Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to
allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct
bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token.
This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog.
Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable()
LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if
necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability,
respectively.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc
hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also
bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs.
Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it
currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which
seems to be a sweet spot.
But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free
LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few
LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully
allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF
map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we
need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the
outcome.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing
bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead
of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF
program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided
arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much
information as we can basically provide.
The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is
passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after
a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were
allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF
verification step.
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for
consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and
signatures.
Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be
used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other
LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one
*even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run
the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when
combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their
relative ordering.
Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to
sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable
context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no
issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us
to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd18 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM
hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it
should not be an issue anymore.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
Remove remaining direct queries to perfmon_capable() and bpf_capable()
in BPF verifier logic and instead use BPF token (if available) to make
decisions about privileges.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-9-andrii@kernel.org
Instead of performing unconditional system-wide bpf_capable() and
perfmon_capable() calls inside bpf_base_func_proto() function (and other
similar ones) to determine eligibility of a given BPF helper for a given
program, use previously recorded BPF token during BPF_PROG_LOAD command
handling to inform the decision.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-8-andrii@kernel.org
Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag
should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types,
derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we
perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-7-andrii@kernel.org
Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading
through delegated BPF token. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag has to be specified
when passing BPF token FD. Given BPF_BTF_LOAD command didn't have flags
field before, we also add btf_flags field.
BTF loading is a pretty straightforward operation, so as long as BPF
token is created with allow_cmds granting BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel
proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating BTF object.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-6-andrii@kernel.org
Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
New BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag is added to specify together with BPF token FD
for BPF_MAP_CREATE command.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-5-andrii@kernel.org
Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).
BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token. Also creating BPF token in init user namespace is
currently not supported, given BPF token doesn't have any effect in init
user namespace anyways.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-4-andrii@kernel.org
Add few new mount options to BPF FS that allow to specify that a given
BPF FS instance allows creation of BPF token (added in the next patch),
and what sort of operations are allowed under BPF token. As such, we get
4 new mount options, each is a bit mask
- `delegate_cmds` allow to specify which bpf() syscall commands are
allowed with BPF token derived from this BPF FS instance;
- if BPF_MAP_CREATE command is allowed, `delegate_maps` specifies
a set of allowable BPF map types that could be created with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_progs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program types that could be loaded with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_attachs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program attach types that could be loaded with
BPF token; delegate_progs and delegate_attachs are meant to be used
together, as full BPF program type is, in general, determined
through both program type and program attach type.
Currently, these mount options accept the following forms of values:
- a special value "any", that enables all possible values of a given
bit set;
- numeric value (decimal or hexadecimal, determined by kernel
automatically) that specifies a bit mask value directly;
- all the values for a given mount option are combined, if specified
multiple times. E.g., `mount -t bpf nodev /path/to/mount -o
delegate_maps=0x1 -o delegate_maps=0x2` will result in a combined 0x3
mask.
Ideally, more convenient (for humans) symbolic form derived from
corresponding UAPI enums would be accepted (e.g., `-o
delegate_progs=kprobe|tracepoint`) and I intend to implement this, but
it requires a bunch of UAPI header churn, so I postponed it until this
feature lands upstream or at least there is a definite consensus that
this feature is acceptable and is going to make it, just to minimize
amount of wasted effort and not increase amount of non-essential code to
be reviewed.
Attentive reader will notice that BPF FS is now marked as
FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which theoretically makes it mountable inside non-init
user namespace as long as the process has sufficient *namespaced*
capabilities within that user namespace. But in reality we still
restrict BPF FS to be mountable only by processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN *in
init userns* (extra check in bpf_fill_super()). FS_USERNS_MOUNT is added
to allow creating BPF FS context object (i.e., fsopen("bpf")) from
inside unprivileged process inside non-init userns, to capture that
userns as the owning userns. It will still be required to pass this
context object back to privileged process to instantiate and mount it.
This manipulation is important, because capturing non-init userns as the
owning userns of BPF FS instance (super block) allows to use that userns
to constraint BPF token to that userns later on (see next patch). So
creating BPF FS with delegation inside unprivileged userns will restrict
derived BPF token objects to only "work" inside that intended userns,
making it scoped to a intended "container". Also, setting these
delegation options requires capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so unprivileged
process cannot set this up without involvement of a privileged process.
