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1,294,546 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ranjan Kumar
a34fc8c736 scsi: mpt3sas: Update driver version to 48.100.00.00
Update driver version to 48.100.00.00.

Signed-off-by: Ranjan Kumar <ranjan.kumar@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231228114810.11923-3-ranjan.kumar@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:40:26 -05:00
Ranjan Kumar
c0767560b0 scsi: mpt3sas: Reload SBR without rebooting HBA
Add a new IOCTL command MPT3ENABLEDIAGSBRRELOAD. As a part of firmware
update operation, applications use this IOCTL command to set the SBR reload
bit in the Host Diagnostic register. This permits HBA firmware to be
updated without powercycling the system.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312280909.MZyhxwBL-lkp@intel.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202312281141.jDyPezRn-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Ranjan Kumar <ranjan.kumar@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231228114810.11923-2-ranjan.kumar@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:40:26 -05:00
Eric Chanudet
10a39667a1 scsi: ufs: qcom: Avoid re-init quirk when gears match
On sa8775p-ride, probing the HBA will go through the
UFSHCD_QUIRK_REINIT_AFTER_MAX_GEAR_SWITCH path although the power info is
the same during the second init.

The REINIT quirk only applies starting with controller v4. For these,
ufs_qcom_get_hs_gear() reads the highest supported gear when setting the
host_params. After the negotiation, if the host and device are on the same
gear, it is the highest gear supported between the two. Skip REINIT to save
some time.

Signed-off-by: Eric Chanudet <echanude@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123192854.1724905-4-echanude@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Halaney <ahalaney@redhat.com> # sa8775p-ride
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:35:56 -05:00
Andrew Halaney
883a8b451c scsi: ufs: qcom: Clarify comments about the initial phy_gear
The comments that currently are within the hw_ver < 4 conditional are
misleading. They really apply to various branches of the conditionals there
and incorrectly state that the phy_gear value can increase.

Right now the logic is to:

 - Default to max supported gear for phy_gear

 - Set phy_gear to minimum value if version < 4 since those versions only
   support one PHY init sequence (and therefore don't need reinit)

 - Set phy_gear to the optimal value if the device version is already
   populated in the controller registers on boot

Let's move some of the comment to outside the if statement and clean up the
bit left about switching to a higher gear on reinit. This way the comment
more accurately reflects the logic.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Halaney <ahalaney@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123-ufs-reinit-comments-v1-1-ff2b3532d7fe@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Manivannan Sadhasivam <manivannan.sadhasivam@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:33:54 -05:00
Martin K. Petersen
2b9bc9efa8 Merge patch series "scsi: hisi_sas: Minor fixes and cleanups"
chenxiang <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com> says:

This series contains some fixes and cleanups including:

 - Fix a deadlock issue related to automatic debugfs;

 - Remove redundant checks for automatic debugfs;

 - Check whether debugfs is enabled before removing or releasing it;

 - Remove hisi_hba->timer for v3 hw;

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1705904747-62186-1-git-send-email-chenxiang66@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:12:47 -05:00
Xiang Chen
f9242f1667 scsi: hisi_sas: Remove hisi_hba->timer for v3 hw
hisi_hba->timer is not used for v3 hw but there are two places that some
operations related to hisi_hba->timer are called by v3 hw:

 - Deleting the timer in function hisi_sas_v3_hw() which is only for v3 hw;

 - Deleting the timer in function hisi_sas_controller_reset_prepare() which
   is common for v1/v2/v3 hw.

We can remove the timer in the first case, but for the second scenario we
need to remove it only for v3 hw, so check hw->sht which is NULL only for
v3 hw before deleting hisi_hba->timer.

Signed-off-by: Xiang Chen <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1705904747-62186-5-git-send-email-chenxiang66@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:11:54 -05:00
Yihang Li
69097a631c scsi: hisi_sas: Check whether debugfs is enabled before removing or releasing it
hisi_sas debugfs remove should be executed only when debugfs is enabled.
Check whether debugfs is enabled and then remove it only if enabled.

Signed-off-by: Yihang Li <liyihang9@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiang Chen <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1705904747-62186-4-git-send-email-chenxiang66@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:11:54 -05:00
Yihang Li
3f03055047 scsi: hisi_sas: Remove redundant checks for automatic debugfs dump
In commit 63f0733d07 ("scsi: hisi_sas: Allocate DFX memory during dump
trigger"), the memory allocation time of the DFX is changed from device
initialization to dump occurs, so .debugfs_itct is not a valid address and
do not need to check.

The parameter hisi_sas_debugfs_enable is enough to check whether automatic
debugfs dump is triggered, so remove redunant checks.

Fixes: 63f0733d07 ("scsi: hisi_sas: Allocate DFX memory during dump trigger")
Signed-off-by: Yihang Li <liyihang9@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiang Chen <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1705904747-62186-3-git-send-email-chenxiang66@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:11:54 -05:00
Yihang Li
3c4f53b2c3 scsi: hisi_sas: Fix a deadlock issue related to automatic dump
If we issue a disabling PHY command, the device attached with it will go
offline, if a 2 bit ECC error occurs at the same time, a hung task may be
found:

