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Author SHA1 Message Date
Dragan Simic
02a68f11ba arm64: dts: rockchip: Remove overdrive-mode OPPs from RK3588J SoC dtsi
commit e0bd7ecf6b upstream.

The differences in the vendor-approved CPU and GPU OPPs for the standard
Rockchip RK3588 variant [1] and the industrial Rockchip RK3588J variant [2]
come from the latter, presumably, supporting an extended temperature range
that's usually associated with industrial applications, despite the two SoC
variant datasheets specifying the same upper limit for the allowed ambient
temperature for both variants.  However, the lower temperature limit is
specified much lower for the RK3588J variant. [1][2]

To be on the safe side and to ensure maximum longevity of the RK3588J SoCs,
only the CPU and GPU OPPs that are declared by the vendor to be always safe
for this SoC variant may be provided.  As explained by the vendor [3] and
according to the RK3588J datasheet, [2] higher-frequency/higher-voltage
CPU and GPU OPPs can be used as well, but at the risk of reducing the SoC
lifetime expectancy.  Presumably, using the higher OPPs may be safe only
when not enjoying the assumed extended temperature range that the RK3588J,
as an SoC variant targeted specifically at higher-temperature, industrial
applications, is made (or binned) for.

Anyone able to keep their RK3588J-based board outside the above-presumed
extended temperature range at all times, and willing to take the associated
risk of possibly reducing the SoC lifetime expectancy, is free to apply
a DT overlay that adds the higher CPU and GPU OPPs.

With all this and the downstream RK3588(J) DT definitions [4][5] in mind,
let's delete the RK3588J CPU and GPU OPPs that are not considered belonging
to the normal operation mode for this SoC variant.  To quote the RK3588J
datasheet [2], "normal mode means the chipset works under safety voltage
and frequency;  for the industrial environment, highly recommend to keep in
normal mode, the lifetime is reasonably guaranteed", while "overdrive mode
brings higher frequency, and the voltage will increase accordingly;  under
the overdrive mode for a long time, the chipset may shorten the lifetime,
especially in high-temperature condition".

To sum the RK3588J datasheet [2] and the vendor-provided DTs up, [4][5]
the maximum allowed CPU core, GPU and NPU frequencies are as follows:

   IP core    | Normal mode | Overdrive mode
  ------------+-------------+----------------
   Cortex-A55 |   1,296 MHz |      1,704 MHz
   Cortex-A76 |   1,608 MHz |      2,016 MHz
   GPU        |     700 MHz |        850 MHz
   NPU        |     800 MHz |        950 MHz

Unfortunately, when it comes to the actual voltages for the RK3588J CPU and
GPU OPPs, there's a discrepancy between the RK3588J datasheet [2] and the
downstream kernel code. [4][5]  The RK3588J datasheet states that "the max.
working voltage of CPU/GPU/NPU is 0.75 V under the normal mode", while the
downstream kernel code actually allows voltage ranges that go up to 0.95 V,
which is still within the voltage range allowed by the datasheet.  However,
the RK3588J datasheet also tells us to "strictly refer to the software
configuration of SDK and the hardware reference design", so let's embrace
the voltage ranges provided by the downstream kernel code, which also
prevents the undesirable theoretical outcome of ending up with no usable
OPPs on a particular board, as a result of the board's voltage regulator(s)
being unable to deliver the exact voltages, for whatever reason.

The above-described voltage ranges for the RK3588J CPU OPPs remain taken
from the downstream kernel code [4][5] by picking the highest, worst-bin
values, which ensure that all RK3588J bins will work reliably.  Yes, with
some power inevitably wasted as unnecessarily generated heat, but the
reliability is paramount, together with the longevity.  This deficiency
may be revisited separately at some point in the future.

The provided RK3588J CPU OPPs follow the slightly debatable "provide only
the highest-frequency OPP from the same-voltage group" approach that's been
established earlier, [6] as a result of the "same-voltage, lower-frequency"
OPPs being considered inefficient from the IPA governor's standpoint, which
may also be revisited separately at some point in the future.

[1] https://wiki.friendlyelec.com/wiki/images/e/ee/Rockchip_RK3588_Datasheet_V1.6-20231016.pdf
[2] https://wmsc.lcsc.com/wmsc/upload/file/pdf/v2/lcsc/2403201054_Rockchip-RK3588J_C22364189.pdf
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-rockchip/e55125ed-64fb-455e-b1e4-cebe2cf006e4@cherry.de/T/#u
[4] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rockchip-linux/kernel/604cec4004abe5a96c734f2fab7b74809d2d742f/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3588s.dtsi
[5] https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rockchip-linux/kernel/604cec4004abe5a96c734f2fab7b74809d2d742f/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3588j.dtsi
[6] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240229-rk-dts-additions-v3-5-6afe8473a631@gmail.com/

Fixes: 667885a686 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: Add OPP data for CPU cores on RK3588j")
Fixes: a7b2070505 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: Split GPU OPPs of RK3588 and RK3588j")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Cc: Alexey Charkov <alchark@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Reviewed-by: Quentin Schulz <quentin.schulz@cherry.de>
Signed-off-by: Dragan Simic <dsimic@manjaro.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/eeec0d30d79b019d111b3f0aa2456e69896b2caa.1742813866.git.dsimic@manjaro.org
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:48 +02:00
Christian Hewitt
7f2e784f27 arm64: dts: amlogic: dreambox: fix missing clkc_audio node
commit 0f67578587 upstream.

Add the clkc_audio node to fix audio support on Dreambox One/Two.

Fixes: 83a6f4c62c ("arm64: dts: meson: add initial support for Dreambox One/Two")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Emanuel Strobel <emanuel.strobel@yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Hewitt <christianshewitt@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Blumenstingl <martin.blumenstingl@googlemail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250503084443.3704866-1-christianshewitt@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Neil Armstrong <neil.armstrong@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:47 +02:00
Tiezhu Yang
12f69c4e30 LoongArch: uprobes: Remove redundant code about resume_era
commit 12614f7942 upstream.

arch_uprobe_skip_sstep() returns true if instruction was emulated, that
is to say, there is no need to single step for the emulated instructions.
regs->csr_era will point to the destination address directly after the
exception, so the resume_era related code is redundant, just remove them.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 19bc6cb640 ("LoongArch: Add uprobes support")
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:45 +02:00
Tiezhu Yang
88650dde2e LoongArch: uprobes: Remove user_{en,dis}able_single_step()
commit 0b326b2371 upstream.

