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Luis Gerhorst b0c89ef025 bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation 
[ Upstream commit e4f4db4779 ]

To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3a ("bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.

However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.

To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.

The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:

  [...]
  // r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
  // r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
  // r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
  //
  r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
  *(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
  // lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
  //
  // Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor
  // for no r9-r10 dependency.
  //
  *(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
  // 2039f26f3a: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID,
  // store may be subject to SSB
  //
  // fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
  //
  r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
  // r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
  //
  // leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
  r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
  if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
  // architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
  // only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
  r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
  [...]

After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to
determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64
times to recover the whole address on amd64.

In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is
overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative
store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer
bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless
logic. See 979d63d50c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on
pointer arithmetic") for details.

Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks}
because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled.
For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable
while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address
into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged
processes.

Fixes: 2039f26f3a ("bpf: Fix leakage due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation")
Signed-off-by: Luis Gerhorst <gerhorst@cs.fau.de>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Henriette Hofmeier <henriette.hofmeier@rub.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/edc95bad-aada-9cfc-ffe2-fa9bb206583c@cs.fau.de
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230109150544.41465-1-gerhorst@cs.fau.de
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
History 2023-02-01 08:34:17 +01:00
arch ARM: dts: at91: sam9x60: fix the ddr clock for sam9x60 2023-02-01 08:34:09 +01:00
block block: mq-deadline: Rename deadline_is_seq_writes() 2023-01-24 07:24:44 +01:00
certs certs: make system keyring depend on built-in x509 parser 2022-09-24 04:31:18 +09:00
crypto crypto: tcrypt - Fix multibuffer skcipher speed test mem leak 2022-12-31 13:32:34 +01:00
Documentation docs: Fix path paste-o for /sys/kernel/warn_count 2023-01-24 07:24:41 +01:00
drivers amd-xgbe: Delay AN timeout during KR training 2023-02-01 08:34:10 +01:00
fs NFSD: fix use-after-free in nfsd4_ssc_setup_dul() 2023-02-01 08:34:09 +01:00
include panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks 2023-01-24 07:24:41 +01:00
init gcc: disable -Warray-bounds for gcc-11 too 2023-01-14 10:33:43 +01:00
io_uring io_uring/poll: don't reissue in case of poll race on multishot request 2023-01-24 07:24:37 +01:00
ipc ipc: fix memory leak in init_mqueue_fs() 2022-12-31 13:32:01 +01:00
kernel bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation 2023-02-01 08:34:17 +01:00
lib panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks 2023-01-24 07:24:41 +01:00
LICENSES LICENSES/LGPL-2.1: Add LGPL-2.1-or-later as valid identifiers 2021-12-16 14:33:10 +01:00
mm panic: Consolidate open-coded panic_on_warn checks 2023-01-24 07:24:41 +01:00
net Revert "wifi: mac80211: fix memory leak in ieee80211_if_add()" 2023-01-24 07:24:44 +01:00
rust Kbuild: add Rust support 2022-09-28 09:02:20 +02:00
samples samples: vfio-mdev: Fix missing pci_disable_device() in mdpy_fb_probe() 2022-12-31 13:32:42 +01:00
scripts - Handle different output of readelf on different distros running 2022-11-27 12:08:17 -08:00
security tomoyo: fix broken dependency on *.conf.default 2023-02-01 08:34:06 +01:00
sound ALSA: usb-audio: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference in snd_usb_pcm_has_fixed_rate() 2023-01-18 11:58:32 +01:00
tools selftests: mptcp: userspace: validate v4-v6 subflows mix 2023-01-24 07:24:37 +01:00
usr usr/gen_init_cpio.c: remove unnecessary -1 values from int file 2022-10-03 14:21:44 -07:00
virt Merge branch 'kvm-dwmw2-fixes' into HEAD 2022-11-23 18:59:45 -05:00
.clang-format inet: ping: use hlist_nulls rcu iterator during lookup 2022-12-01 12:42:46 +01:00
.cocciconfig scripts: add Linux .cocciconfig for coccinelle 2016-07-22 12:13:39 +02:00
.get_maintainer.ignore get_maintainer: add Alan to .get_maintainer.ignore 2022-08-20 15:17:44 -07:00
.gitattributes .gitattributes: use 'dts' diff driver for dts files 2019-12-04 19:44:11 -08:00
.gitignore Kbuild: add Rust support 2022-09-28 09:02:20 +02:00
.mailmap 9 hotfixes. 6 for MM, 3 for other areas. Four of these patches address 2022-12-10 17:10:52 -08:00
.rustfmt.toml rust: add .rustfmt.toml 2022-09-28 09:02:20 +02:00
COPYING COPYING: state that all contributions really are covered by this file 2020-02-10 13:32:20 -08:00
CREDITS MAINTAINERS: Remove Michal Marek from Kbuild maintainers 2022-11-16 14:53:00 +09:00
Kbuild Kbuild updates for v6.1 2022-10-10 12:00:45 -07:00
Kconfig kbuild: ensure full rebuild when the compiler is updated 2020-05-12 13:28:33 +09:00
MAINTAINERS panic: Expose "warn_count" to sysfs 2023-01-24 07:24:41 +01:00
Makefile kbuild: fix 'make modules' error when CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES=y 2023-02-01 08:34:08 +01:00
README Drop all 00-INDEX files from Documentation/ 2018-09-09 15:08:58 -06:00

README 

Linux kernel
============

There are several guides for kernel developers and users. These guides can
be rendered in a number of formats, like HTML and PDF. Please read
Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst first.

In order to build the documentation, use ``make htmldocs`` or
``make pdfdocs``.  The formatted documentation can also be read online at:

    https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/

There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory,
several of them using the Restructured Text markup notation.

Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the
requirements for building and running the kernel, and information about
the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.