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1,320,598 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Maurizio Lombardi
b37768e487 nvme-tcp: log TLS handshake failures at error level
[ Upstream commit 5a58ac9bfc ]

Update the nvme_tcp_start_tls() function to use dev_err() instead of
dev_dbg() when a TLS error is detected. This ensures that handshake
failures are visible by default, aiding in debugging.

Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
John Garry
552e1a93b3 md/raid10: set chunk_sectors limit
[ Upstream commit 7ef50c4c6a ]

Same as done for raid0, set chunk_sectors limit to appropriately set the
atomic write size limit.

Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250711105258.3135198-5-john.g.garry@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
John Garry
fc26f6f2e6 dm-stripe: limit chunk_sectors to the stripe size
[ Upstream commit 5fb9d4341b ]

Same as done for raid0, set chunk_sectors limit to appropriately set the
atomic write size limit.

Setting chunk_sectors limit in this way overrides the stacked limit
already calculated based on the bottom device limits. This is ok, as
when any bios are sent to the bottom devices, the block layer will still
respect the bottom device chunk_sectors.

Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250711105258.3135198-6-john.g.garry@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Keith Busch
bc255fec6f nvme-pci: try function level reset on init failure
[ Upstream commit 5b2c214a95 ]

NVMe devices from multiple vendors appear to get stuck in a reset state
that we can't get out of with an NVMe level Controller Reset. The kernel
would report these with messages that look like:

  Device not ready; aborting reset, CSTS=0x1

These have historically required a power cycle to make them usable
again, but in many cases, a PCIe FLR is sufficient to restart operation
without a power cycle. Try it if the initial controller reset fails
during any nvme reset attempt.

Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nitesh Shetty <nj.shetty@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
NeilBrown
814cfdb635 smb/server: avoid deadlock when linking with ReplaceIfExists
[ Upstream commit d5fc1400a3 ]

If smb2_create_link() is called with ReplaceIfExists set and the name
does exist then a deadlock will happen.

ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_locked() will return with success and the parent
directory will be locked.  ksmbd_vfs_remove_file() will then remove the
file.  ksmbd_vfs_link() will then be called while the parent is still
locked.  It will try to lock the same parent and will deadlock.

This patch moves the ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_unlock() call to *before*
ksmbd_vfs_link() and then simplifies the code, removing the file_present
flag variable.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Yeoreum Yun
58c3642381 firmware: arm_ffa: Change initcall level of ffa_init() to rootfs_initcall
[ Upstream commit 0e0546eabc ]

The Linux IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) subsystem used for
secure boot, file integrity, or remote attestation cannot be a loadable
module for few reasons listed below:

 o Boot-Time Integrity: IMA’s main role is to measure and appraise files
 before they are used. This includes measuring critical system files during
 early boot (e.g., init, init scripts, login binaries). If IMA were a
 module, it would be loaded too late to cover those.

 o TPM Dependency: IMA integrates tightly with the TPM to record
 measurements into PCRs. The TPM must be initialized early (ideally before
 init_ima()), which aligns with IMA being built-in.

 o Security Model: IMA is part of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Making it
 a module would weaken the security model, as a potentially compromised
 system could delay or tamper with its initialization.

IMA must be built-in to ensure it starts measuring from the earliest
possible point in boot which inturn implies TPM must be initialised and
ready to use before IMA.

To enable integration of tpm_event_log with the IMA subsystem, the TPM
drivers (tpm_crb and tpm_crb_ffa) also needs to be built-in. However with
FF-A driver also being initialised at device initcall level, it can lead to
an initialization order issue where:
 - crb_acpi_driver_init() may run before tpm_crb_ffa_driver()_init and
   ffa_init()
 - As a result, probing the TPM device via CRB over FFA is deferred
 - ima_init() (called as a late initcall) runs before deferred probe
   completes, IMA fails to find the TPM and logs the below error:

   |  ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!

Eventually it fails to generate boot_aggregate with PCR values.

Because of the above stated dependency, the ffa driver needs to initialised
before tpm_crb_ffa module to ensure IMA finds the TPM successfully when
present.

[ jarkko: reformatted some of the paragraphs because they were going past
  the 75 character boundary. ]

Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Kees Cook
cd47a512e0 arm64: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
[ Upstream commit 65c430906e ]

GCC appears to have kind of fragile inlining heuristics, in the
sense that it can change whether or not it inlines something based on
optimizations. It looks like the kcov instrumentation being added (or in
this case, removed) from a function changes the optimization results,
and some functions marked "inline" are _not_ inlined. In that case,
we end up with __init code calling a function not marked __init, and we
get the build warnings I'm trying to eliminate in the coming patch that
adds __no_sanitize_coverage to __init functions:

WARNING: modpost: vmlinux: section mismatch in reference: acpi_get_enable_method+0x1c (section: .text.unlikely) -> acpi_psci_present (section: .init.text)

This problem is somewhat fragile (though using either __always_inline
or __init will deterministically solve it), but we've tripped over
this before with GCC and the solution has usually been to just use
__always_inline and move on.

For arm64 this requires forcing one ACPI function to be inlined with
__always_inline.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250724055029.3623499-1-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Tetsuo Handa
1bb8da27ff hfsplus: don't use BUG_ON() in hfsplus_create_attributes_file()
[ Upstream commit c7c6363ca1 ]

When the volume header contains erroneous values that do not reflect
the actual state of the filesystem, hfsplus_fill_super() assumes that
the attributes file is not yet created, which later results in hitting
BUG_ON() when hfsplus_create_attributes_file() is called. Replace this
BUG_ON() with -EIO error with a message to suggest running fsck tool.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+1107451c16b9eb9d29e6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1107451c16b9eb9d29e6
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7b587d24-c8a1-4413-9b9a-00a33fbd849f@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
f7534cbfac hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hfsplus_uni2asc()
[ Upstream commit 94458781ae ]

The hfsplus_readdir() method is capable to crash by calling
hfsplus_uni2asc():