There is a set of selftests at the end of the patch set that simulates
this sequence of steps and validates that everything works as intended.
But careful review is requested to make sure there are no missed gaps in
the implementation and testing.
This somewhat subtle set of aspects is the result of previous
discussions ([0]) about various user namespace implications and
interactions with BPF token functionality and is necessary to contain
BPF token inside intended user namespace.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-3-andrii@kernel.org
Within BPF syscall handling code CAP_NET_ADMIN checks stand out a bit
compared to CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON checks. For the latter, CAP_BPF or
CAP_PERFMON are checked first, but if they are not set, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
takes over and grants whatever part of BPF syscall is required.
Similar kind of checks that involve CAP_NET_ADMIN are not so consistent.
One out of four uses does follow CAP_BPF/CAP_PERFMON model: during
BPF_PROG_LOAD, if the type of BPF program is "network-related" either
CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to proceed.
But in three other cases CAP_NET_ADMIN is required even if CAP_SYS_ADMIN
is set:
- when creating DEVMAP/XDKMAP/CPU_MAP maps;
- when attaching CGROUP_SKB programs;
- when handling BPF_PROG_QUERY command.
This patch is changing the latter three cases to follow BPF_PROG_LOAD
model, that is allowing to proceed under either CAP_NET_ADMIN or
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This also makes it cleaner in subsequent BPF token patches to switch
wholesomely to a generic bpf_token_capable(int cap) check, that always
falls back to CAP_SYS_ADMIN if requested capability is missing.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-2-andrii@kernel.org
The commit 9e926acda0 ("libbpf: Find correct module BTFs for struct_ops maps and progs.")
sets a newly added field (value_type_btf_obj_fd) to -1 in libbpf when
the caller of the libbpf's bpf_map_create did not define this field by
passing a NULL "opts" or passing in a "opts" that does not cover this
new field. OPT_HAS(opts, field) is used to decide if the field is
defined or not:
((opts) && opts->sz >= offsetofend(typeof(*(opts)), field))
Once OPTS_HAS decided the field is not defined, that field should
be set to 0. For this particular new field (value_type_btf_obj_fd),
its corresponding map_flags "BPF_F_VTYPE_BTF_OBJ_FD" is not set.
Thus, the kernel does not treat it as an fd field.
Fixes: 9e926acda0 ("libbpf: Find correct module BTFs for struct_ops maps and progs.")
Reported-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124224418.2905133-1-martin.lau@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Adding kprobes on some assembly functions (mainly exception handling)
will result in crashes (either recursive trap or panic). To avoid such
errors, add ASM_NOKPROBE() macro which allow adding specific symbols
into the __kprobe_blacklist section and use to blacklist the following
symbols that showed to be problematic:
- handle_exception()
- ret_from_exception()
- handle_kernel_stack_overflow()
Signed-off-by: Clément Léger <cleger@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins <charlie@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231004131009.409193-1-cleger@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org> says:
This series adds fast gup support to riscv.
The First patch fixes a bug in __p*d_free_tlb(). Per the riscv
privileged spec, if non-leaf PTEs I.E pmd, pud or p4d is modified, a
sfence.vma is a must.
The 2nd patch is a preparation patch.
The last two patches do the real work:
In order to implement fast gup we need to ensure that the page
table walker is protected from page table pages being freed from
under it.
riscv situation is more complicated than other architectures: some
riscv platforms may use IPI to perform TLB shootdown, for example,
those platforms which support AIA, usually the riscv_ipi_for_rfence is
true on these platforms; some riscv platforms may rely on the SBI to
perform TLB shootdown, usually the riscv_ipi_for_rfence is false on
these platforms. To keep software pagetable walkers safe in this case
we switch to RCU based table free (MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE). See the
comment below 'ifdef CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE' in
include/asm-generic/tlb.h for more details.
This patch enables MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE, then use
*tlb_remove_page_ptdesc() for those platforms which use IPI to perform
TLB shootdown;
*tlb_remove_ptdesc() for those platforms which use SBI to perform TLB
shootdown;
Both case mean that disabling interrupts will block the free and
protect the fast gup page walker.
So after the 3rd patch, everything is well prepared, let's select
HAVE_FAST_GUP if MMU.
