removed when the parent
table (sgt table entry) is changed.
As EDAT1 also introduced protection on all page table levels, we have to
also shadow these correctly.
We don't have to care about:
- ACCF-Validity Control in STE
- Access-Control Bits in STE
- Fetch-Protection Bit in STE
- Common-Segment Bit in STE
As all bits might be dropped and there is no guaranteed that they are
active ("unpredictable whether the CPU uses these bits", "may be used").
Without using EDAT1 in the shadow ourselfes (STE-format control == 0),
simply shadowing these bits would not be enough. They would be ignored.
Please note that we are using the "fake" flag to make this look consistent
with further changes (EDAT2, real-space designation support) and don't let
the shadow functions handle fc=1 stes.
In the future, with huge pages in the host, gmap_shadow_pgt() could simply
try to map a huge host page if "fake" is set to one and indicate via return
value that no lower fake tables / shadow ptes are required.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
In preparation for EDAT1/EDAT2 support for gmap shadows, we have to store
the requested edat level in the gmap shadow.
The edat level used during shadow translation is a property of the gmap
shadow. Depending on that level, the gmap shadow will look differently for
the same guest tables. We have to store it internally in order to support
it later.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
If a guest ste is read-only, it doesn't make sense to force the ptes in as
writable in the host. If the source page is read-only in the host, it won't
have to be made writable. Please note that if the source page is not
available, it will still be faulted in writable. This can be changed
internally later on.
If ste protection is removed, underlying shadow tables are also removed,
therefore this change does not affect the guest.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Let's take the ipte_lock while working on guest 2 provided page table, just
like the other gaccess functions.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
As gmap shadows contains correct protection permissions, protection
exceptons can directly be forwarded to guest 3. If we would encounter
a protection exception while faulting, the next guest 3 run will
automatically handle that for us.
Keep the dat_protection logic in place, as it will be helpful later.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Instead of doing it in the caller, let's just take the mmap_sem
in kvm_s390_shadow_fault(). By taking it as read, we allow parallel
faulting on shadow page tables, gmap shadow code is prepared for that.
Acked-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>