[  667.121659][ T9805] ==================================================================
[  667.122651][ T9805] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_uni2asc+0x902/0xa10
[  667.123627][ T9805] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802592f40c by task repro/9805
[  667.124578][ T9805]
[  667.124876][ T9805] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9805 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(full)
[  667.124886][ T9805] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  667.124890][ T9805] Call Trace:
[  667.124893][ T9805]  <TASK>
[  667.124896][ T9805]  dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0
[  667.124911][ T9805]  print_report+0xd0/0x660
[  667.124920][ T9805]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x81/0x610
[  667.124928][ T9805]  ? __phys_addr+0xe8/0x180
[  667.124934][ T9805]  ? hfsplus_uni2asc+0x902/0xa10
[  667.124942][ T9805]  kasan_report+0xc6/0x100
[  667.124950][ T9805]  ? hfsplus_uni2asc+0x902/0xa10
[  667.124959][ T9805]  hfsplus_uni2asc+0x902/0xa10
[  667.124966][ T9805]  ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x14b/0x360
[  667.124974][ T9805]  hfsplus_readdir+0x845/0xfc0
[  667.124984][ T9805]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_readdir+0x10/0x10
[  667.124994][ T9805]  ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0
[  667.125008][ T9805]  ? iterate_dir+0x18b/0xb20
[  667.125015][ T9805]  ? trace_lock_acquire+0x85/0xd0
[  667.125022][ T9805]  ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80
[  667.125029][ T9805]  ? iterate_dir+0x18b/0xb20
[  667.125037][ T9805]  ? down_read_killable+0x1ed/0x4c0
[  667.125044][ T9805]  ? putname+0x154/0x1a0
[  667.125051][ T9805]  ? __pfx_down_read_killable+0x10/0x10
[  667.125058][ T9805]  ? apparmor_file_permission+0x239/0x3e0
[  667.125069][ T9805]  iterate_dir+0x296/0xb20
[  667.125076][ T9805]  __x64_sys_getdents64+0x13c/0x2c0
[  667.125084][ T9805]  ? __pfx___x64_sys_getdents64+0x10/0x10
[  667.125091][ T9805]  ? __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200
[  667.125126][ T9805]  ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10
[  667.125134][ T9805]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x7fe/0x12f0
[  667.125143][ T9805]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  667.125151][ T9805]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  667.125158][ T9805] RIP: 0033:0x7fa8753b2fc9
[  667.125164][ T9805] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 48
[  667.125172][ T9805] RSP: 002b:00007ffe96f8e0f8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000d9
[  667.125181][ T9805] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fa8753b2fc9
[  667.125185][ T9805] RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00002000000063c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
[  667.125190][ T9805] RBP: 00007ffe96f8e110 R08: 00007ffe96f8e110 R09: 00007ffe96f8e110
[  667.125195][ T9805] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000556b1e3b4260
[  667.125199][ T9805] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  667.125207][ T9805]  </TASK>
[  667.125210][ T9805]
[  667.145632][ T9805] Allocated by task 9805:
[  667.145991][ T9805]  kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
[  667.146352][ T9805]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[  667.146717][ T9805]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[  667.147065][ T9805]  __kmalloc_noprof+0x205/0x550
[  667.147448][ T9805]  hfsplus_find_init+0x95/0x1f0
[  667.147813][ T9805]  hfsplus_readdir+0x220/0xfc0
[  667.148174][ T9805]  iterate_dir+0x296/0xb20
[  667.148549][ T9805]  __x64_sys_getdents64+0x13c/0x2c0
[  667.148937][ T9805]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  667.149291][ T9805]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  667.149809][ T9805]
[  667.150030][ T9805] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802592f000
[  667.150030][ T9805]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
[  667.151282][ T9805] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
[  667.151282][ T9805]  allocated 1036-byte region [ffff88802592f000, ffff88802592f40c)
[  667.152580][ T9805]
[  667.152798][ T9805] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[  667.153373][ T9805] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x25928
[  667.154157][ T9805] head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[  667.154916][ T9805] anon flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[  667.155631][ T9805] page_type: f5(slab)
[  667.155997][ T9805] raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801b442f00 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
[  667.156770][ T9805] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[  667.157536][ T9805] head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801b442f00 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
[  667.158317][ T9805] head: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[  667.159088][ T9805] head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea0000964a01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
[  667.159865][ T9805] head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
[  667.160643][ T9805] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  667.161216][ T9805] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[  667.161732][ T9805] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN9
[  667.163566][ T9805]  post_alloc_hook+0x1c0/0x230
[  667.164003][ T9805]  get_page_from_freelist+0xdeb/0x3b30
[  667.164503][ T9805]  __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x25c/0x2460
[  667.165040][ T9805]  alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fb/0x550
[  667.165489][ T9805]  new_slab+0x23b/0x340
[  667.165872][ T9805]  ___slab_alloc+0xd81/0x1960
[  667.166313][ T9805]  __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x56/0xb0
[  667.166767][ T9805]  __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x255/0x3e0
[  667.167255][ T9805]  psi_cgroup_alloc+0x52/0x2d0
[  667.167693][ T9805]  cgroup_mkdir+0x694/0x1210
[  667.168118][ T9805]  kernfs_iop_mkdir+0x111/0x190
[  667.168568][ T9805]  vfs_mkdir+0x59b/0x8d0
[  667.168956][ T9805]  do_mkdirat+0x2ed/0x3d0
[  667.169353][ T9805]  __x64_sys_mkdir+0xef/0x140
[  667.169784][ T9805]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  667.170195][ T9805]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  667.170730][ T9805] page last free pid 1257 tgid 1257 stack trace:
[  667.171304][ T9805]  __free_frozen_pages+0x80c/0x1250
[  667.171770][ T9805]  vfree.part.0+0x12b/0xab0
[  667.172182][ T9805]  delayed_vfree_work+0x93/0xd0
[  667.172612][ T9805]  process_one_work+0x9b5/0x1b80
[  667.173067][ T9805]  worker_thread+0x630/0xe60
[  667.173486][ T9805]  kthread+0x3a8/0x770
[  667.173857][ T9805]  ret_from_fork+0x517/0x6e0
[  667.174278][ T9805]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  667.174703][ T9805]
[  667.174917][ T9805] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  667.175411][ T9805]  ffff88802592f300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  667.176114][ T9805]  ffff88802592f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  667.176830][ T9805] >ffff88802592f400: 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  667.177547][ T9805]                       ^
[  667.177933][ T9805]  ffff88802592f480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  667.178640][ T9805]  ffff88802592f500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  667.179350][ T9805] ==================================================================

The hfsplus_uni2asc() method operates by struct hfsplus_unistr:

struct hfsplus_unistr {
	__be16 length;
	hfsplus_unichr unicode[HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN];
} __packed;

where HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN is 255 bytes. The issue happens if length
of the structure instance has value bigger than 255 (for example,
65283). In such case, pointer on unicode buffer is going beyond of
the allocated memory.

The patch fixes the issue by checking the length value of
hfsplus_unistr instance and using 255 value in the case if length
value is bigger than HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN. Potential reason of such
situation could be a corruption of Catalog File b-tree's node.

Reported-by: Wenzhi Wang <wenzhi.wang@uwaterloo.ca>
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710230830.110500-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
475d770c19 hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read()
[ Upstream commit c80aa2aaaa ]

The hfsplus_bnode_read() method can trigger the issue:

[  174.852007][ T9784] ==================================================================
[  174.852709][ T9784] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360
[  174.853412][ T9784] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810b5fc6c0 by task repro/9784
[  174.854059][ T9784]
[  174.854272][ T9784] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9784 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #7 PREEMPT(full)
[  174.854281][ T9784] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  174.854286][ T9784] Call Trace:
[  174.854289][ T9784]  <TASK>
[  174.854292][ T9784]  dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0
[  174.854305][ T9784]  print_report+0xd0/0x660
[  174.854315][ T9784]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x81/0x610
[  174.854323][ T9784]  ? __phys_addr+0xe8/0x180
[  174.854330][ T9784]  ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360
[  174.854337][ T9784]  kasan_report+0xc6/0x100
[  174.854346][ T9784]  ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360
[  174.854354][ T9784]  hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360
[  174.854362][ T9784]  hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x2ec/0x380
[  174.854370][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x10/0x10
[  174.854377][ T9784]  ? hfsplus_bnode_write_u16+0x83/0xb0
[  174.854385][ T9784]  ? srcu_gp_start+0xd0/0x310
[  174.854393][ T9784]  ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40
[  174.854402][ T9784]  hfsplus_brec_remove+0x3d2/0x4e0
[  174.854411][ T9784]  __hfsplus_delete_attr+0x290/0x3a0
[  174.854419][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfs_find_1st_rec_by_cnid+0x10/0x10
[  174.854427][ T9784]  ? __pfx___hfsplus_delete_attr+0x10/0x10
[  174.854436][ T9784]  ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50
[  174.854450][ T9784]  hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x262/0x320
[  174.854459][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x10/0x10
[  174.854469][ T9784]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0
[  174.854476][ T9784]  ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40
[  174.854483][ T9784]  hfsplus_delete_cat+0x845/0xde0
[  174.854493][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_cat+0x10/0x10
[  174.854507][ T9784]  hfsplus_unlink+0x1ca/0x7c0
[  174.854516][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_unlink+0x10/0x10
[  174.854525][ T9784]  ? down_write+0x148/0x200
[  174.854532][ T9784]  ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
[  174.854540][ T9784]  vfs_unlink+0x2fe/0x9b0
[  174.854549][ T9784]  do_unlinkat+0x490/0x670
[  174.854557][ T9784]  ? __pfx_do_unlinkat+0x10/0x10
[  174.854565][ T9784]  ? __might_fault+0xbc/0x130
[  174.854576][ T9784]  ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550
[  174.854584][ T9784]  __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110
[  174.854592][ T9784]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  174.854600][ T9784]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  174.854608][ T9784] RIP: 0033:0x7f6fdf4c3167
[  174.854614][ T9784] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 26 0d 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 08
[  174.854622][ T9784] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb948bca8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057
[  174.854630][ T9784] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6fdf4c3167
[  174.854636][ T9784] RDX: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RSI: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RDI: 00007ffcb948bd50
[  174.854641][ T9784] RBP: 00007ffcb948cd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffcb948bb40
[  174.854645][ T9784] R10: 00007f6fdf564fc0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561e1bc9c2d0
[  174.854650][ T9784] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  174.854658][ T9784]  </TASK>
[  174.854661][ T9784]
[  174.879281][ T9784] Allocated by task 9784:
[  174.879664][ T9784]  kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
[  174.880082][ T9784]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[  174.880500][ T9784]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[  174.880908][ T9784]  __kmalloc_noprof+0x205/0x550
[  174.881337][ T9784]  __hfs_bnode_create+0x107/0x890
[  174.881779][ T9784]  hfsplus_bnode_find+0x2d0/0xd10
[  174.882222][ T9784]  hfsplus_brec_find+0x2b0/0x520
[  174.882659][ T9784]  hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x23b/0x320
[  174.883144][ T9784]  hfsplus_delete_cat+0x845/0xde0
[  174.883595][ T9784]  hfsplus_rmdir+0x106/0x1b0
[  174.884004][ T9784]  vfs_rmdir+0x206/0x690
[  174.884379][ T9784]  do_rmdir+0x2b7/0x390
[  174.884751][ T9784]  __x64_sys_rmdir+0xc5/0x110
[  174.885167][ T9784]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  174.885568][ T9784]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  174.886083][ T9784]
[  174.886293][ T9784] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810b5fc600
[  174.886293][ T9784]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[  174.887507][ T9784] The buggy address is located 40 bytes to the right of
[  174.887507][ T9784]  allocated 152-byte region [ffff88810b5fc600, ffff88810b5fc698)
[  174.888766][ T9784]
[  174.888976][ T9784] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[  174.889533][ T9784] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10b5fc
[  174.890295][ T9784] flags: 0x57ff00000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[  174.890927][ T9784] page_type: f5(slab)
[  174.891284][ T9784] raw: 057ff00000000000 ffff88801b4423c0 ffffea000426dc80 dead000000000002
[  174.892032][ T9784] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[  174.892774][ T9784] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  174.893327][ T9784] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[  174.893825][ T9784] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52c00(GFP_NOIO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NO1
[  174.895373][ T9784]  post_alloc_hook+0x1c0/0x230
[  174.895801][ T9784]  get_page_from_freelist+0xdeb/0x3b30
[  174.896284][ T9784]  __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x25c/0x2460
[  174.896810][ T9784]  alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fb/0x550
[  174.897242][ T9784]  new_slab+0x23b/0x340
[  174.897614][ T9784]  ___slab_alloc+0xd81/0x1960
[  174.898028][ T9784]  __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x56/0xb0
[  174.898468][ T9784]  __kmalloc_noprof+0x2b0/0x550
[  174.898896][ T9784]  usb_alloc_urb+0x73/0xa0
[  174.899289][ T9784]  usb_control_msg+0x1cb/0x4a0
[  174.899718][ T9784]  usb_get_string+0xab/0x1a0
[  174.900133][ T9784]  usb_string_sub+0x107/0x3c0
[  174.900549][ T9784]  usb_string+0x307/0x670
[  174.900933][ T9784]  usb_cache_string+0x80/0x150
[  174.901355][ T9784]  usb_new_device+0x1d0/0x19d0
[  174.901786][ T9784]  register_root_hub+0x299/0x730
[  174.902231][ T9784] page last free pid 10 tgid 10 stack trace:
[  174.902757][ T9784]  __free_frozen_pages+0x80c/0x1250
[  174.903217][ T9784]  vfree.part.0+0x12b/0xab0
[  174.903645][ T9784]  delayed_vfree_work+0x93/0xd0
[  174.904073][ T9784]  process_one_work+0x9b5/0x1b80
[  174.904519][ T9784]  worker_thread+0x630/0xe60
[  174.904927][ T9784]  kthread+0x3a8/0x770
[  174.905291][ T9784]  ret_from_fork+0x517/0x6e0
[  174.905709][ T9784]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  174.906128][ T9784]
[  174.906338][ T9784] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  174.906828][ T9784]  ffff88810b5fc580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  174.907528][ T9784]  ffff88810b5fc600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  174.908222][ T9784] >ffff88810b5fc680: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  174.908917][ T9784]                                            ^
[  174.909481][ T9784]  ffff88810b5fc700: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  174.910432][ T9784]  ffff88810b5fc780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  174.911401][ T9784] ==================================================================

