[ Upstream commit 457f4393d0 ]
In amdxdna_gem_obj_vmap(), calling dma_buf_vmap() triggers a kernel
warning if LOCKDEP is enabled. So for imported object, use
dma_buf_vmap_unlocked(). Then, use drm_gem_vmap() for other objects.
The similar change applies to vunmap code.
Fixes: bd72d4acda ("accel/amdxdna: Support user space allocated buffer")
Reviewed-by: Maciej Falkowski <maciej.falkowski@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Hou <lizhi.hou@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250916174842.234709-1-lizhi.hou@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 9e16c8bf9a ]
The unpublished smatch static checker reported a warning.
drivers/accel/amdxdna/aie2_pci.c:904 aie2_query_ctx_status_array()
warn: potential user controlled sizeof overflow
'args->num_element * args->element_size' '1-u32max(user) * 1-u32max(user)'
Even this will not cause a real issue, it is better to put a reasonable
limitation for element_size and num_element. Add condition to make sure
the input element_size <= 4K and num_element <= 1K.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/aL56ZCLyl3tLQM1e@stanley.mountain/
Fixes: 2f509fe6a4 ("accel/amdxdna: Add ioctl DRM_IOCTL_AMDXDNA_GET_ARRAY")
Reviewed-by: Maciej Falkowski <maciej.falkowski@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Lizhi Hou <lizhi.hou@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250909154531.3469979-1-lizhi.hou@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c7d393267c ]
Fix race condition between host1x_syncpt_alloc()
and host1x_syncpt_put() by using kref_put_mutex()
instead of kref_put() + manual mutex locking.
This ensures no thread can acquire the
syncpt_mutex after the refcount drops to zero
but before syncpt_release acquires it.
This prevents races where syncpoints could
be allocated while still being cleaned up
from a previous release.
Remove explicit mutex locking in syncpt_release
as kref_put_mutex() handles this atomically.
Signed-off-by: Mainak Sen <msen@nvidia.com>
Fixes: f5ba33fb96 ("gpu: host1x: Reserve VBLANK syncpoints at initialization")
Signed-off-by: Mikko Perttunen <mperttunen@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250707-host1x-syncpt-race-fix-v1-1-28b0776e70bc@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 674e2b2479 ]
This command:
# echo foo/bar >/proc/$$/attr/smack/current
gives the task a label 'foo' w/o indication
that label does not match input.
Setting the label with lsm_set_self_attr() syscall
behaves identically.
This occures because:
1) smk_parse_smack() is used to convert input to a label
2) smk_parse_smack() takes only that part from the
beginning of the input that looks like a label.
3) `/' is prohibited in labels, so only "foo" is taken.
(2) is by design, because smk_parse_smack() is used
for parsing strings which are more than just a label.
Silent failure is not a good thing, and there are two
indicators that this was not done intentionally:
(size >= SMK_LONGLABEL) ~> invalid
clause at the beginning of the do_setattr() and the
"Returns the length of the smack label" claim
in the do_setattr() description.
So I fixed this by adding one tiny check:
the taken label length == input length.
Since input length is now strictly controlled,
I changed the two ways of setting label
smack_setselfattr(): lsm_set_self_attr() syscall
smack_setprocattr(): > /proc/.../current
to accommodate the divergence in
what they understand by "input length":
smack_setselfattr counts mandatory \0 into input length,
smack_setprocattr does not.
smack_setprocattr allows various trailers after label
Related changes:
* fixed description for smk_parse_smack
* allow unprivileged tasks validate label syntax.
* extract smk_parse_label_len() from smk_parse_smack()
so parsing may be done w/o string allocation.
* extract smk_import_valid_label() from smk_import_entry()
to avoid repeated parsing.
* smk_parse_smack(): scan null-terminated strings
for no more than SMK_LONGLABEL(256) characters
* smack_setselfattr(): require struct lsm_ctx . flags == 0
to reserve them for future.
Fixes: e114e47377 ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c147e13ea7 ]
If an unprivileged task is allowed to relabel itself
(/smack/relabel-self is not empty),
it can freely create new labels by writing their
names into own /proc/PID/attr/smack/current
This occurs because do_setattr() imports
the provided label in advance,
before checking "relabel-self" list.
This change ensures that the "relabel-self" list
is checked before importing the label.
Fixes: 38416e5393 ("Smack: limited capability for changing process label")
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 78fc6a94be ]
According to [1], the label of a UNIX domain socket (UDS)
file (i.e., the filesystem object representing the socket)
is not supposed to participate in Smack security.
To achieve this, [1] labels UDS files with "*"
in smack_d_instantiate().
Before [2], smack_d_instantiate() was responsible
for initializing Smack security for all inodes,
except ones under /proc
[2] imposed the sole responsibility for initializing
inode security for newly created filesystem objects
on smack_inode_init_security().
However, smack_inode_init_security() lacks some logic
present in smack_d_instantiate().
In particular, it does not label UDS files with "*".
This patch adds the missing labeling of UDS files
with "*" to smack_inode_init_security().
