mipi_dsi_dcs_set_tear_scanline_multi can heavily benefit from being
converted to a multi style function as it is often called in the context of
similar functions.
Reviewed-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Tejas Vipin <tejasvipin76@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240818060816.848784-2-tejasvipin76@gmail.com
Remove dependence on libcap. libcap is only used to query whether a
capability is supported, which is just 1 capget system call.
If the capget system call fails, fall back on root permission
checking. Previously if libcap fails then the permission is assumed
not present which may be pessimistic/wrong.
Add a used_root out argument to perf_cap__capable to say whether the
fall back root check was used. This allows the correct error message,
"root" vs "users with the CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability", to
be selected.
Tidy uses of perf_cap__capable so that tests aren't repeated if capget
isn't supported.
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Changbin Du <changbin.du@huawei.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Clark <james.clark@arm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linux.dev>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oliver.upton@linux.dev>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240806220614.831914-1-irogers@google.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Use always the same pf id in devlink port number. When doing
pass-through the PF to VM bus info func number can be any value.
Fixes: 2ae0aa4758 ("ice: Move devlink port to PF/VF struct")
Reviewed-by: Wojciech Drewek <wojciech.drewek@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
When working on multi-buffer packet on arch that has PAGE_SIZE >= 8192,
truesize is calculated and stored in xdp_buff::frame_sz per each
processed Rx buffer. This means that frame_sz will contain the truesize
based on last received buffer, but commit 1dc1a7e7f4 ("ice:
Centrallize Rx buffer recycling") assumed this value will be constant
for each buffer, which breaks the page recycling scheme and mess up the
way we update the page::page_offset.
To fix this, let us work on constant truesize when PAGE_SIZE >= 8192
instead of basing this on size of a packet read from Rx descriptor. This
way we can simplify the code and avoid calculating truesize per each
received frame and on top of that when using
xdp_update_skb_shared_info(), current formula for truesize update will
be valid.
This means ice_rx_frame_truesize() can be removed altogether.
Furthermore, first call to it within ice_clean_rx_irq() for 4k PAGE_SIZE
was redundant as xdp_buff::frame_sz is initialized via xdp_init_buff()
in ice_vsi_cfg_rxq(). This should have been removed at the point where
xdp_buff struct started to be a member of ice_rx_ring and it was no
longer a stack based variable.
There are two fixes tags as my understanding is that the first one
exposed us to broken truesize and page_offset handling and then second
introduced broken skb_shared_info update in ice_{construct,build}_skb().
Reported-and-tested-by: Luiz Capitulino <luizcap@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/8f9e2a5c-fd30-4206-9311-946a06d031bb@redhat.com/
Fixes: 1dc1a7e7f4 ("ice: Centrallize Rx buffer recycling")
Fixes: 2fba7dc515 ("ice: Add support for XDP multi-buffer on Rx side")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
For bigger PAGE_SIZE archs, ice driver works on 3k Rx buffers.
Therefore, ICE_LAST_OFFSET should take into account ICE_RXBUF_3072, not
ICE_RXBUF_2048.
Fixes: 7237f5b0db ("ice: introduce legacy Rx flag")
Suggested-by: Luiz Capitulino <luizcap@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Architectures that have PAGE_SIZE >= 8192 such as arm64 should act the
same as x86 currently, meaning reuse of a page should only take place
when no one else is busy with it.
Do two things independently of underlying PAGE_SIZE:
- store the page count under ice_rx_buf::pgcnt
- then act upon its value vs ice_rx_buf::pagecnt_bias when making the
decision regarding page reuse
Fixes: 2b245cb294 ("ice: Implement transmit and NAPI support")
Signed-off-by: Maciej Fijalkowski <maciej.fijalkowski@intel.com>
Tested-by: Chandan Kumar Rout <chandanx.rout@intel.com> (A Contingent Worker at Intel)
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
The HW fence ctx objects are not ref counted rather tied to the life of
an LRC object. HW fences reference the HW fence ctx, HW fences can
outlive LRCs thus resulting in UAF. Drop the HW fence pointer to HW
fence ctx rather just store what is needed directly in HW fence.
v2:
- Fix typo in commit (Ashutosh)
- Use snprintf (Ashutosh)
Fixes: dd08ebf6c3 ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240815193522.16008-1-matthew.brost@intel.com
Use scoped for_each_child_of_node_scoped() when iterating over device
nodes to make code a bit simpler.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820094023.61155-2-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Two return statements in sbi_cpuidle_dt_init_states() did not drop the
OF node reference count. Solve the issue and simplify entire error
handling with scoped/cleanup.h.