The reason of the issue that code doesn't check the correctness
of the requested offset and length. As a result, incorrect value
of offset or/and length could result in access out of allocated
memory.

This patch introduces is_bnode_offset_valid() method that checks
the requested offset value. Also, it introduces
check_and_correct_requested_length() method that checks and
correct the requested length (if it is necessary). These methods
are used in hfsplus_bnode_read(), hfsplus_bnode_write(),
hfsplus_bnode_clear(), hfsplus_bnode_copy(), and hfsplus_bnode_move()
with the goal to prevent the access out of allocated memory
and triggering the crash.

Reported-by: Kun Hu <huk23@m.fudan.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Jiaji Qin <jjtan24@m.fudan.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Shuoran Bai <baishuoran@hrbeu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703214804.244077-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
efc095b35b hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read()
[ Upstream commit a431930c9b ]

This patch introduces is_bnode_offset_valid() method that checks
the requested offset value. Also, it introduces
check_and_correct_requested_length() method that checks and
correct the requested length (if it is necessary). These methods
are used in hfs_bnode_read(), hfs_bnode_write(), hfs_bnode_clear(),
hfs_bnode_copy(), and hfs_bnode_move() with the goal to prevent
the access out of allocated memory and triggering the crash.

Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703214912.244138-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
5d8b249527 hfs: fix general protection fault in hfs_find_init()
[ Upstream commit 736a0516a1 ]

The hfs_find_init() method can trigger the crash
if tree pointer is NULL:

[   45.746290][ T9787] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000008: 0000 [#1] SMP KAI
[   45.747287][ T9787] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047]
[   45.748716][ T9787] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 9787 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #10 PREEMPT(full)
[   45.750250][ T9787] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   45.751983][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230
[   45.752834][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc
[   45.755574][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   45.756432][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09
[   45.757457][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8
[   45.758282][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
[   45.758943][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004
[   45.759619][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000
[   45.760293][ T9787] FS:  00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   45.761050][ T9787] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   45.761606][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   45.762286][ T9787] Call Trace:
[   45.762570][ T9787]  <TASK>
[   45.762824][ T9787]  hfs_ext_read_extent+0x190/0x9d0
[   45.763269][ T9787]  ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x2dd/0xce0
[   45.763766][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_ext_read_extent+0x10/0x10
[   45.764250][ T9787]  hfs_get_block+0x55f/0x830
[   45.764646][ T9787]  block_read_full_folio+0x36d/0x850
[   45.765105][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_get_block+0x10/0x10
[   45.765541][ T9787]  ? const_folio_flags+0x5b/0x100
[   45.765972][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10
[   45.766415][ T9787]  filemap_read_folio+0xbe/0x290
[   45.766840][ T9787]  ? __pfx_filemap_read_folio+0x10/0x10
[   45.767325][ T9787]  ? __filemap_get_folio+0x32b/0xbf0
[   45.767780][ T9787]  do_read_cache_folio+0x263/0x5c0
[   45.768223][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10
[   45.768666][ T9787]  read_cache_page+0x5b/0x160
[   45.769070][ T9787]  hfs_btree_open+0x491/0x1740
[   45.769481][ T9787]  hfs_mdb_get+0x15e2/0x1fb0
[   45.769877][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_mdb_get+0x10/0x10
[   45.770316][ T9787]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[   45.770731][ T9787]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280
[   45.771200][ T9787]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280
[   45.771674][ T9787]  hfs_fill_super+0x38e/0x720
[   45.772092][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
[   45.772549][ T9787]  ? snprintf+0xbe/0x100
[   45.772931][ T9787]  ? __pfx_snprintf+0x10/0x10
[   45.773350][ T9787]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x2b0
[   45.773796][ T9787]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[   45.774215][ T9787]  ? set_blocksize+0x40a/0x510
[   45.774636][ T9787]  ? sb_set_blocksize+0x176/0x1d0
[   45.775087][ T9787]  ? setup_bdev_super+0x369/0x730
[   45.775533][ T9787]  get_tree_bdev_flags+0x384/0x620
[   45.775985][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
[   45.776453][ T9787]  ? __pfx_get_tree_bdev_flags+0x10/0x10
[   45.776950][ T9787]  ? bpf_lsm_capable+0x9/0x10
[   45.777365][ T9787]  ? security_capable+0x80/0x260
[   45.777803][ T9787]  vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x340
[   45.778203][ T9787]  path_mount+0x13de/0x2010
[   45.778604][ T9787]  ? kmem_cache_free+0x2b0/0x4c0
[   45.779052][ T9787]  ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10
[   45.779480][ T9787]  ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550
[   45.779954][ T9787]  ? putname+0x154/0x1a0
[   45.780335][ T9787]  __x64_sys_mount+0x27b/0x300
[   45.780758][ T9787]  ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10
[   45.781232][ T9787]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[   45.781631][ T9787]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   45.782149][ T9787] RIP: 0033:0x7ffb7265b6ca
[   45.782539][ T9787] Code: 48 8b 0d c9 17 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48
[   45.784212][ T9787] RSP: 002b:00007ffc0c10cfb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[   45.784935][ T9787] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffb7265b6ca
[   45.785626][ T9787] RDX: 0000200000000240 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 00007ffc0c10d100
[   45.786316][ T9787] RBP: 00007ffc0c10d190 R08: 00007ffc0c10d000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   45.787011][ T9787] R10: 0000000000000048 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000560246733250
[   45.787697][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   45.788393][ T9787]  </TASK>
[   45.788665][ T9787] Modules linked in:
[   45.789058][ T9787] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[   45.789554][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230
[   45.790028][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc
[   45.792364][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   45.793155][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09
[   45.794123][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8
[   45.795105][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
[   45.796135][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004
[   45.797114][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000
[   45.798024][ T9787] FS:  00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   45.799019][ T9787] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   45.799822][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   45.800747][ T9787] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