Labeling UDS files with "*" in smack_d_instantiate()
still works for stale UDS files that already exist on
disk. Stale UDS files are useless, but I keep labeling
them for consistency and maybe to make easier for user
to delete them.
Compared to [1], this version introduces the following
improvements:
* UDS file label is held inside inode only
and not saved to xattrs.
* relabeling UDS files (setxattr, removexattr, etc.)
is blocked.
[1] 2010-11-24 Casey Schaufler
commit b4e0d5f079 ("Smack: UDS revision")
[2] 2023-11-16 roberto.sassu
Fixes: e63d86b8b7 ("smack: Initialize the in-memory inode in smack_inode_init_security()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231116090125.187209-5-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com/
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 69204f6cdb ]
If memory allocation for the SMACK64TRANSMUTE
xattr value fails in smack_inode_init_security(),
the SMK_INODE_INSTANT flag is not set in
(struct inode_smack *issp)->smk_flags,
leaving the inode as not "instantiated".
It does not matter if fs frees the inode
after failed smack_inode_init_security() call,
but there is no guarantee for this.
To be safe, mark the inode as "instantiated",
even if allocation of xattr values fails.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Stable-dep-of: 78fc6a94be ("smack: fix bug: invalid label of unix socket file")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 195da3ff24 ]
When a new file system object is created
and the conditions for label transmutation are met,
the SMACK64TRANSMUTE extended attribute is set
on the object regardless of its type:
file, pipe, socket, symlink, or directory.
However,
SMACK64TRANSMUTE may only be set on directories.
This bug is a combined effect of the commits [1] and [2]
which both transfer functionality
from smack_d_instantiate() to smack_inode_init_security(),
but only in part.
Commit [1] set blank SMACK64TRANSMUTE on improper object types.
Commit [2] set "TRUE" SMACK64TRANSMUTE on improper object types.
[1] 2023-06-10,
Fixes: baed456a6a ("smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20230610075738.3273764-3-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com/
[2] 2023-11-16,
Fixes: e63d86b8b7 ("smack: Initialize the in-memory inode in smack_inode_init_security()")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231116090125.187209-5-roberto.sassu@huaweicloud.com/
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Andreev <andreev@swemel.ru>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
commit 502ddcc405 upstream.
The Extended Supported Rates (ESR) IE handling in OnBeacon accessed
*(p + 1 + ielen) and *(p + 2 + ielen) without verifying that these
offsets lie within the received frame buffer. A malformed beacon with
an ESR IE positioned at the end of the buffer could cause an
out-of-bounds read, potentially triggering a kernel panic.
Add a boundary check to ensure that the ESR IE body and the subsequent
bytes are within the limits of the frame before attempting to access
them.
This prevents OOB reads caused by malformed beacon frames.
Signed-off-by: Navaneeth K <knavaneeth786@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 6ef0e1c104 upstream.
The Supported Rates IE length from an incoming Association Request frame
was used directly as the memcpy() length when copying into a fixed-size
16-byte stack buffer (supportRate). A malicious station can advertise an
IE length larger than 16 bytes, causing a stack buffer overflow.
Clamp ie_len to the buffer size before copying the Supported Rates IE,
and correct the bounds check when merging Extended Supported Rates to
prevent a second potential overflow.
This prevents kernel stack corruption triggered by malformed association
requests.
Signed-off-by: Navaneeth K <knavaneeth786@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 154828bf95 upstream.
The Information Element (IE) parser rtw_get_ie() trusted the length
byte of each IE without validating that the IE body (len bytes after
the 2-byte header) fits inside the remaining frame buffer. A malformed
frame can advertise an IE length larger than the available data, causing
the parser to increment its pointer beyond the buffer end. This results
in out-of-bounds reads or, depending on the pattern, an infinite loop.
Fix by validating that (offset + 2 + len) does not exceed the limit
before accepting the IE or advancing to the next element.
This prevents OOB reads and ensures the parser terminates safely on
malformed frames.
Signed-off-by: Navaneeth K <knavaneeth786@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0de7d9cd07 upstream.
Syzbot identified an issue [1] that crashes kernel, seemingly due to
unexistent callback dev->get_valid_routes(). By all means, this should
not occur as said callback must always be set to
get_zero_valid_routes() in __comedi_device_postconfig().
As the crash seems to appear exclusively in i386 kernels, at least,
judging from [1] reports, the blame lies with compat versions
of standard IOCTL handlers. Several of them are modified and
do not use comedi_unlocked_ioctl(). While functionality of these
ioctls essentially copy their original versions, they do not
have required sanity check for device's attached status. This,
in turn, leads to a possibility of calling select IOCTLs on a
device that has not been properly setup, even via COMEDI_DEVCONFIG.
Doing so on unconfigured devices means that several crucial steps
are missed, for instance, specifying dev->get_valid_routes()
callback.
Fix this somewhat crudely by ensuring device's attached status before
performing any ioctls, improving logic consistency between modern
and compat functions.
[1] Syzbot report:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
...
CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 000000006c717000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
get_valid_routes drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1322 [inline]
parse_insn+0x78c/0x1970 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1401
do_insnlist_ioctl+0x272/0x700 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:1594
compat_insnlist drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:3208 [inline]
comedi_compat_ioctl+0x810/0x990 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:3273
__do_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:695 [inline]
__se_compat_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:638 [inline]
__ia32_compat_sys_ioctl+0x242/0x370 fs/ioctl.c:638
do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/syscall_32.c:83 [inline]
...
Reported-by: syzbot+ab8008c24e84adee93ff@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=ab8008c24e84adee93ff
Fixes: 3fbfd2223a ("comedi: get rid of compat_alloc_user_space() mess in COMEDI_CHANINFO compat")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251023132234.395794-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit f24c6e3a39 upstream.
Syzbot identified an issue [1] in multiq3_attach() that induces a
task timeout due to open() or COMEDI_DEVCONFIG ioctl operations,
specifically, in the case of multiq3 driver.
This problem arose when syzkaller managed to craft weird configuration
options used to specify the number of channels in encoder subdevice.
If a particularly great number is passed to s->n_chan in
multiq3_attach() via it->options[2], then multiple calls to
multiq3_encoder_reset() at the end of driver-specific attach() method
will be running for minutes, thus blocking tasks and affected devices
as well.
While this issue is most likely not too dangerous for real-life
devices, it still makes sense to sanitize configuration inputs. Enable
a sensible limit on the number of encoder chips (4 chips max, each
with 2 channels) to stop this behaviour from manifesting.
[1] Syzbot crash:
INFO: task syz.2.19:6067 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
context_switch kernel/sched/core.c:5254 [inline]
__schedule+0x17c4/0x4d60 kernel/sched/core.c:6862
__schedule_loop kernel/sched/core.c:6944 [inline]
schedule+0x165/0x360 kernel/sched/core.c:6959
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x30 kernel/sched/core.c:7016
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:676 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x7e6/0x1350 kernel/locking/mutex.c:760
comedi_open+0xc0/0x590 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:2868
chrdev_open+0x4cc/0x5e0 fs/char_dev.c:414
do_dentry_open+0x953/0x13f0 fs/open.c:965
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1097
...
Reported-by: syzbot+7811bb68a317954a0347@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=7811bb68a317954a0347
Fixes: 77e01cdbad ("Staging: comedi: add multiq3 driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251023132205.395753-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 72262330f7 upstream.
The Comedi low-level driver "c6xdigio" seems to be for a parallel port
connected device. When the Comedi core calls the driver's Comedi
"attach" handler `c6xdigio_attach()` to configure a Comedi to use this
driver, it tries to enable the parallel port PNP resources by
registering a PNP driver with `pnp_register_driver()`, but ignores the
return value. (The `struct pnp_driver` it uses has only the `name` and
`id_table` members filled in.) The driver's Comedi "detach" handler
`c6xdigio_detach()` unconditionally unregisters the PNP driver with
`pnp_unregister_driver()`.
It is possible for `c6xdigio_attach()` to return an error before it
calls `pnp_register_driver()` and it is possible for the call to
`pnp_register_driver()` to return an error (that is ignored). In both
cases, the driver should not be calling `pnp_unregister_driver()` as it
does in `c6xdigio_detach()`. (Note that `c6xdigio_detach()` will be
called by the Comedi core if `c6xdigio_attach()` returns an error, or if
the Comedi core decides to detach the Comedi device from the driver for
some other reason.)
The unconditional call to `pnp_unregister_driver()` without a previous
successful call to `pnp_register_driver()` will cause
`driver_unregister()` to issue a warning "Unexpected driver
unregister!". This was detected by Syzbot [1].
Also, the PNP driver registration and unregistration should be done at
module init and exit time, respectively, not when attaching or detaching
Comedi devices to the driver. (There might be more than one Comedi
device being attached to the driver, although that is unlikely.)
Change the driver to do the PNP driver registration at module init time,
and the unregistration at module exit time. Since `c6xdigio_detach()`
now only calls `comedi_legacy_detach()`, remove the function and change
the Comedi driver "detach" handler to `comedi_legacy_detach`.
-------------------------------------------
[1] Syzbot sample crash report:
Unexpected driver unregister!
