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1,320,615 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Steven Rostedt
c51db71fc1 tracefs: Add d_delete to remove negative dentries
[ Upstream commit d9b13cdad8 ]

If a lookup in tracefs is done on a file that does not exist, it leaves a
dentry hanging around until memory pressure removes it. But eventfs
dentries should hang around as when their ref count goes to zero, it
requires more work to recreate it. For the rest of the tracefs dentries,
they hang around as their dentry is used as a descriptor for the tracing
system. But if a file lookup happens for a file in tracefs that does not
exist, it should be deleted.

Add a .d_delete callback that checks if dentry->fsdata is set or not. Only
eventfs dentries set fsdata so if it has content it should not be deleted
and should hang around in the cache.

Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:21 +02:00
Al Viro
a24ed0e8ce securityfs: don't pin dentries twice, once is enough...
[ Upstream commit 27cd1bf124 ]

incidentally, securityfs_recursive_remove() is broken without that -
it leaks dentries, since simple_recursive_removal() does not expect
anything of that sort.  It could be worked around by dput() in
remove_one() callback, but it's easier to just drop that double-get
stuff.

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:21 +02:00
Al Viro
136994f74e fix locking in efi_secret_unlink()
[ Upstream commit 2c58d42de7 ]

We used to need securityfs_remove() to undo simple_pin_fs() done when
the file had been created and to drop the second extra reference
taken at the same time.  Now that neither is needed (or done by
securityfs_remove()), we can simply call simple_unlink() and be done
with that - the broken games with locking had been there only for the
sake of securityfs_remove().

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:21 +02:00
Wei Gao
c8e0967400 ext2: Handle fiemap on empty files to prevent EINVAL
[ Upstream commit a099b09a33 ]

Previously, ext2_fiemap would unconditionally apply "len = min_t(u64, len,
i_size_read(inode));", When inode->i_size was 0 (for an empty file), this
would reduce the requested len to 0. Passing len = 0 to iomap_fiemap could
then result in an -EINVAL error, even for valid queries on empty files.

Link: https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/issues/1246
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250613152402.3432135-1-wegao@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:21 +02:00
Christian Brauner
a482e56b2a pidfs: raise SB_I_NODEV and SB_I_NOEXEC
[ Upstream commit 1a1ad73aa1 ]

Similar to commit 1ed95281c0 ("anon_inode: raise SB_I_NODEV and SB_I_NOEXEC"):
it shouldn't be possible to execute pidfds via
execveat(fd_anon_inode, "", NULL, NULL, AT_EMPTY_PATH)
so raise SB_I_NOEXEC so that no one gets any creative ideas.

Also raise SB_I_NODEV as we don't expect or support any devices on pidfs.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/20250618-work-pidfs-persistent-v2-1-98f3456fd552@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Alexander Mikhalitsyn <aleksandr.mikhalitsyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:21 +02:00
Rong Zhang
e1b58b4759 fs/ntfs3: correctly create symlink for relative path
[ Upstream commit b1e9d89408 ]

After applying this patch, could correctly create symlink:

ln -s "relative/path/to/file" symlink

Signed-off-by: Rong Zhang <ulin0208@gmail.com>
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: added cpu_to_le32 macro to
rs->Flags assignment]
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:21 +02:00
Lizhi Xu
2ac47f738d fs/ntfs3: Add sanity check for file name
[ Upstream commit e841ecb139 ]

The length of the file name should be smaller than the directory entry size.

Reported-by: syzbot+598057afa0f49e62bd23@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=598057afa0f49e62bd23
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Xu <lizhi.xu@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Komarov <almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:21 +02:00
Damien Le Moal
caf7f7c1a0 ata: libata-sata: Disallow changing LPM state if not supported
[ Upstream commit 413e800cad ]

Modify ata_scsi_lpm_store() to return an error if a user attempts to set
a link power management policy for a port that does not support LPM,
that is, ports flagged with ATA_FLAG_NO_LPM.

Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250701125321.69496-6-dlemoal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Damien Le Moal
86cc6d9072 ata: ahci: Disable DIPM if host lacks support
[ Upstream commit f7870e8d34 ]

The AHCI specification version 1.3.1 section 8.3.1.4 (Software
Requirements and Precedence) states that:

If CAP.SSC or CAP.PSC is cleared to ‘0’, software should disable
device-initiated power management by issuing the appropriate SET
FEATURES command to the device.

To satisfy this constraint and force ata_dev_configure to disable the
device DIPM feature, modify ahci_update_initial_lpm_policy() to set the
ATA_FLAG_NO_DIPM flag on ports that have a host with either the
ATA_HOST_NO_PART flag set or the ATA_HOST_NO_SSC flag set.

Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de.>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250701125321.69496-7-dlemoal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Damien Le Moal
aa078896e3 ata: ahci: Disallow LPM policy control if not supported
[ Upstream commit 65b2c92f69 ]

Commit fa997b0576 ("ata: ahci: Do not enable LPM if no LPM states are
supported by the HBA") introduced an early return in
ahci_update_initial_lpm_policy() to ensure that the target_lpm_policy
of ports belonging to a host that does not support the Partial, Slumber
and DevSleep power states is unchanged and remains set to
ATA_LPM_UNKNOWN and thus prevents the execution of
ata_eh_link_set_lpm().

However, a user or a system daemon (e.g. systemd-udevd) may still
attempt changing the LPM policy through the sysfs
link_power_management_policy of the host.

Improve this to prevent sysfs LPM policy changes by setting the flag
ATA_FLAG_NO_LPM for the port of such host, and initialize the port
target_lpm_policy to ATA_LPM_MAX_POWER to guarantee that no unsupported
low power state is being used on the port and its link.

Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250701125321.69496-9-dlemoal@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Niklas Cassel <cassel@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Al Viro
afa5ceab9d better lockdep annotations for simple_recursive_removal()
[ Upstream commit 2a8061ee5e ]

We want a class that nests outside of I_MUTEX_NORMAL (for the sake of
callbacks that might want to lock the victim) and inside I_MUTEX_PARENT
(so that a variant of that could be used with parent of the victim
held locked by the caller).

In reality, simple_recursive_removal()
	* never holds two locks at once
	* holds the lock on parent of dentry passed to callback
	* is used only on the trees with fixed topology, so the depths
are not changing.

So the locking order is actually fine.

AFAICS, the best solution is to assign I_MUTEX_CHILD to the locks
grabbed by that thing.

Reported-by: syzbot+169de184e9defe7fe709@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
01e20eb22d hfs: fix not erasing deleted b-tree node issue
[ Upstream commit d3ed6d6981 ]

The generic/001 test of xfstests suite fails and corrupts
the HFS volume:

sudo ./check generic/001
FSTYP         -- hfs
PLATFORM      -- Linux/x86_64 hfsplus-testing-0001 6.15.0-rc2+ #3 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Fri Apr 25 17:13:00 PDT 2>
MKFS_OPTIONS  -- /dev/loop51
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 /mnt/scratch

generic/001 32s ... _check_generic_filesystem: filesystem on /dev/loop50 is inconsistent
(see /home/slavad/XFSTESTS-2/xfstests-dev/results//generic/001.full for details)

Ran: generic/001
Failures: generic/001
Failed 1 of 1 tests

fsck.hfs -d -n ./test-image.bin
** ./test-image.bin (NO WRITE)
	Using cacheBlockSize=32K cacheTotalBlock=1024 cacheSize=32768K.
   Executing fsck_hfs (version 540.1-Linux).
** Checking HFS volume.
   The volume name is untitled
** Checking extents overflow file.
** Checking catalog file.
   Unused node is not erased (node = 2)
   Unused node is not erased (node = 4)
<skipped>
   Unused node is not erased (node = 253)
   Unused node is not erased (node = 254)
   Unused node is not erased (node = 255)
   Unused node is not erased (node = 256)
** Checking catalog hierarchy.
** Checking volume bitmap.
** Checking volume information.
   Verify Status: VIStat = 0x0000, ABTStat = 0x0000 EBTStat = 0x0000
                  CBTStat = 0x0004 CatStat = 0x00000000
** The volume untitled was found corrupt and needs to be repaired.
	volume type is HFS
	primary MDB is at block 2 0x02
	alternate MDB is at block 20971518 0x13ffffe
	primary VHB is at block 0 0x00
	alternate VHB is at block 0 0x00
	sector size = 512 0x200
	VolumeObject flags = 0x19
	total sectors for volume = 20971520 0x1400000
	total sectors for embedded volume = 0 0x00

This patch adds logic of clearing the deleted b-tree node.

sudo ./check generic/001
FSTYP         -- hfs
PLATFORM      -- Linux/x86_64 hfsplus-testing-0001 6.15.0-rc2+ #3 SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Fri Apr 25 17:13:00 PDT 2025
MKFS_OPTIONS  -- /dev/loop51
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/loop51 /mnt/scratch

generic/001 9s ...  32s
Ran: generic/001
Passed all 1 tests

fsck.hfs -d -n ./test-image.bin
** ./test-image.bin (NO WRITE)
	Using cacheBlockSize=32K cacheTotalBlock=1024 cacheSize=32768K.
   Executing fsck_hfs (version 540.1-Linux).
** Checking HFS volume.
   The volume name is untitled
** Checking extents overflow file.
** Checking catalog file.
** Checking catalog hierarchy.
** Checking volume bitmap.
** Checking volume information.
** The volume untitled appears to be OK.

Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250430001211.1912533-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Sarah Newman
7d483ad300 drbd: add missing kref_get in handle_write_conflicts
[ Upstream commit 00c9c9628b ]

With `two-primaries` enabled, DRBD tries to detect "concurrent" writes
and handle write conflicts, so that even if you write to the same sector
simultaneously on both nodes, they end up with the identical data once
the writes are completed.

In handling "superseeded" writes, we forgot a kref_get,
resulting in a premature drbd_destroy_device and use after free,
and further to kernel crashes with symptoms.

Relevance: No one should use DRBD as a random data generator, and apparently
all users of "two-primaries" handle concurrent writes correctly on layer up.
That is cluster file systems use some distributed lock manager,
and live migration in virtualization environments stops writes on one node
before starting writes on the other node.

Which means that other than for "test cases",
this code path is never taken in real life.

FYI, in DRBD 9, things are handled differently nowadays.  We still detect
"write conflicts", but no longer try to be smart about them.
We decided to disconnect hard instead: upper layers must not submit concurrent
writes. If they do, that's their fault.

Signed-off-by: Sarah Newman <srn@prgmr.com>
Signed-off-by: Lars Ellenberg <lars@linbit.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Böhmwalder <christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250627095728.800688-1-christoph.boehmwalder@linbit.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Jan Kara
699b302483 udf: Verify partition map count
[ Upstream commit 1a11201668 ]

Verify that number of partition maps isn't insanely high which can lead
to large allocation in udf_sb_alloc_partition_maps(). All partition maps
have to fit in the LVD which is in a single block.

Reported-by: syzbot+478f2c1a6f0f447a46bb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Jan Kara
139a000d20 loop: Avoid updating block size under exclusive owner
[ Upstream commit 7e49538288 ]

Syzbot came up with a reproducer where a loop device block size is
changed underneath a mounted filesystem. This causes a mismatch between
the block device block size and the block size stored in the superblock
causing confusion in various places such as fs/buffer.c. The particular
issue triggered by syzbot was a warning in __getblk_slow() due to
requested buffer size not matching block device block size.

Fix the problem by getting exclusive hold of the loop device to change
its block size. This fails if somebody (such as filesystem) has already
an exclusive ownership of the block device and thus prevents modifying
the loop device under some exclusive owner which doesn't expect it.

Reported-by: syzbot+01ef7a8da81a975e1ccd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Tested-by: syzbot+01ef7a8da81a975e1ccd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250711163202.19623-2-jack@suse.cz
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Andrew Price
9d9b053f7f gfs2: Set .migrate_folio in gfs2_{rgrp,meta}_aops
[ Upstream commit 5c8f12cf1e ]

Clears up the warning added in 7ee3647243 ("migrate: Remove call to
->writepage") that occurs in various xfstests, causing "something found
in dmesg" failures.

[  341.136573] gfs2_meta_aops does not implement migrate_folio
[  341.136953] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 36 at mm/migrate.c:944 move_to_new_folio+0x2f8/0x300

Signed-off-by: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:20 +02:00
Andrew Price
53a0249d68 gfs2: Validate i_depth for exhash directories
[ Upstream commit 557c024ca7 ]

A fuzzer test introduced corruption that ends up with a depth of 0 in
dir_e_read(), causing an undefined shift by 32 at:

  index = hash >> (32 - dip->i_depth);

As calculated in an open-coded way in dir_make_exhash(), the minimum
depth for an exhash directory is ilog2(sdp->sd_hash_ptrs) and 0 is
invalid as sdp->sd_hash_ptrs is fixed as sdp->bsize / 16 at mount time.

So we can avoid the undefined behaviour by checking for depth values
lower than the minimum in gfs2_dinode_in(). Values greater than the
maximum are already being checked for there.

Also switch the calculation in dir_make_exhash() to use ilog2() to
clarify how the depth is calculated.

Tested with the syzkaller repro.c and xfstests '-g quick'.

Reported-by: syzbot+4708579bb230a0582a57@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Andrew Price <anprice@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Maurizio Lombardi
b37768e487 nvme-tcp: log TLS handshake failures at error level
[ Upstream commit 5a58ac9bfc ]

Update the nvme_tcp_start_tls() function to use dev_err() instead of
dev_dbg() when a TLS error is detected. This ensures that handshake
failures are visible by default, aiding in debugging.

Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi <mlombard@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurence Oberman <loberman@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
John Garry
552e1a93b3 md/raid10: set chunk_sectors limit
[ Upstream commit 7ef50c4c6a ]

Same as done for raid0, set chunk_sectors limit to appropriately set the
atomic write size limit.

Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250711105258.3135198-5-john.g.garry@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
John Garry
fc26f6f2e6 dm-stripe: limit chunk_sectors to the stripe size
[ Upstream commit 5fb9d4341b ]

Same as done for raid0, set chunk_sectors limit to appropriately set the
atomic write size limit.

Setting chunk_sectors limit in this way overrides the stacked limit
already calculated based on the bottom device limits. This is ok, as
when any bios are sent to the bottom devices, the block layer will still
respect the bottom device chunk_sectors.

Reviewed-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: John Garry <john.g.garry@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250711105258.3135198-6-john.g.garry@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Keith Busch
bc255fec6f nvme-pci: try function level reset on init failure
[ Upstream commit 5b2c214a95 ]

NVMe devices from multiple vendors appear to get stuck in a reset state
that we can't get out of with an NVMe level Controller Reset. The kernel
would report these with messages that look like:

  Device not ready; aborting reset, CSTS=0x1

These have historically required a power cycle to make them usable
again, but in many cases, a PCIe FLR is sufficient to restart operation
without a power cycle. Try it if the initial controller reset fails
during any nvme reset attempt.

Signed-off-by: Keith Busch <kbusch@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Chaitanya Kulkarni <kch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nitesh Shetty <nj.shetty@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
NeilBrown
814cfdb635 smb/server: avoid deadlock when linking with ReplaceIfExists
[ Upstream commit d5fc1400a3 ]

If smb2_create_link() is called with ReplaceIfExists set and the name
does exist then a deadlock will happen.

ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_locked() will return with success and the parent
directory will be locked.  ksmbd_vfs_remove_file() will then remove the
file.  ksmbd_vfs_link() will then be called while the parent is still
locked.  It will try to lock the same parent and will deadlock.

This patch moves the ksmbd_vfs_kern_path_unlock() call to *before*
ksmbd_vfs_link() and then simplifies the code, removing the file_present
flag variable.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Yeoreum Yun
58c3642381 firmware: arm_ffa: Change initcall level of ffa_init() to rootfs_initcall
[ Upstream commit 0e0546eabc ]

The Linux IMA (Integrity Measurement Architecture) subsystem used for
secure boot, file integrity, or remote attestation cannot be a loadable
module for few reasons listed below:

 o Boot-Time Integrity: IMA’s main role is to measure and appraise files
 before they are used. This includes measuring critical system files during
 early boot (e.g., init, init scripts, login binaries). If IMA were a
 module, it would be loaded too late to cover those.

 o TPM Dependency: IMA integrates tightly with the TPM to record
 measurements into PCRs. The TPM must be initialized early (ideally before
 init_ima()), which aligns with IMA being built-in.

 o Security Model: IMA is part of a Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Making it
 a module would weaken the security model, as a potentially compromised
 system could delay or tamper with its initialization.