The hfs_fill_super() calls hfs_mdb_get() method that tries
to construct Extents Tree and Catalog Tree:

HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_EXT_CNID, hfs_ext_keycmp);
if (!HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree) {
	pr_err("unable to open extent tree\n");
	goto out;
}
HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_CAT_CNID, hfs_cat_keycmp);
if (!HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree) {
	pr_err("unable to open catalog tree\n");
	goto out;
}

However, hfs_btree_open() calls read_mapping_page() that
calls hfs_get_block(). And this method calls hfs_ext_read_extent():

static int hfs_ext_read_extent(struct inode *inode, u16 block)
{
	struct hfs_find_data fd;
	int res;

	if (block >= HFS_I(inode)->cached_start &&
	    block < HFS_I(inode)->cached_start + HFS_I(inode)->cached_blocks)
		return 0;

	res = hfs_find_init(HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree, &fd);
	if (!res) {
		res = __hfs_ext_cache_extent(&fd, inode, block);
		hfs_find_exit(&fd);
	}
	return res;
}

The problem here that hfs_find_init() is trying to use
HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree that is not initialized yet.
It will be initailized when hfs_btree_open() finishes
the execution.

The patch adds checking of tree pointer in hfs_find_init()
and it reworks the logic of hfs_btree_open() by reading
the b-tree's header directly from the volume. The read_mapping_page()
is exchanged on filemap_grab_folio() that grab the folio from
mapping. Then, sb_bread() extracts the b-tree's header
content and copy it into the folio.

Reported-by: Wenzhi Wang <wenzhi.wang@uwaterloo.ca>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710213657.108285-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Sven Stegemann
c0bffbc92a net: kcm: Fix race condition in kcm_unattach()
[ Upstream commit 52565a9352 ]

syzbot found a race condition when kcm_unattach(psock)
and kcm_release(kcm) are executed at the same time.

kcm_unattach() is missing a check of the flag
kcm->tx_stopped before calling queue_work().

If the kcm has a reserved psock, kcm_unattach() might get executed
between cancel_work_sync() and unreserve_psock() in kcm_release(),
requeuing kcm->tx_work right before kcm gets freed in kcm_done().

Remove kcm->tx_stopped and replace it by the less
error-prone disable_work_sync().

Fixes: ab7ac4eb98 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-by: syzbot+e62c9db591c30e174662@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e62c9db591c30e174662
Reported-by: syzbot+d199b52665b6c3069b94@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d199b52665b6c3069b94
Reported-by: syzbot+be6b1fdfeae512726b4e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6b1fdfeae512726b4e
Signed-off-by: Sven Stegemann <sven@stegemann.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250812191810.27777-1-sven@stegemann.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Jakub Kicinski
eb0336f213 tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP
[ Upstream commit 6db015fc4b ]

TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket.
This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket
entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard
read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy
early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real
error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry.

We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock,
so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read
(not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len).

If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue
we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record.
Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting
a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash
should take place.

Reported-by: William Liu <will@willsroot.io>
Reported-by: Savino Dicanosa <savy@syst3mfailure.io>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/tFjq_kf7sWIG3A7CrCg_egb8CVsT_gsmHAK0_wxDPJXfIzxFAMxqmLwp3MlU5EHiet0AwwJldaaFdgyHpeIUCS-3m3llsmRzp9xIOBR4lAI=@syst3mfailure.io
Fixes: 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250807232907.600366-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Jeongjun Park
54f8f98665 ptp: prevent possible ABBA deadlock in ptp_clock_freerun()
[ Upstream commit 2efe41234d ]

syzbot reported the following ABBA deadlock:

       CPU0                           CPU1
       ----                           ----
  n_vclocks_store()
    lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux) [1]
        (physical clock)
                                     pc_clock_adjtime()
                                       lock(&clk->rwsem) [2]
                                        (physical clock)
                                       ...
                                       ptp_clock_freerun()
                                         ptp_vclock_in_use()
                                           lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux) [3]
                                              (physical clock)
    ptp_clock_unregister()
      posix_clock_unregister()
        lock(&clk->rwsem) [4]
          (virtual clock)

Since ptp virtual clock is registered only under ptp physical clock, both
ptp_clock and posix_clock must be physical clocks for ptp_vclock_in_use()
to lock &ptp->n_vclocks_mux and check ptp->n_vclocks.

However, when unregistering vclocks in n_vclocks_store(), the locking
ptp->n_vclocks_mux is a physical clock lock, but clk->rwsem of
ptp_clock_unregister() called through device_for_each_child_reverse()
is a virtual clock lock.

Therefore, clk->rwsem used in CPU0 and clk->rwsem used in CPU1 are
different locks, but in lockdep, a false positive occurs because the
possibility of deadlock is determined through lock-class.

To solve this, lock subclass annotation must be added to the posix_clock
rwsem of the vclock.

Reported-by: syzbot+7cfb66a237c4a5fb22ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7cfb66a237c4a5fb22ad
Fixes: 73f37068d5 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250728062649.469882-1-aha310510@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Rafael J. Wysocki
1e25d8051b cpuidle: governors: menu: Avoid using invalid recent intervals data
[ Upstream commit fa3fa55de0 ]

Marc has reported that commit 85975daeaa ("cpuidle: menu: Avoid
discarding useful information") caused the number of wakeup interrupts
to increase on an idle system [1], which was not expected to happen
after merely allowing shallower idle states to be selected by the
governor in some cases.

However, on the system in question, all of the idle states deeper than
WFI are rejected by the driver due to a firmware issue [2].  This causes
the governor to only consider the recent interval duriation data
corresponding to attempts to enter WFI that are successful and the
recent invervals table is filled with values lower than the scheduler
tick period.  Consequently, the governor predicts an idle duration
below the scheduler tick period length and avoids stopping the tick
more often which leads to the observed symptom.

Address it by modifying the governor to update the recent intervals
table also when entering the previously selected idle state fails, so
it knows that the short idle intervals might have been the minority
had the selected idle states been actually entered every time.

Fixes: 85975daeaa ("cpuidle: menu: Avoid discarding useful information")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/86o6sv6n94.wl-maz@kernel.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/7ffcb716-9a1b-48c2-aaa4-469d0df7c792@arm.com/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Christian Loehle <christian.loehle@arm.com>
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Loehle <christian.loehle@arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2793874.mvXUDI8C0e@rafael.j.wysocki
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Len Brown
a8df217c14 intel_idle: Allow loading ACPI tables for any family
[ Upstream commit e91a158b69 ]

There is no reason to limit intel_idle's loading of ACPI tables to
family 6.  Upcoming Intel processors are not in family 6.

Below "Fixes" really means "applies cleanly until".
That syntax commit didn't change the previous logic,
but shows this patch applies back 5-years.

Fixes: 4a9f45a053 ("intel_idle: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06101aa4fe784e5b0be1cb2c0bdd9afcf16bd9d4.1754681697.git.len.brown@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Xin Long
7d757f17bc sctp: linearize cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv
[ Upstream commit fd60d8a086 ]

A cloned head skb still shares these frag skbs in fraglist with the
original head skb. It's not safe to access these frag skbs.

syzbot reported two use-of-uninitialized-memory bugs caused by this:

  BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211
   sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211
   sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1a7/0xc50 net/sctp/associola.c:998
   sctp_inq_push+0x2ef/0x380 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88
   sctp_backlog_rcv+0x397/0xdb0 net/sctp/input.c:331
   sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1122
   __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3106
   release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3660
   sctp_wait_for_connect+0x487/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9360
   sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1ec1/0x1f00 net/sctp/socket.c:1885
   sctp_sendmsg+0x32b9/0x4a80 net/sctp/socket.c:2031
   inet_sendmsg+0x25a/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]

and

  BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987
   sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987
   sctp_inq_push+0x2a3/0x350 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88
   sctp_backlog_rcv+0x3c7/0xda0 net/sctp/input.c:331
   sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148
   __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213
   release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767
   sctp_wait_for_connect+0x458/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9367
   sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x223a/0x2260 net/sctp/socket.c:1886
   sctp_sendmsg+0x3910/0x49f0 net/sctp/socket.c:2032
   inet_sendmsg+0x269/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]

This patch fixes it by linearizing cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv().