* b4-shazam-merge:
riscv: enable HAVE_FAST_GUP if MMU
riscv: enable MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE for SMP && MMU
riscv: tlb: convert __p*d_free_tlb() to inline functions
riscv: tlb: fix __p*d_free_tlb()
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219175046.2496-1-jszhang@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
Activate the fast gup for riscv mmu platforms. Here are some
GUP_FAST_BENCHMARK performance numbers:
Before the patch:
GUP_FAST_BENCHMARK: Time: get:53203 put:5085 us
After the patch:
GUP_FAST_BENCHMARK: Time: get:17711 put:5060 us
The get time is reduced by 66.7%! IOW, 3x get speed!
Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219175046.2496-5-jszhang@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
In order to implement fast gup we need to ensure that the page
table walker is protected from page table pages being freed from
under it.
riscv situation is more complicated than other architectures: some
riscv platforms may use IPI to perform TLB shootdown, for example,
those platforms which support AIA, usually the riscv_ipi_for_rfence is
true on these platforms; some riscv platforms may rely on the SBI to
perform TLB shootdown, usually the riscv_ipi_for_rfence is false on
these platforms. To keep software pagetable walkers safe in this case
we switch to RCU based table free (MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE). See the
comment below 'ifdef CONFIG_MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE' in
include/asm-generic/tlb.h for more details.
This patch enables MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE, then use
*tlb_remove_page_ptdesc() for those platforms which use IPI to perform
TLB shootdown;
*tlb_remove_ptdesc() for those platforms which use SBI to perform TLB
shootdown;
Both case mean that disabling interrupts will block the free and
protect the fast gup page walker.
Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219175046.2496-4-jszhang@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
This is to prepare for enabling MMU_GATHER_RCU_TABLE_FREE.
No functionality changes.
Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219175046.2496-3-jszhang@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
If non-leaf PTEs I.E pmd, pud or p4d is modified, a sfence.vma is
a must for safe, imagine if an implementation caches the non-leaf
translation in TLB, although I didn't meet this HW so far, but it's
possible in theory.
Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <jszhang@kernel.org>
Fixes: c5e9b2c2ae ("riscv: Improve tlb_flush()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219175046.2496-2-jszhang@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
The kernel test robot reported the following warning after commit
54e35eb861 ("x86/resctrl: Read supported bandwidth sources from CPUID").
even though the issue is present even in the original commit
92bd5a1390 ("x86/resctrl: Add interface to write mbm_total_bytes_config")
which added this function. The reported warning is:
$ make C=1 CHECK=scripts/coccicheck arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.o
...
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c:1621:5-8: Unneeded variable: "ret". Return "0" on line 1655
Remove the local variable 'ret'.
[ bp: Massage commit message, make mbm_config_write_domain() void. ]
Fixes: 92bd5a1390 ("x86/resctrl: Add interface to write mbm_total_bytes_config")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202401241810.jbd8Ipa1-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Acked-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202401241810.jbd8Ipa1-lkp@intel.com
The commit 8b45a26f2b ("drm/msm/dpu: reserve cdm blocks for writeback
in case of YUV output") introduced a smatch warning about another
conditional block in dpu_encoder_helper_phys_cleanup() which had assumed
hw_pp will always be valid which may not necessarily be true.
Lets fix the other conditional block by making sure hw_pp is valid
before dereferencing it.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Fixes: ae4d721ce1 ("drm/msm/dpu: add an API to reset the encoder related hw blocks")
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/574878/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240117194109.21609-1-quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
Breno Leitao says:
====================
Fix MODULE_DESCRIPTION() for net (p2)
There are hundreds of network modules that misses MODULE_DESCRIPTION(),
causing a warnning when compiling with W=1. Example:
WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in drivers/net/arcnet/com90io.o
WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in drivers/net/arcnet/arc-rimi.o
WARNING: modpost: missing MODULE_DESCRIPTION() in drivers/net/arcnet/com20020.o
This part2 of the patchset focus on the drivers/net/ethernet drivers.