Fixes: 6abf32f1d9 ("cpuidle: Add RISC-V SBI CPU idle driver")
Cc: All applicable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820094023.61155-1-krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Calling va_start / va_end multiple times is undefined and causes
problems with certain compiler / platforms.
Change alloc_ordered_workqueue_lockdep_map to a macro and updated
__alloc_workqueue to take a va_list argument.
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Lai Jiangshan <jiangshanlai@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
PCIe ethernet throughut is sub-optimal on Jasper Lake and Elkhart Lake.
The CPU can take long time to exit to C0 to handle IRQ and perform DMA
when C1E has been entered.
For this reason, adjust intel_idle to disable promotion to C1E and still
use C-states from ACPI _CST on those two platforms.
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=219023
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820041128.102452-1-kai.heng.feng@canonical.com
[ rjw: Subject and changelog edits ]
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
The omap1510_idle_loop_suspend/_sz() and omap1610_idle_loop_suspend/_sz()
has been removed since commit feb72f3b31 ("ARM: OMAP1: Remove
omap_sram_idle()"), so remove them.
Signed-off-by: Gaosheng Cui <cuigaosheng1@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240813071125.1044697-1-cuigaosheng1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Kevin Hilman <khilman@baylibre.com>
To receive 863ccdbb91 ("sched: Allow sched_class::dequeue_task() to fail")
which makes sched_class.dequeue_task() return bool instead of void. This
leads to compile breakage and will be fixed by a follow-up patch.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
use_parent_ecpus is used to track whether the children are using the
parent's effective_cpus. When a parent's effective_cpus is changed
due to changes in a child partition's effective_xcpus, any child
using parent'effective_cpus must call update_cpumasks_hier. However,
if a child is not a valid partition, it is sufficient to determine
whether to call update_cpumasks_hier based on whether the child's
effective_cpus is going to change. To make the code more succinct,
it is suggested to remove use_parent_ecpus.
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Both fetch_xcpus and user_xcpus functions are used to retrieve the value
of exclusive_cpus. If exclusive_cpus is not set, cpus_allowed is the
implicit value used as exclusive in a local partition. I can not imagine
a scenario where effective_xcpus is not empty when exclusive_cpus is
empty. Therefore, I suggest removing the fetch_xcpus function.
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
When enable a remote partition, I found that:
cd /sys/fs/cgroup/
mkdir test
mkdir test/test1
echo +cpuset > cgroup.subtree_control
echo +cpuset > test/cgroup.subtree_control
echo 3 > test/test1/cpuset.cpus
echo root > test/test1/cpuset.cpus.partition
cat test/test1/cpuset.cpus.partition
root invalid (Parent is not a partition root)
The parent of a remote partition could not be a root. This is due to the
emtpy effective_xcpus. It would be better to prompt the message "invalid
cpu list in cpuset.cpus.exclusive".
Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Convert binding doc tpa6130a2.txt to yaml format.
Additional change:
- add ref to dai-common.yaml
- add i2c node in example
Fix below warning:
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq-zii-ultra-rmb3.dtb: /soc@0/bus@30800000/i2c@30a20000/amp@60:
failed to match any schema with compatible: ['ti,tpa6130a2']
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240820184604.499017-1-Frank.Li@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Convert the DT binding document for bcm2835-system-timer from .txt
to YAML.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Wahren <wahrenst@gmx.net>
Reviewed-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812200358.4061-2-wahrenst@gmx.net
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
The BCM21664 is nearly identical in terms of register layout to the
BCM23550. Move the shared nodes into a new file, bcm2166x-common.dtsi,
and make both bcm21664.dtsi and bcm23550.dtsi include it. This new
common file is based on the former bcm23550.dtsi file, and inherits
its licensing.