IMA must be built-in to ensure it starts measuring from the earliest
possible point in boot which inturn implies TPM must be initialised and
ready to use before IMA.

To enable integration of tpm_event_log with the IMA subsystem, the TPM
drivers (tpm_crb and tpm_crb_ffa) also needs to be built-in. However with
FF-A driver also being initialised at device initcall level, it can lead to
an initialization order issue where:
 - crb_acpi_driver_init() may run before tpm_crb_ffa_driver()_init and
   ffa_init()
 - As a result, probing the TPM device via CRB over FFA is deferred
 - ima_init() (called as a late initcall) runs before deferred probe
   completes, IMA fails to find the TPM and logs the below error:

   |  ima: No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!

Eventually it fails to generate boot_aggregate with PCR values.

Because of the above stated dependency, the ffa driver needs to initialised
before tpm_crb_ffa module to ensure IMA finds the TPM successfully when
present.

[ jarkko: reformatted some of the paragraphs because they were going past
  the 75 character boundary. ]

Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Kees Cook
cd47a512e0 arm64: Handle KCOV __init vs inline mismatches
[ Upstream commit 65c430906e ]

GCC appears to have kind of fragile inlining heuristics, in the
sense that it can change whether or not it inlines something based on
optimizations. It looks like the kcov instrumentation being added (or in
this case, removed) from a function changes the optimization results,
and some functions marked "inline" are _not_ inlined. In that case,
we end up with __init code calling a function not marked __init, and we
get the build warnings I'm trying to eliminate in the coming patch that
adds __no_sanitize_coverage to __init functions:

WARNING: modpost: vmlinux: section mismatch in reference: acpi_get_enable_method+0x1c (section: .text.unlikely) -> acpi_psci_present (section: .init.text)

This problem is somewhat fragile (though using either __always_inline
or __init will deterministically solve it), but we've tripped over
this before with GCC and the solution has usually been to just use
__always_inline and move on.

For arm64 this requires forcing one ACPI function to be inlined with
__always_inline.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250724055029.3623499-1-kees@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Tetsuo Handa
1bb8da27ff hfsplus: don't use BUG_ON() in hfsplus_create_attributes_file()
[ Upstream commit c7c6363ca1 ]

When the volume header contains erroneous values that do not reflect
the actual state of the filesystem, hfsplus_fill_super() assumes that
the attributes file is not yet created, which later results in hitting
BUG_ON() when hfsplus_create_attributes_file() is called. Replace this
BUG_ON() with -EIO error with a message to suggest running fsck tool.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+1107451c16b9eb9d29e6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=1107451c16b9eb9d29e6
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7b587d24-c8a1-4413-9b9a-00a33fbd849f@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
f7534cbfac hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in hfsplus_uni2asc()
[ Upstream commit 94458781ae ]

The hfsplus_readdir() method is capable to crash by calling
hfsplus_uni2asc():

[  667.121659][ T9805] ==================================================================
[  667.122651][ T9805] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_uni2asc+0x902/0xa10
[  667.123627][ T9805] Read of size 2 at addr ffff88802592f40c by task repro/9805
[  667.124578][ T9805]
[  667.124876][ T9805] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9805 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #1 PREEMPT(full)
[  667.124886][ T9805] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  667.124890][ T9805] Call Trace:
[  667.124893][ T9805]  <TASK>
[  667.124896][ T9805]  dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0
[  667.124911][ T9805]  print_report+0xd0/0x660
[  667.124920][ T9805]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x81/0x610
[  667.124928][ T9805]  ? __phys_addr+0xe8/0x180
[  667.124934][ T9805]  ? hfsplus_uni2asc+0x902/0xa10
[  667.124942][ T9805]  kasan_report+0xc6/0x100
[  667.124950][ T9805]  ? hfsplus_uni2asc+0x902/0xa10
[  667.124959][ T9805]  hfsplus_uni2asc+0x902/0xa10
[  667.124966][ T9805]  ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x14b/0x360
[  667.124974][ T9805]  hfsplus_readdir+0x845/0xfc0
[  667.124984][ T9805]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_readdir+0x10/0x10
[  667.124994][ T9805]  ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0
[  667.125008][ T9805]  ? iterate_dir+0x18b/0xb20
[  667.125015][ T9805]  ? trace_lock_acquire+0x85/0xd0
[  667.125022][ T9805]  ? lock_acquire+0x30/0x80
[  667.125029][ T9805]  ? iterate_dir+0x18b/0xb20
[  667.125037][ T9805]  ? down_read_killable+0x1ed/0x4c0
[  667.125044][ T9805]  ? putname+0x154/0x1a0
[  667.125051][ T9805]  ? __pfx_down_read_killable+0x10/0x10
[  667.125058][ T9805]  ? apparmor_file_permission+0x239/0x3e0
[  667.125069][ T9805]  iterate_dir+0x296/0xb20
[  667.125076][ T9805]  __x64_sys_getdents64+0x13c/0x2c0
[  667.125084][ T9805]  ? __pfx___x64_sys_getdents64+0x10/0x10
[  667.125091][ T9805]  ? __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200
[  667.125126][ T9805]  ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10
[  667.125134][ T9805]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x7fe/0x12f0
[  667.125143][ T9805]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  667.125151][ T9805]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  667.125158][ T9805] RIP: 0033:0x7fa8753b2fc9
[  667.125164][ T9805] Code: 00 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 48
[  667.125172][ T9805] RSP: 002b:00007ffe96f8e0f8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000d9
[  667.125181][ T9805] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fa8753b2fc9
[  667.125185][ T9805] RDX: 0000000000000400 RSI: 00002000000063c0 RDI: 0000000000000004
[  667.125190][ T9805] RBP: 00007ffe96f8e110 R08: 00007ffe96f8e110 R09: 00007ffe96f8e110
[  667.125195][ T9805] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000556b1e3b4260
[  667.125199][ T9805] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  667.125207][ T9805]  </TASK>
[  667.125210][ T9805]
[  667.145632][ T9805] Allocated by task 9805:
[  667.145991][ T9805]  kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
[  667.146352][ T9805]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[  667.146717][ T9805]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[  667.147065][ T9805]  __kmalloc_noprof+0x205/0x550
[  667.147448][ T9805]  hfsplus_find_init+0x95/0x1f0
[  667.147813][ T9805]  hfsplus_readdir+0x220/0xfc0
[  667.148174][ T9805]  iterate_dir+0x296/0xb20
[  667.148549][ T9805]  __x64_sys_getdents64+0x13c/0x2c0
[  667.148937][ T9805]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  667.149291][ T9805]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  667.149809][ T9805]
[  667.150030][ T9805] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802592f000
[  667.150030][ T9805]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
[  667.151282][ T9805] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
[  667.151282][ T9805]  allocated 1036-byte region [ffff88802592f000, ffff88802592f40c)
[  667.152580][ T9805]
[  667.152798][ T9805] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[  667.153373][ T9805] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x25928
[  667.154157][ T9805] head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[  667.154916][ T9805] anon flags: 0xfff00000000040(head|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[  667.155631][ T9805] page_type: f5(slab)
[  667.155997][ T9805] raw: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801b442f00 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
[  667.156770][ T9805] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[  667.157536][ T9805] head: 00fff00000000040 ffff88801b442f00 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
[  667.158317][ T9805] head: 0000000000000000 0000000080080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[  667.159088][ T9805] head: 00fff00000000003 ffffea0000964a01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
[  667.159865][ T9805] head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
[  667.160643][ T9805] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  667.161216][ T9805] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[  667.161732][ T9805] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0xd20c0(__GFP_IO|__GFP_FS|__GFP_NOWARN9
[  667.163566][ T9805]  post_alloc_hook+0x1c0/0x230
[  667.164003][ T9805]  get_page_from_freelist+0xdeb/0x3b30
[  667.164503][ T9805]  __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x25c/0x2460
[  667.165040][ T9805]  alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fb/0x550
[  667.165489][ T9805]  new_slab+0x23b/0x340
[  667.165872][ T9805]  ___slab_alloc+0xd81/0x1960
[  667.166313][ T9805]  __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x56/0xb0
[  667.166767][ T9805]  __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x255/0x3e0
[  667.167255][ T9805]  psi_cgroup_alloc+0x52/0x2d0
[  667.167693][ T9805]  cgroup_mkdir+0x694/0x1210
[  667.168118][ T9805]  kernfs_iop_mkdir+0x111/0x190
[  667.168568][ T9805]  vfs_mkdir+0x59b/0x8d0
[  667.168956][ T9805]  do_mkdirat+0x2ed/0x3d0
[  667.169353][ T9805]  __x64_sys_mkdir+0xef/0x140
[  667.169784][ T9805]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  667.170195][ T9805]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  667.170730][ T9805] page last free pid 1257 tgid 1257 stack trace:
[  667.171304][ T9805]  __free_frozen_pages+0x80c/0x1250
[  667.171770][ T9805]  vfree.part.0+0x12b/0xab0
[  667.172182][ T9805]  delayed_vfree_work+0x93/0xd0
[  667.172612][ T9805]  process_one_work+0x9b5/0x1b80
[  667.173067][ T9805]  worker_thread+0x630/0xe60
[  667.173486][ T9805]  kthread+0x3a8/0x770
[  667.173857][ T9805]  ret_from_fork+0x517/0x6e0
[  667.174278][ T9805]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  667.174703][ T9805]
[  667.174917][ T9805] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  667.175411][ T9805]  ffff88802592f300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  667.176114][ T9805]  ffff88802592f380: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  667.176830][ T9805] >ffff88802592f400: 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  667.177547][ T9805]                       ^
[  667.177933][ T9805]  ffff88802592f480: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  667.178640][ T9805]  ffff88802592f500: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  667.179350][ T9805] ==================================================================