There are still some missing warnings in drivers/net/ethernet that will
be fixed in an upcoming patchset.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240122184543.2501493-2-leitao@debian.org/
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-1-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the Marvel RVU mbox driver.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-11-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the LiteX Liteeth Ethernet device.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Acked-by: Gabriel Somlo <gsomlo@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-10-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the Freescale PQ MDIO driver.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-9-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the FEC (MPC8xx) Ethernet controller.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Wei Fang <wei.fang@nxp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-8-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the NXP ENETC Ethernet driver.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-7-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the EZchip NPS ethernet driver.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-6-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the Cirrus EP93xx ethernet driver.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-5-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the Cavium Liquidio.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-4-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
W=1 builds now warn if module is built without a MODULE_DESCRIPTION().
Add descriptions to the Broadcom iProc GBit driver.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
Acked-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123190332.677489-3-leitao@debian.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
This test is missing a whole bunch of checks for interface
renaming and one ifup. Presumably it was only used on a system
with renaming disabled and NetworkManager running.
Fixes: 91f430b2c4 ("selftests: net: add a test for UDP tunnel info infra")
Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123060529.1033912-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Some (bad) devices can have really terrible discard latency; we don't
want them blocking memory reclaim and causing warnings.
Signed-off-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Even though this is a frame pointer unwind test, it's testing that a
frame pointer stack can be augmented correctly with a partial
Dwarf unwind. So add a feature check so that this test skips instead of
fails if Dwarf unwinding isn't present.
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Spoorthy S <spoorts2@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123163903.350306-3-james.clark@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Even though unwinding depends on either HAVE_DWARF_SUPPORT or
HAVE_LIBUNWIND, scripts testing unwinding can't just look for the
existence of either of those flags. This is because
NO_LIBDW_DWARF_UNWIND=1 can disable unwinding with libdw, but libdw will
still be linked leaving HAVE_DWARF_SUPPORT turned on. Presumably because
it is used for things other than unwinding, so I don't think this needs
to be fixed.
HAVE_DWARF_UNWIND_SUPPORT already takes the combination of all those
things into account, and is used to gate the built in tests like "Test
dwarf unwind", so add it to the feature list output so that it can be
used by the script tests too.
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Spoorthy S <spoorts2@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123163903.350306-2-james.clark@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
The 'Session topology' test currently fails with this message when
evlist__new_default() opens more than one event:
32: Session topology :
--- start ---
templ file: /tmp/perf-test-vv5YzZ
Using CPUID 0x00000000410fd070
Opening: unknown-hardware:HG
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0xb00000000
disabled 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 4
Opening: unknown-hardware:HG
------------------------------------------------------------
perf_event_attr:
type 0 (PERF_TYPE_HARDWARE)
config 0xa00000000
disabled 1
------------------------------------------------------------
sys_perf_event_open: pid 0 cpu -1 group_fd -1 flags 0x8 = 5
non matching sample_type
FAILED tests/topology.c:73 can't get session
---- end ----
Session topology: FAILED!
This is because when re-opening the file and parsing the header, Perf
expects that any file that has more than one event has the sample ID
flag set. Perf record already sets the flag in a similar way when there
is more than one event, so add the same logic to evlist__new_default().
evlist__new_default() is only currently used in tests, so I don't
expect this change to have any other side effects. The other tests that
use it don't save and re-open the file so don't hit this issue.
The session topology test has been failing on Arm big.LITTLE platforms
since commit 251aa04024 ("perf parse-events: Wildcard most
"numeric" events") when evlist__new_default() started opening multiple
events for 'cycles'.
Fixes: 251aa04024 ("perf parse-events: Wildcard most "numeric" events")
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAP-5=fWVQ-7ijjK3-w1q+k2WYVNHbAcejb-xY0ptbjRw476VKA@mail.gmail.com/
Tested-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Tested-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Changbin Du <changbin.du@huawei.com>
Cc: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240124094358.489372-1-james.clark@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
MSA MISC0 bit 1 to 7 contains Colorimetry Indicator Field.
dp_link_get_colorimetry_config() returns wrong colorimetry value
in the DP_TEST_DYNAMIC_RANGE_CEA case in the current implementation.
Hence fix this problem by having dp_link_get_colorimetry_config()
return defined CEA RGB colorimetry value in the case of
DP_TEST_DYNAMIC_RANGE_CEA.