When executing the "perf probe" and "perf stat" test cases about some
cryptographic algorithm, the output shows that "Trace/breakpoint trap".
This is because it uses the software singlestep breakpoint for uprobes
on LoongArch, and no need to use the hardware singlestep. So just remove
the related function call to user_{en,dis}able_single_step() for uprobes
on LoongArch.

How to reproduce:

Please make sure CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENTS is set and openssl supports sm2
algorithm, then execute the following command.

cd tools/perf && make
./perf probe -x /usr/lib64/libcrypto.so BN_mod_mul_montgomery
./perf stat -e probe_libcrypto:BN_mod_mul_montgomery openssl speed sm2

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 19bc6cb640 ("LoongArch: Add uprobes support")
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:45 +02:00
Huacai Chen
c92b99c4c0 LoongArch: Fix MAX_REG_OFFSET calculation
commit 90436d2342 upstream.

Fix MAX_REG_OFFSET calculation, make it point to the last register
in 'struct pt_regs' and not to the marker itself, which could allow
regs_get_register() to return an invalid offset.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 803b0fc5c3 ("LoongArch: Add process management")
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:45 +02:00
Huacai Chen
2135336574 LoongArch: Save and restore CSR.CNTC for hibernation
commit ceb9155d05 upstream.

Save and restore CSR.CNTC for hibernation which is similar to suspend.

For host this is unnecessary because sched clock is ensured continuous,
but for kvm guest sched clock isn't enough because rdtime.d should also
be continuous.

Host::rdtime.d = Host::CSR.CNTC + counter
Guest::rdtime.d = Host::CSR.CNTC + Host::CSR.GCNTC + Guest::CSR.CNTC + counter

so,

Guest::rdtime.d = Host::rdtime.d + Host::CSR.GCNTC + Guest::CSR.CNTC

To ensure Guest::rdtime.d continuous, Host::rdtime.d should be at first
continuous, while Host::CSR.GCNTC / Guest::CSR.CNTC is maintained by KVM.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Xianglai Li <lixianglai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:44 +02:00
Huacai Chen
66a309b4d5 LoongArch: Move __arch_cpu_idle() to .cpuidle.text section
commit 3e245b7b74 upstream.

Now arch_cpu_idle() is annotated with __cpuidle which means it is in
the .cpuidle.text section, but __arch_cpu_idle() isn't. Thus, fix the
missing .cpuidle.text section assignment for __arch_cpu_idle() in order
to correct backtracing with nmi_backtrace().

The principle is similar to the commit 97c8580e85 ("MIPS: Annotate
cpu_wait implementations with __cpuidle")

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:44 +02:00
Tianyang Zhang
111e55db3c LoongArch: Prevent cond_resched() occurring within kernel-fpu
commit 2468b0e3d5 upstream.

When CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT is not configured (i.e. CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE/
CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY), preempt_disable() / preempt_enable() merely
acts as a barrier(). However, in these cases cond_resched() can still
trigger a context switch and modify the CSR.EUEN, resulting in do_fpu()
exception being activated within the kernel-fpu critical sections, as
demonstrated in the following path:

dcn32_calculate_wm_and_dlg()
    DC_FP_START()
	dcn32_calculate_wm_and_dlg_fpu()
	    dcn32_find_dummy_latency_index_for_fw_based_mclk_switch()
		dcn32_internal_validate_bw()
		    dcn32_enable_phantom_stream()
			dc_create_stream_for_sink()
			   kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL)
				__kmem_cache_alloc_node()
				    __cond_resched()
    DC_FP_END()

This patch is similar to commit d021985504 (x86/fpu: Improve crypto
performance by making kernel-mode FPU reliably usable in softirqs).  It
uses local_bh_disable() instead of preempt_disable() for non-RT kernels
so it can avoid the cond_resched() issue, and also extend the kernel-fpu
application scenarios to the softirq context.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tianyang Zhang <zhangtianyang@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:44 +02:00
Sean Christopherson
a065f78eba KVM: x86/mmu: Prevent installing hugepages when mem attributes are changing
[ Upstream commit 9129633d56 ]

When changing memory attributes on a subset of a potential hugepage, add
the hugepage to the invalidation range tracking to prevent installing a
hugepage until the attributes are fully updated.  Like the actual hugepage
tracking updates in kvm_arch_post_set_memory_attributes(), process only
the head and tail pages, as any potential hugepages that are entirely
covered by the range will already be tracked.

Note, only hugepage chunks whose current attributes are NOT mixed need to
be added to the invalidation set, as mixed attributes already prevent
installing a hugepage, and it's perfectly safe to install a smaller
mapping for a gfn whose attributes aren't changing.

Fixes: 8dd2eee9d5 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Handle page fault for private memory")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Tested-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250430220954.522672-1-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:36 +02:00
Isaku Yamahata
3d962ec543 KVM: Add member to struct kvm_gfn_range to indicate private/shared
[ Upstream commit dca6c88532 ]

Add new members to strut kvm_gfn_range to indicate which mapping
(private-vs-shared) to operate on: enum kvm_gfn_range_filter
attr_filter. Update the core zapping operations to set them appropriately.

TDX utilizes two GPA aliases for the same memslots, one for memory that is
for private memory and one that is for shared. For private memory, KVM
cannot always perform the same operations it does on memory for default
VMs, such as zapping pages and having them be faulted back in, as this
requires guest coordination. However, some operations such as guest driven
conversion of memory between private and shared should zap private memory.

Internally to the MMU, private and shared mappings are tracked on separate
roots. Mapping and zapping operations will operate on the respective GFN
alias for each root (private or shared). So zapping operations will by
default zap both aliases. Add fields in struct kvm_gfn_range to allow
callers to specify which aliases so they can only target the aliases
appropriate for their specific operation.