The hfsplus_uni2asc() method operates by struct hfsplus_unistr:

struct hfsplus_unistr {
	__be16 length;
	hfsplus_unichr unicode[HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN];
} __packed;

where HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN is 255 bytes. The issue happens if length
of the structure instance has value bigger than 255 (for example,
65283). In such case, pointer on unicode buffer is going beyond of
the allocated memory.

The patch fixes the issue by checking the length value of
hfsplus_unistr instance and using 255 value in the case if length
value is bigger than HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN. Potential reason of such
situation could be a corruption of Catalog File b-tree's node.

Reported-by: Wenzhi Wang <wenzhi.wang@uwaterloo.ca>
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710230830.110500-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:19 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
475d770c19 hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read()
[ Upstream commit c80aa2aaaa ]

The hfsplus_bnode_read() method can trigger the issue:

[  174.852007][ T9784] ==================================================================
[  174.852709][ T9784] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360
[  174.853412][ T9784] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810b5fc6c0 by task repro/9784
[  174.854059][ T9784]
[  174.854272][ T9784] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9784 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #7 PREEMPT(full)
[  174.854281][ T9784] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[  174.854286][ T9784] Call Trace:
[  174.854289][ T9784]  <TASK>
[  174.854292][ T9784]  dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0
[  174.854305][ T9784]  print_report+0xd0/0x660
[  174.854315][ T9784]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x81/0x610
[  174.854323][ T9784]  ? __phys_addr+0xe8/0x180
[  174.854330][ T9784]  ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360
[  174.854337][ T9784]  kasan_report+0xc6/0x100
[  174.854346][ T9784]  ? hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360
[  174.854354][ T9784]  hfsplus_bnode_read+0x2f4/0x360
[  174.854362][ T9784]  hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x2ec/0x380
[  174.854370][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_bnode_dump+0x10/0x10
[  174.854377][ T9784]  ? hfsplus_bnode_write_u16+0x83/0xb0
[  174.854385][ T9784]  ? srcu_gp_start+0xd0/0x310
[  174.854393][ T9784]  ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40
[  174.854402][ T9784]  hfsplus_brec_remove+0x3d2/0x4e0
[  174.854411][ T9784]  __hfsplus_delete_attr+0x290/0x3a0
[  174.854419][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfs_find_1st_rec_by_cnid+0x10/0x10
[  174.854427][ T9784]  ? __pfx___hfsplus_delete_attr+0x10/0x10
[  174.854436][ T9784]  ? __asan_memset+0x23/0x50
[  174.854450][ T9784]  hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x262/0x320
[  174.854459][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x10/0x10
[  174.854469][ T9784]  ? rcu_is_watching+0x12/0xc0
[  174.854476][ T9784]  ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x29e/0xe40
[  174.854483][ T9784]  hfsplus_delete_cat+0x845/0xde0
[  174.854493][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_delete_cat+0x10/0x10
[  174.854507][ T9784]  hfsplus_unlink+0x1ca/0x7c0
[  174.854516][ T9784]  ? __pfx_hfsplus_unlink+0x10/0x10
[  174.854525][ T9784]  ? down_write+0x148/0x200
[  174.854532][ T9784]  ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
[  174.854540][ T9784]  vfs_unlink+0x2fe/0x9b0
[  174.854549][ T9784]  do_unlinkat+0x490/0x670
[  174.854557][ T9784]  ? __pfx_do_unlinkat+0x10/0x10
[  174.854565][ T9784]  ? __might_fault+0xbc/0x130
[  174.854576][ T9784]  ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550
[  174.854584][ T9784]  __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110
[  174.854592][ T9784]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  174.854600][ T9784]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  174.854608][ T9784] RIP: 0033:0x7f6fdf4c3167
[  174.854614][ T9784] Code: f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 26 0d 0e 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 08
[  174.854622][ T9784] RSP: 002b:00007ffcb948bca8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057
[  174.854630][ T9784] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f6fdf4c3167
[  174.854636][ T9784] RDX: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RSI: 00007ffcb948bcc0 RDI: 00007ffcb948bd50
[  174.854641][ T9784] RBP: 00007ffcb948cd90 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffcb948bb40
[  174.854645][ T9784] R10: 00007f6fdf564fc0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000561e1bc9c2d0
[  174.854650][ T9784] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[  174.854658][ T9784]  </TASK>
[  174.854661][ T9784]
[  174.879281][ T9784] Allocated by task 9784:
[  174.879664][ T9784]  kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
[  174.880082][ T9784]  kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[  174.880500][ T9784]  __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[  174.880908][ T9784]  __kmalloc_noprof+0x205/0x550
[  174.881337][ T9784]  __hfs_bnode_create+0x107/0x890
[  174.881779][ T9784]  hfsplus_bnode_find+0x2d0/0xd10
[  174.882222][ T9784]  hfsplus_brec_find+0x2b0/0x520
[  174.882659][ T9784]  hfsplus_delete_all_attrs+0x23b/0x320
[  174.883144][ T9784]  hfsplus_delete_cat+0x845/0xde0
[  174.883595][ T9784]  hfsplus_rmdir+0x106/0x1b0
[  174.884004][ T9784]  vfs_rmdir+0x206/0x690
[  174.884379][ T9784]  do_rmdir+0x2b7/0x390
[  174.884751][ T9784]  __x64_sys_rmdir+0xc5/0x110
[  174.885167][ T9784]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[  174.885568][ T9784]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[  174.886083][ T9784]
[  174.886293][ T9784] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810b5fc600
[  174.886293][ T9784]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[  174.887507][ T9784] The buggy address is located 40 bytes to the right of
[  174.887507][ T9784]  allocated 152-byte region [ffff88810b5fc600, ffff88810b5fc698)
[  174.888766][ T9784]
[  174.888976][ T9784] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[  174.889533][ T9784] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10b5fc
[  174.890295][ T9784] flags: 0x57ff00000000000(node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[  174.890927][ T9784] page_type: f5(slab)
[  174.891284][ T9784] raw: 057ff00000000000 ffff88801b4423c0 ffffea000426dc80 dead000000000002
[  174.892032][ T9784] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
[  174.892774][ T9784] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[  174.893327][ T9784] page_owner tracks the page as allocated
[  174.893825][ T9784] page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52c00(GFP_NOIO|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NO1
[  174.895373][ T9784]  post_alloc_hook+0x1c0/0x230
[  174.895801][ T9784]  get_page_from_freelist+0xdeb/0x3b30
[  174.896284][ T9784]  __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x25c/0x2460
[  174.896810][ T9784]  alloc_pages_mpol+0x1fb/0x550
[  174.897242][ T9784]  new_slab+0x23b/0x340
[  174.897614][ T9784]  ___slab_alloc+0xd81/0x1960
[  174.898028][ T9784]  __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x56/0xb0
[  174.898468][ T9784]  __kmalloc_noprof+0x2b0/0x550
[  174.898896][ T9784]  usb_alloc_urb+0x73/0xa0
[  174.899289][ T9784]  usb_control_msg+0x1cb/0x4a0
[  174.899718][ T9784]  usb_get_string+0xab/0x1a0
[  174.900133][ T9784]  usb_string_sub+0x107/0x3c0
[  174.900549][ T9784]  usb_string+0x307/0x670
[  174.900933][ T9784]  usb_cache_string+0x80/0x150
[  174.901355][ T9784]  usb_new_device+0x1d0/0x19d0
[  174.901786][ T9784]  register_root_hub+0x299/0x730
[  174.902231][ T9784] page last free pid 10 tgid 10 stack trace:
[  174.902757][ T9784]  __free_frozen_pages+0x80c/0x1250
[  174.903217][ T9784]  vfree.part.0+0x12b/0xab0
[  174.903645][ T9784]  delayed_vfree_work+0x93/0xd0
[  174.904073][ T9784]  process_one_work+0x9b5/0x1b80
[  174.904519][ T9784]  worker_thread+0x630/0xe60
[  174.904927][ T9784]  kthread+0x3a8/0x770
[  174.905291][ T9784]  ret_from_fork+0x517/0x6e0
[  174.905709][ T9784]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  174.906128][ T9784]
[  174.906338][ T9784] Memory state around the buggy address:
[  174.906828][ T9784]  ffff88810b5fc580: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  174.907528][ T9784]  ffff88810b5fc600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
[  174.908222][ T9784] >ffff88810b5fc680: 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  174.908917][ T9784]                                            ^
[  174.909481][ T9784]  ffff88810b5fc700: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[  174.910432][ T9784]  ffff88810b5fc780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[  174.911401][ T9784] ==================================================================