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5970 at drivers/base/driver.c:273 driver_unregister drivers/base/driver.c:273 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5970 at drivers/base/driver.c:273 driver_unregister+0x90/0xb0 drivers/base/driver.c:270
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5970 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/02/2025
RIP: 0010:driver_unregister drivers/base/driver.c:273 [inline]
RIP: 0010:driver_unregister+0x90/0xb0 drivers/base/driver.c:270
Code: 48 89 ef e8 c2 e6 82 fc 48 89 df e8 3a 93 ff ff 5b 5d e9 c3 6d d9 fb e8 be 6d d9 fb 90 48 c7 c7 e0 f8 1f 8c e8 51 a2 97 fb 90 <0f> 0b 90 90 5b 5d e9 a5 6d d9 fb e8 e0 f4 41 fc eb 94 e8 d9 f4 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000373f9a0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8ff24720 RCX: ffffffff817b6ee8
RDX: ffff88807c932480 RSI: ffffffff817b6ef5 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffff8ff24660
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88814cca0000
FS: 000055556dab1500(0000) GS:ffff8881249d9000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055f77f285cd0 CR3: 000000007d871000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
comedi_device_detach_locked+0x12f/0xa50 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:207
comedi_device_detach+0x67/0xb0 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:215
comedi_device_attach+0x43d/0x900 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:1011
do_devconfig_ioctl+0x1b1/0x710 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:872
comedi_unlocked_ioctl+0x165d/0x2f00 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:2178
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xfa0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fc05798eec9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffcf8184238 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fc057be5fa0 RCX: 00007fc05798eec9
RDX: 0000200000000080 RSI: 0000000040946400 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fc057a11f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007fc057be5fa0 R14: 00007fc057be5fa0 R15: 0000000000000003
</TASK>
-------------------------------------------
Reported-by: syzbot+6616bba359cec7a1def1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6616bba359cec7a1def1
Fixes: 2c89e159cd ("Staging: comedi: add c6xdigio driver")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251023123141.6537-1-abbotti@mev.co.uk
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b66cddc8be upstream.
Fix AD4080 chip identification by using the correct 16-bit product ID
(0x0050) instead of GENMASK(2, 0). Update the chip reading logic to
use regmap_bulk_read to read both PRODUCT_ID_L and PRODUCT_ID_H
registers and combine them into a 16-bit value.
The original implementation was incorrectly reading only 3 bits,
which would not correctly identify the AD4080 chip.
Fixes: 6b31ba1811 ("iio: adc: ad4080: add driver support")
Signed-off-by: Antoniu Miclaus <antoniu.miclaus@analog.com>
Reviewed-by: Nuno Sá <nuno.sa@analog.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit d432df758f upstream.
Asserting or deasserting a modem control line using TIOCMBIS or TIOCMBIC
should not deassert any lines that are not in the mask.
Fix this long-standing issue dating back to 2003 when the support for
these ioctls was added with the introduction of the tiocmset() callback.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit b6e0b30161 upstream.
Asserting or deasserting a modem control line using TIOCMBIS or TIOCMBIC
should not deassert any lines that are not in the mask.
Fix this long-standing regression dating back to 2003 when the
tiocmset() callback was introduced.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 75a9f4c547 upstream.
On RSCI IP, a deadlock occurs during a FIFO overrun error, as it uses a
different register to clear the FIFO overrun error status.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 0666e3fe95 ("serial: sh-sci: Add support for RZ/T2H SCI")
Signed-off-by: Biju Das <biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251114101350.106699-3-biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a6cdfd69ad upstream.
Drop "uart-has-rtscts: false" from binding as the IP supports hardware
flow control on all SoCs.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Fixes: 25422e8f46 ("dt-bindings: serial: Add compatible for Renesas RZ/T2H SoC in sci")
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Biju Das <biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251114101350.106699-2-biju.das.jz@bp.renesas.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 0e5a99e0e5 upstream.
Addi-Data GmbH is manufacturing multi-serial ports cards supporting CompactPCI (known as CPCI).
Those cards are identified with different DeviceIds. Those cards integrating standard UARTs
work the same way as PCI/PCIe models already supported in the serial driver.
Signed-off-by: Magne Bruno <magne.bruno@addi-data.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251110162456.341029-1-magne.bruno@addi-data.com
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4e31a5d0a9 upstream.
Some FTDI devices have the first port reserved for JTAG and have been
using a dedicated quirk to prevent binding to it.
As can be inferred directly or indirectly from the commit messages,
almost all of these devices are dual port devices which means that the
more recently added macro for matching on interface number can be used
instead (and some such devices do so already).
This avoids probing interfaces that will never be bound and cleans up
the match table somewhat.
Note that the JTAG quirk is kept for quad port devices, which would
otherwise require three match entries.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 4da3768e18 upstream.
When re-injecting a soft interrupt from an INT3, INT0, or (select) INTn
instruction, discard the exception and retry the instruction if the code
stream is changed (e.g. by a different vCPU) between when the CPU
executes the instruction and when KVM decodes the instruction to get the
next RIP.
As effectively predicted by commit 6ef88d6e36 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject
INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction"), failure to verify that
the correct INTn instruction was decoded can effectively clobber guest
state due to decoding the wrong instruction and thus specifying the
wrong next RIP.
The bug most often manifests as "Oops: int3" panics on static branch
checks in Linux guests. Enabling or disabling a static branch in Linux
uses the kernel's "text poke" code patching mechanism. To modify code
while other CPUs may be executing that code, Linux (temporarily)
replaces the first byte of the original instruction with an int3 (opcode
0xcc), then patches in the new code stream except for the first byte,
and finally replaces the int3 with the first byte of the new code
stream. If a CPU hits the int3, i.e. executes the code while it's being
modified, then the guest kernel must look up the RIP to determine how to
handle the #BP, e.g. by emulating the new instruction. If the RIP is
incorrect, then this lookup fails and the guest kernel panics.