There was feedback that target aliases should be specified such that the
default value (0) is to operate on both aliases. Several options were
considered. Several variations of having separate bools defined such
that the default behavior was to process both aliases. They either allowed
nonsensical configurations, or were confusing for the caller. A simple
enum was also explored and was close, but was hard to process in the
caller. Instead, use an enum with the default value (0) reserved as a
disallowed value. Catch ranges that didn't have the target aliases
specified by looking for that specific value.

Set target alias with enum appropriately for these MMU operations:
 - For KVM's mmu notifier callbacks, zap shared pages only because private
   pages won't have a userspace mapping
 - For setting memory attributes, kvm_arch_pre_set_memory_attributes()
   chooses the aliases based on the attribute.
 - For guest_memfd invalidations, zap private only.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/ZivIF9vjKcuGie3s@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Message-ID: <20240718211230.1492011-3-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Stable-dep-of: 9129633d56 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Prevent installing hugepages when mem attributes are changing")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:36 +02:00
Himanshu Bhavani
220444d209 arm64: dts: imx8mp-var-som: Fix LDO5 shutdown causing SD card timeout
[ Upstream commit c688898313 ]

Fix SD card timeout issue caused by LDO5 regulator getting disabled
after boot.

The kernel log shows LDO5 being disabled, which leads to a timeout
on USDHC2:
[   33.760561] LDO5: disabling
[   81.119861] mmc1: Timeout waiting for hardware interrupt.

To prevent this, set regulator-boot-on and regulator-always-on for
LDO5. Also add the vqmmc regulator to properly support 1.8V/3.3V
signaling for USDHC2 using a GPIO-controlled regulator.

Fixes: 6c2a1f4f71 ("arm64: dts: imx8mp-var-som-symphony: Add Variscite Symphony board and VAR-SOM-MX8MP SoM")
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Bhavani <himanshu.bhavani@siliconsignals.io>
Acked-by: Tarang Raval <tarang.raval@siliconsignals.io>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:35 +02:00
Ze Huang
97dd8c19f2 riscv: dts: sophgo: fix DMA data-width configuration for CV18xx
[ Upstream commit 3e6244429b ]

The "snps,data-width" property[1] defines the AXI data width of the DMA
controller as:

    width = 8 × (2^n) bits

(0 = 8 bits, 1 = 16 bits, 2 = 32 bits, ..., 6 = 512 bits)
where "n" is the value of "snps,data-width".

For the CV18xx DMA controller, the correct AXI data width is 32 bits,
corresponding to "snps,data-width = 2".

Test results on Milkv Duo S can be found here [2].

Link: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/dma/snps%2Cdw-axi-dmac.yaml#L74 [1]
Link: https://gist.github.com/Sutter099/4fa99bb2d89e5af975983124704b3861 [2]

Fixes: 514951a81a ("riscv: dts: sophgo: cv18xx: add DMA controller")
Co-developed-by: Yu Yuan <yu.yuan@sjtu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yu Yuan <yu.yuan@sjtu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Ze Huang <huangze@whut.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250428-duo-dma-config-v1-1-eb6ad836ca42@whut.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Inochi Amaoto <inochiama@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <unicorn_wang@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Wang <wangchen20@iscas.ac.cn>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:35 +02:00
Tom Vincent
61f489ca99 arm64: dts: rockchip: Assign RT5616 MCLK rate on rk3588-friendlyelec-cm3588
[ Upstream commit 5e6a4ee979 ]

The Realtek RT5616 audio codec on the FriendlyElec CM3588 module fails
to probe correctly due to the missing clock properties. This results
in distorted analogue audio output.

Assign MCLK to 12.288 MHz, which allows the codec to advertise most of
the standard sample rates per other RK3588 devices.

Fixes: e23819cf27 ("arm64: dts: rockchip: Add FriendlyElec CM3588 NAS board")
Signed-off-by: Tom Vincent <linux@tlvince.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250417081753.644950-1-linux@tlvince.com
Signed-off-by: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-22 14:29:34 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
7e78061be7 x86/its: FineIBT-paranoid vs ITS
commit e52c1dc745 upstream.

FineIBT-paranoid was using the retpoline bytes for the paranoid check,
disabling retpolines, because all parts that have IBT also have eIBRS
and thus don't need no stinking retpolines.

Except... ITS needs the retpolines for indirect calls must not be in
the first half of a cacheline :-/

So what was the paranoid call sequence:

  <fineibt_paranoid_start>:
   0:   41 ba 78 56 34 12       mov    $0x12345678, %r10d
   6:   45 3b 53 f7             cmp    -0x9(%r11), %r10d
   a:   4d 8d 5b <f0>           lea    -0x10(%r11), %r11
   e:   75 fd                   jne    d <fineibt_paranoid_start+0xd>
  10:   41 ff d3                call   *%r11
  13:   90                      nop

Now becomes:

  <fineibt_paranoid_start>:
   0:   41 ba 78 56 34 12       mov    $0x12345678, %r10d
   6:   45 3b 53 f7             cmp    -0x9(%r11), %r10d
   a:   4d 8d 5b f0             lea    -0x10(%r11), %r11
   e:   2e e8 XX XX XX XX	cs call __x86_indirect_paranoid_thunk_r11

  Where the paranoid_thunk looks like:

   1d:  <ea>                    (bad)
   __x86_indirect_paranoid_thunk_r11:
   1e:  75 fd                   jne 1d
   __x86_indirect_its_thunk_r11:
   20:  41 ff eb                jmp *%r11
   23:  cc                      int3

[ dhansen: remove initialization to false ]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
[ Just a portion of the original commit, in order to fix a build issue
  in stable kernels due to backports ]
Tested-by: Holger Hoffstätte <holger@applied-asynchrony.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250514113952.GB16434@noisy.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:25:00 +02:00
Eric Biggers
bb85c3abbf x86/its: Fix build errors when CONFIG_MODULES=n
commit 9f35e33144 upstream.