[ 4613.652388] INFO: task kworker/u256:0:165233 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 4613.666297] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 4613.674809] task:kworker/u256:0  state:D stack:    0 pid:165233 ppid:     2 flags:0x00000208
[ 4613.683959] Workqueue: 0000:74:02.0_disco_q sas_revalidate_domain [libsas]
[ 4613.691518] Call trace:
[ 4613.694678]  __switch_to+0xf8/0x17c
[ 4613.698872]  __schedule+0x660/0xee0
[ 4613.703063]  schedule+0xac/0x240
[ 4613.706994]  schedule_timeout+0x500/0x610
[ 4613.711705]  __down+0x128/0x36c
[ 4613.715548]  down+0x240/0x2d0
[ 4613.719221]  hisi_sas_internal_abort_timeout+0x1bc/0x260 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.726618]  sas_execute_internal_abort+0x144/0x310 [libsas]
[ 4613.732976]  sas_execute_internal_abort_dev+0x44/0x60 [libsas]
[ 4613.739504]  hisi_sas_internal_task_abort_dev.isra.0+0xbc/0x1b0 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.747499]  hisi_sas_dev_gone+0x174/0x250 [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.753682]  sas_notify_lldd_dev_gone+0xec/0x2e0 [libsas]
[ 4613.759781]  sas_unregister_common_dev+0x4c/0x7a0 [libsas]
[ 4613.765962]  sas_destruct_devices+0xb8/0x120 [libsas]
[ 4613.771709]  sas_do_revalidate_domain.constprop.0+0x1b8/0x31c [libsas]
[ 4613.778930]  sas_revalidate_domain+0x60/0xa4 [libsas]
[ 4613.784716]  process_one_work+0x248/0x950
[ 4613.789424]  worker_thread+0x318/0x934
[ 4613.793878]  kthread+0x190/0x200
[ 4613.797810]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 4613.802121] INFO: task kworker/u256:4:316722 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
[ 4613.816026] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 4613.824538] task:kworker/u256:4  state:D stack:    0 pid:316722 ppid:     2 flags:0x00000208
[ 4613.833670] Workqueue: 0000:74:02.0 hisi_sas_rst_work_handler [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.841491] Call trace:
[ 4613.844647]  __switch_to+0xf8/0x17c
[ 4613.848852]  __schedule+0x660/0xee0
[ 4613.853052]  schedule+0xac/0x240
[ 4613.856984]  schedule_timeout+0x500/0x610
[ 4613.861695]  __down+0x128/0x36c
[ 4613.865542]  down+0x240/0x2d0
[ 4613.869216]  hisi_sas_controller_prereset+0x58/0x1fc [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.876324]  hisi_sas_rst_work_handler+0x40/0x8c [hisi_sas_main]
[ 4613.883019]  process_one_work+0x248/0x950
[ 4613.887732]  worker_thread+0x318/0x934
[ 4613.892204]  kthread+0x190/0x200
[ 4613.896118]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[ 4613.900423] INFO: task kworker/u256:1:348985 blocked for more than 121 seconds.
[ 4613.914341] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
[ 4613.922852] task:kworker/u256:1  state:D stack:    0 pid:348985 ppid:     2 flags:0x00000208
[ 4613.931984] Workqueue: 0000:74:02.0_event_q sas_port_event_worker [libsas]
[ 4613.939549] Call trace:
[ 4613.942702]  __switch_to+0xf8/0x17c
[ 4613.946892]  __schedule+0x660/0xee0
[ 4613.951083]  schedule+0xac/0x240
[ 4613.955015]  schedule_timeout+0x500/0x610
[ 4613.959725]  wait_for_common+0x200/0x610
[ 4613.964349]  wait_for_completion+0x3c/0x5c
[ 4613.969146]  flush_workqueue+0x198/0x790
[ 4613.973776]  sas_porte_broadcast_rcvd+0x1e8/0x320 [libsas]
[ 4613.979960]  sas_port_event_worker+0x54/0xa0 [libsas]
[ 4613.985708]  process_one_work+0x248/0x950
[ 4613.990420]  worker_thread+0x318/0x934
[ 4613.994868]  kthread+0x190/0x200
[ 4613.998800]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

This is because when the device goes offline, we obtain the hisi_hba
semaphore and send the ABORT_DEV command to the device. However, the
internal abort timed out due to the 2 bit ECC error and triggers automatic
dump. In addition, since the hisi_hba semaphore has been obtained, the dump
cannot be executed and the controller cannot be reset.

Therefore, the deadlocks occur on the following circular dependencies:
hisi_sas_dev_gone() -> down() -> hisi_sas_internal_task_abort_dev() -> ...
-> hisi_sas_internal_abort_timeout() -> down().

The deadlock is triggered only when the timeout occurs during device goes
offline. To fix this issue, use .rst_ha_timeout to distinguish the scenario
where a device goes offline from other scenarios.

Fixes: 2ff07b5c6f ("scsi: hisi_sas: Directly call register snapshot instead of using workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yihang Li <liyihang9@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Xiang Chen <chenxiang66@hisilicon.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1705904747-62186-2-git-send-email-chenxiang66@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
2024-01-24 21:11:54 -05:00
Zhipeng Lu
f6cc4b6a3a fjes: fix memleaks in fjes_hw_setup
In fjes_hw_setup, it allocates several memory and delay the deallocation
to the fjes_hw_exit in fjes_probe through the following call chain:

fjes_probe
  |-> fjes_hw_init
        |-> fjes_hw_setup
  |-> fjes_hw_exit

However, when fjes_hw_setup fails, fjes_hw_exit won't be called and thus
all the resources allocated in fjes_hw_setup will be leaked. In this
patch, we free those resources in fjes_hw_setup and prevents such leaks.