The bug reproduces almost instantly by hacking the guest kernel to
repeatedly check a static branch[1] while running a drgn script[2] on
the host to constantly swap out the memory containing the guest's TSS.
[1]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/44d17c51c28c0ac998ea0334edf90b5a
[2]: https://gist.github.com/osandov/10e45e45afa29b11e0c7209247afc00b
Fixes: 6ef88d6e36 ("KVM: SVM: Re-inject INT3/INTO instead of retrying the instruction")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/1cc6dcdf36e3add7ee7c8d90ad58414eeb6c3d34.1762278762.git.osandov@fb.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit a51f025b50 upstream.
Syzbot identified an issue [1] in pcl818_ai_cancel(), which stems from
the fact that in case of early device detach via pcl818_detach(),
subdevice dev->read_subdev may not have initialized its pointer to
&struct comedi_async as intended. Thus, any such dereferencing of
&s->async->cmd will lead to general protection fault and kernel crash.
Mitigate this problem by removing a call to pcl818_ai_cancel() from
pcl818_detach() altogether. This way, if the subdevice setups its
support for async commands, everything async-related will be
handled via subdevice's own ->cancel() function in
comedi_device_detach_locked() even before pcl818_detach(). If no
support for asynchronous commands is provided, there is no need
to cancel anything either.
[1] Syzbot crash:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6050 Comm: syz.0.18 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/18/2025
RIP: 0010:pcl818_ai_cancel+0x69/0x3f0 drivers/comedi/drivers/pcl818.c:762
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
pcl818_detach+0x66/0xd0 drivers/comedi/drivers/pcl818.c:1115
comedi_device_detach_locked+0x178/0x750 drivers/comedi/drivers.c:207
do_devconfig_ioctl drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:848 [inline]
comedi_unlocked_ioctl+0xcde/0x1020 drivers/comedi/comedi_fops.c:2178
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
...
Reported-by: syzbot+fce5d9d5bd067d6fbe9b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fce5d9d5bd067d6fbe9b
Fixes: 00aba6e7b5 ("staging: comedi: pcl818: remove 'neverending_ai' from private data")
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Nikita Zhandarovich <n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ian Abbott <abbotti@mev.co.uk>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251023141457.398685-1-n.zhandarovich@fintech.ru
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 3e0ae02ba8 upstream.
Rust Binder contains the following unsafe operation:
// SAFETY: A `NodeDeath` is never inserted into the death list
// of any node other than its owner, so it is either in this
// death list or in no death list.
unsafe { node_inner.death_list.remove(self) };
This operation is unsafe because when touching the prev/next pointers of
a list element, we have to ensure that no other thread is also touching
them in parallel. If the node is present in the list that `remove` is
called on, then that is fine because we have exclusive access to that
list. If the node is not in any list, then it's also ok. But if it's
present in a different list that may be accessed in parallel, then that
may be a data race on the prev/next pointers.
And unfortunately that is exactly what is happening here. In
Node::release, we:
1. Take the lock.
2. Move all items to a local list on the stack.
3. Drop the lock.
4. Iterate the local list on the stack.
Combined with threads using the unsafe remove method on the original
list, this leads to memory corruption of the prev/next pointers. This
leads to crashes like this one:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 000bb9841bcac70e
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000044
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[000bb9841bcac70e] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
google-cdd 538c004.gcdd: context saved(CPU:1)
item - log_kevents is disabled
Modules linked in: ... rust_binder
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2092 Comm: kworker/1:178 Tainted: G S W OE 6.12.52-android16-5-g98debd5df505-4k #1 f94a6367396c5488d635708e43ee0c888d230b0b
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: MUSTANG PVT 1.0 based on LGA (DT)
Workqueue: events _RNvXs6_NtCsdfZWD8DztAw_6kernel9workqueueINtNtNtB7_4sync3arc3ArcNtNtCs8QPsHWIn21X_16rust_binder_main7process7ProcessEINtB5_15WorkItemPointerKy0_E3runB13_ [rust_binder]
pstate: 23400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : _RNvXs3_NtCs8QPsHWIn21X_16rust_binder_main7processNtB5_7ProcessNtNtCsdfZWD8DztAw_6kernel9workqueue8WorkItem3run+0x450/0x11f8 [rust_binder]
lr : _RNvXs3_NtCs8QPsHWIn21X_16rust_binder_main7processNtB5_7ProcessNtNtCsdfZWD8DztAw_6kernel9workqueue8WorkItem3run+0x464/0x11f8 [rust_binder]
sp : ffffffc09b433ac0
x29: ffffffc09b433d30 x28: ffffff8821690000 x27: ffffffd40cbaa448
x26: ffffff8821690000 x25: 00000000ffffffff x24: ffffff88d0376578
x23: 0000000000000001 x22: ffffffc09b433c78 x21: ffffff88e8f9bf40
x20: ffffff88e8f9bf40 x19: ffffff882692b000 x18: ffffffd40f10bf00
x17: 00000000c006287d x16: 00000000c006287d x15: 00000000000003b0
x14: 0000000000000100 x13: 000000201cb79ae0 x12: fffffffffffffff0
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : b80bb9841bcac706 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : fffffffebee63f30
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000004c31 x1 : ffffff88216900c0 x0 : ffffff88e8f9bf00
Call trace:
_RNvXs3_NtCs8QPsHWIn21X_16rust_binder_main7processNtB5_7ProcessNtNtCsdfZWD8DztAw_6kernel9workqueue8WorkItem3run+0x450/0x11f8 [rust_binder bbc172b53665bbc815363b22e97e3f7e3fe971fc]
process_scheduled_works+0x1c4/0x45c
worker_thread+0x32c/0x3e8
kthread+0x11c/0x1c8
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: 94218d85 b4000155 a94026a8 d10102a0 (f9000509)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Thus, modify Node::release to pop items directly off the original list.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: eafedbc7c0 ("rust_binder: add Rust Binder driver")
Signed-off-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251111-binder-fix-list-remove-v1-1-8ed14a0da63d@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 48bc9da3c9 upstream.