Fixes: 90017accff ("sctp: Add GSO support")
Reported-by: syzbot+773e51afe420baaf0e2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+70a42f45e76bede082be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/dd7dc337b99876d4132d0961f776913719f7d225.1754595611.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Alok Tiwari
e9165b79a1 net: ti: icss-iep: Fix incorrect type for return value in extts_enable()
[ Upstream commit 5f1d1d14db ]

The variable ret in icss_iep_extts_enable() was incorrectly declared
as u32, while the function returns int and may return negative error
codes. This will cause sign extension issues and incorrect error
propagation. Update ret to be int to fix error handling.

This change corrects the declaration to avoid potential type mismatch.

Fixes: c1e0230eea ("net: ti: icss-iep: Add IEP driver")
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250805142323.1949406-1-alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
MD Danish Anwar
8153bce470 net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix emac link speed handling
[ Upstream commit 06feac1540 ]

When link settings are changed emac->speed is populated by
emac_adjust_link(). The link speed and other settings are then written into
the DRAM. However if both ports are brought down after this and brought up
again or if the operating mode is changed and a firmware reload is needed,
the DRAM is cleared by icssg_config(). As a result the link settings are
lost.

Fix this by calling emac_adjust_link() after icssg_config(). This re
populates the settings in the DRAM after a new firmware load.

Fixes: 9facce84f4 ("net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix firmware load sequence.")
Signed-off-by: MD Danish Anwar <danishanwar@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Message-ID: <20250805173812.2183161-1-danishanwar@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Florian Westphal
a2cb4df787 netfilter: ctnetlink: fix refcount leak on table dump
[ Upstream commit de788b2e62 ]

There is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table():
      if (res < 0) {
                nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general); // HERE
                cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;
                ...

While its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last.
If this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented.
This 2nd increment is never undone.

This prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn
keeps prevents cnet->count from dropping back to 0.

This will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as
nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.

This can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop.
It takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before
I see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.

One fix would to change this to:
        if (res < 0) {
		if (ct != last)
	                nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);

But this reference counting isn't needed in the first place.
We can just store a cookie value instead.

A followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,
it looks to me as if this has the same problem and like
ctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a 'skip hint', not the actual
object so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.

Fixes: d205dc4079 ("[NETFILTER]: ctnetlink: fix deadlock in table dumping")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Sabrina Dubroca
5e95347bf4 udp: also consider secpath when evaluating ipsec use for checksumming
[ Upstream commit 1118aaa3b3 ]

Commit b40c5f4fde ("udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in
IPsec case") tried to fix checksumming in UFO when the packets are
going through IPsec, so that we can't rely on offloads because the UDP
header and payload will be encrypted.

But when doing a TCP test over VXLAN going through IPsec transport
mode with GSO enabled (esp4_offload module loaded), I'm seeing broken
UDP checksums on the encap after successful decryption.

The skbs get to udp4_ufo_fragment/__skb_udp_tunnel_segment via
__dev_queue_xmit -> validate_xmit_skb -> skb_gso_segment and at this
point we've already dropped the dst (unless the device sets
IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE, which is not common), so need_ipsec is false and
we proceed with checksum offload.

Make need_ipsec also check the secpath, which is not dropped on this
callpath.

Fixes: b40c5f4fde ("udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in IPsec case")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Jinjiang Tu
2a1f366397 mm/smaps: fix race between smaps_hugetlb_range and migration
[ Upstream commit 45d19b4b6c ]

smaps_hugetlb_range() handles the pte without holdling ptl, and may be
concurrenct with migration, leaing to BUG_ON in pfn_swap_entry_to_page().
The race is as follows.

smaps_hugetlb_range              migrate_pages
  huge_ptep_get
                                   remove_migration_ptes
				   folio_unlock
  pfn_swap_entry_folio
    BUG_ON

To fix it, hold ptl lock in smaps_hugetlb_range().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250724090958.455887-1-tujinjiang@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250724090958.455887-2-tujinjiang@huawei.com
Fixes: 25ee01a2fc ("mm: hugetlb: proc: add hugetlb-related fields to /proc/PID/smaps")
Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Brahmajit Das <brahmajit.xyz@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Al Viro
c07886761f habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
[ Upstream commit 33927f3d0e ]

As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another
thread could close it.  That's fine for the case when all we are doing is
returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland
race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it).  However, if we
follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be
destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed
by its ->release()), we have a UAF.

dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install().
habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the
objects destroyed on close.  In particular, it grabs an extra reference to
another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours;
that "will be" is actually "might have already been".

Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install()
only when everything had been set up.  As a side benefit, we no longer
have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to
underlying file (as well as ->dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet;
unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can't fail.

Fixes: db1a8dd916 ("habanalabs: add support for dma-buf exporter")
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Maxim Levitsky
7ea3763d3a KVM: VMX: Preserve host's DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM while running the guest
[ Upstream commit 6b1dd26544 ]

Set/clear DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM in GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL based on the
host's pre-VM-Enter value, i.e. preserve the host's FREEZE_IN_SMM setting
while running the guest.  When running with the "default treatment of SMIs"
in effect (the only mode KVM supports), SMIs do not generate a VM-Exit that
is visible to host (non-SMM) software, and instead transitions directly
from VMX non-root to SMM.  And critically, DEBUGCTL isn't context switched
by hardware on SMI or RSM, i.e. SMM will run with whatever value was
resident in hardware at the time of the SMI.

Failure to preserve FREEZE_IN_SMM results in the PMU unexpectedly counting
events while the CPU is executing in SMM, which can pollute profiling and
potentially leak information into the guest.

Check for changes in FREEZE_IN_SMM prior to every entry into KVM's inner
run loop, as the bit can be toggled in IRQ context via IPI callback (SMP
function call), by way of /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi.

Add a field in kvm_x86_ops to communicate which DEBUGCTL bits need to be
preserved, as FREEZE_IN_SMM is only supported and defined for Intel CPUs,
i.e. explicitly checking FREEZE_IN_SMM in common x86 is at best weird, and
at worst could lead to undesirable behavior in the future if AMD CPUs ever
happened to pick up a collision with the bit.

Exempt TDX vCPUs, i.e. protected guests, from the check, as the TDX Module
owns and controls GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.

WARN in SVM if KVM_RUN_LOAD_DEBUGCTL is set, mostly to document that the
lack of handling isn't a KVM bug (TDX already WARNs on any run_flag).

Lastly, explicitly reload GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL on a VM-Fail that is missed
by KVM but detected by hardware, i.e. in nested_vmx_restore_host_state().
Doing so avoids the need to track host_debugctl on a per-VMCS basis, as
GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL is unconditionally written by prepare_vmcs02() and
load_vmcs12_host_state().  For the VM-Fail case, even though KVM won't
have actually entered the guest, vcpu_enter_guest() will have run with
vmcs02 active and thus could result in vmcs01 being run with a stale value.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: resolve syntactic conflict in vt_x86_ops definition]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Maxim Levitsky
a8db75995a KVM: VMX: Wrap all accesses to IA32_DEBUGCTL with getter/setter APIs
[ Upstream commit 7d0cce6cbe ]

Introduce vmx_guest_debugctl_{read,write}() to handle all accesses to
vmcs.GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL. This will allow stuffing FREEZE_IN_SMM into
GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL based on the host setting without bleeding the state
into the guest, and without needing to copy+paste the FREEZE_IN_SMM
logic into every patch that accesses GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.

No functional change intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
[sean: massage changelog, make inline, use in all prepare_vmcs02() cases]
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Maxim Levitsky
73a8e77bb5 KVM: nVMX: Check vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl on nested VM-Enter
[ Upstream commit 095686e6fc ]

Add a consistency check for L2's guest_ia32_debugctl, as KVM only supports
a subset of hardware functionality, i.e. KVM can't rely on hardware to
detect illegal/unsupported values.  Failure to check the vmcs12 value
would allow the guest to load any harware-supported value while running L2.

Take care to exempt BTF and LBR from the validity check in order to match
KVM's behavior for writes via WRMSR, but without clobbering vmcs12.  Even
if VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set in vmcs12, L1 can reasonably expect
that vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl will not be modified if writes to the MSR
are being intercepted.

Arguably, KVM _should_ update vmcs12 if VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set
*and* writes to MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR are not being intercepted by L1, but
that would incur non-trivial complexity and wouldn't change the fact that
KVM's handling of DEBUGCTL is blatantly broken.  I.e. the extra complexity
is not worth carrying.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-7-seanjc@google.com
Stable-dep-of: 7d0cce6cbe ("KVM: VMX: Wrap all accesses to IA32_DEBUGCTL with getter/setter APIs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
6c6a7c69a0 KVM: VMX: Extract checking of guest's DEBUGCTL into helper
[ Upstream commit 8a4351ac30 ]

Move VMX's logic to check DEBUGCTL values into a standalone helper so that
the code can be used by nested VM-Enter to apply the same logic to the
value being loaded from vmcs12.