Fixes: 2fcbca6877 ("fjes: platform_driver's .probe and .remove routine")
Signed-off-by: Zhipeng Lu <alexious@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240122172445.3841883-1-alexious@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 18:03:53 -08:00
Randy Dunlap
5ca1a5153a tipc: node: remove Excess struct member kernel-doc warnings
Remove 2 kernel-doc descriptions to squelch warnings:

node.c:150: warning: Excess struct member 'inputq' description in 'tipc_node'
node.c:150: warning: Excess struct member 'namedq' description in 'tipc_node'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123051152.23684-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 17:48:29 -08:00
Randy Dunlap
88bf1b8f3c tipc: socket: remove Excess struct member kernel-doc warning
Remove a kernel-doc description to squelch a warning:

socket.c:143: warning: Excess struct member 'blocking_link' description in 'tipc_sock'

Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123051201.24701-1-rdunlap@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 17:48:09 -08:00
Arseniy Krasnov
e18c709230 vsock/test: add '--peer-port' input argument
Implement port for given CID as input argument instead of using
hardcoded value '1234'. This allows to run different test instances
on a single CID. Port argument is not required parameter and if it is
not set, then default value will be '1234' - thus we preserve previous
behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Arseniy Krasnov <avkrasnov@salutedevices.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123072750.4084181-1-avkrasnov@salutedevices.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 17:47:35 -08:00
Xiao Wang
cb4ede9261
riscv: Avoid code duplication with generic bitops implementation
There's code duplication between the fallback implementation for bitops
__ffs/__fls/ffs/fls API and the generic C implementation in
include/asm-generic/bitops/. To avoid this duplication, this patch renames
the generic C implementation by adding a "generic_" prefix to them, then we
can use these generic APIs as fallback.

Suggested-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Signed-off-by: Xiao Wang <xiao.w.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231112094421.4014931-1-xiao.w.wang@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2024-01-24 17:25:36 -08:00
Song Shuai
05d450aabd
riscv: Support RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET
Inspired from arm64's implement -- commit 70918779ae
("arm64: entry: Enable random_kstack_offset support")

Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall,
the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX() (i.e. 10 bits).

In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and
slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to
disable stack protector for do_trap_ecall_u() at the function level.

Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Song Shuai <songshuaishuai@tinylab.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231109133751.212079-1-songshuaishuai@tinylab.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2024-01-24 17:24:24 -08:00
Yang Li
dded618c07
RISC-V: Remove duplicated include in smpboot.c
./arch/riscv/kernel/smpboot.c: asm/cpufeature.h is included more than once.

Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=7086
Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031004018.45074-1-yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
2024-01-24 17:18:19 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
6098d87eaf A fix to avoid triggering an assert in some cases where RBD exclusive
mappings are involved and a deprecated API cleanup.
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Merge tag 'ceph-for-6.8-rc2' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client

Pull ceph fixes from Ilya Dryomov:
 "A fix to avoid triggering an assert in some cases where RBD exclusive
  mappings are involved and a deprecated API cleanup"

* tag 'ceph-for-6.8-rc2' of https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client:
  rbd: don't move requests to the running list on errors
  rbd: remove usage of the deprecated ida_simple_*() API
2024-01-24 16:59:52 -08:00
Linus Torvalds
f22face166 integrity-6.8-rc1
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Merge tag 'integrity-v6.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity

Pull integrity fix from Mimi Zohar:
 "Revert patch that required user-provided key data, since keys can be
  created from kernel-generated random numbers"

* tag 'integrity-v6.8-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  Revert "KEYS: encrypted: Add check for strsep"
2024-01-24 16:51:59 -08:00
Alexei Starovoitov
9d71bc833f Merge branch 'net-bpf_xdp_adjust_tail-and-intel-mbuf-fixes'
Maciej Fijalkowski says:

====================
net: bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() and Intel mbuf fixes

Hey,

after a break followed by dealing with sickness, here is a v6 that makes
bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() actually usable for ZC drivers that support XDP
multi-buffer. Since v4 I tried also using bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() with
positive offset which exposed yet another issues, which can be observed
by increased commit count when compared to v3.

John, in the end I think we should remove handling
MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL from __xdp_return(), but it is out of the scope
for fixes set, IMHO.

Thanks,
Maciej

v6:
- add acks [Magnus]
- fix spelling mistakes [Magnus]
- avoid touching xdp_buff in xp_alloc_{reused,new_from_fq}() [Magnus]
- s/shrink_data/bpf_xdp_shrink_data [Jakub]
- remove __shrink_data() [Jakub]
- check retvals from __xdp_rxq_info_reg() [Magnus]

v5:
- pick correct version of patch 5 [Simon]
- elaborate a bit more on what patch 2 fixes

v4:
- do not clear frags flag when deleting tail; xsk_buff_pool now does
  that
- skip some NULL tests for xsk_buff_get_tail [Martin, John]
- address problems around registering xdp_rxq_info
- fix bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail() for ZC mbuf

v3:
- add acks
- s/xsk_buff_tail_del/xsk_buff_del_tail
- address i40e as well (thanks Tirthendu)

v2:
- fix !CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS builds
- add reviewed-by tag to patch 3
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-1-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:07 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
0cbb08707c i40e: update xdp_rxq_info::frag_size for ZC enabled Rx queue
Now that i40e driver correctly sets up frag_size in xdp_rxq_info, let us
make it work for ZC multi-buffer as well. i40e_ring::rx_buf_len for ZC
is being set via xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() and this needs to be
propagated up to xdp_rxq_info.

Fixes: 1c9ba9c146 ("i40e: xsk: add RX multi-buffer support")
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-12-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:07 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
a045d2f2d0 i40e: set xdp_rxq_info::frag_size
i40e support XDP multi-buffer so it is supposed to use
__xdp_rxq_info_reg() instead of xdp_rxq_info_reg() and set the
frag_size. It can not be simply converted at existing callsite because
rx_buf_len could be un-initialized, so let us register xdp_rxq_info
within i40e_configure_rx_ring(), which happen to be called with already
initialized rx_buf_len value.