The reason of the issue that code doesn't check the correctness
of the requested offset and length. As a result, incorrect value
of offset or/and length could result in access out of allocated
memory.

This patch introduces is_bnode_offset_valid() method that checks
the requested offset value. Also, it introduces
check_and_correct_requested_length() method that checks and
correct the requested length (if it is necessary). These methods
are used in hfsplus_bnode_read(), hfsplus_bnode_write(),
hfsplus_bnode_clear(), hfsplus_bnode_copy(), and hfsplus_bnode_move()
with the goal to prevent the access out of allocated memory
and triggering the crash.

Reported-by: Kun Hu <huk23@m.fudan.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Jiaji Qin <jjtan24@m.fudan.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Shuoran Bai <baishuoran@hrbeu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703214804.244077-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
efc095b35b hfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_bnode_read()
[ Upstream commit a431930c9b ]

This patch introduces is_bnode_offset_valid() method that checks
the requested offset value. Also, it introduces
check_and_correct_requested_length() method that checks and
correct the requested length (if it is necessary). These methods
are used in hfs_bnode_read(), hfs_bnode_write(), hfs_bnode_clear(),
hfs_bnode_copy(), and hfs_bnode_move() with the goal to prevent
the access out of allocated memory and triggering the crash.

Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250703214912.244138-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Viacheslav Dubeyko
5d8b249527 hfs: fix general protection fault in hfs_find_init()
[ Upstream commit 736a0516a1 ]

The hfs_find_init() method can trigger the crash
if tree pointer is NULL:

[   45.746290][ T9787] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000008: 0000 [#1] SMP KAI
[   45.747287][ T9787] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000040-0x0000000000000047]
[   45.748716][ T9787] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 9787 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.16.0-rc3 #10 PREEMPT(full)
[   45.750250][ T9787] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[   45.751983][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230
[   45.752834][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc
[   45.755574][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   45.756432][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09
[   45.757457][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8
[   45.758282][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
[   45.758943][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004
[   45.759619][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000
[   45.760293][ T9787] FS:  00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   45.761050][ T9787] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   45.761606][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   45.762286][ T9787] Call Trace:
[   45.762570][ T9787]  <TASK>
[   45.762824][ T9787]  hfs_ext_read_extent+0x190/0x9d0
[   45.763269][ T9787]  ? submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x2dd/0xce0
[   45.763766][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_ext_read_extent+0x10/0x10
[   45.764250][ T9787]  hfs_get_block+0x55f/0x830
[   45.764646][ T9787]  block_read_full_folio+0x36d/0x850
[   45.765105][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_get_block+0x10/0x10
[   45.765541][ T9787]  ? const_folio_flags+0x5b/0x100
[   45.765972][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10
[   45.766415][ T9787]  filemap_read_folio+0xbe/0x290
[   45.766840][ T9787]  ? __pfx_filemap_read_folio+0x10/0x10
[   45.767325][ T9787]  ? __filemap_get_folio+0x32b/0xbf0
[   45.767780][ T9787]  do_read_cache_folio+0x263/0x5c0
[   45.768223][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_read_folio+0x10/0x10
[   45.768666][ T9787]  read_cache_page+0x5b/0x160
[   45.769070][ T9787]  hfs_btree_open+0x491/0x1740
[   45.769481][ T9787]  hfs_mdb_get+0x15e2/0x1fb0
[   45.769877][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_mdb_get+0x10/0x10
[   45.770316][ T9787]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[   45.770731][ T9787]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280
[   45.771200][ T9787]  ? lockdep_init_map_type+0x5c/0x280
[   45.771674][ T9787]  hfs_fill_super+0x38e/0x720
[   45.772092][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
[   45.772549][ T9787]  ? snprintf+0xbe/0x100
[   45.772931][ T9787]  ? __pfx_snprintf+0x10/0x10
[   45.773350][ T9787]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x129/0x2b0
[   45.773796][ T9787]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[   45.774215][ T9787]  ? set_blocksize+0x40a/0x510
[   45.774636][ T9787]  ? sb_set_blocksize+0x176/0x1d0
[   45.775087][ T9787]  ? setup_bdev_super+0x369/0x730
[   45.775533][ T9787]  get_tree_bdev_flags+0x384/0x620
[   45.775985][ T9787]  ? __pfx_hfs_fill_super+0x10/0x10
[   45.776453][ T9787]  ? __pfx_get_tree_bdev_flags+0x10/0x10
[   45.776950][ T9787]  ? bpf_lsm_capable+0x9/0x10
[   45.777365][ T9787]  ? security_capable+0x80/0x260
[   45.777803][ T9787]  vfs_get_tree+0x8e/0x340
[   45.778203][ T9787]  path_mount+0x13de/0x2010
[   45.778604][ T9787]  ? kmem_cache_free+0x2b0/0x4c0
[   45.779052][ T9787]  ? __pfx_path_mount+0x10/0x10
[   45.779480][ T9787]  ? getname_flags.part.0+0x1c5/0x550
[   45.779954][ T9787]  ? putname+0x154/0x1a0
[   45.780335][ T9787]  __x64_sys_mount+0x27b/0x300
[   45.780758][ T9787]  ? __pfx___x64_sys_mount+0x10/0x10
[   45.781232][ T9787]  do_syscall_64+0xc9/0x480
[   45.781631][ T9787]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[   45.782149][ T9787] RIP: 0033:0x7ffb7265b6ca
[   45.782539][ T9787] Code: 48 8b 0d c9 17 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48
[   45.784212][ T9787] RSP: 002b:00007ffc0c10cfb8 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
[   45.784935][ T9787] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007ffb7265b6ca
[   45.785626][ T9787] RDX: 0000200000000240 RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 00007ffc0c10d100
[   45.786316][ T9787] RBP: 00007ffc0c10d190 R08: 00007ffc0c10d000 R09: 0000000000000000
[   45.787011][ T9787] R10: 0000000000000048 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000560246733250
[   45.787697][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[   45.788393][ T9787]  </TASK>
[   45.788665][ T9787] Modules linked in:
[   45.789058][ T9787] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[   45.789554][ T9787] RIP: 0010:hfs_find_init+0x86/0x230
[   45.790028][ T9787] Code: c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9a 01 00 00 4c 8d 6b 40 48 c7 45 18 00 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc
[   45.792364][ T9787] RSP: 0018:ffffc90015157668 EFLAGS: 00010202
[   45.793155][ T9787] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff819a4d09
[   45.794123][ T9787] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: ffffffff819acd3a RDI: ffffc900151576e8
[   45.795105][ T9787] RBP: ffffc900151576d0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
[   45.796135][ T9787] R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000004
[   45.797114][ T9787] R13: 0000000000000040 R14: ffff88802c50814a R15: 0000000000000000
[   45.798024][ T9787] FS:  00007ffb72734540(0000) GS:ffff8880cec64000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   45.799019][ T9787] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   45.799822][ T9787] CR2: 00007f9bd8225000 CR3: 000000010979a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[   45.800747][ T9787] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