KVM needs to explicitly check vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl on nested
VM-Enter, as hardware may support features that KVM does not, i.e. relying
on hardware to detect invalid guest state will result in false negatives.
Unfortunately, that means applying KVM's funky suppression of BTF and LBR
to vmcs12 so as not to break existing guests.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-6-seanjc@google.com
Stable-dep-of: 7d0cce6cbe ("KVM: VMX: Wrap all accesses to IA32_DEBUGCTL with getter/setter APIs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
56eb5c57e3 KVM: VMX: Allow guest to set DEBUGCTL.RTM_DEBUG if RTM is supported
[ Upstream commit 17ec2f9653 ]

Let the guest set DEBUGCTL.RTM_DEBUG if RTM is supported according to the
guest CPUID model, as debug support is supposed to be available if RTM is
supported, and there are no known downsides to letting the guest debug RTM
aborts.

Note, there are no known bug reports related to RTM_DEBUG, the primary
motivation is to reduce the probability of breaking existing guests when a
future change adds a missing consistency check on vmcs12.GUEST_DEBUGCTL
(KVM currently lets L2 run with whatever hardware supports; whoops).

Note #2, KVM already emulates DR6.RTM, and doesn't restrict access to
DR7.RTM.

Fixes: 83c529151a ("KVM: x86: expose Intel cpu new features (HLE, RTM) to guest")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
d1a530a224 KVM: x86: Drop kvm_x86_ops.set_dr6() in favor of a new KVM_RUN flag
[ Upstream commit 80c64c7afe ]

Instruct vendor code to load the guest's DR6 into hardware via a new
KVM_RUN flag, and remove kvm_x86_ops.set_dr6(), whose sole purpose was to
load vcpu->arch.dr6 into hardware when DR6 can be read/written directly
by the guest.

Note, TDX already WARNs on any run_flag being set, i.e. will yell if KVM
thinks DR6 needs to be reloaded.  TDX vCPUs force KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH
and never clear the flag, i.e. should never observe KVM_RUN_LOAD_GUEST_DR6.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: drop TDX changes]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
1fc1d9b854 KVM: x86: Convert vcpu_run()'s immediate exit param into a generic bitmap
[ Upstream commit 2478b1b220 ]

Convert kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run()'s "force_immediate_exit" boolean parameter
into an a generic bitmap so that similar "take action" information can be
passed to vendor code without creating a pile of boolean parameters.

This will allow dropping kvm_x86_ops.set_dr6() in favor of a new flag, and
will also allow for adding similar functionality for re-loading debugctl
in the active VMCS.

Opportunistically massage the TDX WARN and comment to prepare for adding
more run_flags, all of which are expected to be mutually exclusive with
TDX, i.e. should be WARNed on.

No functional change intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: drop TDX changes]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Stefan Metzmacher
a831c3e679 smb: client: don't wait for info->send_pending == 0 on error
commit 8c48e1c752 upstream.

We already called ib_drain_qp() before and that makes sure
send_done() was called with IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR, but
didn't called atomic_dec_and_test(&sc->send_io.pending.count)

So we may never reach the info->send_pending == 0 condition.

Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Fixes: 5349ae5e05 ("smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Stefan Metzmacher
65969af6dd smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()
commit 5349ae5e05 upstream.

We should call ib_dma_unmap_single() and mempool_free() before calling
smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection().

And smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection() needs to be the last function to
call as all other state might already be gone after it returns.

Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Fixes: f198186aa9 ("CIFS: SMBD: Establish SMB Direct connection")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Li Zhijian
89237dd4c8 mm/memory-tier: fix abstract distance calculation overflow
commit cce3510313 upstream.

In mt_perf_to_adistance(), the calculation of abstract distance (adist)
involves multiplying several int values including
MEMTIER_ADISTANCE_DRAM.

*adist = MEMTIER_ADISTANCE_DRAM *
		(perf->read_latency + perf->write_latency) /
		(default_dram_perf.read_latency + default_dram_perf.write_latency) *
		(default_dram_perf.read_bandwidth + default_dram_perf.write_bandwidth) /
		(perf->read_bandwidth + perf->write_bandwidth);

Since these values can be large, the multiplication may exceed the
maximum value of an int (INT_MAX) and overflow (Our platform did),
leading to an incorrect adist.

User-visible impact:
The memory tiering subsystem will misinterpret slow memory (like CXL)
as faster than DRAM, causing inappropriate demotion of pages from
CXL (slow memory) to DRAM (fast memory).

For example, we will see the following demotion chains from the dmesg, where
Node0,1 are DRAM, and Node2,3 are CXL node:
 Demotion targets for Node 0: null
 Demotion targets for Node 1: null
 Demotion targets for Node 2: preferred: 0-1, fallback: 0-1
 Demotion targets for Node 3: preferred: 0-1, fallback: 0-1

Change MEMTIER_ADISTANCE_DRAM to be a long constant by writing it with
the 'L' suffix.  This prevents the overflow because the multiplication
will then be done in the long type which has a larger range.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250611023439.2845785-1-lizhijian@fujitsu.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250610062751.2365436-1-lizhijian@fujitsu.com
Fixes: 3718c02dbd ("acpi, hmat: calculate abstract distance with HMAT")
Signed-off-by: Li Zhijian <lizhijian@fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Huang Ying <ying.huang@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: Balbir Singh <balbirs@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Donet Tom <donettom@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Damien Le Moal
05ea5b2f51 block: Make REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH a write operation
commit 3f66ccbaae upstream.

REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH is defined as "12", which makes
op_is_write(REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH) return false, despite the fact that a
zone finish operation is an operation that modifies a zone (transition
it to full) and so should be considered as a write operation (albeit
one that does not transfer any data to the device).

Fix this by redefining REQ_OP_ZONE_FINISH to be an odd number (13), and
redefine REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET and REQ_OP_ZONE_RESET_ALL using sequential
odd numbers from that new value.

Fixes: 6c1b1da58f ("block: add zone open, close and finish operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250625093327.548866-2-dlemoal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Rafael J. Wysocki
bf28095414 ACPI: processor: perflib: Move problematic pr->performance check
commit d405ec23df upstream.

Commit d33bd88ac0 ("ACPI: processor: perflib: Fix initial _PPC limit
application") added a pr->performance check that prevents the frequency
QoS request from being added when the given processor has no performance
object.  Unfortunately, this causes a WARN() in freq_qos_remove_request()
to trigger on an attempt to take the given CPU offline later because the
frequency QoS object has not been added for it due to the missing
performance object.

Address this by moving the pr->performance check before calling
acpi_processor_get_platform_limit() so it only prevents a limit from
being set for the CPU if the performance object is not present.  This
way, the frequency QoS request is added as it was before the above
commit and it is present all the time along with the CPU's cpufreq
policy regardless of whether or not the CPU is online.

Fixes: d33bd88ac0 ("ACPI: processor: perflib: Fix initial _PPC limit application")
Tested-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2801421.mvXUDI8C0e@rafael.j.wysocki
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Jiayi Li
8cc2020d91 ACPI: processor: perflib: Fix initial _PPC limit application
commit d33bd88ac0 upstream.

If the BIOS sets a _PPC frequency limit upfront, it will fail to take
effect due to a call ordering issue.  Namely, freq_qos_update_request()
is called before freq_qos_add_request() for the given request causing
the constraint update to be ignored.  The call sequence in question is
as follows:

cpufreq_policy_online()
  acpi_cpufreq_cpu_init()
    acpi_processor_register_performance()
      acpi_processor_get_performance_info()
        acpi_processor_get_platform_limit()
         freq_qos_update_request(&perflib_req) <- inactive QoS request
  blocking_notifier_call_chain(&cpufreq_policy_notifier_list,
                               CPUFREQ_CREATE_POLICY)
    acpi_processor_notifier()
      acpi_processor_ppc_init()
        freq_qos_add_request(&perflib_req) <- QoS request activation

Address this by adding an acpi_processor_get_platform_limit() call
to acpi_processor_ppc_init(), after the perflib_req activation via
freq_qos_add_request(), which causes the initial _PPC limit to be
picked up as appropriate.  However, also ensure that the _PPC limit
will not be picked up in the cases when the cpufreq driver does not
call acpi_processor_register_performance() by adding a pr->performance
check to the related_cpus loop in acpi_processor_ppc_init().