Commit 5180ff1364 ("i40e: use int for i40e_status") converted 'err' to
int, so two variables to deal with return codes are not needed within
i40e_configure_rx_ring(). Remove 'ret' and use 'err' to handle status
from xdp_rxq_info registration.

Fixes: e213ced19b ("i40e: add support for XDP multi-buffer Rx")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-11-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:07 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
fbadd83a61 xdp: reflect tail increase for MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL
XSK ZC Rx path calculates the size of data that will be posted to XSK Rx
queue via subtracting xdp_buff::data_end from xdp_buff::data.

In bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(), when underlying memory type of
xdp_rxq_info is MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL, add offset to data_end in tail
fragment, so that later on user space will be able to take into account
the amount of bytes added by XDP program.

Fixes: 24ea50127e ("xsk: support mbuf on ZC RX")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-10-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:07 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
3de38c8717 ice: update xdp_rxq_info::frag_size for ZC enabled Rx queue
Now that ice driver correctly sets up frag_size in xdp_rxq_info, let us
make it work for ZC multi-buffer as well. ice_rx_ring::rx_buf_len for ZC
is being set via xsk_pool_get_rx_frame_size() and this needs to be
propagated up to xdp_rxq_info.

Use a bigger hammer and instead of unregistering only xdp_rxq_info's
memory model, unregister it altogether and register it again and have
xdp_rxq_info with correct frag_size value.

Fixes: 1bbc04de60 ("ice: xsk: add RX multi-buffer support")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-9-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:07 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
290779905d intel: xsk: initialize skb_frag_t::bv_offset in ZC drivers
Ice and i40e ZC drivers currently set offset of a frag within
skb_shared_info to 0, which is incorrect. xdp_buffs that come from
xsk_buff_pool always have 256 bytes of a headroom, so they need to be
taken into account to retrieve xdp_buff::data via skb_frag_address().
Otherwise, bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail() would be starting its job from
xdp_buff::data_hard_start which would result in overwriting existing
payload.

Fixes: 1c9ba9c146 ("i40e: xsk: add RX multi-buffer support")
Fixes: 1bbc04de60 ("ice: xsk: add RX multi-buffer support")
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-8-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:07 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
2ee788c064 ice: remove redundant xdp_rxq_info registration
xdp_rxq_info struct can be registered by drivers via two functions -
xdp_rxq_info_reg() and __xdp_rxq_info_reg(). The latter one allows
drivers that support XDP multi-buffer to set up xdp_rxq_info::frag_size
which in turn will make it possible to grow the packet via
bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() BPF helper.

Currently, ice registers xdp_rxq_info in two spots:
1) ice_setup_rx_ring() // via xdp_rxq_info_reg(), BUG
2) ice_vsi_cfg_rxq()   // via __xdp_rxq_info_reg(), OK

Cited commit under fixes tag took care of setting up frag_size and
updated registration scheme in 2) but it did not help as
1) is called before 2) and as shown above it uses old registration
function. This means that 2) sees that xdp_rxq_info is already
registered and never calls __xdp_rxq_info_reg() which leaves us with
xdp_rxq_info::frag_size being set to 0.

To fix this misbehavior, simply remove xdp_rxq_info_reg() call from
ice_setup_rx_ring().

Fixes: 2fba7dc515 ("ice: Add support for XDP multi-buffer on Rx side")
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-7-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:06 -08:00
Tirthendu Sarkar
83014323c6 i40e: handle multi-buffer packets that are shrunk by xdp prog
XDP programs can shrink packets by calling the bpf_xdp_adjust_tail()
helper function. For multi-buffer packets this may lead to reduction of
frag count stored in skb_shared_info area of the xdp_buff struct. This
results in issues with the current handling of XDP_PASS and XDP_DROP
cases.

For XDP_PASS, currently skb is being built using frag count of
xdp_buffer before it was processed by XDP prog and thus will result in
an inconsistent skb when frag count gets reduced by XDP prog. To fix
this, get correct frag count while building the skb instead of using
pre-obtained frag count.

For XDP_DROP, current page recycling logic will not reuse the page but
instead will adjust the pagecnt_bias so that the page can be freed. This
again results in inconsistent behavior as the page refcnt has already
been changed by the helper while freeing the frag(s) as part of
shrinking the packet. To fix this, only adjust pagecnt_bias for buffers
that are stillpart of the packet post-xdp prog run.

Fixes: e213ced19b ("i40e: add support for XDP multi-buffer Rx")
Reported-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tirthendu Sarkar <tirthendu.sarkar@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-6-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:06 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
ad2047cf5d ice: work on pre-XDP prog frag count
Fix an OOM panic in XDP_DRV mode when a XDP program shrinks a
multi-buffer packet by 4k bytes and then redirects it to an AF_XDP
socket.

Since support for handling multi-buffer frames was added to XDP, usage
of bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() helper within XDP program can free the page
that given fragment occupies and in turn decrease the fragment count
within skb_shared_info that is embedded in xdp_buff struct. In current
ice driver codebase, it can become problematic when page recycling logic
decides not to reuse the page. In such case, __page_frag_cache_drain()
is used with ice_rx_buf::pagecnt_bias that was not adjusted after
refcount of page was changed by XDP prog which in turn does not drain
the refcount to 0 and page is never freed.