Signed-off-by: Artur Weber <aweber.kernel@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240729-bcm21664-common-v2-2-ebc21a89bf63@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
This helps in easily initializing blocks of code (e.g. static calls and
keys).
UNROLL(N, MACRO, __VA_ARGS__) calls MACRO N times with the first
argument as the index of the iteration. This allows string pasting to
create unique tokens for variable names, function calls etc.
As an example:
#include <linux/unroll.h>
#define MACRO(N, a, b) \
int add_##N(int a, int b) \
{ \
return a + b + N; \
}
UNROLL(2, MACRO, x, y)
expands to:
int add_0(int x, int y)
{
return x + y + 0;
}
int add_1(int x, int y)
{
return x + y + 1;
}
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Nacked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
With LSMs using static calls and static keys, early_lsm_init needs to
wait for setup_arch for architecture specific functionality which
includes jump tables and static calls to be initialized.
Since not all architectures call jump_table_init in setup_arch,
explicitly call both jump_table_init and static_call_init before
early_security_init.
This only affects "early LSMs" i.e. only lockdown when
CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY is set.
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add a MAINTAINERS entry for the Integrity Policy Enforcement (IPE) LSM.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: removed changelog, updated description per email thread]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add IPE's admin and developer documentation to the kernel tree.
Co-developed-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Add various happy/unhappy unit tests for both IPE's policy parser.
Besides, a test suite for IPE functionality is available at
https://github.com/microsoft/ipe/tree/test-suite
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Enables an IPE policy to be enforced from kernel start, enabling access
control based on trust from kernel startup. This is accomplished by
transforming an IPE policy indicated by CONFIG_IPE_BOOT_POLICY into a
c-string literal that is parsed at kernel startup as an unsigned policy.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Enable IPE policy authors to indicate trust for a singular fsverity
file, identified by the digest information, through "fsverity_digest"
and all files using valid fsverity builtin signatures via
"fsverity_signature".
This enables file-level integrity claims to be expressed in IPE,
allowing individual files to be authorized, giving some flexibility
for policy authors. Such file-level claims are important to be expressed
for enforcing the integrity of packages, as well as address some of the
scalability issues in a sole dm-verity based solution (# of loop back
devices, etc).
This solution cannot be done in userspace as the minimum threat that
IPE should mitigate is an attacker downloads malicious payload with
all required dependencies. These dependencies can lack the userspace
check, bypassing the protection entirely. A similar attack succeeds if
the userspace component is replaced with a version that does not
perform the check. As a result, this can only be done in the common
entry point - the kernel.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch enhances fsverity's capabilities to support both integrity and
authenticity protection by introducing the exposure of built-in
signatures through a new LSM hook. This functionality allows LSMs,
e.g. IPE, to enforce policies based on the authenticity and integrity of
files, specifically focusing on built-in fsverity signatures. It enables
a policy enforcement layer within LSMs for fsverity, offering granular
control over the usage of authenticity claims. For instance, a policy
could be established to only permit the execution of all files with
verified built-in fsverity signatures.
The introduction of a security_inode_setintegrity() hook call within
fsverity's workflow ensures that the verified built-in signature of a file
is exposed to LSMs. This enables LSMs to recognize and label fsverity files
that contain a verified built-in fsverity signature. This hook is invoked
subsequent to the fsverity_verify_signature() process, guaranteeing the
signature's verification against fsverity's keyring. This mechanism is
crucial for maintaining system security, as it operates in kernel space,
effectively thwarting attempts by malicious binaries to bypass user space
stack interactions.
The second to last commit in this patch set will add a link to the IPE
documentation in fsverity.rst.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new hook to save inode's integrity
data. For example, for fsverity enabled files, LSMs can use this hook to
save the existence of verified fsverity builtin signature into the inode's
security blob, and LSMs can make access decisions based on this data.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak, removed changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Allows author of IPE policy to indicate trust for a singular dm-verity
volume, identified by roothash, through "dmverity_roothash" and all
signed and validated dm-verity volumes, through "dmverity_signature".
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: fixed some line length issues in the comments]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
dm-verity provides a strong guarantee of a block device's integrity. As
a generic way to check the integrity of a block device, it provides
those integrity guarantees to its higher layers, including the filesystem
level.