Fixes: d15ce41273 ("ACPI: cpufreq: Switch to QoS requests instead of cpufreq notifier")
Signed-off-by: Jiayi Li <lijiayi@kylinos.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250721032606.3459369-1-lijiayi@kylinos.cn
[ rjw: Consolidate pr-related checks in acpi_processor_ppc_init() ]
[ rjw: Subject and changelog adjustments ]
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+: 2d8b39a62a ACPI: processor: Avoid NULL pointer dereferences at init time
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+: 3000ce3c52 cpufreq: Use per-policy frequency QoS
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+: a1bb46c36c ACPI: processor: Add QoS requests for all CPUs
Cc: 5.4+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.4+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
Andy Shevchenko
dba5701ed6 Documentation: ACPI: Fix parent device references
commit e65cb01134 upstream.

The _CRS resources in many cases want to have ResourceSource field
to be a type of ACPI String. This means that to compile properly
we need to enclosure the name path into double quotes. This will
in practice defer the interpretation to a run-time stage, However,
this may be interpreted differently on different OSes and ACPI
interpreter implementations. In particular ACPICA might not correctly
recognize the leading '^' (caret) character and will not resolve
the relative name path properly. On top of that, this piece may be
used in SSDTs which are loaded after the DSDT and on itself may also
not resolve relative name paths outside of their own scopes.
With this all said, fix documentation to use fully-qualified name
paths always to avoid any misinterpretations, which is proven to
work.

Fixes: 8eb5c87a92 ("i2c: add ACPI support for I2C mux ports")
Reported-by: Yevhen Kondrashyn <e.kondrashyn@gmail.com>
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250710170225.961303-1-andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
Jann Horn
7a2125962c eventpoll: Fix semi-unbounded recursion
commit f2e467a482 upstream.

Ensure that epoll instances can never form a graph deeper than
EP_MAX_NESTS+1 links.

Currently, ep_loop_check_proc() ensures that the graph is loop-free and
does some recursion depth checks, but those recursion depth checks don't
limit the depth of the resulting tree for two reasons:

 - They don't look upwards in the tree.
 - If there are multiple downwards paths of different lengths, only one of
   the paths is actually considered for the depth check since commit
   28d82dc1c4 ("epoll: limit paths").

Essentially, the current recursion depth check in ep_loop_check_proc() just
serves to prevent it from recursing too deeply while checking for loops.

A more thorough check is done in reverse_path_check() after the new graph
edge has already been created; this checks, among other things, that no
paths going upwards from any non-epoll file with a length of more than 5
edges exist. However, this check does not apply to non-epoll files.

As a result, it is possible to recurse to a depth of at least roughly 500,
tested on v6.15. (I am unsure if deeper recursion is possible; and this may
have changed with commit 8c44dac8ad ("eventpoll: Fix priority inversion
problem").)

To fix it:

1. In ep_loop_check_proc(), note the subtree depth of each visited node,
and use subtree depths for the total depth calculation even when a subtree
has already been visited.
2. Add ep_get_upwards_depth_proc() for similarly determining the maximum
depth of an upwards walk.
3. In ep_loop_check(), use these values to limit the total path length
between epoll nodes to EP_MAX_NESTS edges.

Fixes: 22bacca48a ("epoll: prevent creating circular epoll structures")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250711-epoll-recursion-fix-v1-1-fb2457c33292@google.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
Sasha Levin
d4f9351243 fs: Prevent file descriptor table allocations exceeding INT_MAX
commit 04a2c4b451 upstream.

When sysctl_nr_open is set to a very high value (for example, 1073741816
as set by systemd), processes attempting to use file descriptors near
the limit can trigger massive memory allocation attempts that exceed
INT_MAX, resulting in a WARNING in mm/slub.c:

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 44 at mm/slub.c:5027 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x21a/0x288

This happens because kvmalloc_array() and kvmalloc() check if the
requested size exceeds INT_MAX and emit a warning when the allocation is
not flagged with __GFP_NOWARN.

Specifically, when nr_open is set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8) and a
process calls dup2(oldfd, 1073741880), the kernel attempts to allocate:
- File descriptor array: 1073741880 * 8 bytes = 8,589,935,040 bytes
- Multiple bitmaps: ~400MB
- Total allocation size: > 8GB (exceeding INT_MAX = 2,147,483,647)

Reproducer:
1. Set /proc/sys/fs/nr_open to 1073741816:
   # echo 1073741816 > /proc/sys/fs/nr_open

2. Run a program that uses a high file descriptor:
   #include <unistd.h>
   #include <sys/resource.h>

   int main() {
       struct rlimit rlim = {1073741824, 1073741824};
       setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim);
       dup2(2, 1073741880);  // Triggers the warning
       return 0;
   }

3. Observe WARNING in dmesg at mm/slub.c:5027

systemd commit a8b627a introduced automatic bumping of fs.nr_open to the
maximum possible value. The rationale was that systems with memory
control groups (memcg) no longer need separate file descriptor limits
since memory is properly accounted. However, this change overlooked
that:

1. The kernel's allocation functions still enforce INT_MAX as a maximum
   size regardless of memcg accounting
2. Programs and tests that legitimately test file descriptor limits can
   inadvertently trigger massive allocations
3. The resulting allocations (>8GB) are impractical and will always fail

systemd's algorithm starts with INT_MAX and keeps halving the value
until the kernel accepts it. On most systems, this results in nr_open
being set to 1073741816 (0x3ffffff8), which is just under 1GB of file
descriptors.

While processes rarely use file descriptors near this limit in normal
operation, certain selftests (like
tools/testing/selftests/core/unshare_test.c) and programs that test file
descriptor limits can trigger this issue.

Fix this by adding a check in alloc_fdtable() to ensure the requested
allocation size does not exceed INT_MAX. This causes the operation to
fail with -EMFILE instead of triggering a kernel warning and avoids the
impractical >8GB memory allocation request.

Fixes: 9cfe015aa4 ("get rid of NR_OPEN and introduce a sysctl_nr_open")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250629074021.1038845-1-sashal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
Eric Biggers
cfe27f8aff fscrypt: Don't use problematic non-inline crypto engines
commit b41c1d8d07 upstream.

Make fscrypt no longer use Crypto API drivers for non-inline crypto
engines, even when the Crypto API prioritizes them over CPU-based code
(which unfortunately it often does).  These drivers tend to be really
problematic, especially for fscrypt's workload.  This commit has no
effect on inline crypto engines, which are different and do work well.

Specifically, exclude drivers that have CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY or
CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY set.  (Later, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC should be
excluded too.  That's omitted for now to keep this commit backportable,
since until recently some CPU-based code had CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC set.)

There are two major issues with these drivers: bugs and performance.

First, these drivers tend to be buggy.  They're fundamentally much more
error-prone and harder to test than the CPU-based code.  They often
don't get tested before kernel releases, and even if they do, the crypto
self-tests don't properly test these drivers.  Released drivers have
en/decrypted or hashed data incorrectly.  These bugs cause issues for
fscrypt users who often didn't even want to use these drivers, e.g.:

- https://github.com/google/fscryptctl/issues/32
- https://github.com/google/fscryptctl/issues/9
- https://lore.kernel.org/r/PH0PR02MB731916ECDB6C613665863B6CFFAA2@PH0PR02MB7319.namprd02.prod.outlook.com

These drivers have also similarly caused issues for dm-crypt users,
including data corruption and deadlocks.  Since Linux v5.10, dm-crypt
has disabled most of them by excluding CRYPTO_ALG_ALLOCATES_MEMORY.