To address this, let us store the count of frags before the XDP program
was executed on Rx ring struct. This will be used to compare with
current frag count from skb_shared_info embedded in xdp_buff. A smaller
value in the latter indicates that XDP prog freed frag(s). Then, for
given delta decrement pagecnt_bias for XDP_DROP verdict.

While at it, let us also handle the EOP frag within
ice_set_rx_bufs_act() to make our life easier, so all of the adjustments
needed to be applied against freed frags are performed in the single
place.

Fixes: 2fba7dc515 ("ice: Add support for XDP multi-buffer on Rx side")
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-5-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:06 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
c5114710c8 xsk: fix usage of multi-buffer BPF helpers for ZC XDP
Currently when packet is shrunk via bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() and memory
type is set to MEM_TYPE_XSK_BUFF_POOL, null ptr dereference happens:

[1136314.192256] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address:
0000000000000034
[1136314.203943] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[1136314.213768] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[1136314.223550] PGD 0 P4D 0
[1136314.230684] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[1136314.239621] CPU: 8 PID: 54203 Comm: xdpsock Not tainted 6.6.0+ #257
[1136314.250469] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT,
BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019
[1136314.265615] RIP: 0010:__xdp_return+0x6c/0x210
[1136314.274653] Code: ad 00 48 8b 47 08 49 89 f8 a8 01 0f 85 9b 01 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f0 41 ff 48 34 75 32 4c 89 c7 e9 79 cd 80 ff 83 fe 03 75 17 <f6> 41 34 01 0f 85 02 01 00 00 48 89 cf e9 22 cc 1e 00 e9 3d d2 86
[1136314.302907] RSP: 0018:ffffc900089f8db0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[1136314.312967] RAX: ffffc9003168aed0 RBX: ffff8881c3300000 RCX:
0000000000000000
[1136314.324953] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI:
ffffc9003168c000
[1136314.336929] RBP: 0000000000000ae0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09:
0000000000010000
[1136314.348844] R10: ffffc9000e495000 R11: 0000000000000040 R12:
0000000000000001
[1136314.360706] R13: 0000000000000524 R14: ffffc9003168aec0 R15:
0000000000000001
[1136314.373298] FS:  00007f8df8bbcb80(0000) GS:ffff8897e0e00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[1136314.386105] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[1136314.396532] CR2: 0000000000000034 CR3: 00000001aa912002 CR4:
00000000007706f0
[1136314.408377] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2:
0000000000000000
[1136314.420173] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7:
0000000000000400
[1136314.431890] PKRU: 55555554
[1136314.439143] Call Trace:
[1136314.446058]  <IRQ>
[1136314.452465]  ? __die+0x20/0x70
[1136314.459881]  ? page_fault_oops+0x15b/0x440
[1136314.468305]  ? exc_page_fault+0x6a/0x150
[1136314.476491]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[1136314.484927]  ? __xdp_return+0x6c/0x210
[1136314.492863]  bpf_xdp_adjust_tail+0x155/0x1d0
[1136314.501269]  bpf_prog_ccc47ae29d3b6570_xdp_sock_prog+0x15/0x60
[1136314.511263]  ice_clean_rx_irq_zc+0x206/0xc60 [ice]
[1136314.520222]  ? ice_xmit_zc+0x6e/0x150 [ice]
[1136314.528506]  ice_napi_poll+0x467/0x670 [ice]
[1136314.536858]  ? ttwu_do_activate.constprop.0+0x8f/0x1a0
[1136314.546010]  __napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0
[1136314.553462]  net_rx_action+0x133/0x270
[1136314.561619]  __do_softirq+0xbe/0x28e
[1136314.569303]  do_softirq+0x3f/0x60

This comes from __xdp_return() call with xdp_buff argument passed as
NULL which is supposed to be consumed by xsk_buff_free() call.

To address this properly, in ZC case, a node that represents the frag
being removed has to be pulled out of xskb_list. Introduce
appropriate xsk helpers to do such node operation and use them
accordingly within bpf_xdp_adjust_tail().

Fixes: 24ea50127e ("xsk: support mbuf on ZC RX")
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com> # For the xsk header part
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-4-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:06 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
f7f6aa8e24 xsk: make xsk_buff_pool responsible for clearing xdp_buff::flags
XDP multi-buffer support introduced XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS flag that is
used by drivers to notify data path whether xdp_buff contains fragments
or not. Data path looks up mentioned flag on first buffer that occupies
the linear part of xdp_buff, so drivers only modify it there. This is
sufficient for SKB and XDP_DRV modes as usually xdp_buff is allocated on
stack or it resides within struct representing driver's queue and
fragments are carried via skb_frag_t structs. IOW, we are dealing with
only one xdp_buff.

ZC mode though relies on list of xdp_buff structs that is carried via
xsk_buff_pool::xskb_list, so ZC data path has to make sure that
fragments do *not* have XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set. Otherwise,
xsk_buff_free() could misbehave if it would be executed against xdp_buff
that carries a frag with XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS flag set. Such scenario can
take place when within supplied XDP program bpf_xdp_adjust_tail() is
used with negative offset that would in turn release the tail fragment
from multi-buffer frame.

Calling xsk_buff_free() on tail fragment with XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS would
result in releasing all the nodes from xskb_list that were produced by
driver before XDP program execution, which is not what is intended -
only tail fragment should be deleted from xskb_list and then it should
be put onto xsk_buff_pool::free_list. Such multi-buffer frame will never
make it up to user space, so from AF_XDP application POV there would be
no traffic running, however due to free_list getting constantly new
nodes, driver will be able to feed HW Rx queue with recycled buffers.
Bottom line is that instead of traffic being redirected to user space,
it would be continuously dropped.