The hfs_fill_super() calls hfs_mdb_get() method that tries
to construct Extents Tree and Catalog Tree:

HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_EXT_CNID, hfs_ext_keycmp);
if (!HFS_SB(sb)->ext_tree) {
	pr_err("unable to open extent tree\n");
	goto out;
}
HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree = hfs_btree_open(sb, HFS_CAT_CNID, hfs_cat_keycmp);
if (!HFS_SB(sb)->cat_tree) {
	pr_err("unable to open catalog tree\n");
	goto out;
}

However, hfs_btree_open() calls read_mapping_page() that
calls hfs_get_block(). And this method calls hfs_ext_read_extent():

static int hfs_ext_read_extent(struct inode *inode, u16 block)
{
	struct hfs_find_data fd;
	int res;

	if (block >= HFS_I(inode)->cached_start &&
	    block < HFS_I(inode)->cached_start + HFS_I(inode)->cached_blocks)
		return 0;

	res = hfs_find_init(HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree, &fd);
	if (!res) {
		res = __hfs_ext_cache_extent(&fd, inode, block);
		hfs_find_exit(&fd);
	}
	return res;
}

The problem here that hfs_find_init() is trying to use
HFS_SB(inode->i_sb)->ext_tree that is not initialized yet.
It will be initailized when hfs_btree_open() finishes
the execution.

The patch adds checking of tree pointer in hfs_find_init()
and it reworks the logic of hfs_btree_open() by reading
the b-tree's header directly from the volume. The read_mapping_page()
is exchanged on filemap_grab_folio() that grab the folio from
mapping. Then, sb_bread() extracts the b-tree's header
content and copy it into the folio.

Reported-by: Wenzhi Wang <wenzhi.wang@uwaterloo.ca>
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
cc: Yangtao Li <frank.li@vivo.com>
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250710213657.108285-1-slava@dubeyko.com
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <slava@dubeyko.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Sven Stegemann
c0bffbc92a net: kcm: Fix race condition in kcm_unattach()
[ Upstream commit 52565a9352 ]

syzbot found a race condition when kcm_unattach(psock)
and kcm_release(kcm) are executed at the same time.

kcm_unattach() is missing a check of the flag
kcm->tx_stopped before calling queue_work().

If the kcm has a reserved psock, kcm_unattach() might get executed
between cancel_work_sync() and unreserve_psock() in kcm_release(),
requeuing kcm->tx_work right before kcm gets freed in kcm_done().

Remove kcm->tx_stopped and replace it by the less
error-prone disable_work_sync().

Fixes: ab7ac4eb98 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-by: syzbot+e62c9db591c30e174662@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e62c9db591c30e174662
Reported-by: syzbot+d199b52665b6c3069b94@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d199b52665b6c3069b94
Reported-by: syzbot+be6b1fdfeae512726b4e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=be6b1fdfeae512726b4e
Signed-off-by: Sven Stegemann <sven@stegemann.de>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250812191810.27777-1-sven@stegemann.de
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Jakub Kicinski
eb0336f213 tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP
[ Upstream commit 6db015fc4b ]

TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket.
This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket
entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard
read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy
early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real
error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry.

We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock,
so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read
(not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len).

If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue
we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record.
Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting
a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash
should take place.

Reported-by: William Liu <will@willsroot.io>
Reported-by: Savino Dicanosa <savy@syst3mfailure.io>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/tFjq_kf7sWIG3A7CrCg_egb8CVsT_gsmHAK0_wxDPJXfIzxFAMxqmLwp3MlU5EHiet0AwwJldaaFdgyHpeIUCS-3m3llsmRzp9xIOBR4lAI=@syst3mfailure.io
Fixes: 84c61fe1a7 ("tls: rx: do not use the standard strparser")
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250807232907.600366-1-kuba@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Jeongjun Park
54f8f98665 ptp: prevent possible ABBA deadlock in ptp_clock_freerun()
[ Upstream commit 2efe41234d ]

syzbot reported the following ABBA deadlock:

       CPU0                           CPU1
       ----                           ----
  n_vclocks_store()
    lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux) [1]
        (physical clock)
                                     pc_clock_adjtime()
                                       lock(&clk->rwsem) [2]
                                        (physical clock)
                                       ...
                                       ptp_clock_freerun()
                                         ptp_vclock_in_use()
                                           lock(&ptp->n_vclocks_mux) [3]
                                              (physical clock)
    ptp_clock_unregister()
      posix_clock_unregister()
        lock(&clk->rwsem) [4]
          (virtual clock)

Since ptp virtual clock is registered only under ptp physical clock, both
ptp_clock and posix_clock must be physical clocks for ptp_vclock_in_use()
to lock &ptp->n_vclocks_mux and check ptp->n_vclocks.

However, when unregistering vclocks in n_vclocks_store(), the locking
ptp->n_vclocks_mux is a physical clock lock, but clk->rwsem of
ptp_clock_unregister() called through device_for_each_child_reverse()
is a virtual clock lock.

Therefore, clk->rwsem used in CPU0 and clk->rwsem used in CPU1 are
different locks, but in lockdep, a false positive occurs because the
possibility of deadlock is determined through lock-class.

To solve this, lock subclass annotation must be added to the posix_clock
rwsem of the vclock.

Reported-by: syzbot+7cfb66a237c4a5fb22ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7cfb66a237c4a5fb22ad
Fixes: 73f37068d5 ("ptp: support ptp physical/virtual clocks conversion")
Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park <aha310510@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250728062649.469882-1-aha310510@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Rafael J. Wysocki
1e25d8051b cpuidle: governors: menu: Avoid using invalid recent intervals data
[ Upstream commit fa3fa55de0 ]

Marc has reported that commit 85975daeaa ("cpuidle: menu: Avoid
discarding useful information") caused the number of wakeup interrupts
to increase on an idle system [1], which was not expected to happen
after merely allowing shallower idle states to be selected by the
governor in some cases.

However, on the system in question, all of the idle states deeper than
WFI are rejected by the driver due to a firmware issue [2].  This causes
the governor to only consider the recent interval duriation data
corresponding to attempts to enter WFI that are successful and the
recent invervals table is filled with values lower than the scheduler
tick period.  Consequently, the governor predicts an idle duration
below the scheduler tick period length and avoids stopping the tick
more often which leads to the observed symptom.

Address it by modifying the governor to update the recent intervals
table also when entering the previously selected idle state fails, so
it knows that the short idle intervals might have been the minority
had the selected idle states been actually entered every time.

Fixes: 85975daeaa ("cpuidle: menu: Avoid discarding useful information")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/86o6sv6n94.wl-maz@kernel.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pm/7ffcb716-9a1b-48c2-aaa4-469d0df7c792@arm.com/ [2]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Tested-by: Christian Loehle <christian.loehle@arm.com>
Tested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian Loehle <christian.loehle@arm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/2793874.mvXUDI8C0e@rafael.j.wysocki
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Len Brown
a8df217c14 intel_idle: Allow loading ACPI tables for any family
[ Upstream commit e91a158b69 ]

There is no reason to limit intel_idle's loading of ACPI tables to
family 6.  Upcoming Intel processors are not in family 6.

Below "Fixes" really means "applies cleanly until".
That syntax commit didn't change the previous logic,
but shows this patch applies back 5-years.