However, critical security metadata like the dm-verity roothash and its
signing information are not easily accessible to the LSMs.
To address this limitation, this patch introduces a mechanism to store
and manage these essential security details within a newly added LSM blob
in the block_device structure.
This addition allows LSMs to make access control decisions on the integrity
data stored within the block_device, enabling more flexible security
policies. For instance, LSMs can now revoke access to dm-verity devices
based on their roothashes, ensuring that only authorized and verified
content is accessible. Additionally, LSMs can enforce policies to only
allow files from dm-verity devices that have a valid digital signature to
execute, effectively blocking any unsigned files from execution, thus
enhancing security against unauthorized modifications.
The patch includes new hook calls, `security_bdev_setintegrity()`, in
dm-verity to expose the dm-verity roothash and the roothash signature to
LSMs via preresume() callback. By using the preresume() callback, it
ensures that the security metadata is consistently in sync with the
metadata of the dm-verity target in the current active mapping table.
The hook calls are depended on CONFIG_SECURITY.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
[PM: moved sig_size field as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new LSM blob to the block_device structure,
enabling the security subsystem to store security-sensitive data related
to block devices. Currently, for a device mapper's mapped device containing
a dm-verity target, critical security information such as the roothash and
its signing state are not readily accessible. Specifically, while the
dm-verity volume creation process passes the dm-verity roothash and its
signature from userspace to the kernel, the roothash is stored privately
within the dm-verity target, and its signature is discarded
post-verification. This makes it extremely hard for the security subsystem
to utilize these data.
With the addition of the LSM blob to the block_device structure, the
security subsystem can now retain and manage important security metadata
such as the roothash and the signing state of a dm-verity by storing them
inside the blob. Access decisions can then be based on these stored data.
The implementation follows the same approach used for security blobs in
other structures like struct file, struct inode, and struct superblock.
The initialization of the security blob occurs after the creation of the
struct block_device, performed by the security subsystem. Similarly, the
security blob is freed by the security subsystem before the struct
block_device is deallocated or freed.
This patch also introduces a new hook security_bdev_setintegrity() to save
block device's integrity data to the new LSM blob. For example, for
dm-verity, it can use this hook to expose its roothash and signing state
to LSMs, then LSMs can save these data into the LSM blob.
Please note that the new hook should be invoked every time the security
information is updated to keep these data current. For example, in
dm-verity, if the mapping table is reloaded and configured to use a
different dm-verity target with a new roothash and signing information,
the previously stored data in the LSM blob will become obsolete. It is
crucial to re-invoke the hook to refresh these data and ensure they are up
to date. This necessity arises from the design of device-mapper, where a
device-mapper device is first created, and then targets are subsequently
loaded into it. These targets can be modified multiple times during the
device's lifetime. Therefore, while the LSM blob is allocated during the
creation of the block device, its actual contents are not initialized at
this stage and can change substantially over time. This includes
alterations from data that the LSM 'trusts' to those it does not, making
it essential to handle these changes correctly. Failure to address this
dynamic aspect could potentially allow for bypassing LSM checks.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: merge fuzz, subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IPE, like SELinux, supports a permissive mode. This mode allows policy
authors to test and evaluate IPE policy without it affecting their
programs. When the mode is changed, a 1404 AUDIT_MAC_STATUS will
be reported.
This patch adds the following audit records:
audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=0 old_enforcing=1 auid=4294967295
ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
audit: MAC_STATUS enforcing=1 old_enforcing=0 auid=4294967295
ses=4294967295 enabled=1 old-enabled=1 lsm=ipe res=1
The audit record only emit when the value from the user input is
different from the current enforce value.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Users of IPE require a way to identify when and why an operation fails,
allowing them to both respond to violations of policy and be notified
of potentially malicious actions on their systems with respect to IPE
itself.
This patch introduces 3 new audit events.
AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420) indicates the result of an IPE policy evaluation
of a resource.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421) indicates the current active IPE policy
has been changed to another loaded policy.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422) indicates a new IPE policy has been loaded
into the kernel.