Fix several build errors when CONFIG_MODULES=n, including the following:

../arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:195:25: error: incomplete definition of type 'struct module'
  195 |         for (int i = 0; i < mod->its_num_pages; i++) {

Fixes: 872df34d7c ("x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Tested-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Peter Zijlstra
88a817e60d x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches
commit 872df34d7c upstream.

ITS mitigation moves the unsafe indirect branches to a safe thunk. This
could degrade the prediction accuracy as the source address of indirect
branches becomes same for different execution paths.

To improve the predictions, and hence the performance, assign a separate
thunk for each indirect callsite. This is also a defense-in-depth measure
to avoid indirect branches aliasing with each other.

As an example, 5000 dynamic thunks would utilize around 16 bits of the
address space, thereby gaining entropy. For a BTB that uses
32 bits for indexing, dynamic thunks could provide better prediction
accuracy over fixed thunks.

Have ITS thunks be variable sized and use EXECMEM_MODULE_TEXT such that
they are both more flexible (got to extend them later) and live in 2M TLBs,
just like kernel code, avoiding undue TLB pressure.

  [ pawan: CONFIG_EXECMEM_ROX is not supported on backport kernel, made
	   adjustments to set memory to RW and ROX ]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
15335117c5 x86/ibt: Keep IBT disabled during alternative patching
commit ebebe30794 upstream.

cfi_rewrite_callers() updates the fineIBT hash matching at the caller side,
but except for paranoid-mode it relies on apply_retpoline() and friends for
any ENDBR relocation. This could temporarily cause an indirect branch to
land on a poisoned ENDBR.

For instance, with para-virtualization enabled, a simple wrmsrl() could
have an indirect branch pointing to native_write_msr() who's ENDBR has been
relocated due to fineIBT:

<wrmsrl>:
       push   %rbp
       mov    %rsp,%rbp
       mov    %esi,%eax
       mov    %rsi,%rdx
       shr    $0x20,%rdx
       mov    %edi,%edi
       mov    %rax,%rsi
       call   *0x21e65d0(%rip)        # <pv_ops+0xb8>
       ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Such an indirect call during the alternative patching could #CP if the
caller is not *yet* adjusted for the new target ENDBR. To prevent a false
 #CP, keep CET-IBT disabled until all callers are patched.

Patching during the module load does not need to be guarded by IBT-disable
because the module code is not executed until the patching is complete.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
bd57853b86 x86/its: Align RETs in BHB clear sequence to avoid thunking
commit f0cd7091cc upstream.

The software mitigation for BHI is to execute BHB clear sequence at syscall
entry, and possibly after a cBPF program. ITS mitigation thunks RETs in the
lower half of the cacheline. This causes the RETs in the BHB clear sequence
to be thunked as well, adding unnecessary branches to the BHB clear
sequence.

Since the sequence is in hot path, align the RET instructions in the
sequence to avoid thunking.

This is how disassembly clear_bhb_loop() looks like after this change:

   0x44 <+4>:     mov    $0x5,%ecx
   0x49 <+9>:     call   0xffffffff81001d9b <clear_bhb_loop+91>
   0x4e <+14>:    jmp    0xffffffff81001de5 <clear_bhb_loop+165>
   0x53 <+19>:    int3
   ...
   0x9b <+91>:    call   0xffffffff81001dce <clear_bhb_loop+142>
   0xa0 <+96>:    ret
   0xa1 <+97>:    int3
   ...
   0xce <+142>:   mov    $0x5,%eax
   0xd3 <+147>:   jmp    0xffffffff81001dd6 <clear_bhb_loop+150>
   0xd5 <+149>:   nop
   0xd6 <+150>:   sub    $0x1,%eax
   0xd9 <+153>:   jne    0xffffffff81001dd3 <clear_bhb_loop+147>
   0xdb <+155>:   sub    $0x1,%ecx
   0xde <+158>:   jne    0xffffffff81001d9b <clear_bhb_loop+91>
   0xe0 <+160>:   ret
   0xe1 <+161>:   int3
   0xe2 <+162>:   int3
   0xe3 <+163>:   int3
   0xe4 <+164>:   int3
   0xe5 <+165>:   lfence
   0xe8 <+168>:   pop    %rbp
   0xe9 <+169>:   ret

Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
9f132c0397 x86/its: Add support for RSB stuffing mitigation
commit facd226f7e upstream.

When retpoline mitigation is enabled for spectre-v2, enabling
call-depth-tracking and RSB stuffing also mitigates ITS. Add cmdline option
indirect_target_selection=stuff to allow enabling RSB stuffing mitigation.

When retpoline mitigation is not enabled, =stuff option is ignored, and
default mitigation for ITS is deployed.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
4dc1902fde x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs
commit 2665281a07 upstream.

Ice Lake generation CPUs are not affected by guest/host isolation part of
ITS. If a user is only concerned about KVM guests, they can now choose a
new cmdline option "vmexit" that will not deploy the ITS mitigation when
CPU is not affected by guest/host isolation. This saves the performance
overhead of ITS mitigation on Ice Lake gen CPUs.

When "vmexit" option selected, if the CPU is affected by ITS guest/host
isolation, the default ITS mitigation is deployed.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
68d59e9ba3 x86/its: Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigation
commit f4818881c4 upstream.

Indirect Target Selection (ITS) is a bug in some pre-ADL Intel CPUs with
eIBRS. It affects prediction of indirect branch and RETs in the
lower half of cacheline. Due to ITS such branches may get wrongly predicted
to a target of (direct or indirect) branch that is located in the upper
half of the cacheline.

Scope of impact
===============

Guest/host isolation
--------------------
When eIBRS is used for guest/host isolation, the indirect branches in the
VMM may still be predicted with targets corresponding to branches in the
guest.

Intra-mode
----------
cBPF or other native gadgets can be used for intra-mode training and
disclosure using ITS.

User/kernel isolation
---------------------
When eIBRS is enabled user/kernel isolation is not impacted.

Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
-----------------------------------------
After an IBPB, indirect branches may be predicted with targets
corresponding to direct branches which were executed prior to IBPB. This is
mitigated by a microcode update.