The crypto/zstd module has a double-free bug that occurs when multiple
tfms are allocated and freed.
The issue happens because zstd_streams (per-CPU contexts) are freed in
zstd_exit() during every tfm destruction, rather than being managed at
the module level. When multiple tfms exist, each tfm exit attempts to
free the same shared per-CPU streams, resulting in a double-free.
This leads to a stack trace similar to:
BUG: Bad page state in process kworker/u16:1 pfn:106fd93
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x106fd93
flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff)
page_type: 0xffffffff()
raw: 0017ffffc0000000 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: nonzero entire_mapcount
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 2506 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G B
Hardware name: ...
Workqueue: btrfs-delalloc btrfs_work_helper
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x5d/0x80
bad_page+0x71/0xd0
free_unref_page_prepare+0x24e/0x490
free_unref_page+0x60/0x170
crypto_acomp_free_streams+0x5d/0xc0
crypto_acomp_exit_tfm+0x23/0x50
crypto_destroy_tfm+0x60/0xc0
...
Change the lifecycle management of zstd_streams to free the streams only
once during module cleanup.
Fixes: f5ad93ffb5 ("crypto: zstd - convert to acomp")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Suman Kumar Chakraborty <suman.kumar.chakraborty@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit c14ecb555c upstream.
KCSAN reports:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in do_raw_write_lock / do_raw_write_lock
write (marked) to 0xffff800009cf504c of 4 bytes by task 1102 on cpu 1:
do_raw_write_lock+0x120/0x204
_raw_write_lock_irq
do_exit
call_usermodehelper_exec_async
ret_from_fork
read to 0xffff800009cf504c of 4 bytes by task 1103 on cpu 0:
do_raw_write_lock+0x88/0x204
_raw_write_lock_irq
do_exit
call_usermodehelper_exec_async
ret_from_fork
value changed: 0xffffffff -> 0x00000001
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 1103 Comm: kworker/u4:1 6.1.111
Commit 1a365e8223 ("locking/spinlock/debug: Fix various data races") has
adressed most of these races, but seems to be not consistent/not complete.
>From do_raw_write_lock() only debug_write_lock_after() part has been
converted to WRITE_ONCE(), but not debug_write_lock_before() part.
Do it now.
Fixes: 1a365e8223 ("locking/spinlock/debug: Fix various data races")
Reported-by: Adrian Freihofer <adrian.freihofer@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 1fab1fa091 upstream.
ipc_msg_send_request() waits for a generic netlink reply using an
ipc_msg_table_entry on the stack. The generic netlink handler
(handle_generic_event()/handle_response()) fills entry->response under
ipc_msg_table_lock, but ipc_msg_send_request() used to validate and free
entry->response without holding the same lock.
Under high concurrency this allows a race where handle_response() is
copying data into entry->response while ipc_msg_send_request() has just
freed it, leading to a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN in
handle_generic_event():
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in handle_generic_event+0x3c4/0x5f0 [ksmbd]
Write of size 12 at addr ffff888198ee6e20 by task pool/109349
...
Freed by task:
kvfree
ipc_msg_send_request [ksmbd]
ksmbd_rpc_open -> ksmbd_session_rpc_open [ksmbd]
Fix by:
- Taking ipc_msg_table_lock in ipc_msg_send_request() while validating
entry->response, freeing it when invalid, and removing the entry from
ipc_msg_table.
- Returning the final entry->response pointer to the caller only after
the hash entry is removed under the lock.
- Returning NULL in the error path, preserving the original API
semantics.
This makes all accesses to entry->response consistent with
handle_response(), which already updates and fills the response buffer
under ipc_msg_table_lock, and closes the race that allowed the UAF.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Zhitong Liu <liuzhitong1993@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Qianchang Zhao <pioooooooooip@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 892e1cf175 upstream.