To fix this, let us clear the mentioned flag on xsk_buff_pool side
during xdp_buff initialization, which is what should have been done
right from the start of XSK multi-buffer support.

Fixes: 1bbc04de60 ("ice: xsk: add RX multi-buffer support")
Fixes: 1c9ba9c146 ("i40e: xsk: add RX multi-buffer support")
Fixes: 24ea50127e ("xsk: support mbuf on ZC RX")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-3-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:06 -08:00
Maciej Fijalkowski
2690098931 xsk: recycle buffer in case Rx queue was full
Add missing xsk_buff_free() call when __xsk_rcv_zc() failed to produce
descriptor to XSK Rx queue.

Fixes: 24ea50127e ("xsk: support mbuf on ZC RX")
Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124191602.566724-2-maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:24:06 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
c8632acf19 Merge branch 'bpf-token'
Andrii Nakryiko says:

====================
BPF token

This patch set is a combination of three BPF token-related patch sets ([0],
[1], [2]) with fixes ([3]) to kernel-side token_fd passing APIs incorporated
into relevant patches, bpf_token_capable() changes requested by
Christian Brauner, and necessary libbpf and BPF selftests side adjustments.

This patch set introduces an ability to delegate a subset of BPF subsystem
functionality from privileged system-wide daemon (e.g., systemd or any other
container manager) through special mount options for userns-bound BPF FS to
a *trusted* unprivileged application. Trust is the key here. This
functionality is not about allowing unconditional unprivileged BPF usage.
Establishing trust, though, is completely up to the discretion of respective
privileged application that would create and mount a BPF FS instance with
delegation enabled, as different production setups can and do achieve it
through a combination of different means (signing, LSM, code reviews, etc),
and it's undesirable and infeasible for kernel to enforce any particular way
of validating trustworthiness of particular process.

The main motivation for this work is a desire to enable containerized BPF
applications to be used together with user namespaces. This is currently
impossible, as CAP_BPF, required for BPF subsystem usage, cannot be namespaced
or sandboxed, as a general rule. E.g., tracing BPF programs, thanks to BPF
helpers like bpf_probe_read_kernel() and bpf_probe_read_user() can safely read
arbitrary memory, and it's impossible to ensure that they only read memory of
processes belonging to any given namespace. This means that it's impossible to
have a mechanically verifiable namespace-aware CAP_BPF capability, and as such
another mechanism to allow safe usage of BPF functionality is necessary.

BPF FS delegation mount options and BPF token derived from such BPF FS instance
is such a mechanism. Kernel makes no assumption about what "trusted"
constitutes in any particular case, and it's up to specific privileged
applications and their surrounding infrastructure to decide that. What kernel
provides is a set of APIs to setup and mount special BPF FS instance and
derive BPF tokens from it. BPF FS and BPF token are both bound to its owning
userns and in such a way are constrained inside intended container. Users can
then pass BPF token FD to privileged bpf() syscall commands, like BPF map
creation and BPF program loading, to perform such operations without having
init userns privileges.

This version incorporates feedback and suggestions ([4]) received on earlier
iterations of BPF token approach, and instead of allowing to create BPF tokens
directly assuming capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), we instead enhance BPF FS to accept
a few new delegation mount options. If these options are used and BPF FS itself
is properly created, set up, and mounted inside the user namespaced container,
user application is able to derive a BPF token object from BPF FS instance, and
pass that token to bpf() syscall. As explained in patch #3, BPF token itself
doesn't grant access to BPF functionality, but instead allows kernel to do
namespaced capabilities checks (ns_capable() vs capable()) for CAP_BPF,
CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, and CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as applicable. So it forms one
half of a puzzle and allows container managers and sys admins to have safe and
flexible configuration options: determining which containers get delegation of
BPF functionality through BPF FS, and then which applications within such
containers are allowed to perform bpf() commands, based on namespaces
capabilities.

Previous attempt at addressing this very same problem ([5]) attempted to
utilize authoritative LSM approach, but was conclusively rejected by upstream
LSM maintainers. BPF token concept is not changing anything about LSM
approach, but can be combined with LSM hooks for very fine-grained security
policy. Some ideas about making BPF token more convenient to use with LSM (in
particular custom BPF LSM programs) was briefly described in recent LSF/MM/BPF
2023 presentation ([6]). E.g., an ability to specify user-provided data
(context), which in combination with BPF LSM would allow implementing a very
dynamic and fine-granular custom security policies on top of BPF token. In the
interest of minimizing API surface area and discussions this was relegated to
follow up patches, as it's not essential to the fundamental concept of
delegatable BPF token.

It should be noted that BPF token is conceptually quite similar to the idea of
/dev/bpf device file, proposed by Song a while ago ([7]). The biggest
difference is the idea of using virtual anon_inode file to hold BPF token and
allowing multiple independent instances of them, each (potentially) with its
own set of restrictions. And also, crucially, BPF token approach is not using
any special stateful task-scoped flags. Instead, bpf() syscall accepts
token_fd parameters explicitly for each relevant BPF command. This addresses
main concerns brought up during the /dev/bpf discussion, and fits better with
overall BPF subsystem design.

Second part of this patch set adds full support for BPF token in libbpf's BPF
object high-level API. Good chunk of the changes rework libbpf feature
detection internals, which are the most affected by BPF token presence.