Add cmdline parameter indirect_target_selection=off|on|force to control the
mitigation to relocate the affected branches to an ITS-safe thunk i.e.
located in the upper half of cacheline. Also add the sysfs reporting.

When retpoline mitigation is deployed, ITS safe-thunks are not needed,
because retpoline sequence is already ITS-safe. Similarly, when call depth
tracking (CDT) mitigation is deployed (retbleed=stuff), ITS safe return
thunk is not used, as CDT prevents RSB-underflow.

To not overcomplicate things, ITS mitigation is not supported with
spectre-v2 lfence;jmp mitigation. Moreover, it is less practical to deploy
lfence;jmp mitigation on ITS affected parts anyways.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
5100004723 x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe return thunk
commit a75bf27fe4 upstream.

RETs in the lower half of cacheline may be affected by ITS bug,
specifically when the RSB-underflows. Use ITS-safe return thunk for such
RETs.

RETs that are not patched:

- RET in retpoline sequence does not need to be patched, because the
  sequence itself fills an RSB before RET.
- RET in Call Depth Tracking (CDT) thunks __x86_indirect_{call|jump}_thunk
  and call_depth_return_thunk are not patched because CDT by design
  prevents RSB-underflow.
- RETs in .init section are not reachable after init.
- RETs that are explicitly marked safe with ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
16a7d5b7a4 x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe indirect thunk
commit 8754e67ad4 upstream.

Due to ITS, indirect branches in the lower half of a cacheline may be
vulnerable to branch target injection attack.

Introduce ITS-safe thunks to patch indirect branches in the lower half of
cacheline with the thunk. Also thunk any eBPF generated indirect branches
in emit_indirect_jump().

Below category of indirect branches are not mitigated:

- Indirect branches in the .init section are not mitigated because they are
  discarded after boot.
- Indirect branches that are explicitly marked retpoline-safe.

Note that retpoline also mitigates the indirect branches against ITS. This
is because the retpoline sequence fills an RSB entry before RET, and it
does not suffer from RSB-underflow part of the ITS.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
a6f2a436e9 x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug
commit 159013a7ca upstream.

ITS bug in some pre-Alderlake Intel CPUs may allow indirect branches in the
first half of a cache line get predicted to a target of a branch located in
the second half of the cache line.

Set X86_BUG_ITS on affected CPUs. Mitigation to follow in later commits.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:59 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
f23d4f4aeb x86/speculation: Remove the extra #ifdef around CALL_NOSPEC
commit c8c8145886 upstream.

Commit:

  010c4a461c ("x86/speculation: Simplify and make CALL_NOSPEC consistent")

added an #ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE around the CALL_NOSPEC definition.
This is not required as this code is already under a larger #ifdef.

Remove the extra #ifdef, no functional change.

vmlinux size remains same before and after this change:

 CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=y:
      text       data        bss         dec        hex    filename
  25434752    7342290    2301212    35078254    217406e    vmlinux.before
  25434752    7342290    2301212    35078254    217406e    vmlinux.after

 # CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is not set:
      text       data        bss         dec        hex    filename
  22943094    6214994    1550152    30708240    1d49210    vmlinux.before
  22943094    6214994    1550152    30708240    1d49210    vmlinux.after

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250320-call-nospec-extra-ifdef-v1-1-d9b084d24820@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
9ebe6f1bd2 x86/speculation: Add a conditional CS prefix to CALL_NOSPEC
commit 052040e34c upstream.

Retpoline mitigation for spectre-v2 uses thunks for indirect branches. To
support this mitigation compilers add a CS prefix with
-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix. For an indirect branch in asm, this needs to
be added manually.

CS prefix is already being added to indirect branches in asm files, but not
in inline asm. Add CS prefix to CALL_NOSPEC for inline asm as well. There
is no JMP_NOSPEC for inline asm.

Reported-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228-call-nospec-v3-2-96599fed0f33@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
d2498bbb54 x86/speculation: Simplify and make CALL_NOSPEC consistent
commit cfceff8526 upstream.

CALL_NOSPEC macro is used to generate Spectre-v2 mitigation friendly
indirect branches. At compile time the macro defaults to indirect branch,
and at runtime those can be patched to thunk based mitigations.

This approach is opposite of what is done for the rest of the kernel, where
the compile time default is to replace indirect calls with retpoline thunk
calls.

Make CALL_NOSPEC consistent with the rest of the kernel, default to
retpoline thunk at compile time when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is
enabled.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250228-call-nospec-v3-1-96599fed0f33@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
Pawan Gupta
9d8295dcf2 x86/bhi: Do not set BHI_DIS_S in 32-bit mode
commit 073fdbe02c upstream.

With the possibility of intra-mode BHI via cBPF, complete mitigation for
BHI is to use IBHF (history fence) instruction with BHI_DIS_S set. Since
this new instruction is only available in 64-bit mode, setting BHI_DIS_S in
32-bit mode is only a partial mitigation.

Do not set BHI_DIS_S in 32-bit mode so as to avoid reporting misleading
mitigated status. With this change IBHF won't be used in 32-bit mode, also
remove the CONFIG_X86_64 check from emit_spectre_bhb_barrier().

Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
Daniel Sneddon
b86349f326 x86/bpf: Add IBHF call at end of classic BPF
commit 9f725eec8f upstream.

Classic BPF programs can be run by unprivileged users, allowing
unprivileged code to execute inside the kernel. Attackers can use this to
craft branch history in kernel mode that can influence the target of
indirect branches.

BHI_DIS_S provides user-kernel isolation of branch history, but cBPF can be
used to bypass this protection by crafting branch history in kernel mode.
To stop intra-mode attacks via cBPF programs, Intel created a new
instruction Indirect Branch History Fence (IBHF). IBHF prevents the
predicted targets of subsequent indirect branches from being influenced by
branch history prior to the IBHF. IBHF is only effective while BHI_DIS_S is
enabled.

Add the IBHF instruction to cBPF jitted code's exit path. Add the new fence
when the hardware mitigation is enabled (i.e., X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW is
set) or after the software sequence (X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP) is being
used in a virtual machine. Note that X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW and
X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP are mutually exclusive, so the JIT compiler will
only emit the new fence, not the SW sequence, when X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_HW
is set.