The cached ei->i_inline_size can become stale between the initial size
check and when ext4_update_inline_data()/ext4_create_inline_data() use
it. Although ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads the correct value at the
time of the check, concurrent xattr operations can modify i_inline_size
before ext4_write_lock_xattr() is acquired.
This causes ext4_update_inline_data() and ext4_create_inline_data() to
work with stale capacity values, leading to a BUG_ON() crash in
ext4_write_inline_data():
kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:1331!
BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size);
The race window:
1. ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads i_inline_size = 60 (correct)
2. Size check passes for 50-byte write
3. [Another thread adds xattr, i_inline_size changes to 40]
4. ext4_write_lock_xattr() acquires lock
5. ext4_update_inline_data() uses stale i_inline_size = 60
6. Attempts to write 50 bytes but only 40 bytes actually available
7. BUG_ON() triggers
Fix this by recalculating i_inline_size via ext4_find_inline_data_nolock()
immediately after acquiring xattr_sem. This ensures ext4_update_inline_data()
and ext4_create_inline_data() work with current values that are protected
from concurrent modifications.
This is similar to commit a54c4613da ("ext4: fix race writing to an
inline_data file while its xattrs are changing") which fixed i_inline_off
staleness. This patch addresses the related i_inline_size staleness issue.
Reported-by: syzbot+f3185be57d7e8dda32b8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f3185be57d7e8dda32b8
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Deepanshu Kartikey <kartikey406@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20251020060936.474314-1-kartikey406@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit 986835bf4d upstream.
There's issue when file system corrupted:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:1289!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2031 Comm: mkdir Not tainted 6.18.0-rc1-next
RIP: 0010:jbd2_journal_get_create_access+0x3b6/0x4d0
RSP: 0018:ffff888117aafa30 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811a86b000 RCX: ffffffff89a63534
RDX: 1ffff110200ec602 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffff888100763010
RBP: ffff888100763000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff888100763028
R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88812c432000 R14: ffff88812c608000 R15: ffff888120bfc000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f91d6970c99 CR3: 00000001159c4000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__ext4_journal_get_create_access+0x42/0x170
ext4_getblk+0x319/0x6f0
ext4_bread+0x11/0x100
ext4_append+0x1e6/0x4a0
ext4_init_new_dir+0x145/0x1d0
ext4_mkdir+0x326/0x920
vfs_mkdir+0x45c/0x740
do_mkdirat+0x234/0x2f0
__x64_sys_mkdir+0xd6/0x120
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0xfa0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The above issue occurs with us in errors=continue mode when accompanied by
storage failures. There have been many inconsistencies in the file system
data.
In the case of file system data inconsistency, for example, if the block
bitmap of a referenced block is not set, it can lead to the situation where
a block being committed is allocated and used again. As a result, the
following condition will not be satisfied then trigger BUG_ON. Of course,
it is entirely possible to construct a problematic image that can trigger
this BUG_ON through specific operations. In fact, I have constructed such
an image and easily reproduced this issue.
Therefore, J_ASSERT() holds true only under ideal conditions, but it may
not necessarily be satisfied in exceptional scenarios. Using J_ASSERT()
directly in abnormal situations would cause the system to crash, which is
clearly not what we want. So here we directly trigger a JBD abort instead
of immediately invoking BUG_ON.
Fixes: 470decc613 ("[PATCH] jbd2: initial copy of files from jbd")
Signed-off-by: Ye Bin <yebin10@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Message-ID: <20251025072657.307851-1-yebin@huaweicloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
commit ba2457109d upstream.
Sasha has also maintaining stable branch in conjunction with Greg
since cb5d21946d ("MAINTAINERS: Add Sasha as a stable branch
maintainer"). Mention him in 2.Process.rst.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Message-ID: <20251022034336.22839-1-bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
error code on failure instead of success
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Merge tag 'timers_urgent_for_v6.18_rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull timer fix from Borislav Petkov:
- Have timekeeping aux clocks sysfs interface setup function return an
error code on failure instead of success
* tag 'timers_urgent_for_v6.18_rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
timekeeping: Fix error code in tk_aux_sysfs_init()
Owing to Config4.MMUSizeExt and VTLB/FTLB MMU features later MIPSr2+
cores can have more than 64 TLB entries. Therefore allocate an array
for uniquification instead of placing too an small array on the stack.
Fixes: 35ad7e1815 ("MIPS: mm: tlb-r4k: Uniquify TLB entries on init")
Co-developed-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.17+: 9f048fa487: MIPS: mm: Prevent a TLB shutdown on initial uniquification
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.17+
Tested-by: Gregory CLEMENT <gregory.clement@bootlin.com>
Tested-by: Klara Modin <klarasmodin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Fix an uninitialised variable (key) in afs_alloc_anon_key() by setting it
to cell->anonymous_key. Without this change, the error check may return a
false failure with a bad error number.
Most of the time this is unlikely to happen because the first encounter
with afs_alloc_anon_key() will usually be from (auto)mount, for which all
subsequent operations must wait - apart from other (auto)mounts. Once the
call->anonymous_key is allocated, all further calls to afs_request_key()
will skip the call to afs_alloc_anon_key() for that cell.