This patch also adds support for success auditing, allowing users to
identify why an allow decision was made for a resource. However, it is
recommended to use this option with caution, as it is quite noisy.
Here are some examples of the new audit record types:
AUDIT_IPE_ACCESS(1420):
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=297 comm="sh" path="/root/vol/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
ino=3897 rule="op=EXECUTE boot_verified=TRUE action=ALLOW"
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=299 comm="sh" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=300 path="/tmp/tmpdp2h1lub/deny/bin/hello" dev="tmpfs"
ino=131 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
The above three records were generated when the active IPE policy only
allows binaries from the initramfs to run. The three identical `hello`
binary were placed at different locations, only the first hello from
the rootfs(initramfs) was allowed.
Field ipe_op followed by the IPE operation name associated with the log.
Field ipe_hook followed by the name of the LSM hook that triggered the IPE
event.
Field enforcing followed by the enforcement state of IPE. (it will be
introduced in the next commit)
Field pid followed by the pid of the process that triggered the IPE
event.
Field comm followed by the command line program name of the process that
triggered the IPE event.
Field path followed by the file's path name.
Field dev followed by the device name as found in /dev where the file is
from.
Note that for device mappers it will use the name `dm-X` instead of
the name in /dev/mapper.
For a file in a temp file system, which is not from a device, it will use
`tmpfs` for the field.
The implementation of this part is following another existing use case
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE in security/lsm_audit.c
Field ino followed by the file's inode number.
Field rule followed by the IPE rule made the access decision. The whole
rule must be audited because the decision is based on the combination of
all property conditions in the rule.
Along with the syscall audit event, user can know why a blocked
happened. For example:
audit: AUDIT1420 ipe_op=EXECUTE ipe_hook=BPRM_CHECK enforcing=1
pid=2138 comm="bash" path="/mnt/ipe/bin/hello" dev="dm-0"
ino=2 rule="DEFAULT action=DENY"
audit[1956]: SYSCALL arch=c000003e syscall=59
success=no exit=-13 a0=556790138df0 a1=556790135390 a2=5567901338b0
a3=ab2a41a67f4f1f4e items=1 ppid=147 pid=1956 auid=4294967295 uid=0
gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0
ses=4294967295 comm="bash" exe="/usr/bin/bash" key=(null)
The above two records showed bash used execve to run "hello" and got
blocked by IPE. Note that the IPE records are always prior to a SYSCALL
record.
AUDIT_IPE_CONFIG_CHANGE(1421):
audit: AUDIT1421
old_active_pol_name="Allow_All" old_active_pol_version=0.0.0
old_policy_digest=sha256:E3B0C44298FC1C149AFBF4C8996FB92427AE41E4649
new_active_pol_name="boot_verified" new_active_pol_version=0.0.0
new_policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1
The above record showed the current IPE active policy switch from
`Allow_All` to `boot_verified` along with the version and the hash
digest of the two policies. Note IPE can only have one policy active
at a time, all access decision evaluation is based on the current active
policy.
The normal procedure to deploy a policy is loading the policy to deploy
into the kernel first, then switch the active policy to it.
AUDIT_IPE_POLICY_LOAD(1422):
audit: AUDIT1422 policy_name="boot_verified" policy_version=0.0.0
policy_digest=sha256:820EEA5B40CA42B51F68962354BA083122A20BB846F2676
auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 lsm=ipe res=1
The above record showed a new policy has been loaded into the kernel
with the policy name, policy version and policy hash.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
As is typical with LSMs, IPE uses securityfs as its interface with
userspace. for a complete list of the interfaces and the respective
inputs/outputs, please see the documentation under
admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
When deleting a directory in the security file system, the existing
securityfs_remove requires the directory to be empty, otherwise
it will do nothing. This leads to a potential risk that the security
file system might be in an unclean state when the intended deletion
did not happen.
This commit introduces a new function securityfs_recursive_remove
to recursively delete a directory without leaving an unclean state.
Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IPE is designed to provide system level trust guarantees, this usually
implies that trust starts from bootup with a hardware root of trust,
which validates the bootloader. After this, the bootloader verifies
the kernel and the initramfs.
