Add a test to ensure that setting both generic and fixed performance
event filters does not affect the consistency of the fixed event filter
behavior in KVM.
Signed-off-by: Jinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230810090945.16053-7-cloudliang@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Add tests to cover that pmu event_filter works as expected when it's
applied to fixed performance counters, even if there is none fixed
counter exists (e.g. Intel guest pmu version=1 or AMD guest).
Signed-off-by: Jinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230810090945.16053-6-cloudliang@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Add test cases to verify the handling of unsupported input values for the
PMU event filter. The tests cover unsupported "action" values, unsupported
"flags" values, and unsupported "nevents" values. All these cases should
return an error, as they are currently not supported by the filter.
Furthermore, the tests also cover the case where setting non-existent
fixed counters in the fixed bitmap does not fail.
Signed-off-by: Jinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Reviewed-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230810090945.16053-5-cloudliang@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Add custom "__kvm_pmu_event_filter" structure to improve pmu event
filter settings. Simplifies event filter setup by organizing event
filter parameters in a cleaner, more organized way.
Alternatively, selftests could use a struct overlay ala vcpu_set_msr()
to avoid dynamically allocating the array:
struct {
struct kvm_msrs header;
struct kvm_msr_entry entry;
} buffer = {};
memset(&buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
buffer.header.nmsrs = 1;
buffer.entry.index = msr_index;
buffer.entry.data = msr_value;
but the extra layer added by the nested structs is counterproductive
to writing efficient, clean code.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230810090945.16053-4-cloudliang@tencent.com
[sean: massage changelog to explain alternative]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Systems booted with shim have a Forbidden Signature Database called mokx.
During boot, hashes and certs contained within the mokx are loaded into the
blacklist keyring. When calling verify_pkcs7_message_sig the contents of
the blacklist keyring (or revocation list) are referenced when validating
keys on the platform keyring. Currently, when validating against the
secondary or builtin keyrings, the revocation list is not referenced. Move
up the check to allow the revocation list to be used with all keyrings,
including the secondary and builtin, allowing the system owner to take
corrective action should a vulnerability be found within keys contained
within either keyring.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Use the module_platform_driver macro to simplify the code, which is the
same as declaring with module_init() and module_exit().
Signed-off-by: Li Zetao <lizetao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Variable len is being accumulated but the value is never read. It is
redundant and can be removed. Cleans up clang scan build warning:
drivers/char/tpm/eventlog/tpm1.c:276:2: warning: Value stored to 'len' is never read [deadcode.DeadStores]
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.i.king@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Similar to the transmission of TPM responses, also the transmission of TPM
commands may become corrupted. Instead of aborting when detecting such
issues, try resending the command again.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
TPM responses may become damaged during transmission, for example due to
bit flips on the wire. Instead of aborting when detecting such issues, the
responseRetry functionality can be used to make the TPM retransmit its
response and receive it again without errors.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
The CRC functionality is initialized before tpm_tis_core, so it can be used
on all code paths within the module. Therefore, move the CRC check to the
generic send routine, that also contains all other checks for successful
command transmission, so that all those checks are in one place.
Also, this ensures that tpm_tis_ready is called when a CRC failure is
detected, to clear the invalid data from the TPM, which did not happen
previously.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Steffen <Alexander.Steffen@infineon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
TPM devices may insert wait state on last clock cycle of ADDR phase.
For SPI controllers that support full-duplex transfers, this can be
detected using software by reading the MISO line. For SPI controllers
that only support half-duplex transfers, such as the Tegra QSPI, it is
not possible to detect the wait signal from software. The QSPI
controller in Tegra234 and Tegra241 implement hardware detection of the
wait signal which can be enabled in the controller for TPM devices.
The current TPM TIS driver only supports software detection of the wait
signal. To support SPI controllers that use hardware to detect the wait
signal, add the function tpm_tis_spi_transfer_half() and move the
existing code for software based detection into a function called
tpm_tis_spi_transfer_full(). SPI controllers that only support
half-duplex transfers will always call tpm_tis_spi_transfer_half()
because they cannot support software based detection. The bit
SPI_TPM_HW_FLOW is set to indicate to the SPI controller that hardware
detection is required and it is the responsibility of the SPI controller
driver to determine if this is supported or not.
For hardware flow control, CMD-ADDR-DATA messages are combined into a
single message where as for software flow control exiting method of
CMD-ADDR in a message and DATA in another is followed.
[jarkko: Fixed the function names to match the code change, and the tag
in the short summary.]
Signed-off-by: Krishna Yarlagadda <kyarlagadda@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
strlcpy() reads the entire source buffer first.
This read may exceed the destination size limit.
This is both inefficient and can lead to linear read
overflows if a source string is not NUL-terminated [1].
In an effort to remove strlcpy() completely [2], replace
strlcpy() here with strscpy().