Fixes: d27c712578 ("afs: Fix delayed allocation of a cell's anonymous key")
Reported-by: Paulo Alcantra <pc@manguebit.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: syzbot+41c68824eefb67cdf00c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
A disappointingly large set of device specific fixes that have built up
since I've been a bit tardy with sending a pull requests as people kept
sending me new new fixes. The bcm63xx and lpspi issues could lead to
corruption so the fixes are fairly important for the affected parts, the
other issues should all be relatively minor.
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Merge tag 'spi-fix-v6.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi
Pull spi fixes from Mark Brown:
"A disappointingly large set of device specific fixes that have built
up since I've been a bit tardy with sending a pull requests as people
kept sending me new new fixes.
The bcm63xx and lpspi issues could lead to corruption so the fixes are
fairly important for the affected parts, the other issues should all
be relatively minor"
* tag 'spi-fix-v6.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/spi:
spi: nxp-fspi: Propagate fwnode in ACPI case as well
spi: tegra114: remove Kconfig dependency on TEGRA20_APB_DMA
spi: amlogic-spifc-a1: Handle devm_pm_runtime_enable() errors
spi: spi-fsl-lpspi: fix watermark truncation caused by type cast
spi: cadence-quadspi: Fix cqspi_probe() error handling for runtime pm
spi: bcm63xx: fix premature CS deassertion on RX-only transactions
spi: spi-cadence-quadspi: Remove duplicate pm_runtime_put_autosuspend() call
spi: spi-cadence-quadspi: Enable pm runtime earlier to avoid imbalance
A couple of fixes for incorrect device descriptions in the rtq2208
driver.
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Merge tag 'regulator-fix-v6.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regulator
Pull regulator fixes from Mark Brown:
"A couple of fixes for incorrect device descriptions in the rtq2208
driver"
* tag 'regulator-fix-v6.18-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/broonie/regulator:
regulator: rtq2208: Correct LDO2 logic judgment bits
regulator: rtq2208: Correct buck group2 phase mapping logic
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Merge tag 'io_uring-6.18-20251128' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux
Pull io_uring fixes from Jens Axboe:
- Ensure that vectored registered buffer imports ties the lifetime of
those to the zero-copy send notification, not the parent request
- Fix a bug introduced in this merge window, with the introduction of
mixed sized CQE support
* tag 'io_uring-6.18-20251128' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/axboe/linux:
io_uring: fix mixed cqe overflow handling
io_uring/net: ensure vectored buffer node import is tied to notification
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Merge tag 'vfs-6.18-rc8.fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs fixes from Christian Brauner:
- afs: Fix delayed allocation of a cell's anonymous key
The allocation of a cell's anonymous key is done in a background
thread along with other cell setup such as doing a DNS upcall. The
normal key lookup tries to use the key description on the anonymous
authentication key as the reference for request_key() - but it may
not yet be set, causing an oops
- ovl: fail ovl_lock_rename_workdir() if either target is unhashed
As well as checking that the parent hasn't changed after getting the
lock, the code needs to check that the dentry hasn't been unhashed.
Otherwise overlayfs might try to rename something that has been
removed
- namespace: fix a reference leak in grab_requested_mnt_ns
lookup_mnt_ns() already takes a reference on mnt_ns, and so
grab_requested_mnt_ns() doesn't need to take an extra reference
* tag 'vfs-6.18-rc8.fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
afs: Fix delayed allocation of a cell's anonymous key
ovl: fail ovl_lock_rename_workdir() if either target is unhashed
fs/namespace: fix reference leak in grab_requested_mnt_ns
A few last minute fixes came in this week:
- interrupt and gpio numbers in foud separate i.MX8 specific
devicetree files were wrong.
- The vector length property in the C906 CPU description
used the wrong unit.
- Two bugs with uninitialized stack variables in the tee
subsystem.
- Alexander Stein now maintains additional devicetree files.
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Merge tag 'soc-fixes-6.18-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc
Pull SoC fixes from Arnd Bergmann:
"A few last minute fixes came in this week:
- interrupt and gpio numbers in foud separate i.MX8 specific
devicetree files were wrong
- The vector length property in the C906 CPU description used the
wrong unit
- Two bugs with uninitialized stack variables in the tee subsystem
- Alexander Stein now maintains additional devicetree files"
* tag 'soc-fixes-6.18-4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/soc/soc:
riscv: dts: allwinner: d1: fix vlenb property
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TQ-Systems AM335 device trees
tee: qcomtee: initialize result before use in release worker
arm64: dts: imx8qm-mek: fix mux-controller select/enable-gpios polarity
tee: qcomtee: fix uninitialized pointers with free attribute
ARM: dts: nxp: imx6ul: correct SAI3 interrupt line
arm64: dts: imx8dxl-ss-conn: swap interrupts number of eqos
arm64: dts: imx8dxl: Correct pcie-ep interrupt number