As there's no currently supported integrity method for initramfs, and
it's typically already verified by the bootloader. This patch introduces
a new IPE property `boot_verified` which allows author of IPE policy to
indicate trust for files from initramfs.
The implementation of this feature utilizes the newly added
`initramfs_populated` hook. This hook marks the superblock of the rootfs
after the initramfs has been unpacked into it.
Before mounting the real rootfs on top of the initramfs, initramfs
script will recursively remove all files and directories on the
initramfs. This is typically implemented by using switch_root(8)
(https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/switch_root.8.html).
Therefore the initramfs will be empty and not accessible after the real
rootfs takes over. It is advised to switch to a different policy
that doesn't rely on the `boot_verified` property after this point.
This ensures that the trust policies remain relevant and effective
throughout the system's operation.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
This patch introduces a new hook to notify security system that the
content of initramfs has been unpacked into the rootfs.
Upon receiving this notification, the security system can activate
a policy to allow only files that originated from the initramfs to
execute or load into kernel during the early stages of booting.
This approach is crucial for minimizing the attack surface by
ensuring that only trusted files from the initramfs are operational
in the critical boot phase.
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IPE's initial goal is to control both execution and the loading of
kernel modules based on the system's definition of trust. It
accomplishes this by plugging into the security hooks for
bprm_check_security, file_mprotect, mmap_file, kernel_load_data,
and kernel_read_data.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Introduce a core evaluation function in IPE that will be triggered by
various security hooks (e.g., mmap, bprm_check, kexec). This function
systematically assesses actions against the defined IPE policy, by
iterating over rules specific to the action being taken. This critical
addition enables IPE to enforce its security policies effectively,
ensuring that actions intercepted by these hooks are scrutinized for policy
compliance before they are allowed to proceed.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
IPE's interpretation of the what the user trusts is accomplished through
its policy. IPE's design is to not provide support for a single trust
provider, but to support multiple providers to enable the end-user to
choose the best one to seek their needs.
This requires the policy to be rather flexible and modular so that
integrity providers, like fs-verity, dm-verity, or some other system,
can plug into the policy with minimal code changes.
Signed-off-by: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Fan Wu <wufan@linux.microsoft.com>
[PM: added NULL check in parse_rule() as discussed]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
With the increase in the size of the recoverable page fault
queue, we want to ensure the initial messages from GuC in
the G2H buffer have space while we transfer those out to the
actual pf_queue. Bump the G2H queue size to account for this
increase in the pf_queue size.
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Stuart Summers <stuart.summers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/4c2b6974801bcffd8a010d838c8733fa4092573d.1723862633.git.stuart.summers@intel.com
Currently the page fault queue size is hard coded. However
the hardware supports faulting for each EU and each CS.
For some applications running on hardware with a large
number of EUs and CSs, this can result in an overflow of
the page fault queue.
Add a small calculation to determine the page fault queue
size based on the number of EUs and CSs in the platform as
detmined by fuses.
Signed-off-by: Stuart Summers <stuart.summers@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/24d582a3b48c97793b8b6a402f34b4b469471636.1723862633.git.stuart.summers@intel.com
- Check dport for RCH topology before accessing pci_host_bridge
= Skip unnecessary dport setup for cxl-test to fix KASAN warning
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Merge tag 'cxl-fixes-6.11-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl
Pull cxl fixes from Dave Jiang:
"Check for RCH dport before accessing pci_host_bridge and a fix to
address a KASAN warning for the cxl regression test suite cxl-test"
* tag 'cxl-fixes-6.11-rc5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cxl/cxl:
cxl/test: Skip cxl_setup_parent_dport() for emulated dports
cxl/pci: Get AER capability address from RCRB only for RCH dport
Add node for board info registers, which allows getting SoC family and
board revision.
For example, with MESON_GX_SOCINFO config enabled we can get the
following information for board with Amlogic A4 SoC:
soc soc0: Amlogic A4 (A113L2) Revision 40:b (1:1) Detected.
Signed-off-by: Xianwei Zhao <xianwei.zhao@amlogic.com>
Reviewed-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Conor Dooley <conor.dooley@microchip.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240719-soc_info-v3-6-020a3b687c0c@amlogic.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