No return values were used, so direct replacement is safe.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#strlcpy
[2] https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/89
Signed-off-by: Azeem Shaikh <azeemshaikh38@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are
needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These
third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform
KeyStore (PKS).
Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Update Kconfig to enable machine keyring and limit to CA certificates
on PowerVM. Only key signing CA keys are allowed.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
trust_moklist() is specific to UEFI enabled systems. Other platforms
rely only on the Kconfig.
Define a generic wrapper named imputed_trust_enabled().
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
trust_mok variable is accessed within a single function locally.
Change trust_mok from global to local static variable.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
On non-UEFI platforms, handle restrict_link_by_ca failures differently.
Certificates which do not satisfy CA restrictions on non-UEFI platforms
are ignored.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer,
administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed
trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring.
The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform
dependent.
Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring
on PowerVM platform.
Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
After being vouched for by a system keyring, only allow keys into the .ima
and .evm keyrings that have the digitalSignature usage field set.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/41dffdaeb7eb7840f7e38bc691fbda836635c9f9.camel@linux.ibm.com
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Acked-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Add a new link restriction. Restrict the addition of keys in a keyring
based on the key having digitalSignature usage set. Additionally, verify
the new certificate against the ones in the system keyrings. Add two
additional functions to use the new restriction within either the builtin
or secondary keyrings.
[jarkko@kernel.org: Fix checkpatch.pl --strict issues]
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
the AUO G121EAN01 panel, an integer overflow and a memory leak fixes for
the qaic accel, a use-after-free fix for nouveau and a revert for an
alleged fix in EDID parsing.
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Merge tag 'drm-misc-fixes-2023-08-17' of git://anongit.freedesktop.org/drm/drm-misc into drm-fixes
One EPROBE_DEFER handling fix for the JDI LT070ME05000, a timing fix for
the AUO G121EAN01 panel, an integer overflow and a memory leak fixes for
the qaic accel, a use-after-free fix for nouveau and a revert for an
alleged fix in EDID parsing.
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
From: Maxime Ripard <mripard@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/3olqt33em5uhxzjbqghwcwnvmw73h7bxkbdxookmnkecymd4vc@7ogm6gewpprq
None of the callers consume remove_event(), and it incorrectly implies
that the incoming filter isn't modified. Drop the return.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230810090945.16053-3-cloudliang@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Add x86 properties for Intel PMU so that tests don't have to manually
retrieve the correct CPUID leaf+register, and so that the resulting code
is self-documenting.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jinrong Liang <cloudliang@tencent.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230810090945.16053-2-cloudliang@tencent.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
This avoids potential "bleeding" when size == 0 as cache line would be
dirtied (and possibly fetched from other cores) and due to the same
reaons more optimal too.
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
The existing ARC variants have 2 issues
- Use ZOL which may not be present in forthcoming architecture
- Byte loop based vs. generic version which is word loop based
Signed-off-by: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@kernel.org>
The kerndoc for some struct member and function arguments were missing.
Add them.
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202308171742.AncabIG1-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Commit 7ee30bc132 ("KVM: x86: deliver KVM IOAPIC scan request to target
vCPUs") declared but never implemented kvm_make_cpus_request_mask() as
kvm_make_vcpus_request_mask() already existed.
Note, KVM's APIs are painfully inconsistent, as the inclusive variant uses
"vcpus", whereas the exclusive/all variants use "cpus", which is likely
what led to the spurious declaration. The "vcpus" terminology is more
correct, especially since the helpers will kick _physical_ CPUs by calling
kvm_kick_many_cpus(). But that's a cleanup for the future.
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814140339.47732-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[sean: split to separate patch, call out inconsistent naming]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Commit 07f0a7bdec ("kvm: destroy emulated devices on VM exit") removed the
functions but not these declarations.
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814140339.47732-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[sean: split to separate patch]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
ADQ and switchdev are not supported simultaneously. Enabling both at the
same time can result in nullptr dereference.
To prevent this, check if ADQ is active when changing devlink mode to
switchdev mode, and check if switchdev is active when enabling ADQ.
Fixes: fbc7b27af0 ("ice: enable ndo_setup_tc support for mqprio_qdisc")
Signed-off-by: Marcin Szycik <marcin.szycik@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Tested-by: Sujai Buvaneswaran <sujai.buvaneswaran@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816193405.1307580-1-anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
While performing certain power-off sequences, PCI drivers are
called to suspend and resume their underlying devices through
PCI PM (power management) interface. However this NIC hardware
does not support PCI PM suspend/resume operations so system wide
suspend/resume leads to bad MFW (management firmware) state which
causes various follow-up errors in driver when communicating with
the device/firmware afterwards.
To fix this driver implements PCI PM suspend handler to indicate
unsupported operation to the PCI subsystem explicitly, thus avoiding
system to go into suspended/standby mode.