Second, these drivers tend to be *much* slower than the CPU-based code.
This may seem counterintuitive, but benchmarks clearly show it.  There's
a *lot* of overhead associated with going to a hardware driver, off the
CPU, and back again.  To prove this, I gathered as many systems with
this type of crypto engine as I could, and I measured synchronous
encryption of 4096-byte messages (which matches fscrypt's workload):

Intel Emerald Rapids server:
   AES-256-XTS:
      xts-aes-vaes-avx512   16171 MB/s  [CPU-based, Vector AES]
      qat_aes_xts             289 MB/s  [Offload, Intel QuickAssist]

Qualcomm SM8650 HDK:
   AES-256-XTS:
      xts-aes-ce             4301 MB/s  [CPU-based, ARMv8 Crypto Extensions]
      xts-aes-qce              73 MB/s  [Offload, Qualcomm Crypto Engine]

i.MX 8M Nano LPDDR4 EVK:
   AES-256-XTS:
      xts-aes-ce              647 MB/s   [CPU-based, ARMv8 Crypto Extensions]
      xts(ecb-aes-caam)        20 MB/s   [Offload, CAAM]
   AES-128-CBC-ESSIV:
      essiv(cbc-aes-caam,sha256-lib) 23 MB/s   [Offload, CAAM]

STM32MP157F-DK2:
   AES-256-XTS:
      xts-aes-neonbs         13.2 MB/s   [CPU-based, ARM NEON]
      xts(stm32-ecb-aes)     3.1 MB/s    [Offload, STM32 crypto engine]
   AES-128-CBC-ESSIV:
      essiv(cbc-aes-neonbs,sha256-lib)
                             14.7 MB/s   [CPU-based, ARM NEON]
      essiv(stm32-cbc-aes,sha256-lib)
                             3.2 MB/s    [Offload, STM32 crypto engine]
   Adiantum:
      adiantum(xchacha12-arm,aes-arm,nhpoly1305-neon)
                             52.8 MB/s   [CPU-based, ARM scalar + NEON]

So, there was no case in which the crypto engine was even *close* to
being faster.  On the first three, which have AES instructions in the
CPU, the CPU was 30 to 55 times faster (!).  Even on STM32MP157F-DK2
which has a Cortex-A7 CPU that doesn't have AES instructions, AES was
over 4 times faster on the CPU.  And Adiantum encryption, which is what
actually should be used on CPUs like that, was over 17 times faster.

Other justifications that have been given for these non-inline crypto
engines (almost always coming from the hardware vendors, not actual
users) don't seem very plausible either:

  - The crypto engine throughput could be improved by processing
    multiple requests concurrently.  Currently irrelevant to fscrypt,
    since it doesn't do that.  This would also be complex, and unhelpful
    in many cases.  2 of the 4 engines I tested even had only one queue.

  - Some of the engines, e.g. STM32, support hardware keys.  Also
    currently irrelevant to fscrypt, since it doesn't support these.
    Interestingly, the STM32 driver itself doesn't support this either.

  - Free up CPU for other tasks and/or reduce energy usage.  Not very
    plausible considering the "short" message length, driver overhead,
    and scheduling overhead.  There's just very little time for the CPU
    to do something else like run another task or enter low-power state,
    before the message finishes and it's time to process the next one.

  - Some of these engines resist power analysis and electromagnetic
    attacks, while the CPU-based crypto generally does not.  In theory,
    this sounds great.  In practice, if this benefit requires the use of
    an off-CPU offload that massively regresses performance and has a
    low-quality, buggy driver, the price for this hardening (which is
    not relevant to most fscrypt users, and tends to be incomplete) is
    just too high.  Inline crypto engines are much more promising here,
    as are on-CPU solutions like RISC-V High Assurance Cryptography.

Fixes: b30ab0e034 ("ext4 crypto: add ext4 encryption facilities")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250704070322.20692-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
André Draszik
a12df9e579 clk: samsung: gs101: fix alternate mout_hsi0_usb20_ref parent clock
commit ca243e653f upstream.

The alternate parent clock for this mux is mout_pll_usb, not the pll
itself.

Fixes: 1891e4d487 ("clk: samsung: gs101: add support for cmu_hsi0")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603-samsung-clk-fixes-v1-2-49daf1ff4592@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
André Draszik
fc4c256883 clk: samsung: gs101: fix CLK_DOUT_CMU_G3D_BUSD
commit 29a9361f0b upstream.

Use the correct Linux clock ID when instantiating the G3D_BUSD
div_clock.

Fixes: 2c597bb7d6 ("clk: samsung: clk-gs101: Add cmu_top, cmu_misc and cmu_apm support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603-samsung-clk-fixes-v1-1-49daf1ff4592@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
André Draszik
bc3c149be8 clk: samsung: exynos850: fix a comment
commit 320e7efce3 upstream.

The code below the updated comment is for CMU_CPUCL1, not CMU_CPUCL0.

Fixes: dedf87341a ("clk: samsung: exynos850: Add CMU_CPUCL0 and CMU_CPUCL1")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: André Draszik <andre.draszik@linaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250603-samsung-clk-fixes-v1-3-49daf1ff4592@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
Ma Ke
0bd77a08d5 sunvdc: Balance device refcount in vdc_port_mpgroup_check
commit 63ce537246 upstream.

Using device_find_child() to locate a probed virtual-device-port node
causes a device refcount imbalance, as device_find_child() internally
calls get_device() to increment the device’s reference count before
returning its pointer. vdc_port_mpgroup_check() directly returns true
upon finding a matching device without releasing the reference via
put_device(). We should call put_device() to decrement refcount.

As comment of device_find_child() says, 'NOTE: you will need to drop
the reference with put_device() after use'.

Found by code review.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3ee70591d6 ("sunvdc: prevent sunvdc panic when mpgroup disk added to guest domain")
Signed-off-by: Ma Ke <make24@iscas.ac.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250719075856.3447953-1-make24@iscas.ac.cn
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
Yao Zi
facc69f435 LoongArch: Avoid in-place string operation on FDT content
commit 70a2365e18 upstream.

In init_cpu_fullname(), a constant pointer to "model" property is
retrieved. It's later modified by the strsep() function, which is
illegal and corrupts kernel's FDT copy. This is shown by dmesg,

	OF: fdt: not creating '/sys/firmware/fdt': CRC check failed

Create a mutable copy of the model property and do in-place operations
on the mutable copy instead. loongson_sysconf.cpuname lives across the
kernel lifetime, thus manually releasing isn't necessary.

Also move the of_node_put() call for the root node after the usage of
its property, since of_node_put() decreases the reference counter thus
usage after the call is unsafe.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 44a01f1f72 ("LoongArch: Parsing CPU-related information from DTS")
Reviewed-by: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Signed-off-by: Yao Zi <ziyao@disroot.org>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:15 +02:00
Huacai Chen
17bac5a345 LoongArch: Make relocate_new_kernel_size be a .quad value
commit a1a81b5477 upstream.

Now relocate_new_kernel_size is a .long value, which means 32bit, so its
high 32bit is undefined. This causes memcpy((void *)reboot_code_buffer,
relocate_new_kernel, relocate_new_kernel_size) in machine_kexec_prepare()
access out of range memories in some cases, and then end up with an ADE
exception.

So make relocate_new_kernel_size be a .quad value, which means 64bit, to
avoid such errors.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:14 +02:00
Thomas Weißschuh
92ccdef6e4 LoongArch: Don't use %pK through printk() in unwinder
commit 2362e8124e upstream.

In the past %pK was preferable to %p as it would not leak raw pointer
values into the kernel log.

Since commit ad67b74d24 ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
the regular %p has been improved to avoid this issue.

Furthermore, restricted pointers ("%pK") were never meant to be used
through printk(). They can still unintentionally leak raw pointers or
acquire sleeping locks in atomic contexts.

Switch to the regular pointer formatting which is safer and easier to
reason about.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Weißschuh <thomas.weissschuh@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:14 +02:00
Haoran Jiang
f83d469e16 LoongArch: BPF: Fix jump offset calculation in tailcall
commit cd39d9e6b7 upstream.

The extra pass of bpf_int_jit_compile() skips JIT context initialization
which essentially skips offset calculation leaving out_offset = -1, so
the jmp_offset in emit_bpf_tail_call is calculated by

"#define jmp_offset (out_offset - (cur_offset))"

is a negative number, which is wrong. The final generated assembly are
as follow.

54:	bgeu        	$a2, $t1, -8	    # 0x0000004c
58:	addi.d      	$a6, $s5, -1
5c:	bltz        	$a6, -16	    # 0x0000004c
60:	alsl.d      	$t2, $a2, $a1, 0x3
64:	ld.d        	$t2, $t2, 264
68:	beq         	$t2, $zero, -28	    # 0x0000004c

Before apply this patch, the follow test case will reveal soft lock issues.

cd tools/testing/selftests/bpf/
./test_progs --allow=tailcalls/tailcall_bpf2bpf_1

dmesg:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 26s! [test_progs:25056]

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5dc615520c ("LoongArch: Add BPF JIT support")
Reviewed-by: Hengqi Chen <hengqi.chen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Haoran Jiang <jianghaoran@kylinos.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:14 +02:00
Huacai Chen
154bfe9acb PCI: Extend isolated function probing to LoongArch
commit a02fd05661 upstream.

Like s390 and the jailhouse hypervisor, LoongArch's PCI architecture allows
passing isolated PCI functions to a guest OS instance. So it is possible
that there is a multi-function device without function 0 for the host or
guest.

Allow probing such functions by adding a IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LOONGARCH) case
in the hypervisor_isolated_pci_functions() helper.

This is similar to commit 189c6c33ff ("PCI: Extend isolated function
probing to s390").

Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250624062927.4037734-1-chenhuacai@loongson.cn
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:14 +02:00