Hardware that enumerates BHI_NO basically has BHI_DIS_S protections always
enabled, regardless of the value of BHI_DIS_S. Since BHI_DIS_S doesn't
protect against intra-mode attacks, enumerate BHI bug on BHI_NO hardware as
well.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
Daniel Sneddon
87a12b9b38 x86/bpf: Call branch history clearing sequence on exit
commit d4e89d212d upstream.

Classic BPF programs have been identified as potential vectors for
intra-mode Branch Target Injection (BTI) attacks. Classic BPF programs can
be run by unprivileged users. They allow unprivileged code to execute
inside the kernel. Attackers can use unprivileged cBPF to craft branch
history in kernel mode that can influence the target of indirect branches.

Introduce a branch history buffer (BHB) clearing sequence during the JIT
compilation of classic BPF programs. The clearing sequence is the same as
is used in previous mitigations to protect syscalls. Since eBPF programs
already have their own mitigations in place, only insert the call on
classic programs that aren't run by privileged users.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
James Morse
2176530849 arm64: proton-pack: Add new CPUs 'k' values for branch mitigation
commit efe676a1a7 upstream.

Update the list of 'k' values for the branch mitigation from arm's
website.

Add the values for Cortex-X1C. The MIDR_EL1 value can be found here:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/101968/0002/Register-descriptions/AArch>

Link: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/110280/2-0/?lang=en
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
James Morse
e5f5100f1c arm64: bpf: Only mitigate cBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users
commit f300769ead upstream.

Support for eBPF programs loaded by unprivileged users is typically
disabled. This means only cBPF programs need to be mitigated for BHB.

In addition, only mitigate cBPF programs that were loaded by an
unprivileged user. Privileged users can also load the same program
via eBPF, making the mitigation pointless.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
James Morse
38c345fd54 arm64: bpf: Add BHB mitigation to the epilogue for cBPF programs
commit 0dfefc2ea2 upstream.

A malicious BPF program may manipulate the branch history to influence
what the hardware speculates will happen next.

On exit from a BPF program, emit the BHB mititgation sequence.

This is only applied for 'classic' cBPF programs that are loaded by
seccomp.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
James Morse
f2aebb8ec6 arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the branchy loop k value
commit a1152be30a upstream.

Add a helper to expose the k value of the branchy loop. This is needed
by the BPF JIT to generate the mitigation sequence in BPF programs.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
James Morse
ec5bca57af arm64: proton-pack: Expose whether the platform is mitigated by firmware
commit e7956c92f3 upstream.

is_spectre_bhb_fw_affected() allows the caller to determine if the CPU
is known to need a firmware mitigation. CPUs are either on the list
of CPUs we know about, or firmware has been queried and reported that
the platform is affected - and mitigated by firmware.

This helper is not useful to determine if the platform is mitigated
by firmware. A CPU could be on the know list, but the firmware may
not be implemented. Its affected but not mitigated.

spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation() handles this distinction by checking
the firmware state before enabling the mitigation.

Add a helper to expose this state. This will be used by the BPF JIT
to determine if calling firmware for a mitigation is necessary and
supported.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
James Morse
2a3915e861 arm64: insn: Add support for encoding DSB
commit 63de8abd97 upstream.

To generate code in the eBPF epilogue that uses the DSB instruction,
insn.c needs a heler to encode the type and domain.

Re-use the crm encoding logic from the DMB instruction.

Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:58 +02:00
Christian Lamparter
6aac2c5476 Revert "um: work around sched_yield not yielding in time-travel mode"
This reverts commit da780c4a07 which is
commit 887c5c12e8 upstream.


Reason being that the patch depends on at least commit 0b8b2668f9
("um: insert scheduler ticks when userspace does not yield") in order to
build. Otherwise it fails with:

| /usr/bin/ld: arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.o: in function `handle_syscall':
|      linux-6.12.27/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c:43:(.text+0xa2): undefined
| reference to `tt_extra_sched_jiffies'
| collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status

The author Benjamin Berg commented: "I think it is better to just not
backport commit 0b8b2668f9 ("um: insert scheduler ticks when userspace
does not yield")"

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-um/8ce0b6056a9726e540f61bce77311278654219eb.camel@sipsolutions.net/
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 6.12.y
Cc: Benjamin Berg <benjamin.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:57 +02:00
Clément Léger
d6b013b44e riscv: misaligned: enable IRQs while handling misaligned accesses
[ Upstream commit 453805f0a2 ]

We can safely reenable IRQs if coming from userspace. This allows to
access user memory that could potentially trigger a page fault.

Fixes: b686ecdeac ("riscv: misaligned: Restrict user access to kernel memory")
Signed-off-by: Clément Léger <cleger@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250422162324.956065-3-cleger@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:57 +02:00
Clément Léger
45a0697cee riscv: misaligned: factorize trap handling
[ Upstream commit fd94de9f9e ]

Since both load/store and user/kernel should use almost the same path and
that we are going to add some code around that, factorize it.

Signed-off-by: Clément Léger <cleger@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250422162324.956065-2-cleger@rivosinc.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Stable-dep-of: 453805f0a2 ("riscv: misaligned: enable IRQs while handling misaligned accesses")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:57 +02:00
Nylon Chen
126be03494 riscv: misaligned: Add handling for ZCB instructions
[ Upstream commit eb16b3727c ]

Add support for the Zcb extension's compressed half-word instructions
(C.LHU, C.LH, and C.SH) in the RISC-V misaligned access trap handler.

Signed-off-by: Zong Li <zong.li@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Nylon Chen <nylon.chen@sifive.com>
Fixes: 956d705dd2 ("riscv: Unaligned load/store handling for M_MODE")
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250411073850.3699180-2-nylon.chen@sifive.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:56 +02:00
Thorsten Blum
eaa30e1d0e MIPS: Fix MAX_REG_OFFSET
[ Upstream commit c44572e0cc ]

Fix MAX_REG_OFFSET to point to the last register in 'pt_regs' and not to
the marker itself, which could allow regs_get_register() to return an
invalid offset.