Without this fix device/firmware does not recover unless system
is power cycled.
Fixes: 2950219d87 ("qede: Add basic network device support")
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Alok Prasad <palok@marvell.com>
Reviewed-by: John Meneghini <jmeneghi@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816150711.59035-1-manishc@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Now that KVM has a framework for caching guest CPUID feature flags, add
a "rule" that IRQs must be enabled when doing guest CPUID lookups, and
enforce the rule via a lockdep assertion. CPUID lookups are slow, and
within KVM, IRQs are only ever disabled in hot paths, e.g. the core run
loop, fast page fault handling, etc. I.e. querying guest CPUID with IRQs
disabled, especially in the run loop, should be avoided.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-16-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "virtual NMI exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of
using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Note, checking KVM's capabilities instead of the "vnmi" param means that
the code isn't strictly equivalent, as vnmi_enabled could have been set
if nested=false where as that the governed feature cannot. But that's a
glorified nop as the feature/flag is consumed only by paths that are
gated by nSVM being enabled.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-15-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "virtual GIF exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of
using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Note, checking KVM's capabilities instead of the "vgif" param means that
the code isn't strictly equivalent, as vgif_enabled could have been set
if nested=false where as that the governed feature cannot. But that's a
glorified nop as the feature/flag is consumed only by paths that are
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-14-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "Pause Filtering is exposed to L1" via governed feature flags
instead of using dedicated bits/flags in vcpu_svm.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-13-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "LBR virtualization exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag
instead of using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Note, checking KVM's capabilities instead of the "lbrv" param means that
the code isn't strictly equivalent, as lbrv_enabled could have been set
if nested=false where as that the governed feature cannot. But that's a
glorified nop as the feature/flag is consumed only by paths that are
gated by nSVM being enabled.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-12-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "virtual VMSAVE/VMLOAD exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag
instead of using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Opportunistically add a comment explaining why KVM disallows virtual
VMLOAD/VMSAVE when the vCPU model is Intel.
No functional change intended.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-11-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "TSC scaling exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of
using a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
Note, this fixes a benign bug where KVM would mark TSC scaling as exposed
to L1 even if overall nested SVM supported is disabled, i.e. KVM would let
L1 write MSR_AMD64_TSC_RATIO even when KVM didn't advertise TSCRATEMSR
support to userspace.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-10-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "NRIPS exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of using
a dedicated bit/flag in vcpu_svm.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Track "VMX exposed to L1" via a governed feature flag instead of using a
dedicated helper to provide the same functionality. The main goal is to
drive convergence between VMX and SVM with respect to querying features
that are controllable via module param (SVM likes to cache nested
features), avoiding the guest CPUID lookups at runtime is just a bonus
and unlikely to provide any meaningful performance benefits.
Note, X86_FEATURE_VMX is set in kvm_cpu_caps if and only if "nested" is
true, and the CPU obviously supports VMX if KVM+VMX is running. I.e. the
check on "nested" is now implicitly down by the kvm_cpu_cap_has() check
in kvm_governed_feature_check_and_set().
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Reviwed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Use the governed feature framework to track if XSAVES is "enabled", i.e.
if XSAVES can be used by the guest. Add a comment in the SVM code to
explain the very unintuitive logic of deliberately NOT checking if XSAVES
is enumerated in the guest CPUID model.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-7-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Rename the XSAVES secondary execution control to follow KVM's preferred
style so that XSAVES related logic can use common macros that depend on
KVM's preferred style.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-6-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Check KVM CPU capabilities instead of raw VMX support for XSAVES when
determining whether or not XSAVER can/should be exposed to the guest.
Practically speaking, it's nonsensical/impossible for a CPU to support
"enable XSAVES" without XSAVES being supported natively. The real
motivation for checking kvm_cpu_cap_has() is to allow using the governed
feature's standard check-and-set logic.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Recompute whether or not XSAVES is enabled for the guest only if the
guest's CPUID model changes instead of redoing the computation every time
KVM generates vmcs01's secondary execution controls. The boot_cpu_has()
and cpu_has_vmx_xsaves() checks should never change after KVM is loaded,
and if they do the kernel/KVM is hosed.
Opportunistically add a comment explaining _why_ XSAVES is effectively
exposed to the guest if and only if XSAVE is also exposed to the guest.
Practically speaking, no functional change intended (KVM will do fewer
computations, but should still see the same xsaves_enabled value whenever
KVM looks at it).
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Use the governed feature framework to track whether or not the guest can
use 1GiB pages, and drop the one-off helper that wraps the surprisingly
non-trivial logic surrounding 1GiB page usage in the guest.
No functional change intended.
Reviewed-by: Yuan Yao <yuan.yao@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815203653.519297-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