Fixes: 4a9f45a053 ("intel_idle: Convert to new X86 CPU match macros")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06101aa4fe784e5b0be1cb2c0bdd9afcf16bd9d4.1754681697.git.len.brown@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Xin Long
7d757f17bc sctp: linearize cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv
[ Upstream commit fd60d8a086 ]

A cloned head skb still shares these frag skbs in fraglist with the
original head skb. It's not safe to access these frag skbs.

syzbot reported two use-of-uninitialized-memory bugs caused by this:

  BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211
   sctp_inq_pop+0x15b7/0x1920 net/sctp/inqueue.c:211
   sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x1a7/0xc50 net/sctp/associola.c:998
   sctp_inq_push+0x2ef/0x380 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88
   sctp_backlog_rcv+0x397/0xdb0 net/sctp/input.c:331
   sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1122
   __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3106
   release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3660
   sctp_wait_for_connect+0x487/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9360
   sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x1ec1/0x1f00 net/sctp/socket.c:1885
   sctp_sendmsg+0x32b9/0x4a80 net/sctp/socket.c:2031
   inet_sendmsg+0x25a/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:718 [inline]

and

  BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987
   sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x34e/0xbc0 net/sctp/associola.c:987
   sctp_inq_push+0x2a3/0x350 net/sctp/inqueue.c:88
   sctp_backlog_rcv+0x3c7/0xda0 net/sctp/input.c:331
   sk_backlog_rcv+0x142/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1148
   __release_sock+0x1d3/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3213
   release_sock+0x6b/0x270 net/core/sock.c:3767
   sctp_wait_for_connect+0x458/0x820 net/sctp/socket.c:9367
   sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc+0x223a/0x2260 net/sctp/socket.c:1886
   sctp_sendmsg+0x3910/0x49f0 net/sctp/socket.c:2032
   inet_sendmsg+0x269/0x2a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:851
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline]

This patch fixes it by linearizing cloned gso packets in sctp_rcv().

Fixes: 90017accff ("sctp: Add GSO support")
Reported-by: syzbot+773e51afe420baaf0e2b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+70a42f45e76bede082be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/dd7dc337b99876d4132d0961f776913719f7d225.1754595611.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
Alok Tiwari
e9165b79a1 net: ti: icss-iep: Fix incorrect type for return value in extts_enable()
[ Upstream commit 5f1d1d14db ]

The variable ret in icss_iep_extts_enable() was incorrectly declared
as u32, while the function returns int and may return negative error
codes. This will cause sign extension issues and incorrect error
propagation. Update ret to be int to fix error handling.

This change corrects the declaration to avoid potential type mismatch.

Fixes: c1e0230eea ("net: ti: icss-iep: Add IEP driver")
Signed-off-by: Alok Tiwari <alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250805142323.1949406-1-alok.a.tiwari@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:18 +02:00
MD Danish Anwar
8153bce470 net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix emac link speed handling
[ Upstream commit 06feac1540 ]

When link settings are changed emac->speed is populated by
emac_adjust_link(). The link speed and other settings are then written into
the DRAM. However if both ports are brought down after this and brought up
again or if the operating mode is changed and a firmware reload is needed,
the DRAM is cleared by icssg_config(). As a result the link settings are
lost.

Fix this by calling emac_adjust_link() after icssg_config(). This re
populates the settings in the DRAM after a new firmware load.

Fixes: 9facce84f4 ("net: ti: icssg-prueth: Fix firmware load sequence.")
Signed-off-by: MD Danish Anwar <danishanwar@ti.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Message-ID: <20250805173812.2183161-1-danishanwar@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Florian Westphal
a2cb4df787 netfilter: ctnetlink: fix refcount leak on table dump
[ Upstream commit de788b2e62 ]

There is a reference count leak in ctnetlink_dump_table():
      if (res < 0) {
                nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general); // HERE
                cb->args[1] = (unsigned long)ct;
                ...

While its very unlikely, its possible that ct == last.
If this happens, then the refcount of ct was already incremented.
This 2nd increment is never undone.

This prevents the conntrack object from being released, which in turn
keeps prevents cnet->count from dropping back to 0.

This will then block the netns dismantle (or conntrack rmmod) as
nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list() will wait forever.

This can be reproduced by running conntrack_resize.sh selftest in a loop.
It takes ~20 minutes for me on a preemptible kernel on average before
I see a runaway kworker spinning in nf_conntrack_cleanup_net_list.

One fix would to change this to:
        if (res < 0) {
		if (ct != last)
	                nf_conntrack_get(&ct->ct_general);

But this reference counting isn't needed in the first place.
We can just store a cookie value instead.

A followup patch will do the same for ctnetlink_exp_dump_table,
it looks to me as if this has the same problem and like
ctnetlink_dump_table, we only need a 'skip hint', not the actual
object so we can apply the same cookie strategy there as well.

Fixes: d205dc4079 ("[NETFILTER]: ctnetlink: fix deadlock in table dumping")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Sabrina Dubroca
5e95347bf4 udp: also consider secpath when evaluating ipsec use for checksumming
[ Upstream commit 1118aaa3b3 ]

Commit b40c5f4fde ("udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in
IPsec case") tried to fix checksumming in UFO when the packets are
going through IPsec, so that we can't rely on offloads because the UDP
header and payload will be encrypted.

But when doing a TCP test over VXLAN going through IPsec transport
mode with GSO enabled (esp4_offload module loaded), I'm seeing broken
UDP checksums on the encap after successful decryption.

The skbs get to udp4_ufo_fragment/__skb_udp_tunnel_segment via
__dev_queue_xmit -> validate_xmit_skb -> skb_gso_segment and at this
point we've already dropped the dst (unless the device sets
IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE, which is not common), so need_ipsec is false and
we proceed with checksum offload.

Make need_ipsec also check the secpath, which is not dropped on this
callpath.

Fixes: b40c5f4fde ("udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in IPsec case")
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Jinjiang Tu
2a1f366397 mm/smaps: fix race between smaps_hugetlb_range and migration
[ Upstream commit 45d19b4b6c ]

smaps_hugetlb_range() handles the pte without holdling ptl, and may be
concurrenct with migration, leaing to BUG_ON in pfn_swap_entry_to_page().
The race is as follows.

smaps_hugetlb_range              migrate_pages
  huge_ptep_get
                                   remove_migration_ptes
				   folio_unlock
  pfn_swap_entry_folio
    BUG_ON

To fix it, hold ptl lock in smaps_hugetlb_range().

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250724090958.455887-1-tujinjiang@huawei.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250724090958.455887-2-tujinjiang@huawei.com
Fixes: 25ee01a2fc ("mm: hugetlb: proc: add hugetlb-related fields to /proc/PID/smaps")
Signed-off-by: Jinjiang Tu <tujinjiang@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrei Vagin <avagin@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Cc: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Brahmajit Das <brahmajit.xyz@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Dev Jain <dev.jain@arm.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@logfs.org>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@oracle.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <thiago.bauermann@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Al Viro
c07886761f habanalabs: fix UAF in export_dmabuf()
[ Upstream commit 33927f3d0e ]

As soon as we'd inserted a file reference into descriptor table, another
thread could close it.  That's fine for the case when all we are doing is
returning that descriptor to userland (it's a race, but it's a userland
race and there's nothing the kernel can do about it).  However, if we
follow fd_install() with any kind of access to objects that would be
destroyed on close (be it the struct file itself or anything destroyed
by its ->release()), we have a UAF.

dma_buf_fd() is a combination of reserving a descriptor and fd_install().
habanalabs export_dmabuf() calls it and then proceeds to access the
objects destroyed on close.  In particular, it grabs an extra reference to
another struct file that will be dropped as part of ->release() for ours;
that "will be" is actually "might have already been".

Fix that by reserving descriptor before anything else and do fd_install()
only when everything had been set up.  As a side benefit, we no longer
have the failure exit with file already created, but reference to
underlying file (as well as ->dmabuf_export_cnt, etc.) not grabbed yet;
unlike dma_buf_fd(), fd_install() can't fail.