Fixes: 40e084a506 ("MIPS: Add uprobes support.")
Suggested-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:56 +02:00
Borislav Petkov (AMD)
b76eaef983 x86/microcode: Consolidate the loader enablement checking
commit 5214a9f6c0 upstream.

Consolidate the whole logic which determines whether the microcode loader
should be enabled or not into a single function and call it everywhere.

Well, almost everywhere - not in mk_early_pgtbl_32() because there the kernel
is running without paging enabled and checking dis_ucode_ldr et al would
require physical addresses and uglification of the code.

But since this is 32-bit, the easier thing to do is to simply map the initrd
unconditionally especially since that mapping is getting removed later anyway
by zap_early_initrd_mapping() and avoid the uglification.

In doing so, address the issue of old 486er machines without CPUID
support, not booting current kernels.

  [ mingo: Fix no previous prototype for ‘microcode_loader_disabled’ [-Wmissing-prototypes] ]

Fixes: 4c585af718 ("x86/boot/32: Temporarily map initrd for microcode loading")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CANpbe9Wm3z8fy9HbgS8cuhoj0TREYEEkBipDuhgkWFvqX0UoVQ@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:54 +02:00
Yeoreum Yun
abbc99e898 arm64: cpufeature: Move arm64_use_ng_mappings to the .data section to prevent wrong idmap generation
commit 363cd2b81c upstream.

The PTE_MAYBE_NG macro sets the nG page table bit according to the value
of "arm64_use_ng_mappings". This variable is currently placed in the
.bss section. create_init_idmap() is called before the .bss section
initialisation which is done in early_map_kernel(). Therefore,
data/test_prot in create_init_idmap() could be set incorrectly through
the PAGE_KERNEL -> PROT_DEFAULT -> PTE_MAYBE_NG macros.

   # llvm-objdump-21 --syms vmlinux-gcc | grep arm64_use_ng_mappings
     ffff800082f242a8 g     O .bss    0000000000000001 arm64_use_ng_mappings

The create_init_idmap() function disassembly compiled with llvm-21:

  // create_init_idmap()
  ffff80008255c058: d10103ff     	sub	sp, sp, #0x40
  ffff80008255c05c: a9017bfd     	stp	x29, x30, [sp, #0x10]
  ffff80008255c060: a90257f6     	stp	x22, x21, [sp, #0x20]
  ffff80008255c064: a9034ff4     	stp	x20, x19, [sp, #0x30]
  ffff80008255c068: 910043fd     	add	x29, sp, #0x10
  ffff80008255c06c: 90003fc8     	adrp	x8, 0xffff800082d54000
  ffff80008255c070: d280e06a     	mov	x10, #0x703     // =1795
  ffff80008255c074: 91400409     	add	x9, x0, #0x1, lsl #12 // =0x1000
  ffff80008255c078: 394a4108     	ldrb	w8, [x8, #0x290] ------------- (1)
  ffff80008255c07c: f2e00d0a     	movk	x10, #0x68, lsl #48
  ffff80008255c080: f90007e9     	str	x9, [sp, #0x8]
  ffff80008255c084: aa0103f3     	mov	x19, x1
  ffff80008255c088: aa0003f4     	mov	x20, x0
  ffff80008255c08c: 14000000     	b	0xffff80008255c08c <__pi_create_init_idmap+0x34>
  ffff80008255c090: aa082d56     	orr	x22, x10, x8, lsl #11 -------- (2)

Note (1) is loading the arm64_use_ng_mappings value in w8 and (2) is set
the text or data prot with the w8 value to set PTE_NG bit. If the .bss
section isn't initialized, x8 could include a garbage value and generate
an incorrect mapping.

Annotate arm64_use_ng_mappings as __read_mostly so that it is placed in
the .data section.

Fixes: 84b04d3e6b ("arm64: kernel: Create initial ID map from C code")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.9.x
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250502180412.3774883-1-yeoreum.yun@arm.com
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: use __read_mostly instead of __ro_after_init]
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: slight tweaking of the code comment]
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:54 +02:00
Mikhail Lobanov
d362b21fef KVM: SVM: Forcibly leave SMM mode on SHUTDOWN interception
commit a2620f8932 upstream.

Previously, commit ed129ec905 ("KVM: x86: forcibly leave nested mode
on vCPU reset") addressed an issue where a triple fault occurring in
nested mode could lead to use-after-free scenarios. However, the commit
did not handle the analogous situation for System Management Mode (SMM).

This omission results in triggering a WARN when KVM forces a vCPU INIT
after SHUTDOWN interception while the vCPU is in SMM. This situation was
reprodused using Syzkaller by:

  1) Creating a KVM VM and vCPU
  2) Sending a KVM_SMI ioctl to explicitly enter SMM
  3) Executing invalid instructions causing consecutive exceptions and
     eventually a triple fault

The issue manifests as follows:

  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 25506 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12112
  kvm_vcpu_reset+0x1d2/0x1530 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12112
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 25506 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
  6.1.130-syzkaller-00157-g164fe5dde9b6 #0
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996),
  BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:kvm_vcpu_reset+0x1d2/0x1530 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:12112
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   shutdown_interception+0x66/0xb0 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:2136
   svm_invoke_exit_handler+0x110/0x530 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3395
   svm_handle_exit+0x424/0x920 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c:3457
   vcpu_enter_guest arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10959 [inline]
   vcpu_run+0x2c43/0x5a90 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11062
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x50f/0x1cf0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11283
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x570/0xf00 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4122
   vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
   __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
   __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x19a/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:856
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8

Architecturally, INIT is blocked when the CPU is in SMM, hence KVM's WARN()
in kvm_vcpu_reset() to guard against KVM bugs, e.g. to detect improper
emulation of INIT.  SHUTDOWN on SVM is a weird edge case where KVM needs to
do _something_ sane with the VMCB, since it's technically undefined, and
INIT is the least awful choice given KVM's ABI.

So, double down on stuffing INIT on SHUTDOWN, and force the vCPU out of
SMM to avoid any weirdness (and the WARN).