Besides internal refactorings, libbpf allows to pass location of BPF FS from
which BPF token should be created by libbpf. This can be done explicitly though
a new bpf_object_open_opts.bpf_token_path field. But we also add implicit BPF
token creation logic to BPF object load step, even without any explicit
involvement of the user. If the environment is setup properly, BPF token will
be created transparently and used implicitly. This allows for all existing
application to gain BPF token support by just linking with latest version of
libbpf library. No source code modifications are required.  All that under
assumption that privileged container management agent properly set up default
BPF FS instance at /sys/bpf/fs to allow BPF token creation.

libbpf adds support to override default BPF FS location for BPF token creation
through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar knowledge. This allows admins or container
managers to mount BPF token-enabled BPF FS at non-standard location without the
need to coordinate with applications.  LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH can also be used
to disable BPF token implicit creation by setting it to an empty value.

  [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=805707&state=*
  [1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=810260&state=*
  [2] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/list/?series=809800&state=*
  [3] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231219053150.336991-1-andrii@kernel.org/
  [4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
  [5] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230412043300.360803-1-andrii@kernel.org/
  [6] http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2023_material/Trusted_unprivileged_BPF_LSFMM2023.pdf
  [7] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20190627201923.2589391-2-songliubraving@fb.com/

v1->v2:
  - disable BPF token creation in init userns, and simplify
    bpf_token_capable() logic (Christian);
  - use kzalloc/kfree instead of kvzalloc/kvfree (Linus);
  - few more selftest cases to validate LSM and BPF token interations.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124022127.2379740-1-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2024-01-24 16:21:03 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
906ee42cb1 selftests/bpf: Incorporate LSM policy to token-based tests
Add tests for LSM interactions (both bpf_token_capable and bpf_token_cmd
LSM hooks) with BPF token in bpf() subsystem. Now child process passes
back token FD for parent to be able to do tests with token originating
in "wrong" userns. But we also create token in initns and check that
token LSMs don't accidentally reject BPF operations when capable()
checks pass without BPF token.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-31-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:03 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
fadf54935e selftests/bpf: Add tests for LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar
Add new subtest validating LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar semantics.
Extend existing test to validate that LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH allows to
disable implicit BPF token creation by setting envvar to empty string.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-30-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:03 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
cac270ad79 libbpf: Support BPF token path setting through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar
To allow external admin authority to override default BPF FS location
(/sys/fs/bpf) for implicit BPF token creation, teach libbpf to recognize
LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar. If it is specified and user application
didn't explicitly specify bpf_token_path option, it will be treated
exactly like bpf_token_path option, overriding default /sys/fs/bpf
location and making BPF token mandatory.

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-29-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:03 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
b73d08d131 selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF object load with implicit token
Add a test to validate libbpf's implicit BPF token creation from default
BPF FS location (/sys/fs/bpf). Also validate that disabling this
implicit BPF token creation works.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-28-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:03 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
d5baf0cac6 selftests/bpf: Add BPF object loading tests with explicit token passing
Add a few tests that attempt to load BPF object containing privileged
map, program, and the one requiring mandatory BTF uploading into the
kernel (to validate token FD propagation to BPF_BTF_LOAD command).

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-27-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:03 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
6b434b61b4 libbpf: Wire up BPF token support at BPF object level
Add BPF token support to BPF object-level functionality.

BPF token is supported by BPF object logic either as an explicitly
provided BPF token from outside (through BPF FS path), or implicitly
(unless prevented through bpf_object_open_opts).

Implicit mode is assumed to be the most common one for user namespaced
unprivileged workloads. The assumption is that privileged container
manager sets up default BPF FS mount point at /sys/fs/bpf with BPF token
delegation options (delegate_{cmds,maps,progs,attachs} mount options).
BPF object during loading will attempt to create BPF token from
/sys/fs/bpf location, and pass it for all relevant operations
(currently, map creation, BTF load, and program load).

In this implicit mode, if BPF token creation fails due to whatever
reason (BPF FS is not mounted, or kernel doesn't support BPF token,
etc), this is not considered an error. BPF object loading sequence will
proceed with no BPF token.

In explicit BPF token mode, user provides explicitly custom BPF FS mount
point path. In such case, BPF object will attempt to create BPF token
from provided BPF FS location. If BPF token creation fails, that is
considered a critical error and BPF object load fails with an error.

Libbpf provides a way to disable implicit BPF token creation, if it
causes any troubles (BPF token is designed to be completely optional and
shouldn't cause any problems even if provided, but in the world of BPF
LSM, custom security logic can be installed that might change outcome
depending on the presence of BPF token). To disable libbpf's default BPF
token creation behavior user should provide either invalid BPF token FD
(negative), or empty bpf_token_path option.

BPF token presence can influence libbpf's feature probing, so if BPF
object has associated BPF token, feature probing is instructed to use
BPF object-specific feature detection cache and token FD.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-26-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
f3dcee938f libbpf: Wire up token_fd into feature probing logic
Adjust feature probing callbacks to take into account optional token_fd.
In unprivileged contexts, some feature detectors would fail to detect
kernel support just because BPF program, BPF map, or BTF object can't be
loaded due to privileged nature of those operations. So when BPF object
is loaded with BPF token, this token should be used for feature probing.

This patch is setting support for this scenario, but we don't yet pass
non-zero token FD. This will be added in the next patch.