Changes in V2:
-- drop retrieving colorimetry from colorspace
-- drop dr = link->dp_link.test_video.test_dyn_range assignment
Changes in V3:
-- move defined MISCr0a Colorimetry vale to dp_reg.h
-- rewording commit title
-- rewording commit text to more precise describe this patch
Fixes: c943b4948b ("drm/msm/dp: add displayPort driver support")
Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/574888/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1705526010-597-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
Currently, Smack initializes in-memory new inodes in three steps. It first
sets the xattrs in smack_inode_init_security(), fetches them in
smack_d_instantiate() and finally, in the same function, sets the in-memory
inodes depending on xattr values, unless they are in specially-handled
filesystems.
Other than being inefficient, this also prevents filesystems not supporting
xattrs from working properly since, without xattrs, there is no way to pass
the label determined in smack_inode_init_security() to
smack_d_instantiate().
Since the LSM infrastructure allows setting and getting the security field
without xattrs through the inode_setsecurity and inode_getsecurity hooks,
make the inode creation work too, by initializing the in-memory inode
earlier in smack_inode_init_security().
Also mark the inode as instantiated, to prevent smack_d_instantiate() from
overwriting the security field. As mentioned above, this potentially has
impact for inodes in specially-handled filesystems in
smack_d_instantiate(), if they are not handled in the same way in
smack_inode_init_security().
Filesystems other than tmpfs don't call security_inode_init_security(), so
they would be always initialized in smack_d_instantiate(), as before. For
tmpfs, the current behavior is to assign to inodes the label '*', but
actually that label is overwritten with the one fetched from the SMACK64
xattr, set in smack_inode_init_security() (default: '_').
Initializing the in-memory inode is straightforward: if not transmuting,
nothing more needs to be done; if transmuting, overwrite the current inode
label with the one from the parent directory, and set SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE.
Finally, set SMK_INODE_INSTANT for all cases, to mark the inode as
instantiated.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The inode_init_security hook is already a good place to initialize the
in-memory inode. And that is also what SELinux does.
In preparation for this, move the existing smack_inode_init_security() code
outside the 'if (xattr)' condition, and set the xattr, if provided.
This change does not have any impact on the current code, since every time
security_inode_init_security() is called, the initxattr() callback is
passed and, thus, xattr is non-NULL.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr is provided, and the inode is a directory,
update the in-memory inode flags by setting SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5c6d1125f8 ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr makes sense only for directories, enforce
this restriction in smack_inode_setxattr().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5c6d1125f8 ("Smack: Transmute labels on specified directories") # v2.6.38.x
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Since the value of DP_TEST_BIT_DEPTH_8 is already left shifted, in the
BPC unknown case, the additional shift causes spill over to the other
bits of the [DP_CONFIGURATION_CTRL] register.
Fix this by changing the return value of dp_link_get_test_bits_depth()
in the BPC unknown case to (DP_TEST_BIT_DEPTH_8 >> DP_TEST_BIT_DEPTH_SHIFT).
Fixes: c943b4948b ("drm/msm/dp: add displayPort driver support")
Signed-off-by: Kuogee Hsieh <quic_khsieh@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/573989/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1704917931-30133-1-git-send-email-quic_khsieh@quicinc.com
[quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com: fix minor checkpatch warning to align with opening braces]
Signed-off-by: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
The mem_events can be retrieved from the struct perf_pmu now. An ARCH
specific perf_mem_events__ptr() is not required anymore. Remove all of
them.
The Intel hybrid has multiple mem-events-supported PMUs. But they share
the same mem_events. Other ARCHs only support one mem-events-supported
PMU. In the configuration, it's good enough to only configure the
mem_events for one PMU. Add perf_mem_events_find_pmu() which returns the
first mem-events-supported PMU.
In the perf_mem_events__init(), the perf_pmus__scan() is not required
anymore. It avoids checking the sysfs for every PMU on the system.
Make the perf_mem_events__record_args() more generic. Remove the
perf_mem_events__print_unsupport_hybrid().
Since pmu is added as a new parameter, rename perf_mem_events__ptr() to
perf_pmu__mem_events_ptr(). Several other functions also do a similar
rename.
Reviewed-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kajol Jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kajol jain <kjain@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: james.clark@arm.com
Cc: will@kernel.org
Cc: leo.yan@linaro.org
Cc: mike.leach@linaro.org
Cc: renyu.zj@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: yuhaixin.yhx@linux.alibaba.com
Cc: tmricht@linux.ibm.com
Cc: atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: john.g.garry@oracle.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240123185036.3461837-3-kan.liang@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>