Fixes: db1a8dd916 ("habanalabs: add support for dma-buf exporter")
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Maxim Levitsky
7ea3763d3a KVM: VMX: Preserve host's DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM while running the guest
[ Upstream commit 6b1dd26544 ]

Set/clear DEBUGCTLMSR_FREEZE_IN_SMM in GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL based on the
host's pre-VM-Enter value, i.e. preserve the host's FREEZE_IN_SMM setting
while running the guest.  When running with the "default treatment of SMIs"
in effect (the only mode KVM supports), SMIs do not generate a VM-Exit that
is visible to host (non-SMM) software, and instead transitions directly
from VMX non-root to SMM.  And critically, DEBUGCTL isn't context switched
by hardware on SMI or RSM, i.e. SMM will run with whatever value was
resident in hardware at the time of the SMI.

Failure to preserve FREEZE_IN_SMM results in the PMU unexpectedly counting
events while the CPU is executing in SMM, which can pollute profiling and
potentially leak information into the guest.

Check for changes in FREEZE_IN_SMM prior to every entry into KVM's inner
run loop, as the bit can be toggled in IRQ context via IPI callback (SMP
function call), by way of /sys/devices/cpu/freeze_on_smi.

Add a field in kvm_x86_ops to communicate which DEBUGCTL bits need to be
preserved, as FREEZE_IN_SMM is only supported and defined for Intel CPUs,
i.e. explicitly checking FREEZE_IN_SMM in common x86 is at best weird, and
at worst could lead to undesirable behavior in the future if AMD CPUs ever
happened to pick up a collision with the bit.

Exempt TDX vCPUs, i.e. protected guests, from the check, as the TDX Module
owns and controls GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.

WARN in SVM if KVM_RUN_LOAD_DEBUGCTL is set, mostly to document that the
lack of handling isn't a KVM bug (TDX already WARNs on any run_flag).

Lastly, explicitly reload GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL on a VM-Fail that is missed
by KVM but detected by hardware, i.e. in nested_vmx_restore_host_state().
Doing so avoids the need to track host_debugctl on a per-VMCS basis, as
GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL is unconditionally written by prepare_vmcs02() and
load_vmcs12_host_state().  For the VM-Fail case, even though KVM won't
have actually entered the guest, vcpu_enter_guest() will have run with
vmcs02 active and thus could result in vmcs01 being run with a stale value.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-9-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: resolve syntactic conflict in vt_x86_ops definition]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Maxim Levitsky
a8db75995a KVM: VMX: Wrap all accesses to IA32_DEBUGCTL with getter/setter APIs
[ Upstream commit 7d0cce6cbe ]

Introduce vmx_guest_debugctl_{read,write}() to handle all accesses to
vmcs.GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL. This will allow stuffing FREEZE_IN_SMM into
GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL based on the host setting without bleeding the state
into the guest, and without needing to copy+paste the FREEZE_IN_SMM
logic into every patch that accesses GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL.

No functional change intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
[sean: massage changelog, make inline, use in all prepare_vmcs02() cases]
Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-8-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Maxim Levitsky
73a8e77bb5 KVM: nVMX: Check vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl on nested VM-Enter
[ Upstream commit 095686e6fc ]

Add a consistency check for L2's guest_ia32_debugctl, as KVM only supports
a subset of hardware functionality, i.e. KVM can't rely on hardware to
detect illegal/unsupported values.  Failure to check the vmcs12 value
would allow the guest to load any harware-supported value while running L2.

Take care to exempt BTF and LBR from the validity check in order to match
KVM's behavior for writes via WRMSR, but without clobbering vmcs12.  Even
if VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set in vmcs12, L1 can reasonably expect
that vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl will not be modified if writes to the MSR
are being intercepted.

Arguably, KVM _should_ update vmcs12 if VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS is set
*and* writes to MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR are not being intercepted by L1, but
that would incur non-trivial complexity and wouldn't change the fact that
KVM's handling of DEBUGCTL is blatantly broken.  I.e. the extra complexity
is not worth carrying.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-7-seanjc@google.com
Stable-dep-of: 7d0cce6cbe ("KVM: VMX: Wrap all accesses to IA32_DEBUGCTL with getter/setter APIs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
6c6a7c69a0 KVM: VMX: Extract checking of guest's DEBUGCTL into helper
[ Upstream commit 8a4351ac30 ]

Move VMX's logic to check DEBUGCTL values into a standalone helper so that
the code can be used by nested VM-Enter to apply the same logic to the
value being loaded from vmcs12.

KVM needs to explicitly check vmcs12->guest_ia32_debugctl on nested
VM-Enter, as hardware may support features that KVM does not, i.e. relying
on hardware to detect invalid guest state will result in false negatives.
Unfortunately, that means applying KVM's funky suppression of BTF and LBR
to vmcs12 so as not to break existing guests.

No functional change intended.

Reviewed-by: Dapeng Mi <dapeng1.mi@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-6-seanjc@google.com
Stable-dep-of: 7d0cce6cbe ("KVM: VMX: Wrap all accesses to IA32_DEBUGCTL with getter/setter APIs")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:17 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
56eb5c57e3 KVM: VMX: Allow guest to set DEBUGCTL.RTM_DEBUG if RTM is supported
[ Upstream commit 17ec2f9653 ]

Let the guest set DEBUGCTL.RTM_DEBUG if RTM is supported according to the
guest CPUID model, as debug support is supposed to be available if RTM is
supported, and there are no known downsides to letting the guest debug RTM
aborts.

Note, there are no known bug reports related to RTM_DEBUG, the primary
motivation is to reduce the probability of breaking existing guests when a
future change adds a missing consistency check on vmcs12.GUEST_DEBUGCTL
(KVM currently lets L2 run with whatever hardware supports; whoops).

Note #2, KVM already emulates DR6.RTM, and doesn't restrict access to
DR7.RTM.

Fixes: 83c529151a ("KVM: x86: expose Intel cpu new features (HLE, RTM) to guest")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-5-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
d1a530a224 KVM: x86: Drop kvm_x86_ops.set_dr6() in favor of a new KVM_RUN flag
[ Upstream commit 80c64c7afe ]

Instruct vendor code to load the guest's DR6 into hardware via a new
KVM_RUN flag, and remove kvm_x86_ops.set_dr6(), whose sole purpose was to
load vcpu->arch.dr6 into hardware when DR6 can be read/written directly
by the guest.

Note, TDX already WARNs on any run_flag being set, i.e. will yell if KVM
thinks DR6 needs to be reloaded.  TDX vCPUs force KVM_DEBUGREG_AUTO_SWITCH
and never clear the flag, i.e. should never observe KVM_RUN_LOAD_GUEST_DR6.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-4-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: drop TDX changes]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
1fc1d9b854 KVM: x86: Convert vcpu_run()'s immediate exit param into a generic bitmap
[ Upstream commit 2478b1b220 ]

Convert kvm_x86_ops.vcpu_run()'s "force_immediate_exit" boolean parameter
into an a generic bitmap so that similar "take action" information can be
passed to vendor code without creating a pile of boolean parameters.

This will allow dropping kvm_x86_ops.set_dr6() in favor of a new flag, and
will also allow for adding similar functionality for re-loading debugctl
in the active VMCS.

Opportunistically massage the TDX WARN and comment to prepare for adding
more run_flags, all of which are expected to be mutually exclusive with
TDX, i.e. should be WARNed on.

No functional change intended.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250610232010.162191-3-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[sean: drop TDX changes]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Stefan Metzmacher
a831c3e679 smb: client: don't wait for info->send_pending == 0 on error
commit 8c48e1c752 upstream.

We already called ib_drain_qp() before and that makes sure
send_done() was called with IB_WC_WR_FLUSH_ERR, but
didn't called atomic_dec_and_test(&sc->send_io.pending.count)

So we may never reach the info->send_pending == 0 condition.

Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Fixes: 5349ae5e05 ("smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00
Stefan Metzmacher
65969af6dd smb: client: let send_done() cleanup before calling smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection()
commit 5349ae5e05 upstream.

We should call ib_dma_unmap_single() and mempool_free() before calling
smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection().

And smbd_disconnect_rdma_connection() needs to be the last function to
call as all other state might already be gone after it returns.

Cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Cc: Long Li <longli@microsoft.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
Fixes: f198186aa9 ("CIFS: SMBD: Establish SMB Direct connection")
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-08-20 18:30:16 +02:00