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Fixes: ed129ec905 ("KVM: x86: forcibly leave nested mode on vCPU reset")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Lobanov <m.lobanov@rosa.ru>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250414171207.155121-1-m.lobanov@rosa.ru
[sean: massage changelog, make it clear this isn't architectural behavior]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:52 +02:00
Dave Hansen
d87392094f x86/mm: Eliminate window where TLB flushes may be inadvertently skipped
commit fea4e317f9 upstream.

tl;dr: There is a window in the mm switching code where the new CR3 is
set and the CPU should be getting TLB flushes for the new mm.  But
should_flush_tlb() has a bug and suppresses the flush.  Fix it by
widening the window where should_flush_tlb() sends an IPI.

Long Version:

=== History ===

There were a few things leading up to this.

First, updating mm_cpumask() was observed to be too expensive, so it was
made lazier.  But being lazy caused too many unnecessary IPIs to CPUs
due to the now-lazy mm_cpumask().  So code was added to cull
mm_cpumask() periodically[2].  But that culling was a bit too aggressive
and skipped sending TLB flushes to CPUs that need them.  So here we are
again.

=== Problem ===

The too-aggressive code in should_flush_tlb() strikes in this window:

	// Turn on IPIs for this CPU/mm combination, but only
	// if should_flush_tlb() agrees:
	cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));

	next_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(&next->context.tlb_gen);
	choose_new_asid(next, next_tlb_gen, &new_asid, &need_flush);
	load_new_mm_cr3(need_flush);
	// ^ After 'need_flush' is set to false, IPIs *MUST*
	// be sent to this CPU and not be ignored.

        this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next);
	// ^ Not until this point does should_flush_tlb()
	// become true!

should_flush_tlb() will suppress TLB flushes between load_new_mm_cr3()
and writing to 'loaded_mm', which is a window where they should not be
suppressed.  Whoops.

=== Solution ===

Thankfully, the fuzzy "just about to write CR3" window is already marked
with loaded_mm==LOADED_MM_SWITCHING.  Simply checking for that state in
should_flush_tlb() is sufficient to ensure that the CPU is targeted with
an IPI.

This will cause more TLB flush IPIs.  But the window is relatively small
and I do not expect this to cause any kind of measurable performance
impact.

Update the comment where LOADED_MM_SWITCHING is written since it grew
yet another user.

Peter Z also raised a concern that should_flush_tlb() might not observe
'loaded_mm' and 'is_lazy' in the same order that switch_mm_irqs_off()
writes them.  Add a barrier to ensure that they are observed in the
order they are written.

Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202411282207.6bd28eae-lkp@intel.com/ [1]
Fixes: 6db2526c1d ("x86/mm/tlb: Only trim the mm_cpumask once a second") [2]
Reported-by: Stephen Dolan <sdolan@janestreet.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:51 +02:00
Heiko Carstens
5c3b8f0575 s390/entry: Fix last breaking event handling in case of stack corruption
[ Upstream commit ae952eea6f ]

In case of stack corruption stack_invalid() is called and the expectation
is that register r10 contains the last breaking event address. This
dependency is quite subtle and broke a couple of years ago without that
anybody noticed.

Fix this by getting rid of the dependency and read the last breaking event
address from lowcore.

Fixes: 56e62a7370 ("s390: convert to generic entry")
Acked-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:47 +02:00
Niklas Schnelle
be54b750c3 s390/pci: Fix missing check for zpci_create_device() error return
commit 42420c50c6 upstream.

The zpci_create_device() function returns an error pointer that needs to
be checked before dereferencing it as a struct zpci_dev pointer. Add the
missing check in __clp_add() where it was missed when adding the
scan_list in the fixed commit. Simply not adding the device to the scan
list results in the previous behavior.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 0467cdde8c ("s390/pci: Sort PCI functions prior to creating virtual busses")
Signed-off-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Bayer <gbayer@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:47 +02:00
Wojciech Dubowik
fe3da1bfd8 arm64: dts: imx8mm-verdin: Link reg_usdhc2_vqmmc to usdhc2
commit 5591ce0069 upstream.

Define vqmmc regulator-gpio for usdhc2 with vin-supply
coming from LDO5.

Without this definition LDO5 will be powered down, disabling
SD card after bootup. This has been introduced in commit
f5aab0438e ("regulator: pca9450: Fix enable register for LDO5").

Fixes: 6a57f224f7 ("arm64: dts: freescale: add initial support for verdin imx8m mini")
Fixes: f5aab0438e ("regulator: pca9450: Fix enable register for LDO5")
Tested-by: Manuel Traut <manuel.traut@mt.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Schenker <philippe.schenker@impulsing.ch>
Tested-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>
Reviewed-by: Francesco Dolcini <francesco.dolcini@toradex.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wojciech Dubowik <Wojciech.Dubowik@mt.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
2025-05-18 08:24:46 +02:00
Christian Bruel
e993398cbd arm64: dts: st: Use 128kB size for aliased GIC400 register access on stm32mp25 SoCs
[ Upstream commit 06c231fe95 ]

Adjust the size of 8kB GIC regions to 128kB so that each 4kB is mapped 16
times over a 64kB region.
The offset is then adjusted in the irq-gic driver.

see commit 12e14066f4 ("irqchip/GIC: Add workaround for aliased GIC400")

Fixes: 5d30d03aaf ("arm64: dts: st: introduce stm32mp25 SoCs family")
Suggested-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Bruel <christian.bruel@foss.st.com>
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250415111654.2103767-3-christian.bruel@foss.st.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-09 09:50:52 +02:00
Christian Bruel
aa4ea53554 arm64: dts: st: Adjust interrupt-controller for stm32mp25 SoCs
[ Upstream commit de2b2107d5 ]

Use gic-400 compatible and remove address-cells = <1> on aarch64

Fixes: 5d30d03aaf ("arm64: dts: st: introduce stm32mp25 SoCs family")
Signed-off-by: Christian Bruel <christian.bruel@foss.st.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250415111654.2103767-2-christian.bruel@foss.st.com
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@foss.st.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
2025-05-09 09:50:51 +02:00