We also switched BPF cookie detector from using kprobe program to
tracepoint one, as tracepoint is somewhat less dangerous BPF program
type and has higher likelihood of being allowed through BPF token in the
future. This change has no effect on detection behavior.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-25-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
05f9cdd55d libbpf: Move feature detection code into its own file
It's quite a lot of well isolated code, so it seems like a good
candidate to move it out of libbpf.c to reduce its size.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-24-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
d6dd1d4936 libbpf: Further decouple feature checking logic from bpf_object
Add feat_supported() helper that accepts feature cache instead of
bpf_object. This allows low-level code in bpf.c to not know or care
about higher-level concept of bpf_object, yet it will be able to utilize
custom feature checking in cases where BPF token might influence the
outcome.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-23-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
ea4d587354 libbpf: Split feature detectors definitions from cached results
Split a list of supported feature detectors with their corresponding
callbacks from actual cached supported/missing values. This will allow
to have more flexible per-token or per-object feature detectors in
subsequent refactorings.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-22-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
0350f9d99e selftests/bpf: Utilize string values for delegate_xxx mount options
Use both hex-based and string-based way to specify delegate mount
options for BPF FS.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-21-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
6c1752e0b6 bpf: Support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options
Besides already supported special "any" value and hex bit mask, support
string-based parsing of delegation masks based on exact enumerator
names. Utilize BTF information of `enum bpf_cmd`, `enum bpf_map_type`,
`enum bpf_prog_type`, and `enum bpf_attach_type` types to find supported
symbolic names (ignoring __MAX_xxx guard values and stripping repetitive
prefixes like BPF_ for cmd and attach types, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ for maps, and
BPF_PROG_TYPE_ for prog types). The case doesn't matter, but it is
normalized to lower case in mount option output. So "PROG_LOAD",
"prog_load", and "MAP_create" are all valid values to specify for
delegate_cmds options, "array" is among supported for map types, etc.

Besides supporting string values, we also support multiple values
specified at the same time, using colon (':') separator.

There are corresponding changes on bpf_show_options side to use known
values to print them in human-readable format, falling back to hex mask
printing, if there are any unrecognized bits. This shouldn't be
necessary when enum BTF information is present, but in general we should
always be able to fall back to this even if kernel was built without BTF.
As mentioned, emitted symbolic names are normalized to be all lower case.

Example below shows various ways to specify delegate_cmds options
through mount command and how mount options are printed back:

12/14 14:39:07.604
vmuser@archvm:~/local/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf
$ mount | rg token

  $ sudo mkdir -p /sys/fs/bpf/token
  $ sudo mount -t bpf bpffs /sys/fs/bpf/token \
               -o delegate_cmds=prog_load:MAP_CREATE \
               -o delegate_progs=kprobe \
               -o delegate_attachs=xdp
  $ mount | grep token
  bpffs on /sys/fs/bpf/token type bpf (rw,relatime,delegate_cmds=map_create:prog_load,delegate_progs=kprobe,delegate_attachs=xdp)

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-20-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
aeaa97b006 bpf: Fail BPF_TOKEN_CREATE if no delegation option was set on BPF FS
It's quite confusing in practice when it's possible to successfully
create a BPF token from BPF FS that didn't have any of delegate_xxx
mount options set up. While it's not wrong, it's actually more
meaningful to reject BPF_TOKEN_CREATE with specific error code (-ENOENT)
to let user-space know that no token delegation is setup up.

So, instead of creating empty BPF token that will be always ignored
because it doesn't have any of the allow_xxx bits set, reject it with
-ENOENT. If we ever need empty BPF token to be possible, we can support
that with extra flag passed into BPF_TOKEN_CREATE.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-19-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
0054493e51 bpf,selinux: Allocate bpf_security_struct per BPF token
Utilize newly added bpf_token_create/bpf_token_free LSM hooks to
allocate struct bpf_security_struct for each BPF token object in
SELinux. This just follows similar pattern for BPF prog and map.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-18-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
fcb9597ff7 selftests/bpf: Add BPF token-enabled tests
Add a selftest that attempts to conceptually replicate intended BPF
token use cases inside user namespaced container.

Child process is forked. It is then put into its own userns and mountns.
Child creates BPF FS context object. This ensures child userns is
captured as the owning userns for this instance of BPF FS. Given setting
delegation mount options is privileged operation, we ensure that child
cannot set them.

This context is passed back to privileged parent process through Unix
socket, where parent sets up delegation options, creates, and mounts it
as a detached mount. This mount FD is passed back to the child to be
used for BPF token creation, which allows otherwise privileged BPF
operations to succeed inside userns.

We validate that all of token-enabled privileged commands (BPF_BTF_LOAD,
BPF_MAP_CREATE, and BPF_PROG_LOAD) work as intended. They should only
succeed inside the userns if a) BPF token is provided with proper
allowed sets of commands and types; and b) namespaces CAP_BPF and other
privileges are set. Lacking a) or b) should lead to -EPERM failures.

Based on suggested workflow by Christian Brauner ([0]).

  [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-17-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
404cbc149c libbpf: Add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API
Wire through token_fd into bpf_prog_load().

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-16-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
a3d63e8525 libbpf: Add BPF token support to bpf_btf_load() API
Allow user to specify token_fd for bpf_btf_load() API that wraps
kernel's BPF_BTF_LOAD command. This allows loading BTF from unprivileged
process as long as it has BPF token allowing BPF_BTF_LOAD command, which
can be created and delegated by privileged process.

Wire through new btf_flags as well, so that user can provide
BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag, if necessary.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-15-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:02 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
364f848375 libbpf: Add BPF token support to bpf_map_create() API
Add ability to provide token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command through
bpf_map_create() API.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-14-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:01 -08:00
Andrii Nakryiko
639ecd7d62 libbpf: Add bpf_token_create() API
Add low-level wrapper API for BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command in bpf() syscall.

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-13-andrii@kernel.org
2024-01-24 16:21:01 -08:00